Opinion

Basdakis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

Court
United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed
Feb 11, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Daniel T. Horner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.0%

“[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-1158V

Filed: January 16, 2025

CONSTANTINE BASDAKIS,

Special Master Horner

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Lisa Annette Roquemore, Law Office of Lisa A. Roquemore, Rancho Santa Margarita,

CA, for petitioner.

Emilie Williams, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On September 8, 2020, the petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq. (2012)

(“Vaccine Act”).2 (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner alleged that he suffered multiple joint pains

and inflammatory arthritis, including in his left shoulder, as a result of his October 13,

2017 pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. (Id.) Petitioner filed an expert report further

contending that he suffered vaccine-caused polymyalgia rheumatica (“PMR”). (Ex. 6.)

However, in June of 2022, I held a Rule 5 status conference in which I explained that

petitioner was unlikely to prevail on his PMR claim but noted that that expert opinions in

the case appeared to support a separate claim for a shoulder injury related to vaccine

administration (“SIRVA”). (ECF No. 43.) Thereafter, the parties settled the case as a

disputed SIRVA claim. (ECF No. 61.) On January 23, 2024, the undersigned issued a

1 Because this document contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be

made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic

Government Services). This means the document will be available to anyone with access to the

internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact

medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from

public access.

2 Within this decision, all citations to § 300aa will be the relevant sections of the Vaccine Act at 42 U.S.C.

§ 300aa-10, et seq.

decision awarding damages based on the parties’ stipulation. (ECF No. 62.) On June

20, 2024, petitioner filed a final motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 67.)

Petitioner’s counsel requests a total of $130,217.71 for attorneys’ fees and costs,

including $108,215.00 for attorneys’ fees and $22,002.71 for costs. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner

incurred personal costs totaling $4,076.34. (Id.)

On August 27, 2024, respondent filed a response to petitioner’s motion. (ECF

No. 68.) Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13

requires respondent to file a response to a request by a petitioner for an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Id. at 1.) Respondent adds, however, that he “is satisfied

the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this

case.” (Id. at 2.) Respondent requests that the court exercise its discretion and

determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 4.)

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. §

300aa-15(e). The Federal Circuit has approved the lodestar approach to determine

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). It is “well within the special

master’s discretion” to determine the reasonableness of fees. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health

& Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Hines ex rel. Sevier v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“[T]he reviewing court

must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both

attorneys’ fees and costs.”). Special masters can reduce a fee request sua sponte,

without providing petitioners notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). However, “[t]he failure of

respondent to identify with particularity any objection to a request for attorney’s fees and

costs may be taken into consideration by the special master in the decision.” Vaccine

Rule 13(a)(3). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioners’

fee application. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719,

729 (2011). Instead, they may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Program to

determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson v. Sec’y of Dep’t of

Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 486 (1991), rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in

relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their

prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee

requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior

experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521.

The undersigned has reviewed the billing records submitted with petitioner’s

request. (ECF No. 67.) The hourly rates are consistent with what has been awarded in

prior cases. However, Ms. Roquemore has a history of excessive billing warranting

reduction. Previous decisions have commented on excessive client communications,

completing junior-level, paralegal-like work, or administrative tasks, at her full hourly

rate, and for devoting work hours to “misplaced” efforts. E.g., D.S. v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., No. 10-77V, 2017 WL 6397826, at 3–5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 20,

2017) (reducing fees by 10% due to excessive client and interoffice communications,

2

duplicative billing, and time spent on administrative tasks); Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., No. 11-685V, 2021 WL 6211169, at *12 (Fed Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 8,

2021 (noting excessive time spent on certain tasks and time spent on junior-level work

billed at full hourly rate); Iniguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 18-1537V,

2023 WL 3729843, at *4–6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 30, 2023) (finding that Ms.

Roquemore’s nearly six-figure fee for a case that settled for $10,000.00 reflected a lack

of billing judgment and reducing the fee by 15%); D.G. v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., No. 11-577V, 2020 WL 3265015, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 2020

(explaining that counsel’s performance contributed to “‘perplexing’ twists and turns” in

the case and that “the case need not have generated the high fees and costs that it has

over the lengthy period it was litigated.”); J. T. v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 12-

618V, 2018 WL 4623163, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 20, 2018) (finding that Ms. Roquemore

billed for an excessive amount of time to complete several tasks); Sanchez v. Sec'y of

Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11-685V, 2016 WL 909186, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb.

17, 2016) (reducing Ms. Roquemore’s billable hours due to excessive billing

practices); Brown v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No 09-426V, 2013 WL 1790212, at

*3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 8, 2013) (finding that some of the hours billed by

Ms. Roquemore were excessive and unreasonable). While nothing in counsel’s billing

records in this case stands out as egregious, review of billing entries does show

continuation of the types of billing practices for which reductions have previously been

taken. Moreover, the procedural history of this case is notable insofar as the bulk of

counsel’s efforts in this case pertained to a claim that petitioner ultimately did not

support. Accord Iniguez, 2023 WL 3729843, at *4–6 (questioning counsel’s billing

judgment in misplaced efforts); D.G., 2020 WL 3265015, at *4–5 (explaining that

counsel spent excessive time litigating injuries that were ultimately abandoned).

Considering all of this, a 10% reduction to counsel’s fees is appropriate. This results in

a reduction from $108,215.00 to $97,393.50.

The undersigned GRANTS petitioner’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs with

the above-referenced reduction.

Accordingly, the undersigned awards $123,472.55 (representing

$119,396.21 for petitioner’s counsel’s fees and costs and $4,076.34 for

petitioner’s personally incurred costs) to be paid through an ACH deposit to

petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Daniel Horner

Daniel Horner

Special Master

3 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice

renouncing the right to seek review.

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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