The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARBIN JARQUIN and JUAN
URBINA, on their own behalf and on
behalf of those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No: 8:24-cv-477-MSS-AAS
BRANCH RECONSTRUCTION,
LLC and TIMOTHY BUTLER,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Final Default Judgment. (Dkt. 13) Despite having been served, Defendants Branch
Reconstruction, LLC and Timothy Butler have failed to appear, answer, or otherwise
respond to the Complaint, which Plaintiffs filed on February 22, 2024. (Dkt. 1) The
Clerk entered default against each Defendant on March 26, 2024. (Dkts. 10, 11) Upon
consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being otherwise fully advised, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and Costs and DENIES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion for Fees.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Marbin Jarquin (“Jarquin”) and Juan Urbina (“Urbina”), on their
own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, initiated this action against
Defendants Branch Reconstruction, LLC (“Branch”) and Timothy Butler (“Butler”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages, liquidated
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the
“FLSA”). (Dkt. 1) Plaintiffs also raised claims under Florida common law and §
448.08, Florida Statutes (2024). (Id.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Branch is a
Florida limited liability company engaged in the construction business with offices in
Hillsborough County, Florida. (Id. at ¶ 3) Plaintiffs also allege Butler, a Florida
resident, owns and operates Branch. (Id. at ¶ 43)
Plaintiffs allege that at all times material to this action, Defendant Branch was
an enterprise covered by the FLSA. (Id. at ¶ 28) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Branch
“operated as an organization which sold and/or marketed its services and/or goods
to customers from throughout the United States and also provided its services for
goods sold and transported from across state lines of other states . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 26)
They allege Branch “obtained and solicited funds from non-Florida sources, accepted
funds from non-Florida sources, used telephonic transmissions going over state lines
to do its business, transmitted funds outside the State of Florida, and otherwise
regularly engaged in interstate commerce, particularly with respect to its employees.”
(Id.) Plaintiffs allege that, “[u]pon information and belief, the annual gross revenue of
[Branch] was at all times material hereto in excess of $500,000 per annum . . . .” (Id.
at ¶ 27) Plaintiffs also allege they were engaged in interstate commerce for Branch. (Id.
at ¶ 28)
As for Butler, Plaintiffs allege that during their employment with Branch, Butler
maintained control of Branch’s operations, was involved in its day-to-day functions,
provided Plaintiffs with their work schedules, controlled Branch’s finances, and could
cause Branch to pay or not to pay its employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46)
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Branch employed them as construction workers. (Id.
at ¶ 28) Jarquin alleges he worked between forty and sixty hours per week for Branch
from March 2023 through November 6, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 30) In exchange, Jarquin
alleges Branch promised to pay him a salary of approximately $1,300 per week. (Id. at
¶ 10) However, Jarquin alleges he only ever received one paycheck from Branch,
which compensated him for two weeks of employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 13, 34) Urbina
alleges he worked an average of sixty-one hours per week for Branch from February
2023 through October 26, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 30) Urbina alleges Branch promised to
pay him a salary of approximately $1,320 per week. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 52) Nonetheless,
Urbina alleges Branch only paid him $8,000 during his employment. (Id. at ¶ 54) Thus,
Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to pay them minimum and overtime wages as
required by the FLSA. Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ conduct was knowing and willful.
(Id. at ¶¶ 39, 47)
On March 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed returns of service that show Branch and
Butler were served with process. (Dkts. 6, 7) To date, neither Defendant has filed an
answer or other responsive pleading in this case. Upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clerk’s
Default, (Dkt. 8), the Clerk entered default against each Defendant. (Dkts. 10, 11)
Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to the counts of the Complaint that
raised claims under Florida law. (Dkt. 12) Plaintiffs then filed the Motion, requesting
final judgment of default against each Defendant on Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims. (Dkt. 13)
Plaintiffs seek an award of actual and liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD & ANALYSIS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, a court may enter a default judgment
if it has jurisdiction over the claims and parties and there is a sufficient basis in the
pleadings to support the relief sought. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l
Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975);1 Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789
F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015). In defaulting, a defendant admits the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded allegations of fact. Id. at 1245. But “[t]he defendant is not held to admit facts
that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law. In short . . . a default is not
treated as an absolute confession of the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's
right to recover.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.
If the facts in the complaint are sufficient to establish liability, then the court
must conduct an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages. See Adolph Coors Co.
v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543–44 (11th Cir. 1985).
Damages may be awarded only if the record adequately reflects the basis for the award
via a hearing or the submission of detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.
See id. at 1544.
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business
on September 30, 1981.
a. Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which confers jurisdiction for civil actions arising under federal law, because
Plaintiffs sue Defendants under the FLSA, a federal statute. As for the Court’s personal
jurisdiction over Defendants, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Branch is a Florida limited
liability company that does business and maintains offices in Hillsborough County,
Florida. Plaintiffs also allege Defendant Butler is a Florida resident. The Court finds
these allegations minimally sufficient to establish its jurisdiction over the parties.
Accordingly, the Court assesses whether Plaintiffs’ allegations establish Defendants’
liability under the FLSA.
b. Liability
The Complaint’s allegations are sufficient to warrant a grant of default
judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. The FLSA requires employers to pay a minimum wage
to their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The FLSA also prohibits an employee from
working more than 40 hours per week unless the employee is compensated at “a rate
not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” Id. at
§ 207(a)(2). “Any employer who violates [§ 206 or § 207] shall be liable to the employee
. . . affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime
compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. at §
216(b).
“To trigger liability under the FLSA’s overtime and minimum wage provisions,
a plaintiff must show: (1) an employee-employer relationship exists between the
parties, and (2) he is ‘covered’ by the FLSA.” Cabreja v. SC Maintenance, Inc., No.
19-cv-296, 2019 WL 2931469, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 2019) (citing Josendis v. Wall
to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011)). As to the first
element, “[a]n employee is ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ while an
‘employer’ includes ‘any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee . . . .’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) and (d))
(noting an individual is derivatively liable for an employer’s FLSA violation if he “(1)
acts on behalf of that employer and (2) asserts control over conditions of the
employee’s employment”). As to the second element, a plaintiff may establish he is
“covered” by the FLSA by showing one of two types of FLSA coverage: individual
coverage or enterprise coverage. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1298. “[A]n employee may
claim ‘individual coverage’ if he regularly and ‘directly participat[es] in the actual
movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.’” Id. (quoting Thorne v.
Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff may claim
“enterprise coverage” if the plaintiff’s employer
“has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or . . . has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working
on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce
by any person” and . . . has an “annual gross volume of sales made or
business done . . . not less than $500,000.”
Gaviria v. Maldonado Brothers, Inc., No. 13-60321, 2014 WL 12531281, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)).
Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to establish an employer-employee relationship
existed between them and Defendants. By their default, Defendants admit Defendant
Branch employed Plaintiffs as construction workers. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 28) Defendants admit
Defendant Branch employed Jarquin from March 2023 to November 2023, and
Urbina from February 2023 to October 2023. (Id. at ¶ 30) They also admit Defendant
Butler owned and operated Branch; maintained control of Branch’s operations; was
involved in its day-to-day functions; provided Plaintiffs with their work schedules;
controlled Branch’s finances; and could cause Branch to pay or not to pay its
employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45–46) These allegations are sufficient to establish an
employer-employee relationship between each Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiffs also allege sufficient facts to establish that Defendants are covered by
the FLSA. Plaintiffs allege Branch “sold and/or marketed its services and/or goods to
customers from through the United States and also provided its services for goods sold
and transported from across state lines of other states . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 26) They allege,
“Upon information and belief, [Branch’s] annual gross revenue . . . was at all times
material hereto in excess of $500,000 per annum . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 27) Plaintiffs allege
Branch, as a “construction company,” affects interstate commerce, and Plaintiffs’
work for Branch also affects interstate commerce. (Id. at ¶ 28) These allegations are
sufficient to establish enterprise coverage.
By their default, Defendants admit they willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs
minimum wages and overtime compensation as required by the FLSA. (Id. at ¶¶ 39,
47) See Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307
(11th Cir. 2009). Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs Campbell and Katsiamakis are
entitled to default judgment against Defendants on their claims for unpaid minimum
wages.
c. Damages
Plaintiffs seek awards of actual and liquidated damages based on their FLSA
claims. Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may award
Plaintiffs damages without a hearing if their claims are “for a sum certain that can be
made certain by computation.” “A plaintiff may establish the necessary amount of
damages by affidavit.” Swisher v. The Finishing Line, Inc., 2008 WL 4330318, No.
07-cv-1542, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)). In an action
for unpaid minimum wages under the FLSA, a plaintiff is entitled to recover the
federal minimum wage applicable at the time. Kimball v. Pradius Realty, Inc., No. 05-
cv-1584, 2006 WL 8448580, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2006). In an action for unpaid
overtime compensation, a plaintiff is entitled to recover for uncompensated overtime
hours at “a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).
In support of their claims for damages, Plaintiffs Jarquin and Urbina each
submit a declaration detailing the number of hours he worked without minimum wage
or overtime compensation. (Dkts. 13-1, 13-2)
i. Jarquin’s Damages
Jarquin asserts he worked an average of 50 hours per week from March 2023
through November 6, 2023, but Defendants only paid him for two weeks of work.
(Dkt. 13-1) Jarquin assumes he is entitled to recover Florida’s minimum wage in this
action. Thus, Jarquin seeks $11 per hour in minimum wages for his work performed
for Defendants between March 2023 and September 30, 2023, and $12 per hour in
minimum wages for his work performed from September 30, 2023 through November
6, 2023.2 (Id.) Jarquin seeks minimum wage compensation for 33 weeks of
employment. (Id.) Based on his assumptions and a mathematical error,3 he contends
he is entitled to $37,950.00 as actual damages. (Id.)
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to Jarquin’s actual damages for
unpaid minimum wages because the federal minimum wage in effect throughout
Jarquin’s employment was $7.25 per hour.4 The Court accepts his declaration that he
worked an average of 50 hours per week. The Court also accepts Jarquin’s calculation
that he is entitled to 33 weeks’ worth of unpaid minimum wages. The Court calculates
the unpaid minimum wages by multiplying the federal minimum wage by 40 hours for
2 Florida Minimum Wage History 2000 to 2024, FLORIDA COMMERCE,
https://www.floridajobs.org/docs/default-source/business-growth-and-partnerships/for-
employers/posters-and-required-notices/2024-minimum-wage/2000-2024-florida-minimum-wage-
history.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2025) (showing the Florida minimum wage effective from September
30, 2022 to September 29, 2023 was $11, and the Florida minimum wage effective from September
30, 2023 to September 29, 2024 was $12).
3 Jarquin’s calculation is as follows: Pre-September 30, 2023: $11 x 50 (average hours worked per
week) x 33 (compensable weeks) = $18,150. Post-September 30, 2023: $12 x 50 (average hours worked
per week) x 33 (compensable weeks) = $19,800. Jarquin does not say when he received his one
paycheck from Defendants, but the Court will assume the paycheck compensated him for work
performed before September 30, 2023. Thus, the calculation should be as follows: Pre-September 30,
2023: $11 x 50 (average hours worked per week) x 28 (compensable weeks) = $15,400.00. Post-
September 30, 2023: $12 x 50 (average hours worked per week) x 5 (compensable weeks) = $3,000.00.
4 Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2024,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/history (last
visited Jan. 7, 2025) (showing the minimum wage for federal jurisdictions from 2022 to 2024 was
$7.25 per hour).
each week Jarquin worked for which he was not paid. Accordingly, the Court finds
Jarquin is entitled to $9,570.00 in unpaid minimum wages. Additionally, under 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), Jarquin is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to his
actual damages. Thus, Jarquin is entitled to recover a total of $19,140.00 on his unpaid
minimum wages claim.
As for Jarquin’s claim for unpaid overtime compensation, Jarquin avers
Defendants promised to pay him $1,300 per week. (Dkt. 13-1) Because Jarquin worked
an average of 50 hours per week, Jarquin concludes his hourly rate was $26 per hour.
(Id.) Jarquin worked approximately ten hours of overtime each week, (id.), for which
he is owed $39 per hour. Jarquin was not compensated for 33 weeks of employment.
(Id.) Thus, Jarquin is entitled to recover $12,870.00 in unpaid overtime compensation.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Jarquin is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal
to his actual damages. Thus, Jarquin is entitled to recover a total of $25,740 on his
unpaid overtime compensation claim.
In total, the Court awards Jarquin $44,880.00 in actual and liquidated damages
for his FLSA claims.
ii. Urbina’s Damages
Urbina asserts he worked an average of 60 hours per week from February 2023
through October 26, 2023, but Defendants only paid him $8,000. (Dkt. 13-2) Urbina
assumes his term of employment was 38 weeks. Based on Urbina’s calculations, he
contends he is entitled to $42,160.00 as actual damages for unpaid minimum wages.
(Id.)
The Court concludes Urbina is entitled to $3,020.00 in actual damages for
unpaid minimum wages. The federal minimum wage in effect throughout Urbina’s
employment was $7.25 per hour.5 The Court accepts his declaration that he worked
an average of 60 hours per week. The Court also accepts Urbina’s declaration that his
term of employment was 38 weeks. The Court calculates the unpaid minimum wages
by multiplying the federal minimum wage by 40 hours for each week Urbina worked,
which equals $11,020.00. The Court then subtracts the $8,000 he was paid.
Accordingly, the Court finds Urbina is entitled to $3,020.00 in unpaid minimum
wages. Urbina is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to his actual
damages. Thus, Urbina is entitled to recover a total of $6,020.00 on his unpaid
minimum wages claim.
As for Urbina’s claim for unpaid overtime compensation, Urbina avers
Defendants promised to pay him $1,320 per week. (Dkt. 13-2) Because Urbina worked
an average of 60 hours per week, Urbina concludes his hourly rate was $22 per hour.
(Id.) Urbina worked approximately 20 hours of overtime each week, (id.), for which
he is owed $33 per hour. Urbina was not paid overtime compensation for 38 weeks of
employment. (Id.) Thus, Urbina is entitled to recover $25,080.00 in unpaid overtime
compensation. Because he is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to his
actual damages, Urbina is entitled to recover a total of $50,160.00 on his unpaid
overtime compensation claim.
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 4.
In total, the Court awards Urbina $56,180.00 in actual and liquidated damages
for his FLSA claims.
d. Attorney’s Fees & Costs
The FLSA mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a
prevailing plaintiff. Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1191 n.18
(5th Cir. 1979).6 A prevailing plaintiff is “one who has been awarded some relief by
the court” and “has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.”
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603 (2001) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs are prevailing plaintiffs under the
FLSA because the Court finds they are entitled to default judgment against Defendants
and awards of actual and liquidated damages. Accordingly, the FLSA mandates the
Court award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs.
“[T]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable
fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This
calculation produces the “lodestar,” which is then adjusted to reflect “results
obtained.” Id. The party seeking fees bears the burden of establishing the appropriate
hours and hourly rates. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d
1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
6 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (adopting as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981).
In determining the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation,
“‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’” hours must be excluded. Norman,
836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 343). Such hours are those “that would
be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one's adversary irrespective of the skill,
reputation or experience of counsel.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience,
and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. “The fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing the requested rates are in line with the prevailing market rates by
producing direct evidence of rates charges in similar circumstances or opinion
evidence of reasonable rates.” Dozier v. DBI Servs., LLC, No. 18-cv-972, 2023 WL
11959809, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2023) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). “At a
minimum, satisfactory evidence consists of more than the affidavit of the attorney
performing the work[;] instead ‘satisfactory evidence necessarily must speak to rates
actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.’” Id. (Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299).
Once the lodestar is calculated, there is a “strong presumption” that it represents
“the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348,
1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). However, the district court must consider
whether the lodestar should be adjusted for “results obtained.” Norman, 836 F.2d at
1302 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37). “If the result was partial or limited success,
then the lodestar must be reduced to an amount that is not excessive. In doing so, the
court may attempt to identify specific hours spent in unsuccessful claims or it may
simply reduce the award by some proportion.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs seek a fee award of $2,869.50. (Dkt. 13 at 7) Plaintiffs do
not inform the Court the number of hours for which they were billed. Plaintiffs seek
an hourly rate of $450 to compensate Plaintiffs’ attorney, and an hourly rate of $75 for
“the support team (legal assistants).” (Id.) In support of their fee application, Plaintiffs
purport to supply a billing record as Exhibit C to the Motion, but the document at
Exhibit C is plainly a record of Plaintiffs’ taxable costs.
The documentation Plaintiffs provide to support their fee application is
insufficient. Without evidence of the number of hours for which Ms. Jiminez and Ms.
Ortiz billed Plaintiffs, the Court cannot determine whether the number of hours billed
is reasonable. Additionally, Plaintiffs provide no evidence or opinion testimony from
which the Court could determine Ms. Jiminez’s or Ms. Ortiz’s skill-level, experience,
or reputation. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299; Plum Creek Tech., LLC v. Next Cloud,
LLC, No. 19-cv-1974, 2020 WL 3317897, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2020). Likewise,
Plaintiffs provide no evidence that an hourly rate of $450 is “the prevailing market
rate” in Tampa or in the Middle District of Florida for similar services by lawyers
comparable to Ms. Jiminez, or that an hourly rate of $75 is “the prevailing market
rate” in Tampa or in the Middle District of Florida for similar services by legal
assistants comparable to Ms. Ortiz. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299; Plum Creek, 2020
WL 3317897, at *4. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’
fees without prejudice.
As prevailing parties, Plaintiffs are also entitled to an award of costs. Under the
FLSA, the following may be taxed as costs:
(1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees for printed or electronically
recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees
related to printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees; and (6) compensation of
court-appointed experts and fees related to interpretation services.
Pilipajc v. Atria Grp., LLC, No. 13–cv–2415, 2016 WL 7228875, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
19, 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1920); see also E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600,
624 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that private process server fees are taxable costs under §
1920). Plaintiffs attach a record of costs associated with Plaintiffs’ prosecution of this
action. (Dkt. 13-3) Although the record contains no description for the $405 charge,
the fee equals the filing fee Plaintiffs paid when filing the Complaint. (Id.) As for the
two $75 charges for “To be served on: Branch Reconstruction, LLC and Timothy
Butler,” the Court assumes each charge was for the service of process on one of the
Defendants. (Id.) The $150 charge for “Office Expenses – postage, prints, and related
expenses” is taxable. (Id.) Finally, the $70 charge for “Non-Military Affidavit request”
is taxable as a fee related to a witness. (Id.) Thus, all the enumerated costs are
compensable under § 1920. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs
equal to $775.00.
e. Post-Judgment Interest
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. §
1961(a)(b). Post-judgment interest shall be calculated from the date of judgment “at a
rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week
preceding the date of the judgment.” Id. Such interest “shall be computed daily to the
date of payment . . . , and shall be compounded annually.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Final Judgment, (Dkt. 13), is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. Plaintiff Jarquin is entitled to recover $44,880.00 in actual and liquidated
damages from Defendants.
3. Plaintiff Urbina is entitled to recover $56,180.00 in actual and liquidated
damages from Defendants.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT as follows:
Judgment is entered FOR Plaintiffs Jarquin and Urbina and AGAINST
Defendants Branch Reconstruction, LLC and Timothy Butler. For
Plaintiff Jarquin, judgment is entered in the amount of $44,880.00. For
Plaintiff Urbina, judgment is entered in the amount of $56,180.00.”
5. Plaintiffs are awarded $775.00 in costs.
6. Plaintiffs’ application for attorneys’ fees is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs are permitted leave to file a renewed motion for
attorneys’ fees within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order that
includes the documentation and evidence necessary for the Court to
determine a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees under the applicable legal
standard.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 7th day of February 2025.
// y |
SLL tba
Copies furnished to: MARYS. SORIVEN
Counsel of Record UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Any pro se party
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