Opinion

Snodgrass v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed: Feb 14, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 34.0%

stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious objection

How later courts described this case

stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious objection
“A rule 3.850 motion cannot be used to go behind representations the defendant made to the trial court, and the court may summarily deny postconviction claims that are refuted by such representations.”
“It has long been the law that a trial court should not couch an instruction to a jury or otherwise act in any way that would appear to coerce any juror to reach a hasty decision or to abandon a conscientious belief in order to achieve a unanimous position.”
holding a motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted unless “there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the law.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

RONDLE LEE SNODGRASS, III,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-79-MMH-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Rondle Lee Snodgrass, III, an inmate of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Florida on December 1, 2021,1 by filing a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).2 The assigned judge

transferred the action to the Middle District of Florida on January 24, 2022.

See Order (Doc. 4). Snodgrass is proceeding on an Amended Petition (Doc. 9),

in which he challenges a 2014 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment

of conviction for first-degree murder. He raises seven grounds for relief. See

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).

2 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the

document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.

Amended Petition at 7–34. Respondents submitted a memorandum in

opposition to the Petition. See Response (Doc. 12). They also submitted

exhibits. See Docs. 12-1 through 12-31. Snodgrass filed a brief in reply. See

Reply (Doc. 16). This action is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On March 22, 2012, a grand jury indicted Snodgrass on one count of

first-degree murder. Doc. 12-8 at 66–68. In the indictment, the State alleged

Snodgrass killed Michael Wilson on August 20, 2011, by stabbing him. Id.

Snodgrass proceeded to a trial, and on October 30, 2013, a jury found him

guilty of the single offense charged. Id. at 126–27. On January 17, 2014, the

trial court sentenced Snodgrass to life in prison. Id. at 154–59.

On direct appeal, with the benefit of counsel, Snodgrass filed an initial

brief, arguing the trial court erred when it denied the defense’s motion for

judgment of acquittal. Doc. 12-14 at 2–34. The State filed an answer brief.

Doc. 12-15 at 2–19. The First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam

affirmed Snodgrass’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion on

May 26, 2015, Doc. 12-16 at 2, and issued the mandate on August 3, 2015, id.

at 10.

On February 15, 2016, Snodgrass filed a state petition for writ of

habeas corpus, raising three grounds of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. Doc. 12-18 at 2–51. The First DCA denied the petition on the merits

on March 1, 2016, Doc. 12-19 at 2, and on April 14, 2016, it denied rehearing,

Doc. 12-20 at 7.

Subsequently, on May 4, 2016, Snodgrass filed a motion to correct an

illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Doc. 12-4

at 2–14. The postconviction court denied relief on December 8, 2017. Doc.

12-5 at 2–4. Snodgrass did not pursue an appeal.

On December 18, 2017, Snodgrass filed an amended motion for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and a

“Notice of Amendment,” arguing that the issues raised therein were timely as

the “‘sole issues argued within relate[] back to the one ground/grounds

initially presented in his timely-filed Rule 3.850 motion, and only expound[]

upon the claims already before the court (File date: 5/4/16).’” Doc. 12-24 at 3

(alterations in original); see also Doc. 12-27 at 6–59. In the amended Rule

3.850 motion, Snodgrass alleged counsel was ineffective when he failed to: (1)

adequately argue the defense’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; (2) object

to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law; (3) object to the trial court’s

response to a jury question; (4) retain an expert witness; (5) properly argue

the defense’s theory of the case during closing argument; (6) call a witness;

(7) impeach a State witness; and (8) object to the prosecutor’s improper

remarks during closing arguments. Doc. 12-27 at 9–42. The postconviction

court determined Snodgrass never filed an initial Rule 3.850 motion and

denied the amended Rule 3.850 motion as untimely filed. Doc. 12-27 at

60–63. On August 30, 2019, the First DCA reversed that decision and

remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing because “factual issues

remain[ed]” as to the filing of Snodgrass’s initial Rule 3.850 motion. Doc. 12-

24 at 7.

On remand, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing. Doc.

12-27 at 293–312. It ultimately found Snodgrass had filed an initial Rule

3.850 motion on May 4, 2016, id. at 313–17, and as such, Snodgrass timely

filed his amended Rule 3.850 motion, id. On March 13, 2020, the

postconviction court denied Snodgrass’s amended Rule 3.850 motion. Id. at

399–415. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s denial

of relief on June 9, 2021, Doc. 12-31 at 2, and on July 7, 2021, it issued the

mandate, id. at 4.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at

474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before

the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Snodgrass’s] claim[s]

without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala.

Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “‘The purpose of AEDPA

is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of

error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As

such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “greatly

circumscribed and highly deferential.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state

court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state

court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s

adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United

States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the

unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted

by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely relied on

different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such as

persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher

court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 125–26, 132.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)

bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or

(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Richter, 562 U.S. at 97–98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope

of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As

explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d

389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct

clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable

application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows

for relief only “if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.

at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The

“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief

only “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous factual

determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal

courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of

the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §

2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),

which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the

state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing

evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.

Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield

v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192

L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise

relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because

the federal habeas court would have reached a

different conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571

U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d

738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential

review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Titlow, 571

U.S. at 19. “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court

blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’

and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility fairminded

jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S.

at 102–03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet. Richter,

562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per

curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective

assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”

of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104

S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.

2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of

any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test

before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part

Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet

the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d

1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation

is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state

court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are

both highly deferential, and when the two apply in

tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). “The question is not

whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was

incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”

then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the

deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds

another layer of deference—this one to a state court’s decision—when we are

considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s

decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As

such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Snodgrass alleges counsel was ineffective when he

failed to adequately argue the defense’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

See Amended Petition at 7. According to Snodgrass, the State’s theory of the

case required the jury to impermissibly “pyramid inferences.” Id. He contends

counsel should have argued that none of the witnesses who testified at trial

saw him with a knife during the incident and that the knives recovered from

the scene did not contain his DNA. See id. at 9.

Snodgrass raised a substantially similar claim in his amended Rule

3.850 motion. Doc. 12-27 at 9–13. In denying relief, the postconviction court

explained:

At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Defense

Counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. Counsel’s

motion was a “boilerplate” motion, in that he simply

argued that the State failed to prove a prima facie

case against Defendant. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.

Defense Counsel then renewed his motion at

the close of evidence. “The purpose of a motion for

judgment of acquittal is to challenge the legal

sufficiency of the evidence, and where the state has

brought forth competent evidence to support its claim

that each element of the crime has been performed, a

judgment of acquittal will not lie.” Cunningham v.

State, 385 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). “The

trial court should not grant a motion for judgment of

acquittal unless there is no view of the evidence

which the jury might take favorable to the opposite

party that can be sustained under the law. McBride

v. State, 7 So. 3d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)

(internal quotations omitted); see also State v. Odom,

56 So. 3d 46, 49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“In moving for

a judgment of acquittal, a defendant admits not only

the facts stated in the evidence, but also every

reasonable conclusion favorable to the State that the

fact-finder might fairly infer from the evidence.”).

Here, the State presented substantial evidence

that was legally adequate to support a conviction.

Stated differently, it is clear there was a reasonable

view of the evidence from which the jury could find

Defendant guilty (indeed, the jury did so). While

Defendant may wish to discount the testimony of the

State’s witnesses, doing so requires rendering a

credibility determination that only the jury can

make. State v. Shearod, 992 So. 2d 900, 903 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2008). Thus, the record demonstrates that even

the most eloquent and persuasive advocate could not

have succeeded in convincing the trial court to grant

a judgment of acquittal in this case. As such, Ground

One of Defendant’s motion fails for lack of prejudice.

Id. at 401–02 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam affirmed

the postconviction court’s order without a written opinion. Doc. 12-31 at 2.

To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits,3 the

Court applies the deferential standard for federal court review of state court

adjudications. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court

concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. Therefore, Snodgrass is not entitled to relief on the basis of this

claim.

Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of this claim is

not entitled to deference, Snodgrass’s ineffectiveness claim is still without

3 Throughout this Order, in looking through the appellate court’s per curiam

affirmance to the circuit court’s “relevant rationale,” the Court presumes that the

appellate court “adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125.

merit because the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion. In

reviewing a motion for a judgment of acquittal, trial courts must determine

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979) (emphasis omitted); see also Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 962

(Fla. 1997) (quoting Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1991) (holding a

motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted unless “there is no

view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposite party

that can be sustained under the law.”).

When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence

presented at trial could have led a rational trier of fact to find Snodgrass

committed first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Witnesses

testified that during a party at Snodgrass’s and Shea Carter-Strong’s4 house,

multiple fights broke out on the lawn. Doc. 12-10 at 43–44, 55, 77. One of the

partygoers, James Ton, testified that Snodgrass and the victim, Michael

Wilson, fought. Id. at 55. He explained that when Wilson got into his truck to

leave the house, Snodgrass began to punch him through the driver’s side

4 Snodgrass’s codefendant.

window. Id. at 55–56. Carter-Strong was also present at the window. Id. at

56. According to Ton, Snodgrass appeared to stab Wilson in the left eye with

a rusty screwdriver, and in doing so, he nicked Carter-Strong on the

forehead. Id. at 57–58. Justin Smith, another partygoer, also testified that

Snodgrass had a screwdriver in his hand, and Carter-Strong appeared to be

bleeding when he was next to Snodgrass at the truck window. Id. at 181.

Carter-Strong testified that he was beside Snodgrass at the driver’s

side window of Wilson’s truck when Snodgrass punched Wilson. Doc. 12-11 at

28. They backed away from the window when the truck began to move and

returned to the house. Id. at 28–29. Carter-Strong realized that he was

bleeding from the head; when Snodgrass saw the blood, he stated, “[H]e’s not

going to get away with doing that to your face.” Id. at 29–30. Snodgrass left,

but Carter-Strong did not know where he went after making the statement.

Id. at 30. Carter-Strong then left the bathroom, grabbed a knife, and

returned to the truck. Id. He entered the passenger-side door of the truck and

stabbed Wilson in the back. Id. at 31. According to Carter-Strong, Wilson was

already slumped over when he stabbed him. Id.

The medical examiner determined that straight-edge and serrated

knives caused multiple wounds to Wilson’s chest and lung. Id. at 125–26.

These wounds were fatal. Id. at 131, 134. Wilson also sustained wounds to his

back from both types of knives. Id. at 128–31. The medical examiner testified

that Wilson had wounds around his left eye, but he could not determine

whether a blade or sharp screwdriver caused the injuries. Id. at 121. On

cross-examination, the medical examiner conceded it was more likely than

not a blade caused the injuries to Wilson’s eye. Id. at 136.

In considering the motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court

had the testimony of two individuals who witnessed Snodgrass fight Wilson

and stab him in the left eye with a sharp object.5 Carter-Strong also heard

Snodgrass threaten Wilson, and when he returned to the truck, he found

Wilson already slumped over in the seat. While Snodgrass points to the lack

of DNA evidence on knives that law enforcement recovered from the scene,

“the weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility are questions solely

for the jury.” Shearod, 992 So. 2d at 903. Based on this evidence, there is no

reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different

because the trial court would not have granted the motion for a judgment of

5 Both Ton and Smith testified that Snodgrass appeared to stab Wilson in the

left eye with a screwdriver. Doc. 12-10 at 57–58, 181. However, Ton described the

lighting as “[v]ery dim” and noted he was five to six feet away from Snodgrass and

Carter-Strong. Id. at 57. Smith testified he was approximately 20 feet away from

them. Id. at 180

acquittal. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Gudinas, 693 So. 2d at 962.

Therefore, even assuming arguendo counsel performed deficiently, Snodgrass

has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As such, relief on the claim in Ground

One is due to be denied.

B. Ground Two

Next, Snodgrass argues counsel was ineffective when he failed to object

to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the legal standard for a motion for a new

trial. See Amended Petition at 10. He alleges that counsel filed a written

motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the

weight of the evidence. See Doc. 12-27 at 13; see also Amended Petition at 10.

However, during a hearing on that motion, the prosecutor relied on his

argument at trial in response to the defense’s motion for a judgment of

acquittal. See Doc. 12-27 at 13–14; see also Amended Petition at 10.

Snodgrass explains that a motion for a judgment of acquittal concerns the

sufficiency of the evidence, whereas a motion for a new trial concerns the

weight of the evidence. See Doc. 12-27 at 14; see also Amended Petition at 10.

He contends that if counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s argument, the

trial court would have granted a new trial. See Amended Petition at 10.

Snodgrass raised a substantially similar claim in his amended Rule

3.850 motion. Doc. 12-27 at 13–16. The postconviction court denied relief,

stating:

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.600(a)(2)

provides a trial court shall grant a new trial if the

jury’s verdict is contrary to the law or the weight of

the evidence. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal

summarized:

The “sufficiency of the evidence” standard

examines whether the evidence presented

is legally adequate to permit a conviction

while the weight of the evidence standard

evaluates whether a greater amount of

credible evidence supports an acquittal.

In deciding a motion for new trial

pursuant to Rule 3.600(b), the trial court

acts as a “safety valve” by “granting a

new trial where the evidence is

technically sufficient to prove the

criminal charge but the weight of the

evidence does not appear to support the

jury verdict.”

Velloso v. State, 117 So. 3d 903, 904 (Fla 4th DCA

2013).

Here, it is clear that Defendant suffered no

prejudice because it would have been improper for

the trial court to grant the motion for a new trial.

Irrespective of how well Defense Counsel litigated his

motion for new trial, the record evidence is such that

there is no reasonable probability the trial court

would have granted the motion. Indeed, the trial

transcript demonstrates there was not a “greater

amount of credible evidence” to support an acquittal

and that the weight of the evidence in fact supported

a conviction.

Id. at 403–04 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam affirmed

the postconviction court’s order without a written opinion. Doc. 12-31 at 2.

To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits, the

Court applies the deferential standard for federal court review of state court

adjudications. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court

concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to

clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. Therefore, Snodgrass is not entitled to relief on the basis of this

claim.

Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of this claim is

not entitled to deference, Snodgrass’s ineffectiveness claim is still without

merit because the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion.

Considering the evidence as detailed in Ground One, supra, no reasonable

probability exists that the trial court would have granted the defense’s

motion for a new trial even if counsel had made the suggested argument

because the weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Accordingly,

Snodgrass is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim in Ground Two.

C. Ground Three

As Ground Three, Snodgrass argues counsel was ineffective when he

failed to object to the trial court’s response to a jury question. See Amended

Petition at 14. The record reflects the following exchange occurred

approximately seven minutes after the jury began to deliberate:

THE COURT: Let’s put this on the record. Is Mr.

Snodgrass still around?

THE BAILIFF: Right here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. What I’m going to do Miss

Rose, I’m going to let you repeat what you just said to

me since they’re your words, what the jury has asked

Miss Rose our civilian bailiff.

THE BAILIFF: They want to know if they continue

through and if they—if for some reason they run into

a problem and they can’t reach a verdict, what to do.

I told them just push the button, and you know, write

that down. And I will give it to the judge and she’ll

make the decision.

THE COURT: And they asked—didn’t they also ask

you how late they should go?

THE CLERK: If they have a time limit.

THE BAILIFF: Time limit, yeah.

THE COURT: Why don’t we bring them out? I’d like

to clarify the time limit, if that’s fine. What I’d like to

let them know is we are obviously happy to stay here

as long as they’re comfortable deliberating, but if

they need to return tomorrow, that’s an option. Just

so they don’t think they have to—there’s any—I don’t

want them to think there’s any time limit of

deliberating. Okay? So if you’ll just bring them back

out. Is that fine with the State?

MS. PERRY [For the State]: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON [For the State]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that fine with the defense?

MR. FLETCHER [For the Defense]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: I just don’t want them to think there’s

any certain amount of time they get.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: You-all don’t need to sit down. Just a

real quick clarification. All right. Madam Bailiff said

that you-all asked the question, how much time you

had, things like that. Just to let you know, you-all

have as much time as you want. There is no set time

for how long you-all deliberate. You deliberate until

you make a decision. Now, that being said, if you-all

begin to get tired, you can come back tomorrow, so

please don’t think you have to make the decision

today. You can come back tomorrow. We’re all aware

this is a very important decision to make, and if you

as a group become tired and want to come back

tomorrow, that is perfectly acceptable. But you

have—even if you needed to come back the next day,

you could. You have all the time you need. Okay?

There is no limit. All right? All right. Go to the jury

room. All right. Thank you so much.

(Jury excused.)

THE COURT: I just wanted to clarify that there was

no time limit. Thank you. It’s approximately 2:15.

The door is closed. Does the State have any exception

or objection to what I just said?

MR. THOMPSON: No, ma’am.

THE COURT: Does the defense?

MR. FLETCHER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks. All right. We’re in recess.

Doc. 12-12 at 59–62. Snodgrass complains that the trial court’s response

“created the spector [sic] that jurors would not be relieved on [sic] the

‘hardships’ of jury duty, unless a unamious [sic] ‘decision’ was reached.”

Amended Petition at 15. According to Snodgrass, the response “for[e]closed

the possibility of a ‘hung jury.’” Id.

Snodgrass raised a substantially similar claim in his amended Rule

3.850 motion. Doc. 12-27 at 16–18. The postconviction court denied relief,

stating in pertinent part:

The transcript shows that the jury had not

even yet begun deliberations at the time they asked

this question. Thus, the jury’s question was not one

based on any sort of initial deadlock in being able to

reach a verdict. Instead, the question was aimed at

identifying at the outset any time restrictions on

deliberations. The trial court answered the question

by assuring the jury that it could take all the time it

needed to decide the case and need not do so within

any fixed time boundaries. Defense Counsel had no

basis to object to the trial court’s answer to the jury’s

question because the answer was legally correct. See

Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 976 (Fla. 1999) (“It

has long been the law that a trial court should not

couch an instruction to a jury or otherwise act in any

way that would appear to coerce any juror to reach a

hasty decision or to abandon a conscientious belief in

order to achieve a unanimous position.”) (emphasis

added). It is clear the trial court simply wanted the

jury to understand that it was not operating under a

fixed countdown clock during its discussions.

The propriety of the trial court’s instruction is

reinforced by the lawfulness of an Allen charge. See

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). “An Allen

charge is a supplemental instruction generally given

when it appears the jury is having difficulty reaching

a verdict.” Gahley v. State, 567 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla.

1st DCA 1990). In Florida, a standard Allen charge

is:

I know that all of you have worked

hard to try to find a verdict in this case.

It apparently has been impossible for you

so far. Sometimes an early vote for

discussion can make it hard to reach an

agreement about the case later. The vote,

not the discussion, might make it hard to

see all sides of the case.

We are all aware that it is legally

permissible for a jury to disagree. There

are two things a jury can lawfully do:

agree on a verdict or disagree on what

the facts of the case may truly be.

There is nothing to disagree about

on the law. The law is as I told you. If you

have any disagreements about the law, I

should clear them up for you now. That

should be my problem, not yours.

If you disagree over what you

believe the evidence showed, then only

you can resolve that conflict, if it is to be

resolved.

I have only one request of you. By

law, I cannot demand this of you, but I

want you to go back into the jury room.

Then, taking turns, tell each of the other

jurors about any weakness of your own

position. You should not interrupt each

other or comment on each other’s views

until each of you has had a chance to

talk. After you have done that, if you

simply cannot reach a verdict, then

return to the courtroom and I will declare

this case mistried, and will discharge you

with my sincere appreciation for your

services.

You may now retire to continue

with your deliberations.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 4.1

Thus, even in the hypothetical event that the

jury had faced some initial deadlock during its

discussion, it would have been appropriate for the

trial court to once ask the jury to continue

deliberations. Here, no such initial deadlock occurred.

The jury merely wanted to know how if it was

operating under any fixed time limits and the trial

court assured the jury that it could take all the time

it wanted to discuss the case. Defense counsel had no

legal basis to object to the trial court’s actions and

therefore was not deficient failing to object in the

manner Defendant now advocates. See Hitchcock v.

State, 991 So. 2d 337, 361 (Fla. 2008) (“Counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a

meritless objection.”). Accordingly, this Court denies

Ground Three of Defendant’s motion.

Id. at 406–07. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s

order without a written opinion. Doc. 12-31 at 2.