Cokes v. Stanson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

SHERRY COKES, et al., : Case No. 3:24-cv-332

:

Plaintiff, :

:

District Judge Michael J. Newman

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

MARY ANN LUGER STANSON, et al., :

:

Defendant. :

:

ORDER and

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

This case is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. #1) and for a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. #1) is GRANTED.

However, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS

this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Upon careful review, Plaintiff’s description of her case is difficult to comprehend. In a civil

complaint form section entitled “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff wrote the following:

To the list of profilirater [sic] names of the occulage [sic] eye

process program[,] the senseless morven [sic] avenue of late

unauthorized succession of minutes[,] hours[,] days[,] and time are

calculated by the formage [sic] of adjudication of non-accidental

concurrence of multiple secret job titles of standard undercover

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

practices of the revelation of project manner fortress service by air

expression companies[.]

The degree of education and startup job works program certificate

of deposits of living and work relationships of manufacturing future

ingredient design of within and without the depository start up

system[.]

The Justice Department of Super Foundry Friends was invaded by

the demise of Helen Street from the 100 Space Laboratory

Department of the Spacer Founders Development Set Program[.]

The lineage of Helena Street family oglyphic [sic] family statute of

civil rights of Medgar evers [sic] projectile sheets[.] Uncle Jobe

McKinley District 6[.].

(Doc. #1-1, PageID #6) .2 Plaintiff’s Complaint includes several handwritten attachments, which

fail to illuminate her statement of claim. Id. at 8-13. For relief, Plaintiff seeks “[t]he return of my

true knowledge barring process of true educational degrees[,] run spots[,] trivial pursuits of

monetary treasure accounts from unlawful prosperity[,] hidden accountants[.] The occrumen [sic]

of valid investigation reports on by coaches and factory agents of hunting rights to wrong BP

Creem[.]” Id. at 7.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint upon finding (1) the

claims are frivolous or malicious; (2) it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(3) it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. It is appropriate for

the Court to conduct this review sua sponte prior to issuance of process “so as to spare prospective

defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

2 Plaintiff’s Motion and Complaint were submitted in a combination of lowercase and capital letters. Quoted portions

of the filings that appear in this Order and Report and Recommendation use lowercase letters for better readability.

The undersigned has taken care to preserve the original meaning, as best as can be determined.

In conducting this initial review, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true and

construes them liberally in her favor. See Donald v. Marshall, No. 84-3231, 1985 WL 13183, at

*1 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1985) (stating that, “[w]hen considering a pro se action for dismissal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the complaint should be liberally construed and the allegations of the

complaint must be taken as true and construed in favor of the plaintiff”). However, while pro se

pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), pro se

plaintiffs must still satisfy basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989).

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a

complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

In addition to the § 1915(e)(2) review, the Court must dismiss an action if it determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Williams v. Cincy Urban

Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (Weber, D.J.) (citing

Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), a pleading must contain “a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction ….” “The basic statutory grants of federal-

court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-

question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘diversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.”

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006).

District courts have federal-question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. District courts have

diversity jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and involves “(1) citizens of different States;

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; [or] (3) citizens of different States

and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Although Plaintiff indicated that this Court has subject-

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, (Doc. #1-1, PageID #5), it is not clear

from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether she is asserting any claims under federal law. See Frengler v.

Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989)) (“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’”).

Indeed, her Complaint is devoid of reference to any federal laws, regulations, or provisions under

the United States Constitution. Moreover, the undersigned is unable to discern any plausible legal

claim. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants under federal law, the

undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.

The Court should also dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint because there is no plausible legal

basis for establishing subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiff indicated that this Court

has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(1), and 1343. (Doc. #1-1,

PageID #5). However, as explained above, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants do not involve

or arise under any federal laws or the United States Constitution. Thus, Plaintiff is unable to

establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(A)(3) in support of her assertion of

federal-question jurisdiction is misplaced. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #5). Section 1343(A)(3) of Title

28 of the United States Code provides original jurisdiction for federal district courts in order for a

plaintiff “to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United

States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States.” But as discussed above, the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not

involve any violations of her constitutional rights or “any Act of Congress providing for equal

rights of citizens ….” Therefore, Plaintiff has not established federal subject-matter jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim also does not meet the requirements of diversity of citizenship

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically,

Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the complete diversity and amount in controversy requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 1332. Based on the addresses provided by Plaintiff for herself and Defendants, the parties

are residents of Ohio. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 4-5). She does not allege that Defendants may be

domiciled elsewhere for purposes of determining their state of citizenship. Moreover, Plaintiff

seeks nonmonetary relief or, at most, unspecified monetary relief in “monetary treasure accounts,”

failing to allege an amount in controversy. Id. at 7. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly

allege diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to establish this Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

#1) is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3);

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the

foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore

deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997); and

3. The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.

January 31, 2025 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being served with

this Report and Recommendation. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report

objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If

the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at

an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or

such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless

the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.

1981).