State of Tennessee v. James E. Mathis

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 19, 2000

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES E. MATHIS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County

No. II-1098-328-C Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2000-00316-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 9, 2000

Defendant James E. Mathis was convicted by a Williamson County jury of possession of contraband

in a penal institution and sentenced to eight (8) years incarceration in the Department of Correction.

In this appeal as of right Defendant raises one issue for appellate review: whether the trial court erred

when it refused to suppress incriminating statements made by Defendant to the corrections officers.

Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. After a review of

the entire record and applicable law we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.

THOMAS T. WOODALL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID G. HAYES, J., and

NORMA MCGEE OGLE , J., joined.

M. Wallace Coleman, Jr., Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, James E. Mathis.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General;

Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Defendant James E. Mathis was convicted by a Williamson County jury of possession of

contraband in a penal institution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-201, and sentenced to eight (8) years

incarceration in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right Defendant raises one issue

for our review: whether the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress

incriminating statements made by Defendant to the corrections officers. Defendant contends that

his conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. After a review of the entire record and

applicable law we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Before turning to Defendant's issue on the merits we address several deficiencies in Defense

counsel's preparation of this matter. There is no motion for new trial filed in the record. The record

of proceedings in this case is on audio-visual tapes and not in written transcripts. In his brief,

Defendant claims that his counsel made an oral motion for a new trial at the conclusion of his trial.

Unfortunately, Defendant’s brief does not include a citation to the video record regarding the motion.

In fact, there are no time-specific citations in Defendant’s entire brief. Although we have viewed

the audio-visual tapes of the motion to suppress, the trial, and the sentencing hearing, we are unable

to locate any hearing on a motion for new trial. Even if Defense counsel did make an oral motion

for a new trial, he did not reduce the oral motion to writing within thirty days as required by

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b). Hence, there is no record, oral or written, of a motion

for new trial in Defendant’s case.

Ordinarily, a party’s failure to provide citations to the record in a brief, as required by

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(g), results in waiver of the issue before this Court. Tenn.

Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Equally

important regarding evidentiary issues, failure to make a motion for a new trial within thirty (30)

days of judgment, as well as failure to reduce an oral motion for a new trial to writing within thirty

(30) days, customarily results in a waiver of the defendant’s right to argue the issue on appeal.

Tenn.R.App.P. 3(e); Tenn.R.Crim.P. 33(b); State v. Givhan, 616 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1980). Nevertheless, we elect to address Defendant’s issue on the merits.

FACTS

Officer Thomas Justus, Captain John Jordan, and Defendant testified at the suppression

hearing. Officer Justus, a corrections officer at the John I. Easley Criminal Justice Center in

Williamson County, testified that he was on duty September 11, 1998 when the incident involving

Defendant occurred. Justus testified that when he entered the “364" dormitory–a large room that

houses several inmates--he observed three inmates quickly exit a freestanding shower located in the

corner of the room. The rapid departure made Justus suspicious, so he investigated. Approaching

the shower he smelled marijuana. When Justus pulled the shower curtain back, approximately eight

or nine marijuana cigarettes fell from the space between the shower curtain and the rod onto the

floor. Justus confiscated the marijuana, then he and another officer found and detained the three

inmates who had run off. Defendant was among them.

Justus testified that he brought one of the three inmates immediately to the supervisor’s office

for questioning; he does not remember who was first. Shortly thereafter, the remaining two were

also questioned. In addition to Justus, the officers present during questioning were shift supervisor

Sergeant McCullough and Corrections Officer Weathers. The focus of their questions concerned

ownership of the marijuana. Justus testified that, although all three inmates admitted to smoking

marijuana in the shower before Justus arrived, each denied ownership of the marijuana as well as any

knowledge regarding the hidden cigarettes. (At trial, Justus testified that he did not remember

whether Defendant stated that he was “smoking marijuana” or merely “smoking.”) Justus testified

that neither he nor the other officers read the inmates Miranda warnings before they questioned

them, but that all statements were voluntary. Justus testified further that the questioning took place

in a “regular office” with glass windows, and the doors were unlocked.

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Captain John Jordan, supervisor of the Easley Criminal Justice Center, testified at the

suppression hearing that he arrived at the Center in the evening hours of September 11, 1998. At

that time, Jordan learned that marijuana had been confiscated. Jordan was also informed that the

three inmates involved had been questioned and that one of them, Michael Taylor, wanted to speak

with him regarding the incident. Jordan first talked to Taylor. Later, Defendant also came to

Jordan’s office to speak with him. Detective Hagen was present when Defendant arrived. Jordan

testified that before his interview with Defendant, Hagen read Defendant his Miranda rights from

a card provided by Jordan. Defendant understood his rights. Jordan said that Defendant admitted

he had been smoking marijuana with the other inmates but denied ownership of the contraband.

Jordan testified that Defendant did not ask for an attorney or request to leave his office at any time

during their discussion. Furthermore, neither inmate’s presence in the office was mandatory and the

statements were voluntary.

At the suppression hearing, Defendant testified that he admitted to Officer Justus he had been

smoking marijuana. Defendant said that later that same evening, Defendant was summoned by a

corrections officer to speak with Captain Jordan and Detective Hagen in Jordan’s office. Defendant

stated that he was not Mirandized before he was questioned by them and, in fact, that he had never

been read Miranda warnings during his incarceration at the Center. Defendant testified that Jordan

asked him whether he wanted to “tell them what was going on,” and Defendant responded, “not

really.” Jordan claimed to already possess a statement from Defendant in which Defendant admitted

his guilt. Defendant claimed that he made no statements to Jordan except to confirm Jordan’s

statements to him regarding the identity of the person responsible for bringing contraband into the

Center by responding, “you’re good.” Defendant testified that he denied ownership of the marijuana

at all times but that the statements he did make were voluntary and uncoerced.

From the facts presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that the

Defendant was read his Miranda warnings by Detective Hagan and in the presence of Captain Jordan

before being questioned by either of them. The trial court further found that Defendant understood

the warnings and subsequently waived them before making any statements. For purposes of

analyzing his first statements to Officer Justus under Miranda, the trial court decided that Defendant

was not “in custody” when he made his statements to Justus immediately following the discovery

of marijuana in the shower: neither the language used by Justus to summon Defendant to the

supervisor’s office, the Defendant’s physical surroundings during interrogation, nor the extent to

which Defendant was confronted with evidence of his guilt rendered Defendant “in custody” for

Miranda purposes. Lastly, the trial court found that there was no additional imposition on

Defendant’s freedom of movement when questioned by Justus.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence his statements

to Officer Justus and Captain Jordan to the effect that he was smoking marijuana. He asserts that

he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes and that the incriminating statements to Justus should

have been suppressed because they were made before Miranda warnings were given. Defendant

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denies making any statement to Jordan but if a statement is nevertheless found to have been made,

Defendant argues that it was tainted and, therefore, inadmissible as a confession subsequent to an

illegally obtained statement.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “no person ...

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

Similarly, Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution states that “in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9.

The Supreme Court has held that the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment require that

precautions be taken before statements obtained through custodial interrogation are allowed as

evidence against an accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16

L.Ed.2d 694 (1964). Generally, when statements made by an accused are the product of a custodial

interrogation by law enforcement officers, the statements may not be admitted into evidence unless

the accused is

warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything

he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence

of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him

prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. Only when the suspect is informed of his rights via the “Miranda” warnings may a suspect be

deemed to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney.

Id. Moreover, any statement obtained after a waiver of this right must be voluntary, and not be

extracted by “any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,

however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.

532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).

Miranda warnings are required only when a person is subject to custodial interrogation by

law enforcement. “Custodial” means that the subject of questioning is in “custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86

S.Ct. at 1630. “Interrogation” has been interpreted to refer to questions that law enforcement officers

should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). In order for Miranda to apply, the

suspect’s statements must be in response to interrogation by law enforcement personnel. See State

v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). Moreover, the suspect must also know

that he is being interrogated by an agent of the State. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-97,

110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990).

These standards are modified, however, when the suspect subjected to questioning is already

in custody because he is incarcerated. In Tennessee, the standard to determine whether Miranda

warnings must precede questioning in a prison setting were set out in State v. Goss, 995 S.W.2d 617,

629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). In Goss, this Court held that a prisoner is not automatically “in

custody” within the meaning of Miranda; there must be an additional imposition on the inmate’s

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freedom of movement. Id. Relevant to this determination is (1) the language used to summon the

inmate, (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation, (3) the extent to which the inmate is

confronted with evidence of his guilt, and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate.

Id.

This Court must uphold a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing unless the

evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). In

evaluating the correctness of a trial court's ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, appellate courts

may consider the proof adduced both at the suppression hearing and at trial. State v. Henning, 975

S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the evidence

preponderates against the trial court’s findings. State v. Harts, 7 S.W.3d 78, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1999). Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution

of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. Odom, 928

S.W.2d at 23. The application of the law to the facts, however, is a question of law which is

reviewed de novo on appeal. Harts, 7 S.W.3d at 84.

The testimony that Officer Justus and Captain Jordan gave at trial was essentially the same

as the testimony that they gave at Defendant’s suppression hearing. The only difference is found in

the testimony of Justus: at trial he testified that he did not remember whether Defendant stated that

he was “smoking marijuana” or merely that he was “smoking.” At the suppression hearing, however,

Justus testified that Defendant admitted to smoking marijuana. This discrepancy does not affect the

admissibility of Defendant’s statement, however.

After a review of both the trial and suppression hearing records, we believe that the

circumstances of the questioning in this case did not require Miranda warnings before Defendant

made his statement to Officer Justus. Defendant relies, in part, on our Supreme Court’s decision in

State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1996), to support the argument that Defendant was “in

custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings when he spoke to Officer Justus. This reliance is

misplaced. The defendant in Anderson was not incarcerated at the time the statements were made.

The objective assessment factors that the Court considered relevant to determine whether the

defendant in Anderson was “in custody” are thus not analogous to Defendant’s circumstances.

Defendant’s brief cites numerous conditions of prison life to bolster his contention that he was “in

custody” (i.e., Defendant was told what to do on a daily basis, he was instructed regarding what time

to arise and to sleep, he had no choice regarding what he would eat or wear, etc.). There is no

dispute regarding the fact that Defendant was in custody in the literal sense of the word. As we

discussed above, however, an inmate is not in custody for Miranda purposes unless there is an added

imposition on the inmate’s freedom of movement. Goss, 995 S.W.2d at 629 (emphasis added).

Mere prisoner status is not sufficient. Id.

In Goss, our Court held that factors relevant to deciding whether there was additional

imposition on an inmate’s freedom of movement were (1) the language used to summon the inmate,

(2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation, (3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted

with evidence of his guilt, and (4) the additional pressure, if any, exerted to detain the inmate. Id.

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The trial court found, specifically, that neither the language used by Justus to summon Defendant

to the supervisor’s office, the Defendant’s physical surroundings during interrogation, nor the extent

to which Defendant was confronted with evidence of his guilt rendered Defendant “in custody” for

Miranda purposes. In addition, the trial court found that Justus exerted no additional pressure on

Defendant when he detained him for questioning. Under our holding in Goss, the trial court’s

findings are sufficient to conclude that Defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes at the

time he was questioned by Officer Justus. Consequently, Defendant’s constitutional rights as

defined in Miranda were not violated, and his statements were properly admitted.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that Defendant was

Mirandized before the questioning by Captain Jordan and Detective Hagen began. Also, the proof

supports the trial court’s findings that Defendant understood the warnings given him and that he

waived them before making his statements. Defendant’s brief cites State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915

(Tenn. 1992), for the proposition that Defendant’s statements to Jordan were tainted by the fact that

his earlier statements were unconstitutionally extracted in violation of Miranda. But we have already

decided that Defendant’s previous statements were indeed admissible. Defendant is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we find that Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we find that the trial court

did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

___________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

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