(PC) Hill v. State of California

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SHAWN CODY HILL, No. 1:24-cv-01284-SAB (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT

13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION

14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF

15 ACTION

Defendants.

16 (ECF No. 8)

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19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42

20 U.S.C. § 1983.

21 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on October 22, 2024. (ECF No. 1.)

22 On December 9, 2024, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state

23 a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint.

24 (ECF No. 7.)

25 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the December 9,

26 2024 order. Therefore, on January 21, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause

27 why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order

28 to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is

1 warranted.

2 I.

3 SCREENING REQUIREMENT

4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

6 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

7 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that

8 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

9 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

10 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

11 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate

15 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v.

16 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

17 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings

18 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

19 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

20 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

21 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss

22 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant

23 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

24 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d

25 at 969.

26 II.

27 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

28 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the

1 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

2 Plaintiff was assaulted in his cell while housed at Lerdo pretrial facility in a mental health

3 unit. The physical altercation resulted in Plaintiff having surgery on his right hand. The facility

4 no longer has an administrative segregation unit to house the mentally ill inmates resulting in all

5 inmates being housed together. The facility also does not allow basic materials for the practice of

6 Plaintiff’s Asatru religious beliefs.

7 III.

8 DISCUSSION

9 “[P]retrial detainees ... possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners,” Stone v. City

10 and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992), and are entitled to

11 treatment more considerate than that afforded individuals who have been convicted of a crime,

12 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). Constitutional claims of a pretrial

13 detainee “arise[ ] from the due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and not from the

14 [E]ighth [A]mendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Jones v. Johnson, 781

15 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 573 n.16 (1979)), overruled

16 on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). “[T]he more protective

17 [F]ourteenth [A]mendment standard applies to conditions of confinement when detainees ... have

18 not been convicted” of a crime. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).

19 The Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to do more than provide minimal

20 necessities to non-convicted detainees. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 931. Under the Due Process

21 Clause, pretrial detainees have a right to be free from jail conditions or restrictions that “amount

22 to punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-37; see also Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190,

23 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). “This standard differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted

24 prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth

25 Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment.” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1205.

26 A. State of California

27 “Suits against state officials in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against

28 the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108,

1 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating prisoner's suit against state officials in their official capacities as a

2 suit against the state of California). An official capacity suit “represent[s] only another way of

3 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

4 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally,

5 for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at 166 (emphasis in original).

6 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state,

7 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public

8 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal

9 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against

10 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid

11 congressional override....” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

12 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an

13 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of

14 Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “The

15 State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims

16 brought under § 1983 in federal court....” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State

17 Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d

18 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of Corrections and California Board of

19 Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue

20 claims for damages or injunctive relief against the State of California in this action.

21 B. Kern County Sheriff’s Office as Defendant

22 City or county governments, including departments within them such as the Sheriff's

23 Department, cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of an employee. Monell v.

24 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In order to state a section

25 1983 claim against the Sheriff's Department as a whole, plaintiff would have to allege that a

26 department policy or custom caused his injuries. Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 952

27 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). This could be demonstrated by an unconstitutional policy, or

28 that the department “through inaction, failed to implement adequate policies or procedures to

1 safeguard” the constitutional rights of jail detainee. Id. In order to hold the sheriff's department

2 liable for a failure to act, plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the department “exhibited

3 deliberate indifference” to the violation of his rights. Id. A municipality is deliberately indifferent

4 to the violation of constitutional rights where it has a policy that is “obviously, facially deficient,”

5 or where there is a “pattern of prior, similar violations of federally protected rights, of which the

6 relevant policymakers had actual or constructive notice.” Id. at 1142.

7 Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts establishing that Defendant Kern

8 County Sheriff’s Office has a policy or custom led to Plaintiff’s injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

9 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

10 C. Failure to Protect

11 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or

12 other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d

13 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006);

14 Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of

15 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

16 conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012)

17 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To

18 state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal

19 connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights.

20 Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v.

21 Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).

22 “[P]retrial detainees ... possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. City

23 of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d

24 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). “If a plaintiff “had not been convicted of a crime, but had only been

25 arrested, [then] his rights derive from the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s

26 protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

27 1187 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (noting that “the

28 Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment” is relied upon in considering claims of

1 pretrial detainees because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has

2 complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions”).

3 The elements of a pretrial detainee’s failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth

4 Amendment are: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions

5 under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of

6 suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that

7 risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high

8 degree of risk involved; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff’s

9 injuries. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016). Specifically, a

10 pretrial detainee need not “prove an individual defendant’s subjective intent to punish in the

11 context of a ... failure-to protect claim.” Id. at 1070. A pretrial detainee who asserts a due process

12 claim for failure to protect instead must prove “more than negligence but less than subjective

13 intent – something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. at 1071.

14 Here, Plaintiff fails to name and link any individual Defendant to an affirmative act or

15 omission giving rise to his failure to protect claim. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. §

16 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a Defendant’s actions and the

17 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There are no facts that any

18 official was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm but failed to take any reasonable measure

19 to abate the risk. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

20 D. Supervisory Liability

21 A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved

22 in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the

23 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228,

24 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The

25 requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others or

26 by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or

27 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652

28 F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a

1 supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the

2 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional

3 deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.”

4 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208).

5 “Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about

6 constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory

7 role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243,

8 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

9 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207). In other words, to state a claim against any

10 individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the

11 individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and

12 failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632, 2016 WL 11520620, at *5 (C.D.

13 Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th

14 Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual

15 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”).

16 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the Sheriff Youngblood was either

17 personally involved in or causally connected to the constitutional deprivations that Plaintiff

18 alleged to have experienced. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against

19 Sheriff Youngblood.

20 E. Free Exercise of Religion

21 “The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison

22 door[,]” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of

23 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)), but a prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion “is

24 necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration,” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993)

25 (citing O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the

26 government action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of his religion. Graham

27 v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987). “A substantial burden ... place[s] more than an

28 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting

1 contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his

2 behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013)

3 (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.

4 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

5 As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not name any Defendant in connection with this claim,

6 nor does he specify in what way denial of materials burdens his ability to practice his Asatru

7 religion. Plaintiff merely states that he has been denied basic materials necessary to practice his

8 religion, yet basic materials are provided for other religions. Because Plaintiff has not shown

9 “more than an inconvenience” to the exercise of his Asatru religion, he fails to state a cognizable

10 First Amendment claim. See Ohno, 723 F.3d at 1011.

11 IV.

12 FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

13 Here, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, and on December 9, 2024, an order issued

14 providing Plaintiff with the legal standards that applied to his claims, advising him of the

15 deficiencies that needed to be corrected, and granting him leave to file an amended complaint within

16 thirty days. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the

17 Court’s December 9, 2024 order. Therefore, on January 21, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to

18 show cause within fourteen (14) days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.)

19 Plaintiff failed to respond to the January 21, 2025 order and the time to do so has passed.

20 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules

21 or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions

22 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to control its docket

23 and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of

24 the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000).

25 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to

26 obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52,

27 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

28 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended

1 complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply

2 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United States

3 Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order);

4 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and

5 failure to comply with local rules).

6 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is

7 required to consider several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

8 (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public

9 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

10 sanctions.’ ” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423). These factors guide

11 a court in deciding what to do, and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take

12 action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th

13 Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

14 In this instance, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation and the

15 Court’s need to manage its docket weigh in favor of dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)

16 Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint

17 within thirty days of December 9, 2024 and has not done so. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the

18 order of the Court by filing an amended complaint hinders the Court’s ability to move this action

19 towards disposition. This action can proceed no further without Plaintiff’s compliance with the

20 order and his failure to comply indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to diligently litigate this

21 action.

22 Since it appears that Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently there arises a

23 rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendants in this action. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447,

24 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The risk of prejudice to the defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal.

25 The public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is greatly outweighed by the

26 factors in favor of dismissal. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to move this action forward. In order

27 for this action to proceed, Plaintiff is required to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies

28 in the operative pleading. Despite being ordered to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended

1 complaint or respond to the order to show cause and this action cannot simply remain idle on the

2 Court’s docket, unprosecuted. In this instance, the fourth factor does not outweigh Plaintiff’s

3 failure to comply with the Court’s orders.

4 Finally, a court’s warning to a party that their failure to obey the court’s order will result

5 in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;

6 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s November 18, 2024, order

7 requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint expressly stated: “If Plaintiff fails to file an

8 amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district ju6dge

9 that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.” (ECF No. 7.) In

10 addition, the Court’s January 21, 2025, order to show cause specifically stated: “Plaintiff’s failure

11 to comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss the action for the reasons

12 stated above.” (ECF No. 8.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal would result from

13 her noncompliance with the Court’s orders.

14 V.

15 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS

16 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended

17 complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order to file an

18 amended and has not responded to the Court’s order to show why the action should not be

19 dismissed. In considering the factors to determine if this action should be dismissed, the Court

20 finds that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to obey the December 9, 2024 and

21 January 21, 2025 orders, failure to prosecute this action, and failure to state a cognizable claim for

22 relief.

23 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a

24 District Judge to this action.

25 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for Plaintiff’s

26 failure to comply with a court orders, failure to prosecute, and failure to state a cognizable claim

27 for relief.

28 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

1 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen

2 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

3 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should

4 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is

5 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights

6 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.

7 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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10 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee

11 | Dated: _ February 14, 2025

STANLEY A. BOONE

12 United States Magistrate Judge

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