Kalapach v. Columbia County Prison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ASHLEY KALAPACH, : Civ. No. 1:24-CV-1478

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

COLUMBIA COUNTY PRISON, :

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss

filed by defendants Columbia County Prison Board (“CCPB”) and George

Nye, the Warden of the prison. (Doc. 17). The plaintiff, Ashley Kalapach,

brought this action against the Columbia County Prison (“CCP”), the

CCP Ward, CCPB, CCP Warden George Nye, and Former CCP

Corrections Officer Joseph A. Rogutski. (Doc. 1). Kalapach’s amended

complaint asserts violations of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 arising out of an alleged sexual assault committed by Rogutski

while she was incarcerated at CCP. ( Doc. 15).

Defendants CCPB and Nye now move to dismiss the claims against

them. (Doc. 17). They argue that Kalapach cannot establish

liability against CCPB, that the claim against Nye in his official capacity

is redundant to the claim against CCPB, and that Kalapach has not

pleaded facts to show the requisite personal involvement of Nye in the

alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 18, 25). After consideration, we

find that Kalapach has pleaded sufficient facts to establish

liability against CCPB. However, we conclude that the claim against Nye

in his official capacity fails as a matter of law, and Kalapach has failed

to plead sufficient facts to show Nye’s personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs. Accordingly, the motion will be granted in part and denied in

part.

II. Background

Ashley Kalapach first met Defendant Joseph Rogutski in 2016

while she was incarcerated at CCP. (Doc. 15 ¶ 27). Rogutski was

employed as a corrections officer at CCP and was assigned to guard

Kalapach at a hospital during her surgery. ( . ¶¶ 28-29). Kalapach was

released from prison but became incarcerated at CCP again in 2021. ( .

1 , 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

¶ 30). During this time, Kalapach was assigned to a cell in the basement

block where Rogutski supervised inmates. ( . ¶¶ 31-32).

The amended complaint asserts that Rogutski made sexual

advances and comments towards Kalapach on multiple occasions

between January and March 2022, including requests to see her breasts.

(Doc. 15 ¶¶ 37-38). Further, Kalapach alleges that on August 31, 2022,

Rogutski ordered her to go to her cell where Rogutski forced himself upon

her. ( . ¶¶ 42-45). After the alleged incident, Kalapach called her

fiancé, Kyle Briggs, and told him about her encounter with Rogutski. ( .

¶ 54). Briggs called the jail to report what Kalapach told him on the same

day, which led to Kalapach disclosing the alleged incident with Rogutski

to two CCP lieutenants. ( . ¶¶ 56-57). Rogutski was placed on paid

leave and subsequently fired. ( . ¶ 58).

Kalapach alleges that prior to the August 2022 incident, Rogutski

sexually harassed at least one other inmate and was temporarily

removed from the cell block before returning one month later. (Doc. 15 ¶

6). She also alleges that Rogutski was smuggling contraband, including

tobacco and prescription drugs, into the CCP to exchange for sexual acts

and that he made a number of sexual comments and requests in front of

other corrections officers. ( . ¶¶ 34-41).

Kalapach filed her original complaint on August 30, 2024, against

CCP, CCP Ward, CCPB, Nye, and Rogutski. (Doc. 1). CCP, CCP Ward,

CCPB, and Nye filed the first motion to dismiss on October 29, 2024.

(Doc. 10). Kalapach then amended her complaint, withdrawing all claims

against CCP and CCP Ward, claims of vicarious liability and negligent

hiring against CCPB and Nye, and her request for injunctive relief. (Doc.

15). As to CCPB and Nye, Kalapach’s remaining claim asserts a violation

of her civil rights pursuant to § 1983. ( ). CCPB and Nye filed this

instant motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a

claim. (Doc. 17). After consideration, the motion will be granted in part

and denied in part.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

Defendants CCPB and George Nye have filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set

forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, , 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-

movant.” , 20 F.3d 1250,

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

; , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”).

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-

part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any

legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for

relief.” Jd. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more

than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief. A complaint

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234—35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Jgba/,

“[wlhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’— ‘that the pleader is entitled

to relief’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination

will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public

record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 268, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court

can also consider “undisputedly authentic documentls] that a defendant

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are

based on the lattached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (8d Cir. 1993). Additionally,

if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the

court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v.

Nat! Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).

However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when

deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.

B. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be Granted in Part

and Denied in Part.

As we have noted, Kalapach asserts a § 1983 claim against CCPB

and George Nye alleging that as administrators of the Columbia County

Prison, they failed to adequately implement and enforce policies to

ensure the safety of women incarcerated at the prison. As we will

discuss, to the extent Kalapach asserts a claim against CCPB, she

has set forth sufficient facts to establish § 1983 liability against this

defendant. Kalapach’s claims against Nye, however, are insufficient

because her existing claim against CCPB is the same as her claim against

Nye in his official capacity as Columbia County Prison Warden.

Additionally, she has not pleaded sufficient facts to show any personal

involvement by Nye in the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly,

we will dismiss the claim against Nye in his individual capacity.

1. Columbia County Prison Board

Kalapach asserts a claim against the CCPB under a theory of

liability, alleging that CCPB’s failure to prevent Rogutski from

committing the alleged sexual abuse despite having knowledge of

previous incidents and complaints constitutes deliberate indifference.

She asserts this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability

upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives

another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.”

, 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section

1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a

remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory

right.” (citation omitted).

A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation under

§ 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity’s policy, custom, or

practice. , 436 U.S. 658,

695 (1978). However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because

injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”

, 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, a

plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged

constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom.

, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

In cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train officers, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure to train police

officers . . . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons

with whom the police come into contact.” , 489 U.S. at 388.

To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate

“contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a

prior pattern of similar incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under

which the supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have

communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.”

, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing

, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Here, we conclude that Kalapach sufficiently establishes

liability against CCPB. In the amended complaint, Kalapach alleges that

Rogutski had a history of harassment against female inmates and CCPB

was aware of this conduct. (Doc. 15 ¶ 4). Specifically, Kalapach states

that Rogutski sexually harassed at least one other inmate prior to the

alleged incident against her in August 2022 and that Rogutski was

temporarily removed from working in the cell block after the previous

incident. ( . ¶ 6).

At the motion to dismiss stage, where we must accept these factual

allegations as true, we conclude that Kalapach has sufficiently alleged

that Rogutski was previously accused of sexual harassment against

inmates before the alleged sexual assault against her and that CCPB was

deliberately indifferent when it allowed him to continue working with

female inmates despite having knowledge of the prior incident.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss this claim against CCPB will be

denied.

2. George Nye

Kalapach also asserts a § 1983 claim against George Nye in both

his official capacity as warden of Columbia County Prison and in his

personal capacity. Liability under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that

the defendant had personal involvement in the alleged constitutional

violation. , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988).

Personal involvement may be shown through allegations regarding the

defendant’s own conduct, or that the defendant had knowledge of the

unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the behavior. . In this case,

Nye contends that Kalapach’s claim against him in his official capacity is

redundant and should therefore be dismissed because the existing claim

against CCPB is virtually the same. Nye further asserts that Kalapach’s

claim against him in his individual capacity should also be dismissed

because she fails to allege any facts that establish his personal

involvement in the failure to prevent Rogutski’s alleged actions.

Because Kalapach is suing CCPB for the same alleged violations

pursuant to § 1983, the claim against Nye in his official capacity is

redundant. , 169 F. App’x 688, 693 (3d. Cir. 2006)

(nonprecedential) (“[A] lawsuit against public officers in their official

capacities is functionally a suit against the public entity that employs

them.”). Accordingly, the claim against Nye in his official capacity fails

as a matter of law and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Further, Kalapach does not allege any facts regarding Nye’s own

conduct or knowledge. She avers in her amended complaint that other

corrections officers would overhear Rogutski’s harassing comments and

were therefore aware of his actions prior to the alleged assault. However,

there are no facts from which we can even infer that Nye was aware of

Rogutski’s comments or his alleged history of harassing female inmates

such that he acquiesced in the wrongful conduct. Rather, the complaint,

as currently pleaded, appears to rely on a theory,

which is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against Nye. Accordingly, the

§ 1983 claim against George Nye in his individual capacity will be

dismissed without prejudice.

C. The Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend will be Granted.

The plaintiff has requested leave to amend her complaint. Rule 15

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend a

pleading once as a matter of course, if amended within a particular

timeframe, and with either consent of the opposing party or leave of court

in all other cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend should be freely

given “when justice so requires.” However, the decision to grant a

party’s request to amend a pleading lies within the discretion of the court.

, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). A court may deny a

party’s request to amend if amendment would result in undue delay, is

motivated by bad faith, or would be futile. , 371 U.S. 178,

182 (1962). Amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

, 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In assessing

‘futility,’ the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency

as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).”).

Here, there is no indication that granting Kalapach’s request for

leave to amend the § 1983 claim against Nye in his individual capacity

would result in undue delay, would be futile, is motivated by bad faith,

or would prejudice the defendants. Accordingly, we will grant Kalapach’s

request and permit her to amend the complaint with respect to the § 1983

claim against Nye in his individual capacity.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc.

17) will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. The motion will be DENIED as to the claim against the

Columbia County Prison Board; and

2. The motion will be GRANTED as to the claim against George

Nye. The official capacity claim will be dismissed WITH

PREJUDICE, and the individual capacity claim will be

dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the plaintiff

endeavoring to amend her complaint to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

An appropriate order follows.

Submitted this 4th day of February 2025.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge