“[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys' fees and costs.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys' fees and costs.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 19-1320V
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
ALFRED LEIDNER, *
*
Petitioner, * Special Master Shah
*
v. * Filed: December 12, 2024
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH *
AND HUMAN SERVICES, *
*
Respondent. *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Joshua David Ross, Cantey Hanger LLP, Fort Worth, TX, for Petitioner.
Tyler King, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1
On August 29, 2019, Alfred Leidner (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking compensation
under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program2 (“the Vaccine Program”). Pet., ECF
No. 1. Petitioner alleged he suffered from Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”) and chronic
inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (“CIDP”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”)
vaccination he received on December 4, 2017. See id. On November 20, 2023, the parties filed a
stipulation, which former Special Master Katherine E. Oler adopted as her decision on November
27, 2023; Petitioner was awarded $159,036.47 in damages. ECF Nos. 64, 65.
1
Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made
publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government
Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance
with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that
the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.
2
The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2018)) (hereinafter
“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All subsequent references to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the
pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.
On March 5, 2024, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by his
current counsel at Cantey Hanger, LLP, and his former counsel at Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky,
P.C. (“Fees App.”). ECF No. 70. Petitioner requests total attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount
of $59,912.40, representing $26,546.00 in attorneys’ fees and $17,607.09 in attorneys’ costs
incurred by Cantey Hanger, LLP, and $14,598.60 in attorneys’ fees and $1,160.71 in attorneys’
costs incurred by Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C. Fees App. at 1-2. Petitioner indicates that
he personally has not incurred any costs related to the prosecution of his petition. Id.. Respondent
responded to the motion on March 5, 2024, stating that “Respondent is satisfied the statutory
requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case” and requesting “that
the Court exercise its discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.”
Resp’t’s Resp. at 2-3 (ECF No. 71). Petitioner did not file a reply.
This matter is now ripe for consideration.
I. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Section 15(e) (1) of the Vaccine Act allows the Special Master to award “reasonable
attorneys’ fees, and other costs.” § 300aa–15(e)(1)(A)–(B). Petitioners are entitled to an award
of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if they are entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act,
or, even if they are unsuccessful, they are eligible so long as the Special Master finds that the
petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, because Petitioner was awarded compensation
pursuant to a stipulation, he is entitled to a final award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
It is “well within the special master's discretion” to determine the reasonableness of fees.
Saxton v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521–22 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Hines
v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“[T]he reviewing court must grant
the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys' fees and
costs.”). Applications for attorneys' fees must include contemporaneous and specific billing
records that indicate the work performed and the number of hours spent on said work. See Savin
v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008).
Reasonable hourly rates are determined by looking at the “prevailing market rate” in the
relevant community. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The “prevailing market
rate” is akin to the rate “in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 895, n.11. The petitioner bears the burden of providing
adequate evidence to prove that the requested hourly rate is reasonable. Id.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
1. Cantey Hanger, LLP
Petitioner requests the following rates of compensation for his attorney, Ms. Scharli Branch
at Cantey Hanger, LLP: $305.00 for work performed in 2021, $314.00 per hour for work
performed in 2022, $330.00 per hour for work performed in 2023, and $348.00 per hour for work
performed in 2024. It appears that this is Ms. Branch’s first case in the Vaccine Program, and
therefore the Court has not previously had an opportunity to assess the reasonableness of Ms.
2
Branch’s hourly rates. Ms. Branch’s affidavit states that she was admitted to practice law in Texas
in 2017, and she has been admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Ex. 41 at
2. Ms. Branch also states that in 2015 she was an intern for then-Chief Special Master Dorsey,
and from 2016 to 2018, she was a law clerk to now-Chief Special Master Corcoran. Id. Based
on my experience, the hourly rates billed by Ms. Branch are reasonable and shall be awarded
herein.
2. Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C.
Petitioner requests the following hourly rates for work of his former counsel at Saltz,
Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C.: for Mr. Lawrence R. Cohan, $440.00 per hour for work performed
in 2018, $450.00 per hour for work performed in 2019, $484.00 per hour for work performed in
2020, and $509.00 per hour for work performed in 2021; and for Mr. David J. Carney, $315.00
per hour for work performed in 2018. Mr. Cohan’s requested rates from 2018 and 2019 and Mr.
Carney’s requested rate from 2018 are consistent with what counsel have previously been awarded
for their Vaccine Program work and shall be awarded herein. Mr. Cohan’s rates for 2020 and
2021, however, require adjustment. Mr. Cohan has been previously awarded $470.00 per hour for
time billed in 2020, and $484.00 per hour for time billed in 2021. See, e.g., Lesher v. Sec’y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1076V, 2021 WL 1526198, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 17,
2021). Therefore, these rates shall be awarded herein. This results in a reduction of $220.40.3
B. Reasonable Hours Expended
Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that
are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Additionally, it is well-established that billing for
administrative/clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States,
18 Cl. Ct. 379, 387 (1989); Arranga v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 02-1616V, 2018 WL
2224959, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 12, 2018).
1. Cantey Hanger, LLP
The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be reasonable. I have reviewed the billing
entries and find that they adequately describe the work done on the case and the amount of time
spent on that work. None of the entries appear objectionable; nor has Respondent identified any
entries as objectionable. Accordingly, Petitioner is awarded final attorneys’ fees for his counsel
at Cantey Hanger, LLP in the amount of $26,546.00.
2. Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C.
The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be reasonable. I have reviewed the billing
entries and find that they adequately describe the work done on the case and the amount of time
spent on that work. None of the entries appear objectionable; nor has Respondent identified any
3
This amount was calculated as follows: (($484 - $470) x 3.6 hrs. = $50.40) + (($509 - $484) x 6.8 hrs. = $170.00)
= $220.40.
3
entries as objectionable. Accordingly, Petitioner is awarded final attorneys’ fees for his counsel
at Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C. in the amount of $14,378.20.
C. Attorneys’ Costs
Like attorneys’ fees, a request for reimbursement of attorneys’ costs must be reasonable.
Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (Fed. Cl. 1992).
1. Cantey Hanger, LLP
Petitioner requests a total of $17,607.09 in attorneys’ costs for his counsel at Cantey
Hanger, LLP. This amount is comprised of scanning costs, legal research fees, acquiring medical
records, and postage. Ex. 37 at 3. These administrative costs are typical in Vaccine Program cases
and were reasonably incurred in this matter. I discuss other costs below.
a. Life Care Planner Report
Petitioner requests reimbursement for life care planning services provided by Mr. Nicholas
J. Choppa with OSC Vocational Systems, Inc., in the amount of $2,614.50, at a rate of $249.00
per hour. I find this rate to be reasonable and the amount requested to be reasonable, and award it
herein.
b. Dr. S. Michael Phillips’s Expert Costs
Petitioner requests reimbursement for expert services provided by neurologist and board-
certified immunologist, Dr. S. Michael Phillips, for 19.9 hours at a rate of $600.00 per hour,
totaling $11,940.00. Ex. 37 at 16-18. Petitioner explains that he retained Dr. Phillips in response
to Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report. Fees App. at 9. Petitioner asserts that Dr. Phillips has
significant prior experience and has “served as an expert witness in the Vaccine Program for the
Respondent and has testified approximately twenty times on their behalf and has provided reports
for many other claims.” Id. Petitioner points to Dr. Phillips’s extensive education, career, board
certifications, clinical experience, and publication history. Id. at 9-10. Petitioner also notes that
“Dr. Phillip’s [sic] dual experience in neurology and immunology helped illustrate and explain
key issues in this case including Petitioner’s diagnosis and the Althen prongs.” Id. at 10.
While Dr. Phillips’s requested rate of $600.00 per hour is not necessarily objectionable, it
exceeds the $550.00 per hour that he was previously awarded for similar work in 2022. See Hock
v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-945V, 2024 WL 1639992, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Mar. 18, 2024). Accordingly, I will reduce Dr. Phillips’s rate from $600.00 to $550.00 per hour
for the expert services he performed in 2022 in this case. This results in a reduction of $995.00.4
Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to final attorneys’ costs from his counsel at Cantey Hanger, LLP
in the amount of $16,612.09.
2. Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C.
4
This amount was calculated as follows: ($600 - $550) x 19.9 hrs. = $995.
4
Petitioner requests a total of $1,160.71 in attorneys’ costs for his counsel at Saltz,
Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C. This amount is for expenses associated with acquiring medical
records, legal research fees, and the Court’s filing fee. Ex. 39 at 2. Petitioner has provided
adequate documentation supporting all requested costs, and Respondent has not identified any
specific costs as objectionable. I find these costs to be reasonable and shall fully reimburse them.
Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to final attorneys’ costs from his counsel at Saltz, Mongeluzzi
& Bendesky, P.C. in the amount of $1,160.71.
II. Conclusion
In accordance with the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2012), I have reviewed the
billing records and costs in this case and find that Petitioner’s request for fees and costs is
reasonable. I find that it is reasonable to compensate Petitioner and his counsel as follows:
Cantey Hanger, LLP
Attorneys’ Fees Requested $26,546.00
(Reduction to Fees) -
Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded $26,546.00
Attorneys’ Costs Requested $17,607.09
(Reduction to Costs) ($995.00)
Total Attorneys’ Costs Awarded $16,612.09
Cantey Hanger, LLP
$43,158.09
Total Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Saltz, Mongeluzzi, & Bendesky, P.C.
Attorneys’ Fees Requested $14,598.60
(Reduction to Fees) ($220.40)
Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded $14,378.20
Attorneys’ Costs Requested $1,160.71
(Reduction to Costs) -
Total Attorneys’ Costs Awarded $1,160.71
Saltz, Mongeluzzi, & Bendesky, P.C.
$15,538.91
Total Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Total Attorneys’ Fees and Costs $58,697.00
Accordingly, I award the following:
1. A lump sum in the amount of $43,158.09, comprised of $26,546.00 in attorneys’
fees, and $16,612.09 in attorneys’ costs incurred by Cantey Hanger, LLP, in the
form of a check payable jointly to Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel, Joshua
David Ross.
5
2. A lump sum in the amount of $15,538.91, comprised of $14,378.20 in attorneys’
fees, and $1,160.71 in attorneys’ costs incurred by Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Bendesky,
P.C., in the form of a check payable jointly to Petitioner and Petitioner’s former
counsel, Lawrence R. Cohan.
In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the
court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jennifer A. Shah
Jennifer A. Shah
Special Master
5
Entry of judgment can be expedited by each party’s filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek review. Vaccine
Rule 11(a).
6