Wilson v. Lamb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TAJHON WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1354-BJD-PDB

WARDEN TRAVIS LAMB and

OFFICER Z. WILSON,

Defendants.

__________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, Tajhon Wilson, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a Complaint (Doc.

1; Compl.) for the violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two

individuals based on conduct that occurred at the Regional Medical Center

(“RMC”). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officer Wilson physically assaulted him

on January 6, 2023, while he was handcuffed and on his way to a mental health

examination. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff contends Defendant Wilson broke his

jaw. Id. The next month, Plaintiff was transferred to a different correctional

institution, where he remained for about six months before returning to RMC.

Id. at 6–7.

Plaintiff alleges that, upon his return to RMC in August 2023, Defendant

Wilson began “retaliating [against him] . . . for reporting misconduct by

correctional officers” and “orchestrated a hit on [his] life . . . [by] pa[ying] a high

ranking gang member … to knock [him] out.” Id. at 7–8. Additionally, Plaintiff

alleges that, days before he submitted his Complaint, Defendant Warden Lamb

threatened to cut off all access to medical care, including cardiology, and

Plaintiff was “suffer[ing] from chest pains and heart complications” at the time.

Id. at 7.

In acknowledgement of his three-strikes status, Plaintiff contends he

included these latter allegations (regarding events that transpired when he

returned to RMC in August) to demonstrate he was in imminent danger of

serious physical injury when he filed his Complaint. See id. at 7–8. The Court

found his allegations sufficient to invoke the “imminent-danger” exception to

dismissal and permitted him to proceed as a pauper despite him being a three-

strikes litigant. See Order (Doc. 5) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Prison

Litigation Reform Act). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive

damages for the injuries to his jaw and for an alleged denial of medical

treatment for his chest pains. See Compl. at 5.

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9; Def. Mot.),

which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 12; Pl. Resp.).

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II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff’s “failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as

true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not

accept as true legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8(a) demands “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A

plaintiff should allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

III. Analysis

Defendants seek dismissal on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff is a

three-strikes litigant, and he did not sufficiently allege he was in imminent

danger of serious physical injury; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for any purported claims other than the excessive

force claim against Defendant Wilson based on the alleged January 6, 2023

assault; (3) Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim against Defendant Lamb;

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and (4) any claim for damages against the Warden in his official capacity is

barred under the Eleventh Amendment.1 See Def. Mot. at 1.

First, as to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s pauper status should

be revoked and the action dismissed because he is a three-strikes litigant, their

Motion will be denied. The Court previously concluded Plaintiff sufficiently

invoked the “imminent danger” exception to the three-strikes bar. See Order

(Doc. 5). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilson placed a hit on

his life upon his return to RMC, Defendant Wilson assaulted him again and

threatened to kill him, and Defendant Lamb threatened to withdraw all

medical care, including for chest pains he was experiencing when he filed his

Complaint. See Compl. at 7–8.

Next, as to exhaustion, Defendants concede Plaintiff exhausted his

administrative remedies for the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

against Defendant Wilson arising out of the alleged events on January 23,

2023. See Def. Mot. at 14. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion will be denied as to

this argument as well.

1 Defendants incorrectly mention a “Defendant Ward” in the section of their

Motion invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Def. Mot. at 17–18. As Plaintiff

notes in his Response, no such Defendant is named in the Complaint. See Pl. Resp.

at 6. Plaintiff names Defendant Wilson solely in his individual capacity. See Compl.

at 2.

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With respect to any purported claims Plaintiff seeks to raise against

Defendants Wilson or Lamb based on events that occurred after he returned to

RMC in August 2023, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief, or any

such claims are unrelated to the January 2023 incident, so whether he

exhausted any such claims is moot.2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under the color of state law deprived

him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law.

“[V]erbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a constitutional claim.” Hernandez

v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim that his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must allege the defendant was deliberately indifferent

to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d

1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). Conditions of confinement are sufficiently serious

under the Eighth Amendment only if they are so extreme that they expose the

prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or

safety.” Id. at 1289. Allegations of merely harsh conditions do not state a claim

under the Eighth Amendment. Id.

2 For instance, if Plaintiff intended to state a separate Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendant Wilson for “assault[ing him] again” on an unspecified date

after his return to RMC, not only are his allegations vague, but the two incidents are

not sufficiently related so as to be joined in the same action. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

20(a)(2).

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Temporary strip status amounts to merely harsh conditions of

confinement, not those that are sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth

Amendment violation. See Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th

Cir. 2016) (“Confinement without clothing (other than boxers), bedding, or

hygienic materials for 72 hours during the months of April and August in

Florida is not the type of extreme prison condition[] that create[s] a substantial

risk of serious harm.”); O’Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App’x 928, 932 (11th Cir.

2016) (holding the prisoner failed to state the conditions of his confinement

were cruel and unusual when he was placed on strip status for weeks).

A prison official may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of

vicarious liability. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir.

2010). See also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is

axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more

than a theory of respondeat superior.”). A claim against a supervisor arises

only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional

violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the

supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.

Absent personal participation in a constitutional violation, the requisite

causal connection “can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts

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the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and he fails to do so.” See id.; Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. A plaintiff

relying on the “history of widespread abuse” theory must demonstrate the past

deprivations were “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration,” such

that the supervising official was on notice of the need to take corrective action.

See Crawford, 906 F.2d at 671. “A single incident of a constitutional violation

is insufficient to prove a policy or custom . . . .” Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643

F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lamb threatened to arrange for officers to

refuse Plaintiff his medical appointments and thereafter ordered that he be

placed on strip status. See Compl. at 8. He claims such conduct “illustrates a

continuum of supervisory indifference to long standing . . . mistreatment.” Id.;

see also Pl. Resp. at 5. Plaintiff explains in his Complaint that he included

these allegations to overcome the three-strikes bar, and the Court construes

them through that lens. In other words, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s

allegations as an attempt to assert a separate Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Lamb. However, to the extent that is what Plaintiff

intended, his allegations are insufficient. Plaintiff does not allege Warden

Lamb successfully prevented him from receiving medical care for a serious

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medical need, and threats alone do not violate the Constitution. See Compl. at

8.3

Additionally, accepting as true that Defendant Lamb placed Plaintiff on

property restriction, Plaintiff does not allege “that he was deprived of the

‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ or that the conditions of his

confinement posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his future health

or safety.” See O’Connor, 644 F. App’x at 932 (quoting Crosby, 379 F.3d at

1289). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lamb is

premised solely on Lamb’s supervisory position as Warden and knowledge of

Defendant Wilson’s alleged assaults on Plaintiff, his claim fails because he

alleges no facts showing a causal connection between Defendant Lamb’s

actions or inactions and a constitutional deprivation.

It appears Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate a causal connection by

alleging that Defendant Lamb knew of a “history of widespread abuse” or a

need for “training” but failed to take appropriate action. See Compl. at 7–8.

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the causal

3 Moreover, even if Plaintiff could plausibly state a claim against Defendant

Lamb for denying him medical attention for a serious medical need, any such claim

is unrelated to the excessive force claim against Defendant Wilson and, therefore,

may not be pursued in the same Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). If Plaintiff

wants to pursue a claim against Defendant Lamb for a denial of medical care, he may

initiate a separate action by filing a new complaint.

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connection necessary to proceed on a claim against a supervisor under § 1983.

He does not allege Defendant Lamb was aware of prior, similar constitutional

deprivations occurring with such regularity that they could be described as

“obvious, flagrant, rampant, [or] of continued duration.” See Crawford, 906

F.2d at 671. He also does not allege facts demonstrating “the need for more or

different training [was] obvious.” See Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d

1390, 1397–98 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Failure to train can amount to deliberate

indifference when the need for more or different training is obvious, such as

when there exists a history of abuse by subordinates that has put

the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures, and when the

failure to train is likely to result in the violation of a constitutional right.”

(internal citations omitted)). Rather, in his Complaint, Plaintiff focuses solely

on his own experiences, which do not demonstrate Defendant Lamb was on

notice of a “history of widespread abuse.” See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312

(reasoning that the plaintiff’s evidence of “a single incident of unconstitutional

activity,” and reliance on “his experience alone” was insufficient to establish

the correctional facility had a custom or practice “that was persistent or

widespread”).

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Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent any purported

claims against Defendant Lamb in his individual or official capacity are

dismissed without prejudice. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.

2. Defendant Wilson must answer the Complaint (Doc. 1) within

twenty days of the date of this Order.

3. The Clerk shall terminate Defendant Warden Lamb as a party

to this action.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of

January 2025.

4 ry

Pill) Bene

BRIAN/J . DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Tajhon Wilson

Counsel of Record

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