HOWSER v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MATTHEW W. HOWSER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-9

)

MICHELLE KING,1 )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

1 Michelle King is substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend

the docket to reflect this change.

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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly analyzed

the opinions of Dr. Gregory Hogan, D.C. (Doc. No. 8). Further, Plaintiff argues the

ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding is flawed because it failed to consider

his lumbar degenerative disc disease, lumbar spinal stenosis, and his non-severe

impairments. (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts that his activities of daily living do not support

a finding that he could work on a full time and sustained basis. (Id.). After a thorough

review of the record, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision.

After assessing all the evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following RFC:

[T]he undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the

work must: be limited to occasional climbing of stairs and ramps; entail no

climbing of ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; be limited to occasional

balancing; be limited to occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, humidity, vibration,

and irritants such as concentrated fumes, odors, dust, gases, or poor

ventilation; avoid all exposure to hazards such as heavy, dangerous

machinery and unprotected heights; and allow to alternate between sitting

and standing positions for up to two minutes at 30-minute intervals without

going off-task and without leaving the workplace.

(R. 22). This RFC logically followed from the ALJ’s analysis of medical source opinions.

Among these opinions were two submitted by Dr. Hogan. The first was a physical

medical source statement form dated March 23, 2022. (Ex. 10F). This was a check box

form opining that Plaintiff was very limited, including that he could sit and stand/walk less

than two hours in a workday; never stoop, crouch/squat, or climb ladders; and would be

absent from work more than four days per-month. (Id.). The second opinion consisted

of a May 27, 2022 physician’s medical report. (Ex. 13F/5). In this report, Dr. Hogan

submitted several narrative statements and opined, in relevant part, that Plaintiff was

unable to perform prolonged sitting, standing, kneeling, crouching, twisting, reaching, and

climbing. (Id.; R. 26). The ALJ analyzed both of these opinions and found the first not

to be persuasive because it was not consistent with other opinions in the record and not

supported, as Dr. Hogan did not provide any explanation for the assessed check box

limitations. (R. 25-26). However, the ALJ found Dr. Hogan’s second opinion to be

persuasive because it was consistent with treatment records and supported by Dr. Hogan’s

treating history. (R. 26).

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Hogan’s first opinion was

not supported, as there were portions of the check box form that contained narrative

statements in support of his findings. (Doc. No. 8 at 15). Plaintiff also asserts that the

ALJ erred in finding Dr. Hogan’s second opinion persuasive, but not adopting the postural

limitations opined by Dr. Hogan. (Id. at 18). The Court rejects both of Plaintiff’s

arguments regarding the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Hogan’s opinions.

First, as to the narrative statements on Dr. Hogan’s check box form, the Court notes

that the ALJ did not err in finding these statements did not support Dr. Hogan’s opinion.

Indeed, these statements did not convey support for Dr. Hogan’s opined limitations, as they

contained only information related to Plaintiff’s conditions, including his diagnoses,

prognosis, symptoms, nature of pain, clinical and objective signs, and frequency and length

of contact with the patient. (Ex. 10F). These statements did not support Dr. Hogan’s

opinion as they did not specifically relate to the extent to which he articulated support for

his own opinion. See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-1197, 2021 WL

1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL

1565162 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2021) (stating “supportability relates to the extent to which a

medical source has articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion”).

Second, as to Dr. Hogan’s report, while the ALJ found these opined limitations

persuasive he was under no obligation to incorporate all of them into Plaintiff’s RFC.

See Wilkinson v. Commissioner Social Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014)

(citations omitted) (explaining that “no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate

into an RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the

source's opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight[.]”). Indeed, instead of adopting Dr.

Hogan’s opined postural limitations, the ALJ adopted the persuasive postural limitations

opined by the state agency consultants and limited Plaintiff to occasional climbing of ramps

and stairs; no climbing of ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; and occasional stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling. (R. 22, 26, Exs. 2A/5, 4A/5). While the state agency

consultants opined that Plaintiff be limited to frequent balancing, (Exs. 2A/5, 4A/5), the

ALJ explained that he instead reduced Plaintiff’s RFC to include occasional balancing to

afford Plaintiff the “utmost benefit of the doubt[.]” (R. 26). These adopted postural

limitations did not conflict with Dr. Hogan’s opined persuasive postural limitations, which

limited Plaintiff to no prolonged kneeling, crouching, twisting, reaching, and climbing.

(R. 26, Ex. 13F/5). Moreover, the ALJ accounted for Dr. Hogan’s opined limitations of

no prolonged sitting and standing by limiting Plaintiff to alternating between sitting and

standing positions for up to two minutes at 30-minute intervals, consistent with these

opined persuasive limitations. (R. 22). Accordingly, because the RFC’s postural

limitations logically flowed from the ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinions, including Dr.

Hogan’s, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments as to the analysis of Dr. Hogan’s opinions

are without merit.

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Likewise, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in crafting his

RFC. (Doc. No. 8 at 15-18). The Court views Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC failed to

account for all of his impairments as a request to reweigh the evidence. Plaintiff contends

that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not incorporate his ongoing left low back pain that impairs

his ability to sustain any kind of work. (Id. at 17-18). Here, Plaintiff alleged disability

resulting from back problems, lumbar/spinal stenosis, degenerative discs in the neck,

noncancerous tumor on the spinal cord, diabetes, neuropathy, and high blood pressure. (R.

22; Ex. 3E/2). Plaintiff asserts that he could, at most, function at a sedentary level of

employment and would require breaks to adjust his posture and manage his pain. (Id. at

18). At his hearing, Plaintiff’s representative asserted that he had the severe impairments

of herniated disc in lumbar, spinal stenosis, diabetic neuropathy, sleep apnea, and vertigo.

(R. 23, 40). At Step Two, the ALJ assessed that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of

morbid obesity, lumbar spinal stenosis, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status-

post surgical discectomy, type II diabetes mellitus with diabetic polyneuropathy, and allergic

rhinitis. (R. 19-20). In assessing all the evidence, the ALJ took into consideration

Plaintiff’s lower left back pain and noted Plaintiff’s visits to the emergency room and

examinations following complaints of lower back pain. (R. 23). After about a month of

these symptoms, as the ALJ explained, Plaintiff underwent a lumbar decompression and

reported the surgery had “helped him considerably[.]” (R. 24). Since the surgery,

Plaintiff continued with conservative treatment and his diagnostic imaging was generally

unremarkable. (Id.). The ALJ noted that the longitudinal record showed that Plaintiff had

ongoing spinal pain and the ALJ afforded Plaintiff the “utmost benefit of the doubt” and

restricted him to light work with additional postural and environmental limitations and a

sit/stand option. (R. 24-26). This analysis reflects that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s back

pain, and Plaintiff fails to point to any relevant evidence within the record that the ALJ did

not consider. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

Similarly, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that his activities of daily

living cited by the ALJ do not support a finding that he could work on a full time and

sustained basis. (Doc. No. 8 at 18-19). Plaintiff argues that his activities of daily living

were sporadic and transitory and that the ALJ erred in stating that these activities were

inconsistent with those of a totally disabled individual. (Id.). In this matter, the ALJ

stated the following about these activities:

With regards to activities of daily living, the claimant reported watching

television, going to his parents’ house, and taking care of his own personal

care. He reported needing no reminders to take care of his personal needs

or grooming or to take medications. The claimant reported preparing

simple meals, doing laundry, and doing dishes. The claimant reported

being able to drive and go out alone. He reported being able to shop, pay

bills, count change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook/money

orders. The claimant reported spending time with others, in person, on the

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. Nos. 10, 12) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak, J.

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

phone, and texting. He reported going out to dinner with his wife and

friends, going to Wednesday night Bible study, and church. He reported

going to Bible study and church every week. Exhibit 7E. The claimant

testified that he drives daily to his parents, a half mile away. He testified

that his father is disabled, and he will feed him and give him his medication.

While the claimant alleged difficulties with some activities, his activities of

daily living do not preclude the limitations set forth in the above residual

functional capacity. The undersigned notes that the claimant’s self-

described activities of daily living are not consistent with a totally disabled

individual.

(R. 25).

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his activities of daily living.

While Plaintiff is correct that an ALJ may not base a finding of non-disability on sporadic

and transitory activities, such as a trip to Europe, none of Plaintiff’s activities here are

sporadic or transitory. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001)

(holding the claimant’s trip to Europe was a sporadic daily activity that could not be used

to show an ability to engage in substantial gainful activity); McBee v. Colvin, No. 15-263-

J, 2017 WL 1101884, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2017) (stating that daily activities such

as caring for personal needs, managing personal finances, watching television, going

outside, preparing simple meals, and reading were not sporadic or transitory in nature).

As such, the ALJ was correct in stating that these activities were not consistent with those

of a totally disabled individual, and these findings were supported by substantial evidence.

All told, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, the Court affirms the findings of the Commissioner.

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