Melancon v. Walsh

Case: 24-30232 Document: 44-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 24-30232 February 7, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Chad Melancon,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Bradley Walsh, Individually and in his Capacity as a duly Commissioned

law enforcement officer for St. Charles Parish; Greg Champagne, Sheriff;

Unidentified Party,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:23-CV-7394

______________________________

Before Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Chad Melancon brought this action against

Defendants-Appellees Bradley Walsh and Greg Champagne for

constitutional and state law violations arising from his allegedly unlawful

arrest for residential contractor fraud. The district court found Melancon’s

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 24-30232

arrest was supported by probable cause and dismissed all claims. We

AFFIRM.

I.

A.

Defendant-Appellee Bradley Walsh, a police officer for St. Charles

Parish Sheriff’s Office, applied for a warrant to arrest Plaintiff-Appellant

Chad Melancon for committing residential contractor fraud. We begin by

summarizing the affidavit Walsh submitted in support of the arrest warrant.1

In the affidavit, Walsh stated that he was assigned to a complaint by a

homeowner regarding her contractor Melancon not completing work,

installing items without approval, and doing work that violated code

regulations. In her initial complaint made to another officer, the homeowner

explained that she entered a contract with Melancon’s construction company

for work on her residence for just over $200,000, and she had already paid

$220,000. The homeowner confronted Melancon but “he only requests

more money . . . which she refuses to pay until he makes good with the work

he has already been paid to complete.” The homeowner provided copies of

the contract, estimate paperwork, and receipts.

The affidavit goes on to describe Walsh meeting with the homeowner

at her residence, along with a contractor and structural inspector. From this

meeting, Walsh learned the following: Melancon only obtained a permit for

replacing the roof and did not obtain permits for structural changes made to

the residence; the homeowner alleged Melancon falsified paperwork to show

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1

On a motion to dismiss, the court may “consider documents attached to either a

motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in

the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.” Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. v.

Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).

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he paid for hardware that the homeowner’s receipts showed she purchased;

and the homeowner claimed to have requested a specific style of “J&K”

cabinet but Melancon installed the wrong-color cabinets and claimed they

were custom built. Walsh observed that at least some of the cabinets were

stamped with the “J&K” logo, were minorly damaged, and could have been

left over from a previous job. He also observed that the painting in the house

that had been paid for was not completed, floors were damaged, and

unapproved items had been installed in the garage.

According to Walsh’s affidavit, the homeowner explained she asked

Melancon if he had abandoned the project because several things she paid for

were left unfinished, and Melancon responded with a change order and

advised he would not complete any work if it was not paid. The homeowner

paid the additional $10,700 because she felt it was her only option, but

claimed that “there were a few things on the change order that she hadn’t

yet received as well as things that she didn’t ask for but was being charged

for.” In their last communication, Melancon informed the homeowner to

contact his attorney as he would not be accepting further communications

from her. Walsh concludes his affidavit by stating that he “attempted to make

contact with Melancon but to n[o] avail.” Based on the affidavit, a judge

issued the warrant to arrest Melancon for one count of “Residential

Contractor Fraud $5k to $25K--(Felony)” on December 27, 2022.

Turning to the complaint, we take the following well-pleaded facts as

true. See Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2019). On December

28, Walsh issued a supplemental report, which acknowledged that Melancon

“was also alleging additional monies owed to him through the victim’s

change order.” Walsh did not provide the supplemental report to the judge

who issued the warrant. The next day, Walsh entered Melancon’s

information into a database, notifying law enforcement of the outstanding

warrant. On December 30, Walsh contacted another officer and asked that

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Melancon be picked up and arrested because the homeowner wanted

Melancon arrested that day. Melancon was arrested that same day and held

through the New Year’s holiday, away from his family, until he was able to

post bond on January 4, 2023. The District Attorney’s office later refused the

charges.

In a subsequent civil suit between the homeowner and Melancon’s

company, Walsh testified that he attempted to contact Melancon only once

and did not verify his phone number, leave a message, or follow up. Walsh

also answered “no” to a series of questions about whether he concluded

Melancon had committed any of the seven actions from which the residential

contractor fraud statute specifies “misappropriation or intentional taking

may be inferred.” La. Stat. § 14:202.1. Walsh further testified that “he

believed that Melancon was taking the position that the alleged victim still

owed him money in order for him to complete the work before Melancon

came back to work”; “he had no idea what constituted the actual monetary

component of the dispute”; “there was no information to suggest that the

alleged victim was either coerced or somehow untowardly forced to sign the

construction contract with Melancon”; and “he was aware that Melancon

had previously hired his own lawyer once there was a dispute with the alleged

victim” but made no effort to contact Melancon’s lawyer.

Melancon also alleges that Walsh testified that he was neither a

licensed contractor nor had he taken courses on or worked in the field of

contractor fraud. Despite this lack of experience and training, he agreed to

take over the financial crimes division and handle all financial crimes

involving contractor fraud. And Walsh admitted there are no specific

guidelines for contractor fraud cases, or any standard operating procedures

or guidelines related to financial crimes.

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B.

Melancon filed suit against Walsh, individually and in his official

capacity as a law enforcement officer for St. Charles Parish, and against Greg

Champagne, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Charles

Parish. Seeking money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Melancon brought

claims for unlawful arrest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, punitive

damages, and Monell liability. He also brought a Louisiana state law claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Walsh and Champagne (Defendants-Appellees) filed a motion to

dismiss, asserting the defense of qualified immunity, and attaching Walsh’s

affidavit and the arrest warrant. Defendants-Appellees also took issue with

Melancon’s reliance on Walsh’s answers when he was deposed as a witness

in a later civil suit between the homeowner and Melancon’s company, citing

to and attaching a notice of deposition of Walsh from November 2023. In

Melancon’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, he acknowledged the

complaint referenced and included excerpts of Walsh’s deposition and

attached the full transcript.

The district court granted Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss

on April 1, 2024. Beginning with false arrest, the district court found that the

claim was defeated by the issuance of a facially valid arrest warrant

establishing probable cause, and rejected arguments that the warrant (a) was

so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make it facially unreasonable, or

(b) was based on omission or misrepresentation, without which there was no

probable cause. Next, the district court held that Melancon’s failure to plead

the absence of probable cause also defeated his remaining federal claims for

abuse of process, malicious prosecution, punitive damages, and Monell

liability. Having dismissed all federal claims, the district court dismissed the

remaining supplemental state law claims. Finally, the district court

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concluded Defendants-Appellees are also shielded from liability by qualified

immunity. This appeal timely followed.

II.

“Dismissals for failure to state a claim are reviewed de novo.” Cody v.

Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2021). At this stage in

proceedings, a court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true, drawing all

reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Mayfield v. Currie,

976 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Benfield, 945 F.3d at 336).

Dismissal is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

Melancon asserts constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To

state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead two—

and only two—allegations.” Anokwuru v. City of Houston, 990 F.3d 956, 963

(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir.

2020)). “First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him

of a federal right.” Id. (quoting Arnold, 979 F.3d at 266). “Second, he must

allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of

state or territorial law.” Id. (quoting Arnold, 979 F.3d at 266).

Where, as here, a plaintiff is “confronted with a qualified-immunity

defense at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must plead ‘facts which, if proved,

would defeat [the] claim of immunity.’” Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 285

(5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019)).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability

for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

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statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “We undertake a two-

pronged analysis to determine whether a government official is entitled to

qualified immunity, inquiring: (1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has

alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the

right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). Courts “exercise their

sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 285

(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).

III.

On appeal, Melancon pursues Fourth Amendment claims of false

arrest and malicious prosecution against Walsh in his individual capacity, and

Monell liability claims against both Walsh and Champagne in their official

capacities.2

A.

We begin with Melancon’s claims against Walsh individually and

focus on the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether

Melancon has alleged a constitutional violation. Melancon argues that he

sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment violation under Franks. In Franks,

“the Supreme Court held an officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he

deliberately or recklessly provides false information necessary to secure an

arrest warrant.” Laviage v. Fite, 47 F.4th 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing

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2

While Melancon originally filed suit against Walsh and Champagne in both their

individual and official capacities, Melancon does not pursue claims against Champagne in

his individual capacity on appeal.

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Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). To prevail on a Franks claim,

“plaintiffs must show that (1) the affidavit supporting a warrant contained

false statements or material omissions; (2) the affiant made such false

statements or omissions knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth; and (3) the false statements or material omissions

were necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Davis v. Hodgkiss, 11 F.4th

329, 333 (5th Cir. 2021).

The last element requires courts to conduct a “corrected affidavit”

analysis to determine “whether the warrant affidavit would support probable

cause if the misstatements and material omissions were eliminated.” Hughes

v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 620 (5th Cir. 2024). Whether a warrant affidavit

provides probable cause is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Kohler

v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 2006). Probable cause means a “fair

probability” that the defendant committed the crime, which requires more

than a “bare suspicion” but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Reitz

v. Woods, 85 F.4th 780, 790 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Watson,

273 F.3d 599, 602–03 (5th Cir. 2001)). To determine if probable cause exists,

courts “must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and decide ‘whether

these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable

police officer’ demonstrate ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal

activity.’” Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 282 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56–57 (2018)).

Relying on Walsh’s affidavit, a judge found probable cause to arrest

Melancon for residential contractor fraud. Residential contractor fraud is

defined as (1) “the misappropriation or intentional taking of anything of value

which belongs to another” (2) without consent or by fraudulent means, by

(3) “a person who has contracted to perform any home improvement or

residential construction.” La. Stat. § 14:202.1. The statute says that

misappropriation “may be inferred when a person does any of the following”

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and goes on to enumerate seven actions, such as failing “to perform any work

during a forty-five-day period of time or longer after receiving payment.” Id.

Finally, the statute sets forth varying maximum sentences and fines

depending on the value of the misappropriation, including as relevant here, a

value between five and twenty-five thousand dollars. Id.

This case turns on the “corrected affidavit” analysis. Melancon

argues that he sufficiently stated a Franks claim by alleging that Walsh

intentionally omitted information from the affidavit that would have vitiated

probable cause if included. Specifically, Melancon relies on information

Walsh later admitted knowing in a supplemental report and deposition to

allege that Walsh made five material omissions. Examining the effect on

probable cause after correcting the affidavit for each alleged omission, we

conclude that Melancon fails to state a Franks claim because the

reconstructed affidavit still sufficiently establishes probable cause.

First, Melancon relies on Walsh’s deposition to allege Walsh

materially omitted from the affidavit that “there was no issue as to the quality

of the work performed.”3 In response to the question of whether Walsh

concluded anything the homeowner complained about was not fraud, Walsh

responded “[j]ust the quality of work . . . I’m not charging him for quality of

work.” To reflect that Melancon was not being charged for the quality of the

work, we remove any references to quality from the affidavit, such as the

discussion of the wrong-color cabinets with minor damage. But the

correction is immaterial because probable cause is established through

allegations unrelated to the quality of work, including the $20,000

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3

Because we find that Melancon would fail to state a Franks claim even if the

portions of the deposition testimony Melancon relies on were reproduced directly in the

complaint, we do not decide whether the entire transcript is properly considered part of the

pleadings.

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discrepancy between the amount paid and the contract, and work that was

paid for but not completed.

Second, Melancon argues it was material to omit that Walsh “did not

know about the precise dollar amounts involved” because the value

determines “whether the offense should be charged as a felony.” Melancon

alleged in his complaint that “Walsh testified that he had no idea what

constituted the actual monetary component of the dispute” and had “no

evidence to support the $5,000 - $25,000 contractor fraud violation.”

Taking these allegations as true, the affidavit must be corrected to reflect that

Walsh did not know the amount of money in dispute, or at least not the

precise dollar amount. Walsh’s lack of knowledge of the specific amount in

dispute is not inconsistent with, and so does not negate, anything in the

affidavit on which probable cause for the value of the work could be based,

including the homeowner’s complaint that “she has paid over $220,000”

although the contract was for “just over $200,000.” Therefore probable

cause for finding a violation of between five and twenty-five thousand dollars

is unaffected by this omission.

Third, Melancon argues Walsh materially omitted that he “did not

know the nature of any work that was allegedly not completed” by Melancon.

But the pages of the deposition transcript Melancon relies on merely discuss

the quality of the work (covered in the first alleged omission) and then go on

to discuss the monetary value of the work (covered in the second alleged

omission). Accordingly, this alleged omission fails for the same reasons.

Fourth, Melancon alleges Walsh omitted that Melancon and the

homeowner were in a dispute over “payment for additional renovations that

[the homeowner] requested pursuant to a change order.” The complaint

specifically states that Walsh knew “Melancon was taking the position that

the alleged victim still owed him money in order for him to complete the work

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before Melancon came back to work.” As the district court reasoned, the

allegation that Melancon had a monetary demand against the homeowner

does not “retract[] allegations upon which probable cause was established.”

In any case, the affidavit already substantially included this alleged omission

by stating that “[Melancon] only requests more money to which [the

homeowner] refuses to pay until he makes good with the work he has already

been paid to complete.” Therefore any “correction” would be immaterial to

the finding of probable cause.

Finally, Melancon argues it was material to omit that Walsh “did not

conclude that [Melancon] had committed any of the seven enumerated

actions that would have allowed the inference that [Melancon] had

misappropriated or intentionally taken [the homeowner’s] property in

violation of” the statute. Importantly, Melancon does not contend that the

affidavit contains a false or misleading statement implying that Walsh did

conclude one of the enumerated actions occurred. Nor does Melancon argue

that the mere absence of an enumerated action renders the affidavit facially

invalid. See Kohler, 470 F.3d at 1113 (explaining that the “materiality analysis

presumes that the warrant affidavit, on its face, supports a finding of probable

cause”). Because the affidavit suffices to establish probable cause without a

conclusion that an enumerated action was committed, probable cause

remains after reconstructing the affidavit to indicate the absence of any such

conclusion.

In sum, the five alleged omissions are immaterial. Probable cause

remains even after reconstructing the affidavit to exclude references to the

quality of Melancon’s work; add Walsh’s lack of knowledge about the

monetary value of the dispute; and indicate that Walsh did not conclude

Melancon committed an enumerated action. As a result, Melancon fails to

plead a Fourth Amendment violation under Franks.

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Failure to plead a Franks claim defeats Melancon’s claims against

Walsh in his individual capacity. Without a Franks violation, Melancon

cannot allege the absence of probable cause—a baseline requirement for the

Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (false arrest);

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022) (malicious prosecution). Because

Melancon has not alleged a constitutional violation, Walsh is also entitled to

qualified immunity. See Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249, 256 (5th Cir.

2023) (finding “no need to reach the second step of the qualified immunity

analysis” because there was probable cause to arrest). And without an

underlying constitutional violation, Melancon cannot sustain a claim for

punitive damages under § 1983. Therefore the district court did not err in

dismissing Melancon’s claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and

punitive damages.

B.

Similarly, failure to plead a constitutional violation defeats

Melancon’s claims against both Walsh and Sheriff Champagne in their

official capacities. Official capacity suits are really suits against the

governmental entity of which the officials act as agents. Guillot ex rel. T.A.G.

v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023). To bring a claim against a

municipality under § 1983, or a Monell claim, plaintiffs must show “the

deprivation of a federally protected right caused by action taken pursuant to

an official municipal policy.” Hutcheson v. Dallas County, 994 F.3d 477, 482

(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir.

2010); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). As with

Melancon’s other claims, the district court correctly found that the “failure

to plead the absence of probable cause—and, thereby, state a constitutional

violation”—defeats the Monell claim. See Reitz, 85 F.4th at 795 (finding

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“[f]urther discussion of Monell’s elements, contours, and jurisprudence is

unnecessary,” where there was no constitutional violation).

* * *

It is not lost on the court that Melancon spent six days in jail for

charges that were ultimately rejected. While Melancon highlights the timing

of his arrest, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Walsh had any

control over the duration of Melancon’s incarceration. Melancon has not

claimed he was denied a right to bail, has not challenged the constitutionality

of the statute under which he was arrested, and has not alleged a retaliatory

motive for his arrest. On these facts, probable cause defeats Melancon’s

claims. In so holding, we do not minimize the gravity of the deprivation to

Melancon’s liberty. We stress that individuals like Melancon “remain

clothed with a presumption of innocence and with their constitutional

guarantees intact.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978)

(citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)). Presumed innocent until proven

guilty, arrestees retain a “strong interest in liberty.” United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). Arresting and jailing a citizen is no small matter,

and we expect law enforcement to exercise such power with care to protect

this interest in liberty.

IV.

Finding no reversible error in the district court’s proceedings, we

AFFIRM.

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