Karen Formby Holmes v. George David Holmes

02/05/2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 5, 2024 Session

KAREN FORMBY HOLMES v. GEORGE DAVID HOLMES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County

No. 2015-CV-847 Ted A. Crozier, Judge

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No. M2022-01195-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal arises from a divorce. The former husband challenges the classification and

division of the marital estate. Because the husband failed to comply with our procedural

rules, we deem his issues waived and dismiss the appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M. S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

George David Holmes, Gallatin, Tennessee, pro se appellant.

Emily C. Green, Springfield, Tennessee, and Nancy K. Corley, Hendersonville, Tennessee,

for the appellee, Karen Formby Holmes.

OPINION

I.

After more than thirty years of marriage, Karen Formby Holmes (“Wife”) filed for

a divorce from George David Holmes (“Husband”), alleging irreconcilable differences and

Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. At this point, the couple’s three children were

grown. Husband answered and, a few years later, filed a counter-complaint for divorce.

The parties attempted to mediate the case, but they were unsuccessful.

Much occurred while the divorce was pending. Husband sold his law practice and

applied for disability. He also incurred a substantial amount of additional debt, which he

contended was marital. With the court’s permission, the parties sold two marital assets, a

commercial building and the marital residence. They deposited the proceeds from these

sales with the court. At the court’s direction, the parties used a portion of these proceeds

to pay various debts. The court reserved decision on the characterization of these debts as

separate or marital for the final hearing.

Six years after Wife initiated divorce proceedings, the court convened the final

hearing. At trial, the parties voluntarily withdrew their requests for alimony and stipulated

to the divorce. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129 (2021). But they remained at odds over

the proper classification and division of their numerous assets and debts. Based on the

proof presented, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital estate. It specifically

found that the division was fair and equitable, and it ordered each party to pay its own

attorney’s fees.

II.

A.

On appeal, Husband argues that the court erred in its classification and division of

certain assets and debts. Where the classification, division, or allocation of marital

property or debt are at issue, Rule 7 of this Court requires “the brief of the party raising the

issue” to include, either in the body of the brief or as an appendix, a table of property and

debt and their valuations. TENN. CT. APP. R. 7(a). The table must “list all property and

debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate property, (2) all marital

property, and (3) all separate and marital debts.” Id. Additionally, table entries “must

include a citation to the record where each party’s evidence regarding the classification or

valuation of the property . . . and . . . where the trial court’s decision regarding the

classification, valuation, division, or allocation of the property . . . can be found.” Id. 7(b).

Husband did not provide us with a compliant Rule 7 table. Instead, he identified in

the body of his brief the specific funds and debts he contends were wrongly classified or

divided. See Robbins v. Robbins, No. E2017-01427-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3954323, at

*14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2018) (reasoning that appellant failed to comply with Rule 7

when he “simply itemize[d] various funds, properties and debts and t[ook] issue with the

Trial Court’s findings with respect to each”). This is problematic because we do not judge

a trial court’s division of the marital estate based on the distribution of specific marital

assets or debts. Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We

consider the overall property division. Id.; Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2005) (“In the final analysis, the appropriateness of the trial court’s division

depends on its results.”).

We have described the Rule 7 table as “essential.” Blount v. Blount, No. E2017-

00243-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1433198, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); Harden v.

Harden, No. M2009-01302-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2612688, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June

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30, 2010). The table is so essential that a failure to comply with Rule 7 may be deemed a

waiver of issues related to the classification, valuation, and division of property or debt.

Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); see also Blount, 2018

WL 1433198, at *3 (holding that husband waived any challenges to the court’s order

granting wife a portion of his military pension for failure to comply with Rule 7); Butcher

v. Butcher, No. W2011-01808-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2107977, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.

June 12, 2012) (“We have held that the failure to comply with Rule 7 of the Court of

Appeals waives issues relating to the requirements of the Rule.”); Rountree v. Rountree,

369 S.W.3d 122, 133 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is well settled that ‘where an appellant

fails to comply with this rule, that appellant waives all such issues relating to the rule’s

requirements.’” (quoting Harden, 2010 WL 2612688, at *8)).

The missing table is not the only barrier to our review. Husband’s brief also fails to

fully comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TENN. R.

APP. P. 27(a) (listing the required contents in the appellant’s brief). Husband omits the

applicable standard of review. And, more importantly, he fails to support many of his

arguments with citations to legal authority. See id. 27(a)(7). Thus, he relies largely on

conclusory assertions. It is not our responsibility “to research or construct the parties’

arguments for them.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 80 (Tenn. 2010); Bean v. Bean, 40

S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“[P]arties cannot expect this court to do [their] work

for them.”). We may deem an issue waived when a litigant fails to support that issue with

“an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).” Hodge v. Craig,

382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012); see also Tenn. State Bank v. Mashek, 616 S.W.3d 777,

813 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).

Although we may overlook these deficiencies “[f]or good cause,” we find none here.

TENN. R. APP. P. 2. We are mindful that Husband has chosen to represent himself on

appeal. Self-represented parties are entitled to fair treatment by our courts; but they “are

not . . . entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case to the courts.” Whitaker v.

Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We cannot entirely excuse

them from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules imposed on

represented parties. Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). This is

especially true when the pro se litigant is a lawyer.

B.

Wife requests an award of attorney’s fees for defending this appeal. Tennessee

follows the well-established rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees

absent a statute or agreement between the parties providing otherwise. State v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000). Under the version of

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c) applicable when this divorce was filed, we have

the discretion to award a plaintiff spouse reasonable attorney’s fees incurred “in enforcing

any decree for alimony and/or child support.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) (2014);

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Pippin v. Pippin, 277 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). But neither alimony nor

child support were at issue in this divorce. So we decline Wife’s request.

III.

When an appellant has failed to comply with our rules, dismissal of the appeal is

appropriate. See Duchow v. Whalen, 872 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)

(dismissing appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules); cf. Crowe v. Birmingham &

N.W. Ry. Co., 1 S.W.2d 781, 781 (Tenn. 1928) (recognizing this Court may “refus[e] to

consider a case upon its merits, where the appellant has not complied with the rules of that

court”). So we dismiss Husband’s appeal.

s/ W. Neal McBrayer

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

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