Goins v. Winkel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JUSTIN GOINS, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-00653

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) James E. Grimes, Jr.

CORPORAL WINKEL, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Justin Goins filed suit without a lawyer against a Defendant he

identifies only as Corporal Winkel, alleging civil rights violations under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments. Though served, Defendant failed to appear or defend

against this lawsuit. Nor did any representative appear on his behalf. Plaintiff

moves for a default judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff Justin Goins was a pre-trial detainee at the

Cuyahoga County jail. (ECF No. 1, PageID #4; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #14.) An officer

escorted him to his cell in handcuffs when another inmate allegedly stepped out of a

shower and blindsided Mr. Goins, assaulting him. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID #15.)

Another officer reported the assault, to which Defendant Corporal Winkel responded.

(Id.)

Mr. Goins claims that he and the officer who witnessed the assault attempted

to explain what happened to Corporal Winkel when he arrived, including that

Mr. Goins was in handcuffs at the time of the incident. (Id.) However, Mr. Goins

claims that Corporal Winkel “wasn’t trying to hear anything [he had] to say” and

tried to force Mr. Goins back into his cell. (Id.) Mr. Goins responded by allegedly

putting his back against the wall and stating that he was “not locking down until [he

could] talk to someone.” (Id.) The officer allegedly tried to explain to Corporal Winkel

that he did not have to “spray [Mr. Goins] because [he was] secured.” (Id.) Mr. Goins

claims that he tried to move out of Corporal Winkel’s reach, which is when Corporal

Winkel allegedly sprayed Mr. Goins with mace. (Id.)

Mr. Goins filed a grievance with the jail, which he claimed was “investigated

and closed.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #7.) He claimed he tried to appeal the decision, but

got no response. (Id.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Based on this event, on April 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against

Defendant, raising a claim against him in both his individual and official capacity

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated his

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force when

Defendant maced Mr. Goins while he was handcuffed. (ECF. No. 1, PageID #3–4.)

The record reflects that Plaintiff completed service on Defendant on June 12,

2024. (ECF No. 9.) Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint and has not

taken any other action to defend this lawsuit. Nor has anyone done so on his behalf.

On November 8, 2024, the Clerk entered default against Defendant under Rule 55(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 10.) On December 13, 2024,

Plaintiff moved for a default judgment under Rule 55(b). (ECF. No. 13.) He filed

another motion for a default judgment on February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 20.)

ANALYSIS

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of default

and default judgment. “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief

is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit

or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). On

November 8, 2024, the Clerk entered default against Defendant, who failed to

answer, appear, or otherwise defend. (ECF No. 10.)

After entry of default under Rule 55(a), the party seeking relief may apply for

a default judgment under Rule 55(b). “An allegation—other than one relating to the

amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the

allegation is not denied.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). In other words, a default on well-

pleaded allegations establishes the defendant’s liability, but the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing damages. Flynn v. People’s Choice Home Loan, Inc., 440 F.

App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110

(6th Cir. 1995)). “Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only the

defendant’s liability and the amount of damages must be proved.” Antoine, 66 F.3d

at 110.

I. Liability

Once default is entered, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all

the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint regarding liability, including

jurisdictional averments. Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (E.D.

Mich. 2006) (citing Visioneering Constr. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 661 F.2d 119, 124 (6th

Cir. 1981)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to

the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the

allegation is not denied.”).

Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff filed his complaint asserting claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for

Defendant’s use of excessive force. However, the Supreme Court has held, and the

Sixth Circuit agrees, “that all excessive force claims should be considered under the

Fourth Amendment standard.” Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 1994)

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (6th Cir. 1989)). Where excessive

force claims are brought under Section 1983, the Sixth Circuit embraces a

reasonableness standard, which “requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,”

and “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others.” Id. (quoting Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1990)).

Although Plaintiff brings his excessive force claim under the Eighth

Amendment, the Court liberally construes his claim under the Fourth Amendment

instead. Plaintiff alleges that he “wasn’t being a threat” and was handcuffed, so the

use of mace amounted to an excessive use of force in violation of his constitutional

rights. (ECF. No. 1, PageID #3–5.) By virtue of his default, Defendant has admitted

the allegations in the complaint, and those allegations are sufficient to establish

Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment as to liability.

II. Damages

Where a defendant is in default, the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint as

to liability are taken as true, but not as to damages. Ford Motor, 441 F. Supp. 2d at

846 (citing Visioneering Constr., 661 F.2d at 124); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v.

Mosley Entm’t Inc., No. 01-CV-74510-DT, 2002 WL 1303039, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May

21, 2002) (citations omitted) (allegations regarding the amount of damages are not

controlling). “[T]he civil rules ‘require that the party moving for a default judgment

must present some evidence of its damages.’” IBEW Local Union 82 v. Union Lighting

Prot., No. 3:11-CV-208, 2012 WL 554573, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2012) (quoting

Mill’s Pride, L.P. v. W.D. Miller Enters., LLC, No. 2:07-cv-990, 2010 WL 987167, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2010)).

“The Clerk of Court may enter a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(1) only if

the plaintiff's entire complaint and all of the plaintiff's claims are for a sum certain

or a sum that can be made certain by computation.” National Auto Grp., Inc. v. Van

Devere, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-2543, 2021 WL 1857143, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2021)

(quoting Van Zeeland Oil Co. v. Lawrence Agency, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-150, 2009 WL

10678619, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2009)). “A claim for damages under Rule

55(b)(1) ‘is not a sum certain unless there is no doubt as to the amount to which a

plaintiff is entitled as a result of the defendant's default.’” Id. at *2 (quoting Highway

Com. Servs., Inc. v. Zitis, No. 2:07-cv-1252, 2008 WL 4115512, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.

28, 2008)).

Rule 55(b)(2) permits, but does not require, the district court to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to determine damages. Arthur v. Robert James & Assoc. Asset

Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-460, 2012 WL 1122892, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2012) (citing

Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x 351, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2009)). The Court may rely

on affidavits the plaintiff submits in support of damages without the need for a

hearing. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).

In support of his motion for default judgment, Plaintiff has submitted

affidavits setting out the amount of damages claimed. (ECF No. 11-1; ECF No. 12;

ECF No. 13-1; ECF No. 14; ECF No. 20-1.) However, these affidavits are “not

conclusive.” Antoine, 66 F.3d at 110; see Flynn, 440 F. App’x at 457 (determining pro

se plaintiff’s submitted documentation did not provide support for the claim of

damages). Further, while Plaintiff requested $500,000 in his complaint, the

affidavits he has submitted request $250,000. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5; ECF No. 11-

1, PageID #56; ECF No. 12, PageID #59; ECF No. 13-1, PageID #62; ECF No. 14,

PageID #66; ECF No. 21, PageID #81.) But in no instance has Plaintiff provided any

support for this amount of his claimed damages. He has not provided any evidence

or documents to support claims for economic loss or non-economic loss. Contrary to

what Plaintiff might think, damages in litigation for a tort, even a constitutional tort,

do not amount to a lottery ticket. Although a pro se plaintiff’s filing should be liberally

construed, Plaintiff must still establish the extent of his damages. Antoine, 66 F.3d

at 100 (citing Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015, 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc);

Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831, 841 (W.D. Mich. 1983)); see Flynn, 440 F. App’x at

457 (finding district court provided leniency to pro se plaintiff’s claim on damages).

Based on this record, the Court finds that the record provides no support to

enter a default judgment awarding specific damages at this time and that further

proceedings are necessary to determine the appropriate amount of damages to award

in the judgment. Because Mr. Goins represents himself in this matter, the Court will

afford him one additional opportunity to substantiate his damages. To do so,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 72(a), and Local Rule 72.1, the Court

REFERS this matter to the Magistrate Judge for such further proceedings as are

necessary to determine damages and such other matters as might be appropriate or

arise in working toward that determination. The Magistrate Judge will determine

what additional proceedings and submissions might be appropriate. Unless and until

the Magistrate Judge does so, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to make no further

filings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment as to liability and REFERS this matter to the Magistrate Judge

for such further proceedings as are necessary.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2025

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio