Beasley v. C.O. Walton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAVON S. BEASLEY, Civil No. 3:25-cv-107

Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

v .

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WALTON, .

et al.,

Defendants .

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983,

filed by Ta’Von Beasley (“Beasley”), a pretrial detainee currently housed at the Dauphin

County Prison, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). The complaint is before the Court for

preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court will dismiss Beasley's

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26,

1996), authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is

proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court is required to identify

cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

This initial screening is to be done as soon as practicable and need noi await service of

process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, district courts apply the

standard governing motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757, 2017 WL

3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (stating “[t]he legal standard for dismissing a

complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or §

1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.

2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a court employs

the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72/b)(6)’);

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if it

does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell At.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 370, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The

plaintiff must aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Intl Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but . . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Efhypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and /qbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“(Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[Elven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

Because Beasley proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his

complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations

omitted).

ll. The Complaint

Beasley filed this § 1983 action against Correctional Officer Walton and Teacher

Derrick. (Doc. 1). In his complaint, Beasley alleges that on January 9, 2025, Correctional

Officer Walton opened his legal mail outside of his presence. (/d. at pp. 4-7). He seeks

monetary relief for “tampering with] mail.” (/d. at p. 7).

lll. Discussion

The Supreme Court has made clear that prisoners do not surrender all constitutional

rights during their confinement, and the Supreme Court has instructed that “federal courts

must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates.” Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). The Third Circuit has explained that prisoners “do not forfeit their

First Amendment right to use of the mails,” particularly with respect to privileged “legal mail”

exchanged with counsel, and that a “pattern and practice of opening properly marked

incoming [legal] mail outside an inmate's presence infringes communication protected by

the right to free speech.” Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogéted in

part by Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Oney, 196 F. App’x 126, 128

(3d Cir. 2006) (reaffirming holding in Bieregu that “prison officials impinge upon the First

Amendment rights of prisoners when they open prisoners’ legal mail outside the presence of

the addressee prisoner’).

In order to state a claim of this sort under the First Amendment, a prisoner must

allege that the interference with his legal mail was done according to a “pattern and

practice.” Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring a pattern and

practice of opening legal mail outside of prisoners’ presence}. A prisoner may allege that

actions were taken pursuant to a pattern or practice without the existence of a “blanket

policy.” /d. at 359 (distinguishing between a “pattern and practice” and an “explicit policy’).

Prisoners need not allege or prove any “actual injury” beyond the direct injury to their First

Amendment right to use the mails. Taylor, 196 F. App’x at 128.

Notably, courts have found that mere isolated incidents of opening legal mail outside

of an inmate’s presence, without evidence of an improper motive, is insufficient to establish

a First Amendment violation. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 501 F. App’x 176,

178 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he District Court correctly determined that Nixon's claim alleging a

single, isolated interference with his personal mail was insufficient to constitute a First

Amendment violation.”); Hale v. Pa. Dep.t of Corr., No. 3:07-CV-0345, 2010 WL 3791833, at

*3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2010) (“[O]pening [court mail] outside [prisoner's] presence on two

occasions...does not demonstrate a pattern or practice of improper handling of his legal

mail sufficient to find a First Amendment violation...lsolated incidents of opening legal mail

outside of an inmate’s presence, without any evidence of improper motive, is nothing more

than an assertion of negligence, and is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”);

Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that accidental opening of a single

piece of legal mail did not give rise to a cognizable claim); Beese v. Liebe, 51 F. App’x 979,

981 (7th Cir. 2002) (dismissing First Amendment claim based on allegations that four pieces

of legal mail had been opened outside of inmate’s presence, since the inmate presented no

evidence that his legal mail had been intentionally opened, and where the inmate-plaintiff

merely speculated that the prison official intended to do so); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d

427, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that isolated and inadvertent mishandling of legal

mail was not actionable); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).

In the complaint, Beasley alleges that his legal mail was opened outside of his

presence on one occasion. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-7). Specifically, Beasley alleges that on January

9, 2025, he was handed a legal letter from Defendant Walton that was opened outside of

Beasley’s presence. (/d.). In the supplement to the complaint, Beasley reiterates that

Defendant Walton “signed for [his] legal mail without [his] presence” on January 9, 2025.

(Doc. 9, pp. 5-6). The incident that Beasley describes is insufficient to set forth a pattern

and practice of interference with legal mail that impinges on his First Amendment rights. A

single instance of interference with legal or personal mail generally does not rise to the level

of actionable First Amendment censorship. See Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116,

120 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that district court “correctly determined that a single instance of

interference with an inmate’s [legal] mail is not sufficient to constitute a First Amendment

violation’) (citing Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1452). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the First

Amendment claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

IV. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, the Court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114

(3d Cir. 2002). Beasley's First Amendment claim will be dismissed with prejudice, as

granting leave to amend would be futile. It is well-settled that interference with a single

incoming letter—legal or personal—does not implicate a First Amendment violation.

V. Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A separate Order shall issue.

E Mariani

4, United States District Judge

‘4

Dated: February / , 2025