Bradley v. Prince

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TYRONE BRADLEY, No. 4:24-CV-01652

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SCOTT PRINCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 30, 2025

Plaintiff Tyrone Bradley filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging

constitutional violations by medical providers at the State Correctional Institution

in Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI Dallas). His Section 19831 claims sound in deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Because Bradley fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, the Court will dismiss his complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but will grant him leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Bradley initially recounts that, in August 2022, he underwent left knee

surgery for his “ACL and meniscus.”2 He was discharged with a “full leg brace”

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

and began receiving physical therapy sessions in Pittstown, Pennsylvania.3 During

this time, Bradley was being held in pretrial detention.4

In November 2022, Bradley was sentenced to three to six years’

imprisonment for controlled substance offenses, to be served in a state correctional

institution.5 During the following months, he was transferred between three

different facilities (Luzerne County Prison, SCI Smithfield, and SCI Camp Hill).6

On February 8, 2023, Bradley was moved to SCI Dallas, his current facility of

incarceration.7

The gravamen of Bradley’s complaint involves the medical care he received

while at SCI Dallas. He first alleges that, immediately upon his arrival, he

informed unspecified “medical staff” about his prior knee surgery and the resulting

swelling, stiffness, and pain he was experiencing.8 According to Bradley, he did

not receive a knee brace until May 7, 2023.9 He also recounts that, despite his

knee problems, he was assigned to the “top tier” of the housing unit (requiring him

to walk up and down stairs every day) and to the top bunk in his cell.10 He does

not allege who was responsible for his cell assignment.

3 Id.

4 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

5 Id. ¶ 10.

6 Id. ¶¶ 11-15.

7 Id. ¶ 18.

8 Id.

9 Id. ¶ 19.

10 Id.

Bradley next avers that on August 26, 2023, he submitted a sick-call form,

and three days later—while the prison was on lockdown—he was visited at his cell

by defendant Physician Assistant Mark Able.11 PA Able witnessed Bradley’s

difficulty in climbing down from the top bunk and also examined Bradley’s knee,

which was “swollen and stiff.”12 PA Able prescribed “Naproxen 375 mg” to treat

Bradley’s knee issues.13

Later that day, when Bradley went to pick up the prescribed medication, he

avers that he informed “medical staff” that he was still assigned to the top tier and

top bunk, and that this assignment was causing him knee pain.14 On September 5,

2023, Bradley was moved to the bottom bunk but remained housed on the top tier

of the unit.15

On September 15, 2023, Bradley filed a formal grievance (# 1052987)

regarding the medical care he was receiving at SCI Dallas.16 In his grievance, he

explained that since late August 2023, he had spoken to “medical staff” on several

occasions concerning his knee pain and swelling.17 He recounted that he “had been

given bottom bunk status, a knee brace, and pain medication,” as well as daily

11 Id. ¶ 20.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. ¶ 21.

15 Id. ¶ 22.

16 Id. ¶ 23; Doc. 1-1 at 1.

17 Doc. 1-1 at 1.

monitoring of his knee brace by the medical department.18 He asserted, however,

that “the pain meds [he had] received do not work” and that he needed “to have an

MRI and/or X-ray for [his] serious medical need.”19

In the October 10, 2023 initial review response to Bradley’s grievance, the

prison’s Corrections Health Care Administrator thoroughly reviewed Bradley’s

medical history and the treatment provided, found his extensive medical treatment

to be appropriate, and denied his grievance.20 Bradley appealed to the Facility

Manager, who upheld the grievance denial on November 9, 2023.21

On November 26, 2023, Bradley attempted to appeal the Facility Manager’s

decision to final review. However, he “mistakenly” filed the appeal with the

Facility Manager due to his misunderstanding of the grievance process, which he

acknowledges was “an error on [his] behalf.”22 On December 18, 2023, the

Superintendent of SCI Dallas (who is also the Facility Manager)23 responded to

Bradley and informed him that an appeal to final review must be mailed to the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), provided him with

the SOIGA’s mailing address, and noted that his appeal would “not be processed”

as currently filed.24 It does not appear, and Bradley does not allege, that he ever

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Doc. 1 ¶ 24; Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.

21 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25-26; Doc. 1-1 at 5.

22 See Doc. 1 ¶ 27; Doc. 1-1 at 6-7.

23 See Doc. 1-1 at 5, 7.

24 Id. at 7.

properly filed an appeal to final review with the SOIGA or received a decision by

the SOIGA on such an appeal.

Bradley lodged the instant Section 1983 complaint in this Court on

September 27, 2024.25 He sues three defendants: Doctor Scott Prince, CRNP

Loretta DeBoer, and Physician Assistant Mark Able.26 He initially moved for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis,27 but then submitted the full filing fee on or

about November 20, 2024.28 Bradley’s complaint is now ripe for screening under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.29 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”30 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).31

25 See generally Doc. 1.

26 Id. ¶¶ 4-6.

27 Doc. 3.

28 See Doc. 8.

29 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

30 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

31 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”32 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.33 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.34

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.35 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”36 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.37 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

32 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

33 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

34 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

35 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

36 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

37 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”38

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”39

Because Bradley proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”40 This is particularly true

when the pro se litigant, like Bradley, is incarcerated.41

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review of Bradley’s Section 1983 complaint and its attachments, it is

clear that he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court

will address his pleading deficiencies in turn.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”42 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”43 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through

38 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

39 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

40 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

41 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

42 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

43 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;

however, such averments must be made with particularity.44 Furthermore, it is

equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does

not give rise to Section 1983 liability.45

Bradley’s initial pleading deficiency is his failure to allege personal

involvement. Although he identifies three individual Defendants, Bradley never

delineates how two of them were involved in the alleged constitutional

misconduct.

First, with respect to CRNP DeBoer, this Defendant is identified only in the

caption and “Defendant” identification section of Bradley’s complaint. There are

no allegations of how CRNP DeBoer was involved in Bradley’s treatment at SCI

Dallas or how her actions violated the Eighth Amendment.

Second, although Bradley names Dr. Prince as a Defendant, he does not

provide any relevant allegations as to Dr. Prince’s purportedly deficient medical

care. Dr. Prince is mentioned only once near the end of Bradley’s complaint. In

that paragraph, Bradley alleges that he was seen by Dr. Prince on July 26, 2024,

44 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

45 See id. at 374 (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal

involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s

grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases);

Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v.

Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s

claims against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against

them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”).

regarding the results of an X-ray, and that Dr. Prince informed Bradley that his

“restrictions have been updated.”46 This single sentence does not indicate how Dr.

Prince was involved in constitutionally violative medical care at SCI Dallas.

To plausibly plead a Section 1983 claim, Bradley must specify each

Defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct in order

to state a claim against them. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the Section

1983 claims against defendants CRNP DeBoer and Dr. Prince pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal involvement.

B. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”47 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had

a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that

need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.”48 A serious

medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment

46 Doc. 1 ¶ 30.

47 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

48 Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.”49

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.50 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”51 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.52

Assuming that Bradley has stated a serious medical need with respect to his

knee issues, his medical indifference claims fail at the second element. That is, he

has not plausibly alleged facts that would show that any particular Defendant acted

with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs.

As noted above, Bradley fails to allege any relevant involvement by Dr.

Prince or CRNP DeBoer in his medical care, and thus logically fails to allege that

these Defendants were aware of and deliberately indifferent to his knee problems.

As to PA Able, Bradley’s only allegation is that on a single occasion, PA Able

49 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

50 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

51 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

52 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

visited Bradley’s cell, examined his knee, and prescribed pain medication as

treatment. This single allegation does not implicate negligence, let alone deliberate

indifference. And even if this allegation could be construed as Bradley asserting

that PA Able failed to provide appropriate care, it is well settled that mere

disagreement as to a medical provider’s professional judgment or treatment plan

generally does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.53

Additionally, Bradley’s complaint fails to adequately plead causation, the

third element of a medical indifference claim. It is impossible to determine from

his allegations whether any particular Defendant’s conduct caused his harm.

Bradley appears to maintain that “his knee has not healed correctly” due to the

absence of appropriate medical devices and treatment.54 However, his complaint

does not plausibly allege that any named Defendant’s actions proximately caused

this alleged injury.55 Accordingly, Bradley’s Eighth Amendment claims must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

53 See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (explaining that “mere disagreement as to the proper medical

treatment” does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation”); see also Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,’ when

medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence

that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation omitted)); Brown v. Borough

of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

54 Doc. 1 ¶ 31.

55 It appears that Bradley may be assigning blame to other medical providers at previous jails or

correctional institutions. Such claims, however, are not part of the instant lawsuit and do not

appear to have been raised in the administrative remedy process.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Bradley sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.56

However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary damages from state

officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state.57 This immunity from private suit extends to state

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”58 States may waive

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.59 There are two

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”60

56 See Doc. 1 ¶ 7.

57 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

58 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

59 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

60 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

Bradley seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as legal costs.61

To the extent those damages are sought against Defendants in their official

capacities, such claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Moreover, Bradley’s request for a declaration that his constitutional rights were

violated62 is retrospective, rather than prospective, in nature. Thus, Bradley’s

official capacity claims must be dismissed as well.

D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)63 requires prisoners to

exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials for alleged

constitutional violations.64 Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is

seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the

administrative system.65 The exhaustion process a prisoner must follow is

governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where the inmate

is incarcerated.66

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections employs a three-step grievance

process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative remedies in

61 See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 44, 45, 47.

62 See id. ¶ 43.

63 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.

64 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only

“available” remedies must be exhausted).

65 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).

66 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

most cases.67 If informal resolution attempts do not solve the problem, the first

step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the Facility

Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon which the

claim is based.”68 An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator must be

appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review

response or rejection.69 Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility Manager must

be appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances

and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15 working days of the

date of the Facility Manager’s decision.70

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.

Those requirements include, among other conditions, that the grievance “be legible

[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as

well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to

the grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the

event(s)”; and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including

“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”71

67 See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T

OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter

“DC-ADM 804”).

68 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5), (8).

69 Id. § 2(A)(1).

70 Id. § 2(B)(1).

71 Id. § 1(A)(11).

Generally, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, not a pleading requirement.72 Nevertheless, when it is apparent from the

face of the complaint that a plaintiff has failed to administratively exhaust a claim,

dismissal may be appropriate based on “failure to state a claim.”73 This includes

sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim.74

Bradley has included his grievance filings, denials, and appeals as part of his

complaint.75 Those documents, as well as Bradley’s own allegations,76 reflect

several significant administrative exhaustion deficiencies.

First, and most importantly, Bradley concedes that he filed his appeal to

final review with the wrong entity. Although this appeal was procedurally rejected

by the Facility Manager and Bradley was explicitly informed that he must file his

final appeal with the SOIGA, it does not appear that Bradley took this critical step.

Proper administrative exhaustion, however, requires an inmate to complete each

step of their facility’s grievance process and to do so correctly so that the agency

72 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.

73 See Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 460 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).

74 See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Booth v. Churner,

206 F.3d 289, 290-91, 300 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal where

prisoner-plaintiff conceded in his complaint that he did not exhaust administrative remedies);

Pena-Ruiz v. Solorzano, 281 F. App’x 110, 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential)

(“Although failure to exhaust administrative remedies is generally an affirmative defense to be

pleaded by the defendant, we have recognized that a district court has the inherent power to

dismiss sua sponte a complaint . . . which facially violates a bar to suit.”).

75 Doc. 1-1.

76 See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 23-27.

decides the issue on the merits.77 It therefore appears that Bradley failed to

complete the administrative exhaustion process and procedurally defaulted his

Eighth Amendment claims.

Another potential deficiency that presents itself from the face of Bradley’s

grievance is that he did not identify any individual “directly involved in the

event(s),” as required by DC-ADM 804. Bradley’s grievance and appeals are

devoid of names or any other potentially identifying information (like a medical

position or job description) that would indicate who Bradley believed was

responsible for the purportedly unconstitutional medical treatment at SCI Dallas.

Indeed, his grievance states only that he spoke to unspecified “medical staff” about

his knee problems. Yet it does not even allege that the unspecified “medical staff”

failed to act, because the grievance proceeds to recount that—in response to his

complaints—he was assigned to the bottom bunk, given a knee brace, and

prescribed pain medication. Thus, it appears that Bradley failed to properly

exhaust his claims against the instant Defendants because he never identified them

during the grievance process as being responsible for the alleged Eighth

Amendment violations.78

77 See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (explaining that proper administrative exhaustion “means using

all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the

issues on the merits)” (citation omitted)).

78 The Court does not rely on this identification issue as a basis for finding administrative

remedies unexhausted. Rather, it is Bradley’s failure to seek final review with the SOIGA that

renders his Eighth Amendment claims unexhausted.

E. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”79 Bradley will be granted leave to

amend in the event that he can plead facts that would plausibly state a Section 1983

claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

If Bradley chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without

reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his

claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered

paragraphs. Bradley must leave one-inch margins on all four sides of his

pleading.80 Any exhibits or documents he wishes to present should be attached to

his amended complaint. He must also name proper defendants and specify the

offending actions taken by a particular defendant. This step is particularly critical

for Bradley, as his initial complaint is largely devoid of allegations that

demonstrate Defendants’ personal involvement in the purportedly deficient

medical care. He must also sign the amended complaint and indicate the nature of

the relief sought.

79 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

80 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 5.1.

If Bradley does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of his

Section 1983 claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with

prejudice and the Court will close this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Bradley’s complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. Bradley may file an amended complaint in accordance with this

Memorandum. If no amended complaint is timely filed, dismissal without

prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the Court will

close this case. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge