rejecting sovereign citizen’s theory that financing statements filed under the Uniform Commercial Code created a contract with the United States
How later courts described this case
- rejecting sovereign citizen’s theory that financing statements filed under the Uniform Commercial Code created a contract with the United States
- explaining that a plaintiff must make a non-frivolous argument that a contract exists to establish the court’s jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-2132
Filed: February 7, 2025
________________________________________
)
ROOZANI-SUN EL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
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THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________________ )
ORDER
Roozani-Sun El, proceeding pro se, alleges that various Illinois officials have breached
contractual obligations and Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 at 2. 1 Plaintiff also seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Based on the information provided, the court
GRANTS leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Because Plaintiff has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must screen
the complaint to ensure that it states a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and falls within this court’s
jurisdiction. This court lacks jurisdiction to hear this action.
This court’s primary grant of jurisdiction appears in the Tucker Act, which provides that:
[this court] shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). But “[t]he Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it
does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.”
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To invoke this court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff
must identify a “separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.”
Greenlee Cnty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). If Plaintiff
fails to establish jurisdiction, this court must dismiss the complaint. RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the
1
The court cites the page numbers in the ECF Header.
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”); Outlaw v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 656, 658-59 (2014).
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence. Stephens v. United States, 884 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When
determining whether this court has jurisdiction, “the court accepts as true all uncontroverted
factual allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estes Express Lines v. United
States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Because Plaintiff appears pro se, the court holds
Plaintiff’s pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Naskar v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 319, 320 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). That leniency, however, does not relieve Plaintiff
from establishing this court’s jurisdiction. Stephens, 884 F.3d at 1156; Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249,
253 (2007).
Plaintiff brings several claims against various Illinois state officials. ECF No. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff alleges “unconstitutional acts, wrongful acts,” due process violations, breach of
contract, “breach to sworn official oaths to the Illinois Constitution . . . breach of trust affidavit
of obligation,” and “non response and acquiescence to breach of trust affidavit of obligation,”
among other claims. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff claims these Illinois state officials breached a
“self-executing contract” in the form of an “invoice,” which Plaintiff attached to the complaint.
See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-12; ECF No. 1-2 at 23-28.
Even assuming all alleged facts in the complaint to be true and construing them in the
best light for Plaintiff, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim. First, these
allegations are against the State of Illinois, Illinois state officials, or the individuals Plaintiff
identifies as breaching contract or trust. There is not a single allegation against the United States
or anyone acting on its behalf. Again, under the Tucker Act, this court’s jurisdiction is limited to
cases against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This jurisdiction does not extend to any
other party, and “if the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as to them
must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 588 (1941). Thus, this court does not have jurisdiction over cases against individual federal
officials, states, or state officials. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. The court must dismiss those claims.
To the extent that Plaintiff makes a contractual claim against the Government based on
his birth certificate, such a claim is frivolous and fails to establish this court’s jurisdiction. E.g.
Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. United States, 990 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that a
plaintiff must make a non-frivolous argument that a contract exists to establish the court’s
jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous.”). From what the court can discern, Plaintiff
might be attempting to assert that his birth certificate provides a lien or collateral that he may
draw against. ECF No. 1-2 at 1. Plaintiff then attempts to establish a trust, with himself as
trustee, by a Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) financing statement. ECF No. 1-2 at 1. Such
claims are frivolous.
Birth certificates do not “recognize or impose contractual rights, obligations, or duties”
that would allow Mr. El to pursue recovery from the United States. As this court previously
explained rejecting similar arguments, “[c]onstruing the complaint in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff
alleges that his birth certificate and social security number are express contracts with the United
States. Such allegations are frivolous and cannot support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in
this matter.” Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 286 (2011). And “there is no basis in
the laws of the United States” for any claim that a UCC filing creates a contract with the United
States. See Rivera v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 644, 646 (2012) (rejecting sovereign citizen’s
theory that financing statements filed under the Uniform Commercial Code created a contract
with the United States).
Accordingly, as Plaintiff does not establish this court’s jurisdiction over the claims made
in the complaint, pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3), this court must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. For
the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
ECF No. 2, DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, DENIES-AS-MOOT the
Government’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6, and DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to enter
judgment accordingly.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the court certifies that any appeal of this decision
would not be taken in good faith.
It is so ORDERED.
s/ Edward H. Meyers
Edward H. Meyers
Judge