ROSADO v. DICKSON

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMESON ROSADO,

Plaintiff. □□ .

“mm Civil Action No. 24-1256 (ZNQ) (RLS)

OPINION

JOSEPH DICKSON, e¢. al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHL, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon an Order to Show Cause (““OTSC”) that

directed Pro Se Plaintiff Jameson Rosado (“Plaintiff or “Rosado”) to show cause as to why his

Complaint should not be dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel,

entire controversy, and judicial immunity. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff responded to the OTSC on

January 28, 2025, (“Plaintiff's Response,” ECF No. 34.) The Court has carefully considered

Plaintiff's submission and decides the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.! For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint based on the doctrines of res judicata, judicial immunity, and

prosecutorial immunity. The dismissal will be with prejudice.

' Hereinafter, all references to “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background

On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff Jameson Rosado filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1), and it was

accepted by the Court on August 2, 2024.2 The Complaint is not a model of clarity in at least two

respects: the defendants it purports to name and the claims it purports at assert.

As to what defendants are named in the Complaint, the only one that is clearly identified

in the Complaint is the Honorable Joseph A. Dickson, U.S.M.J. (ret.} (Judge Dickson”), who is

identified on the caption as part of a “JOSEPH DICKSON, ET AL.” (Compl. at 1.° The

remainder of the Complaint is a long narrative that names several federal and state court judges

and members of federal, state and municipal law enforcement agencies. (See generally id.) These

are apparently intended by Plaintiff to be more than mere mentions in passing because the

Complaint also states that Judge Dickson is “on[e] of several defendants in this matter.” (id. at 2)

Also, in his various subsequent submissions to the Court, Plaintiff has insisted at least twice that

there are other parties to this suit beyond Judge Dickson. (See ECF No, 24 (“The Court is reminded

that there are parties other than Joseph Dickson involved in this matter’) and ECF No, 29 (“BOTH

federal & State of NJ judges, as well as other parties involved... .”)).

As best the Court can intuit based on the broadest reading of the Complaint, and for the

purposes of this Opinion, the Court will consider the Complaint to name as defendants the

following individuals:

? Plaintiff's Complaint was not accepted until August 2, 2024 when he paid the Court’s filing fee after the Court denied

a series of his requests to waive the filing fee and/or proceed i forma pauperis, See applications (ECF Nos. 1-2, 7,

13, and 15) and denials (ECF Nos. 5, 11, 14 and 16).

3 Given that the Complaint does not include numbered paragraphs, the Court cites to its page numbers herein.

U.S. District Court Judges Esther Salas and John M. Vazquez. (ret.)

e U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson (ret.)

¢ Mike Kelly, Carteret Police Officer

e Sgt. E. Stentella, Carteret Police Officer

e Jerry Sanseverino, U.S. Marshals Inspector

e William Feingold, New Jersey Superior Court Judge

e Allen Comba, Carteret Municipal Court Judge

e Colleen Flynn, New Jersey Superior Court Judge

« Kaitlyn Maltese, Assistant Middlesex County Prosecutor

® Stephen Tardiff, Carteret Clerk

e United States Marshals Service

e¢ William Higgins, Carteret Police Officer

As to the claims Plaintiff is now asserting, the Complaint is likewise less than clear.

Plaintiff is a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) employee who, in a previous suit,

challenged his termination from the FBI. That suit concluded with summary judgment against

Plaintiff, which was later affirmed by the Third Circuit. See Rosado y. Att’y Gen., 838 F. App’x

719 (3d Cir. 2021), The Honorable Esther Salas, U.S.D.J. (“Judge Salas”), and Judge Dickson

presided over that case.

The present Complaint before this Court asserts that Judge Dickson dispatched the United

States Marshals Service “unlawfully to [Plaintiff's] home,” (Compl. at 2.) At some later point,

the FBI along with the Carteret Police Department also seized Plaintiff's firearms and banned

Plaintiff from purchasing new ones.’ (7d. at 13-14.) In response, Plaintiff filed a civil suit against

Judge Dickson and various agents/officers: Rosado v. Dickson, et. al., Civ. No. 22-1274. (Compl.

at 1.) The Honorable John M. Vazquez, U.S.D.J., (ret.) (Judge Vazquez”), presided over that

* The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Complaint neglects to mention that, as observed by the Third

Circuit, the visit to Plaintiff's home by the U.S. Marshals Service and the subsequent seizure of his firearms was in

response to at feast one threatening voicemail left for Judge Dickson. See Rosado v. Dickson, App. No, 22-3218, 2023

WL 6830156, at *1 Gd Cir, Oct. 17, 2023)

case. According to Plaintiff, Judge Vazquez mishandled that case and improperly dismissed it,°

(See generally id.) The present Complaint also asserts that Judge Dickson and Judge Salas

improperly denied Plaintiff's request for pro bono counsel on numerous occasions. (/d. at 12.)

In terms of relief, at best the Court can discern, Plaintiff requests (1) a passport to be paid

for by Defendants, (2) return of his two firearms, (3) future health insurance copays to be paid by

Defendants, (4) the Court to invalidate the “two NJ Court judgments, which were not conducted

in accordance with fair due process,” (5) restitution, and (6) “reinstatement.” (Ud. 16-19.)

B. Procedural History

After the Complaint was filed on February 29, 2024 in this action, Defendant filed a motion

to appoint counsel (ECF No. 4) and requested the Court to waive the filing fee of the Complaint.

(ECF No. 4.) The undersigned denied Plaintiff's request to waive the Court’s filing fee and

instructed Plaintiff to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a formal application to proceed in forma pauperis, which was denied without

prejudice. (ECF No. 11.) Simultaneously, the Honorable Rukhsanah L. Singh, U.S.M.J. (“Judge

Singh”), denied Plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff then filed another

application to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 15), which the Court again denied on the basis

that Plaintiff's household income and assets exceeded those suitable for waiving the Court’s filing

fee, (ECF No. 16.) The case was then administratively terminated pending Plaintiff's payment of

a filing fee.

In August 2024, Plaintiff paid the filing fee and his case was re-opened. (ECF Nos, 17—

18.) Plaintiff immediately filed a motion to transfer the case from the Trenton Vicinage to the

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Judge Vazquez dismissed with prejudice the claims in that civil suit

largely on the bases of judicial immunity, res judicata, and repeated inadequate pleading. See Rosado v. Dickson,

oy Ne 22-1274, ECF No, 14 (D.N.J. Oct, 28, 2022). The Third Circuit affirmed. See Rosado, 2023 WL 6830156,

Newark Vicinage of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (ECF No, 19.)

The Honorable Renee M. Bumb, U.S.D.J. (“Chief Judge Bumb”), denied that motion. (ECF No.

20.) In October 2024, Plaintiff again asked for the Court to appoint him counsel. (ECF Nos. 21—

24.) In response, the undersigned issued an order stating in relevant part that

a court may request that an attorney represent an indigent party

provided that the party has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, and further provided that an analysis of the factors

governing the appointment of counsel warrant the appointment of

pro bono counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e}(1) (where a litigant is

proceeding in forma pauperis, “[t]he court may request an attorney

to represent any person unable to afford counsel’); see also Local

Civil Rules, Appendix H; Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 Gd Cir.

1993) cert. denied 510 U.S. 1196 (1994). Given that Plaintiff has

since been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter,

he does not qualify for pre bono counsel.

(ECF No. 25.) Undeterred, Plaintiff again filed a motion to appoint counsel on January 15, 2025.

(ECF No. 31.) Judge Singh again denied that motion, (ECF No, 32.) Thereafter, the Court issued

the instant O'TSC on January 24, 2025. (ECF No. 33.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD/APPLICABLE LAW

A. Pro Se Complaint

Plaintiff in this matter is proceeding pro se. “The obligation to liberally construe a pro se

litigant’s pleadings is well-established.” Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S, 655 F.3d 333, 339 Gd

Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle vy. Gamble, 429 US, 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 319,

520-21 (1972). “Courts are to construe complaints so ‘as to do substantial justice,’ keeping in

mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally.” Alston v. Parker, 363

F.3d 229, 234 (Gd Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Liberal construction does not, however, require

the Court to credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs y. Yatauro,

984 F, Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch, Dist., 132 F.3d 902,

906 (3d Cir. 1997)). “[T]here are limits to [the courts’].., flexibility... [P]ro se litigants still

must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). “Even a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to

state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to

support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Grohs, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (citing Adilhouse v.

Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).

B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel®

As briefly addressed, this case implicates the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata or claim

preclusion is appropriate when there is “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving

(2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”

Hoffinan v. Nordic Naturals, 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d

215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)). The third factor “generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity

of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims,” /¢ Under federal law, “[t}he . .

, judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State... shall have the same full faith and credit in

every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or

usage in the courts of such State... .” 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Allen y. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96

n.8 (1980). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to give res judicata effect to a state

judgment to the extent the state would give its own prior judgment such effect. Davis y. U.S. Steel

Supply, Div. of U.S. Steel Corp., 688 F.2d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1982).

6 Although the OTSC directed Plaintiff to show cause as to why his complaint should not be dismissed in part based

on collateral estoppel, the Court need not reach a decision based on collateral estoppel due to the application of res

judicata and judicial and prosecutorial immunity.

Cc, Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity

Additionally, this case raises concerns of judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Judicial

immunity “is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should

be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Figueroa v.

Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000); Stamp v. Sparkian, 435 U.S. 349, 365-57 (1978)

(“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. . .”); Gromek vy. Maenza, 614 F. App’x 42, 45 Gd

Cir, 2015) (explaining that judicial immunity is not forfeited solely by allegation of malice or

corruption of motive) (citing Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir.

2000)).

This immunity, however, is not absolute. Instead, it is “justified and defined by the

functions it protects and serves.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Immunity does

not extend to actions not within the judge’s official capacity, nor does it extend to actions taken in

the absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). To determine whether

an act is “judicial,” courts look to whether the act performed by the judge “is a function normally

performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i,e., whether they dealt with the judge

in his judicial capacity.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362).

Prosecutors have their own immunity. Under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity,

“prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their conduct in their role as

prosecutors.” Newsome v. City of Newark, Civ. No. 13-6234, 2014 WL 4798783, at *2 (D.N.J.

Sept, 25, 2014). The Supreme Court in dmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), held that “a

state prosecuting attorney who act[s] within the scope of his [or her] duties in initiating and

pursuing a criminal prosecution” is not amenable to suit. Jd. at 410; see also Pierre v. Treasury

Civ, No. 18-3443, 2018 WL 5801549, at *7-8 (D.N.J. Nov, 5, 2018). This immunity

applies to any action “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” while

a state prosecuting attorney is advocating for the State. /mb/er, 424 U.S, at 430-31; see also Moore

v. Middlesex Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 503 F. App’x 108, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Although a

prosecutor’s deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence is not entitled to absolute immunity,

the decision to withhold such evidence from the defense while functioning as an advocate for the

State is protected by absolute immunity.”).

Til. DISCUSSION

In what seems to be a summary of Plaintiff's prior proceedings as well as disagreements

with those state and federal court judgments, as best the Court can discern, Plaintiff responds to

the OTSC by renewing arguments regarding the merits of his claims and asserting that he is in

urgent need of relief. (Plaintiff's Response at 1-2,) Plaintiff argues that the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey maintains prejudicial documents and improperly allowed the

Carteret Police Department and FBI to seize his firearms. (Ud. at 3-4.) Plaintiff also takes issue

with the Court’s repeated denial to appoint pro bono counsel. (/d. at 5.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues

that the Honorable Colleen M Flynn, J.S.C. (“Judge Flynn”), committed errors in the New Jersey

state court proceedings, and that new evidence has come to light that would alter those judgments,

(id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff also reminds the Court that “withholding . .. exculpatory evidence is a

crime,” (id, at 7), and argues that the Court twice improperly denied his applications to proceed in

pauperis. Ud. at 10.) Plaintiff adds that “Carteret, who is a defendant in the present matter

refused ... the OPRA request,” and stated that the prior courts have not shown that there was

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Gd. at 13.) Plaintiff concludes his response to the OTSC by

noting that the Court “has taken advantage of [and] fully exploited BOTH [Plaintiffs] role as a

pro se litigant AND [his] inability to secure counsel, in BOTH federat [and] state forums.” (Jd. at

16.)

As an initial mater, the Court notes that it is sensitive to Plaintiff's requests and numerous

attempts to receive pro bono counsel. That is why the Court (1) liberally construes Plaintiffs

Compiaint, (2) has given Plaintiff an attempt to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss

his case, and (3) carefully explained its reasoning for denying Plaintiffs request for pro bono

counsel. (See ECF No. 12.) The Court has already decided Plaintiff's requests for counsel and

will not do so again in this Opinion,

As a second matter, the Court will not entertain arguments made by Plaintiff that require

the Court to revisit the state court proceedings. As stated, under federal law, “[t]he ... judicial

proceedings of any court of any... State... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court

within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the

courts of such State... 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Allen, 449 U.S, at 96 1.8. Thus, the Court must

give res judicata effect to the state judgments irrespective of whether the state judges are entitled

to judicial immunity for their official judicial decisions. See Davis, 688 F.2d at 170.

Additionally, for reasons already addressed in Judge Vazquez’s August 1, 2022 Opinion,

the New Jersey state and federal judges implicated in Plaintiff's Complaint are entitled to judicial

immunity. See Rosado v. Dickson, Civ. No. 22-1274, 2022 WL 3029327, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 1,

2022). It is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff is challenging decisions made by those judges in

the prior state and federal court proceedings. There is nothing in the record to show that the prior

state and federal judges did not perform their official duties or were acting in the absence of

jurisdiction. Instead, the record indicates that the state and federal judges acted diligently in

resolving Plaintiff's disputes, addressing Plaintiffs arguments each time,

In addition to the fact that these state and federal judges are entitled to judicial immunity,

Judge Vazquez already addressed these arguments and they are therefore barred by the doctrine of

res judicata given that there was a final judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties. See

Rosado, 2022 WL 3029327, at *3. The Third Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the judges

from the prior suits. See Rosado y, Dickson, App. No. 22-3218, 2023 WL 6830156, at *2 (3d Cir.

Oct. 17, 2023) (Moreover, judicial immunity bars Rosado’s claims for damages based on alleged

conduct and mistakes made by the judges who were involved in his prior civil action.”).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss New Jersey State Judges Feingold and Flynn, Municipal Court

Judge Alien Comba, United States District Judges Esther Salas and John M. Vazquez, and United

States Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson with prejudice on the grounds that they have judicial

immunity and any claims against them are barred by res judicata.

Plaintiff also brings claims against Kaitlyn Maltese (“Maltese”), an Assistant Middlesex

County Prosecutor. Maltese is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. There is nothing in the record

to indicate that Maltese acted outside the scope of her official duties as a prosecutor. Instead, the

record informs the Court that Maltese was acting as an advocate for the State and her actions were

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Jimbler, 424 U.S. at 430-

31, Moreover, Judge Vazquez already addressed Maltese’s liability exposure in a prior decision.

Rosade, 2022 WL 3029327, at *3 (“Plaintiffs claims against the County Prosecutor Defendant

implicate the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity... Accordingly, Maltese is immune from

Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims.”). Asa result, just like with respect to the state and federal judges,

there is a final judgment on the merits involving the same parties, and res judicata applies,

Accordingly, Maltese will be dismissed with prejudice.

10

That leaves Carteret Police Officers, a United States Marshals Service inspector, and the

United States Marshals Service itself left in this action. Those Defendants will also be dismissed

with prejudice because claims against them are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff

alieges that Mike Kelly, Sergeant Stentella, and William Higgins from the Carteret Police

Department, Stephen ‘Tardiff, a Carteret Clerk, Jerry Sanseverino, a United States Marshals

inspector, and the entire United States Marsals Service unconstitutionally seized his firearms, (See

Compl. at 3.) The Court has already addressed Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants in

Rosado v, Dickson, Civ. No. 22-1274, 2022 WL 1443674, at *1 (D.N.J. May 5, 2022). There, the

Court discussed Second and Fourth Amendment doctrine and found that Plaintiffs claims against

those Defendants were conclusory. /d. at *3. The Third Circuit also affirmed the District Court’s

dismissal of the Second and Fourth Amendment claims, See Rosado y. Dickson, 2023 WL

6830156, at *2 (“The District Court also properly rejected Rosado’s Second and Fourth

Amendment claims.”), As such, there was a prior decision on the merits involving the same

parties, and Plaintiff's instant claims are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, Mike Kelly,

Sergeant Stentella, Stephen Tardiff, William Higgins, Jerry Sanseverino, and the entire United

States Marsals Service will be dismissed with prejudice.

As a final matter, as noted, these dismissals will be with prejudice. The Third Circuit has

cautioned that a district court may deny leave to amend only if (1) the moving party’s delay in

seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the non-moving party, or

(2) the amendment would be futile. Adams v, Gould, Inc,, 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). Here,

time and time again Plaintiffhas been unable to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint. Afdassarsky

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that the court may refuse to allow

an amendment that fails to state a cause of action), Moreover, given that the Court relies on the

11

doctrine of res judicata, and judicial and prosecutorial immunity, the Court finds that further

amendment will be futile. See Olsen v. Citi Bank Legal Dep't, Civ. No. 15-2190, 2015 WL

7258861, at *3 (D.NJ. Nov. 17, 2015) (dismissing pro se complaint with prejudice where

amendment was futile); Pue v. NJ. Dep’t of Labor, Civ. No. 23-855, 2024 WL 1975387, at *3-4,

6 (D.N.J. May 3, 2024) (dismissing matter with prejudice on the basis that pro se plaintiffs second

amended complaint still failed to allege facts that would change the court’s prior ruling that

defendants were entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and further finding that any

additional amendments would be futile); Banks v. FBZ, Civ. No. 19-9367, 2020 WL 4261198, at

*1—2 (D.NJ. July 23, 2020) (dismissing a pro se plaintiffs third amended complaint with

prejudice on sovereign immunity grounds).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: February 10, 2025 aS, ud

UND ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1?