“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”
How later courts described this case
- “While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”
- “Florida law has not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued.”
- “Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ANDY JAMES SEVILLA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-144-WFJ-AAS
MANATEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Andy James Sevilla, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, initiated this action by
filing a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Upon review, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court concludes that the complaint must be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. In addition, if he wishes to proceed with this action,
Mr. Sevilla must either pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. Screening of Complaint
Mr. Sevilla sues the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office and four deputies in their
official capacities: Sean Gilbert, Brian Philips, Christopher Houghton, and Christopher
Minca. (Doc. 1 at 1-3). Mr. Sevilla alleges that on August 10, 2024, he “was handcuffed,
beaten, then tased twice in [the] back.” (Id. at 5). As a result, he allegedly suffered a
“damaged right knee” that required an X-ray and a “knee brace.” (Id.) The complaint
contains no additional information about the alleged excessive-force incident. (Id.) As
relief, Mr. Sevilla seeks “funds due to receiving wounds and now having PTSD.” (Id.)
As currently pled, the complaint is deficient and must be dismissed without
prejudice. First, Mr. Sevilla cannot pursue a § 1983 claim against the Manatee County
Sheriff’s Office. “Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered
legal entities subject to suit” under § 1983. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.
1992); see also Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th
Cir. 2013) (“Florida law has not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with
the capacity to be sued.”). Accordingly, Mr. Sevilla cannot proceed against the Manatee
County Sheriff’s Office. See, e.g., Heid v. Rutkoski, No. 6:20-cv-727-GKS-DCI, 2022 WL
1819096, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2022) (“Because the Orange County Sheriff’s
Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983, as a matter of law, it
is not a proper party to this action.”).
Second, Mr. Sevilla sues the remaining defendants in their official capacities, but
he fails to allege facts sufficient to support liability under that theory. An official-capacity
claim is a claim against the entity of which the named defendant is an agent—in this case,
Manatee County. Owens v. Fulton Cnty., 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). “When suing local officials in their
official capacities under § 1983, the plaintiff has the burden to show that a deprivation of
constitutional rights occurred as a result of an official government policy or custom.”
Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005). “A policy is a decision that is
officially adopted by the [government entity], or created by an official of such rank that he
or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the [government entity].” Sewell v. Town of
Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). “A custom is a practice that is so
settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” Id. Mr. Sevilla fails to plead facts
showing that the alleged excessive-force incident resulted from a policy or custom of
Manatee County. Accordingly, he fails to state an official-capacity claim against the
individual defendants.
Third, Mr. Sevilla’s excessive-force claim is inadequately pled. “Although suspects
have a right to be free from force that is excessive, they are not protected against a use of
force that is necessary in the situation at hand.” Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816,
821 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, “[t]he merits of excessive force claims are fact sensitive.”
Anderson v. Vazquez, 813 F. App’x 358, 360 (11th Cir. 2020). Courts consider several
factors “in determining whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable,
including (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need
and the amount of force used, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted and, (4) whether the
force was applied in good faith or maliciously and sadistically.” Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526
F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008).
Mr. Sevilla “fails to provide any factual context by which a court could evaluate the
plausibility of the excessive force” claim. Stepp v. Brown, No. 8:22-cv-590-KKM-AAS,
2022 WL 2717388, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2022). He does not explain how any particular
defendant was involved in the use of force. See, e.g., Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316,
1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must
demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the
defendant caused a legal wrong.”). Furthermore, Mr. Sevilla “does not describe his actions
preceding his apprehension (and thus whether there was a need for the application of force
as alleged).” Stepp, 2022 WL 2717388, at *2. Without such detail, Mr. Sevilla fails to state
a plausible excessive-force claim. If he wishes to pursue this claim, “he must explain the
circumstances under which force was used, including what he did and said, what each
officer did and said, and the nature and extent of any injuries he sustained.” Lancaster v.
Adams, No. 3:21-cv-559-BJD-JBT, 2021 WL 4502796, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021).
For all these reasons, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. In light of his
pro se status, the Court will give Mr. Sevilla an opportunity to amend his complaint. See
Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Where a
more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one
chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with
prejudice.”).
II. Filing Fee or Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Mr. Sevilla neither paid the $405.00 filing fee nor sought leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. If he wishes to pursue this action, Mr. Sevilla must either pay the filing fee or
submit a complete motion to proceed in forma pauperis in accordance with the instructions
set out below. Failure to comply with this directive within thirty days of the date of this
order will result in the dismissal of this action without further notice.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1. Mr. Sevilla’s complaint, (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED without prejudice.
a. If Mr. Sevilla wishes to amend, he shall file an amended complaint within
THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order.
b. To amend, Mr. Sevilla should complete a new civil-rights complaint
form, titling it “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must
include all of Mr. Sevilla’s claims and may not refer back to, or
incorporate, the complaint. The amended complaint shall supersede the
complaint. Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342,
1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. If Mr. Sevilla fails to file an amended complaint by the above deadline, or
fails to seek an extension of time to do so, this order dismissing the complaint
will become a final judgment. “[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave
to amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time
allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff [amending his
complaint or] seeking an extension. And when the order becomes a final
judgment, the district court loses ‘all its prejudgment powers to grant any
more extensions’ of time to amend the complaint.” Auto. Alignment & Body
Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 720-71 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
3. Within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order, Mr. Sevilla must either (1)
file a fully completed Affidavit of Indigency form (if he desires to proceed
as a pauper and incur the pauper’s filing fee of $350) or (2) pay the $405.00
filing fee (if he does not desire to proceed as a pauper). Failure to comply
with this directive will result in the dismissal of this case without further
notice.
4. Mr. Sevilla must advise the Court of any change of address. He must entitle
the paper “Notice to the Court of Change of Address” and must exclude any
motions from the notice. Failure to inform the Court of an address change
will result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Mr. Sevilla an Affidavit of Indigency
form and the standard form for pro se prisoner complaints.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 31, 2025.
lieth,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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