William Collins v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

HEARD AT JACKSON

September 12, 2000 Session

WILLIAM COLLINS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County

No. 20408 Lynn W. Brown, Judge

No. E1999-02759-CCA-R3-PC

November 2, 2000

Because the trial court properly treated a habeas corpus petition as one for post-conviction relief and

because the statute of limitations barred any review of constitutional issues, the petition was properly

dismissed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed.

GARY R. WADE, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID G. HAYES and THOMAS T.

WOODALL , JJ., joined.

William Collins, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter, Patricia C. Kussmann, Assistant Attorney General,

Victor Vaughn, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The petitioner, William Collins, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and, in the

alternative, post-conviction relief. The trial court treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief

and entered an order of dismissal. The record demonstrates that the petitioner filed a motion to

amend along with several other motions after the order of dismissal was entered. While those

motions were originally denied, the trial court's ruling was later set aside, after which the petitioner

filed a notice of appeal. Because there has been no disposition by the trial court of any of the issues

presented after the entry of the order of dismissal, those issues will not be considered in this appeal.

The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed as

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The judgment dismissing the petition is affirmed.

On May 17, 1984, the petitioner was convicted of the September 19, 1980, first degree

murder of James Bailey. The victim was shot in the neck by a .38 caliber Derringer. The petitioner

received a life sentence. On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v.

Collins, 698 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). Application for permission to appeal to the

supreme court was denied on September 3, 1985. Later, the petitioner filed a petition for post-

conviction relief, arguing that the jury instructions on malice violated his constitutional rights and

claiming that he was denied his right to confront witnesses. The trial court denied relief. On direct

appeal, this court affirmed. William T. Collins, Jr. v. State, No. 222 (Tenn. Crim. App., at

Knoxville, July 24, 1987). Permission to appeal to the supreme court was denied on October 12,

1987. The petitioner filed another post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel. The trial court denied relief. This court affirmed on direct appeal. William T. Collins, Jr.

v. State, No. 279 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 5, 1991). Application for permission to

appeal was denied April 5, 1991.

This petition, filed September 13, 1993, included, among other issues, allegations that the

jury instructions on malice violated the petitioner's constitutional rights and that the petitioner was

denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on post-conviction. Both the petitioner and the

state filed several other pleadings. The petitioner made no claim that he had either served his

sentence or that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment. On August 3, 1998,

Judge Arden Hill denied relief, concluding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial judge also ruled that as thirteenth juror in the original trial, he was satisfied with the verdict

of first degree murder. In September of 1993, the petitioner was subject to the following statute of

limitations:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of this state must

petition for post-conviction relief under this chapter within three (3)

years of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court

to which an appeal is taken or consideration of such petition shall be

barred.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed).

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-1081 authorized trial courts to treat a petition for

habeas corpus as a petition for post-conviction relief "when the relief and procedure authorized by

[that] chapter appear[ed] adequate and appropriate . . . ." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-108 (repealed).

Because the petitioner asserted no grounds for habeas corpus relief, the trial court, in our view,

properly treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief.

When a petitioner attempts to set aside a conviction because of the abridgement of a

constitutional right, the statutory post-conviction procedure is a single means of relief. Luttrell v.

State, 644 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). In contrast, it is well settled in this state that the

writ of habeas corpus, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101 to 29-21-130, will issue only in

1

Under current law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-205(c), "[a] petition for habeas corpus may be treated as a

petition [for post-c onviction relief] whe n the relief an d proce dure au thorized b y this part appears adequate and

appropriate, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in title 29, chapter 21, or any other statute."

-2-

the case of a void judgment or to free a prisoner held in custody after his term of imprisonment has

expired. State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows, 215 Tenn. 668, 389 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1965). Unlike the

post-conviction petition, the purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely

voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsome v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189

(1968). A petitioner cannot collaterally attack a facially valid conviction in a habeas corpus

proceeding. Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992); State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211

Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d 887, 888 (1963). In Archer v. State, our supreme court held as follows:

When the restraint, from which relief is sought by a writ of habeas

corpus, proceeds from a judgment erroneous but not void, the writ

will not lie. Nor, under it, can the party impeach a judgment as

contrary to the facts. And, in general, this is not the remedy where

the imprisonment is on judicial process. But where the sentence is

void, not merely voidable, or the term of imprisonment under it has

expired, relief may be had by the writ. . . . [J]udicial officers . . .

sometimes use the writ as if it were a writ of error, under which they

might correct the errors and irregularities of other tribunals. "Any

such employment of the writ is an abuse."

851 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State ex rel. Karr v. Taxing District of Shelby County,

84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 240, 249-50 (1886) (citations omitted).

Clearly, the petitioner seeks post-conviction relief. The attack on the conviction is collateral

in nature. The 1967 Act, as amended, provided for a three-year statute of limitations for post-

conviction relief. Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Because our supreme

court denied the petitioner's application for permission to appeal his conviction on September 3,

1985, some eight years prior to this filing, the trial court correctly determined that the petition was

filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

The petitioner also argues that he is entitled to have his erroneous jury instruction claim

considered under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(1). That is, he argues, that his claim is "based

upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized

as existing at the time of trial . . . ." In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), upon which the

petitioner relies, the Supreme Court held that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction on

reasonable doubt that misstated the burden of proof was reversible error, not subject to a harmless

error analysis. The Court observed that the Constitution requires that all jury verdicts of guilt be

reached on a beyond a reasonable doubt basis. Id. at 281. In making its determination, the high

court ruled as follows:

Insofar as the possibility of harmless-error review is concerned, the

jury-instruction error in this case is quite different from the jury-

instruction error of erecting a presumption regarding an element of

the offense. . . . "[W]hen a jury is instructed to presume malice from

-3-

predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond

a reasonable doubt." . . . A reviewing court may thus be able to

conclude that the presumption played no significant role in the

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

Id. at 280-81 (citations omitted). The petitioner correctly points out that the jury instructions on

malice in his case were disapproved of in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which held

unconstitutional an instruction entitling the jury to presume malice, an element of murder. The

Supreme Court reasoned that the jury might consider the instruction mandatory and thus place the

burden of "disposing" of that element on the defendant. In State v. Martin, our supreme court ruled

that such an instruction may be harmless error if found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

702 S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tenn. 1985). In the petitioner's first post-conviction petition, decided by this

court on October 12, 1987, the instructions were deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. That

determination is final. As such, the ruling in Sullivan is distinguishable and would not afford the

petitioner any procedural relief.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE

-4-