Seats v. Meathaney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEVIN SEATS, #R65374, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-02175-SMY

)

SGT. MEATHANEY, )

MICHAEL KRAMER,1 )

C/O ROUNDTREE, )

LT. SULGER, )

LT. DYE, and )

NURSE LEWIS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Devin Seats, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was

housed at Menard Correctional Center. He claims Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

need for medical attention, inflicted excessive force, and retaliated against him in violation of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). He seeks monetary damages. Id.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1 Plaintiff spells this defendant’s surname as “Kremar” throughout the Complaint. The Clerk will be directed to correct

the spelling.

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff, who is

severely mentally ill, was on crisis watch at Menard on August 19, 2024 and began cutting himself

on his left arm (Doc. 1, p. 2). He showed his wound to C/O’s Kremar and Roundtree and asked

for medical attention. They responded by saying, “That’s not deep enough, cut deeper,” and failed

to summon medical assistance. Plaintiff continued to cut himself and “beat and bang[ed]” for

medical attention. Id. Kremar and Roundtree returned to the gallery to take other inmates on call

passes. They continued to ignore Plaintiff’s pleas for medical help, with Kremar saying, “you still

ain’t dead yet?” (Doc. 1, p. 2).

Sometime later, Sgt. Meathaney came to Plaintiff’s crisis watch cell and sprayed him with

two cans of O.C. (pepper) spray. Roundtree put Plaintiff in “extremely tight” handcuffs and

shackles and took him to the holding cage. Meathaney, Lt. Sulger, and Lt. Dye told Plaintiff he

was not allowed any medical attention because they didn’t care what he did or cut. These

defendants instructed Nurse Lewis not to give Plaintiff any medical care, and she did not provide

any, even after seeing the wound on Plaintiff’s left arm (Doc. 1, p. 3).

Dye and Sulger placed Plaintiff back in the same crisis watch cell where he had been

“maced.” Plaintiff’s skin was burning and he had an open wound, but he was not allowed to

shower. The cell had mace/O.C. spray all over the walls and floor. Plaintiff was housed there for

at least another week, during which he did not have a mattress, was forced to sleep on the floor

with only a “safety blanket,” and was denied shower access. Id. Sulger and Dye told Plaintiff he

would remain there for a while since he is trying to sue everybody. These events caused Plaintiff

emotional pain and injury.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious

medical & mental health needs against Kremar and Roundtree for

allowing Plaintiff to continue cutting himself, and against Kremar,

Roundtree, Meathaney, Sulger, Dye, and Lewis for depriving

Plaintiff of medical attention for his self-inflicted arm laceration.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Meathaney for

deploying O.C. spray on Plaintiff and against Roundtree for placing

Plaintiff in extremely tight handcuffs and shackles.

Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Sulger and Dye for

keeping Plaintiff in the crisis watch cell without a shower or mattress

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Sulger and Dye for housing Plaintiff in the crisis watch cell for

approximately one week, denying him a shower to wash the O.C.

spray off his body, and forcing him to sleep on the floor

contaminated with O.C. spray without a mattress or adequate

bedding.

Count 5: State law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

against all defendants for the conduct described in Counts 1-4.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is

plausible on its face.”).

Discussion

Count 1

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

or mental health needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017); Sanville v. McCaughtry,

266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001). To state such a claim, a prisoner must plead facts and

allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical or mental health

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Rasho,

856 F.3d at 475. The allegations in the Complaint are sufficient for Plaintiff to proceed on the

deliberate indifference claim in Count 1 against Kremar, Roundtree, Meathaney , Sulger, Dye, and

Lewis.

Count 2

“Correctional officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

of causing harm.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy,

559 U.S. 34 (2010). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Meathaney sprayed him with two cans of O.C.

spray while he was merely “walking from the back of his cell using the washroom” (Doc. 1, p. 2).

Plaintiff indicates he did not pose any threat before he was sprayed or while Roundtree applied the

tight restraints. These allegations state a viable excessive force claim against Meathaney and

Roundtree.

Count 3

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or

otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680

F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). “A complaint

states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation may

plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sulger and Dye told him he would remain in the crisis cell

under the difficult conditions because Plaintiff was “trying [to] sue everybody” (Doc. 1, p. 3).

Although Plaintiff does not describe any specific lawsuits, the Court takes judicial notice that he

filed two cases in this District that were served on Menard correctional officers in July 2024, not

long before the alleged retaliation took place: Seats v. Doty, et al., Case No. 24-cv-1051-MAB

(S.D. Ill., Doc. 24), and Seats v. Wills, et al., Case No. 23-cv-3876-GCS (S.D. Ill., Docs. 36, 41,

48). Given this chronology of events, Count 3 may proceed against Sulger and Dye.

Count 4

Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care,

sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 346-47 (1981). To state an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, Plaintiff must plead facts suggesting he was denied “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to his health or safety (the objective element).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). He must also sufficiently plead that the defendant

exhibited deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, despite the

defendant’s knowledge of the bad conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sulger and Dye knew about the conditions in his crisis watch

cell – contamination with O.C. spray on the walls and floor, where Plaintiff had to sleep without

sufficient bedding – and deprived him of the ability to shower to clean the O.C. spray off his body

and arm wound. He also alleges that they kept him in the cell under these conditions for at least a

week. These factual allegations may support a finding that these defendants created a substantial

risk to Plaintiff’s health, and are sufficient for this Eighth Amendment claim to proceed against

Sulger and Dye.

Count 5

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must

demonstrate that the defendant(s) intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme and outrageous

conduct” that resulted in severe emotional distress. Somberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d

1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006); see Lopez v. City of Chi., 464 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2006). The tort

has three components: (1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor

must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a

high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct must in

fact cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988).

Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy this pleading standard. Accordingly, Count 5 will proceed against

Kremar, Roundtree, Meathaney, Sulger, Dye, and Lewis, based on the conduct described in Counts

1-4.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff raises claims against each defendant in his or her individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their

individual capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823

F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the individual

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

The Complaint states colorable claims in Counts 1 and 5 against Kremar, Roundtree,

Meathaney, Sulger, Dye, and Lewis; in Count 2 against Meathaney and Roundtree; and in Counts

3 and 4 against Sulger and Dye. The Clerk is DIRECTED to correct the spelling of Defendant

Kramer’s name to “Kremar.”

The Clerk shall prepare for Sgt. Meathaney, Michael Kremar, C/O Roundtree, Lt. Sulger,

Lt. Dye, and Nurse Lewis: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail

these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place

of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of

Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the

Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will

require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 13, 2025

s/ Staci M. Yandle_____

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve

them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an

appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date

of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days

or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.