Holmes v. American Home Patient/Lincare

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICIA HOLMES, No. 4:21-CV-01683

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 28, 2025

“The determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party under

a fee shifting statute generally is a disagreeable and tedious task, especially where

the fee petition is vigorously contested ….”1 The laborious nature of the Court’s

review has been compounded by the overzealous, and frequently unhelpful,

arguments put forth by the parties. Plaintiff is entitled to neither a king’s ransom nor

a paltry sum; she may recover her reasonable attorneys’ fees. After expending

considerable effort to review the entire record, I grant Patricia Holmes’ First Motion

for Attorneys’ Fees and Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in part.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the Fees and Costs Requested

Plaintiff seeks to recover her attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As

Defendant correctly notes, Holmes’ requested hours do not align with the

documentation submitted. After a painstaking, line-by-line review of these materials,

I summarize Plaintiff's requested attorneys’ fees and costs in the tables below.

Plaintiff's Requested Attorneys’ and Paralegals’ Fees

Hourly Rate

Thomas B. Anderson 462.6 $600.00 $277,560.00

(Initial Request)

Thomas B. Anderson 110.0 $600.00 $66,000.00

(Supplemental Request)

James G. Bordas, III 30.75 $600.00 $18,450.00

(Initial Request)

James G. Bordas, II 5.3 $600.00 $3,180.00

(Supplemental Request)

Donneshia Johnson 37 $175.00 $6,475.00

(Initial Request)

Jessica Karadeema 72.7 $175.00 $12,722.50

(Initial Request)

Jessica Karadeema 0.2 $175.00 $35.00

(Supplemental Request)

Richard Monahan 186.3 $500.00 $93,150.00

(Supplemental Request)

Michael Prascik 47.6 $300.00 $14,280.00

(Supplemental Request)

2 The hours sought have been adjusted as follows: Anderson’s requested hours were reduced by

14.4 hours in his initial request and by 5.5 hours in his supplemental request; Bordas’ hours

were reduced by 2.25 hours in his initial request; Karadeema’s hours were reduced by 14.75

hours in her initial request; and Prasick’s hours were increased by 0.2 hours in his sole request.

In total, Plaintiff has requested $491,852.50 in attorneys’ fees. Holmes then

seeks to enhance this award by a factor of five to reach a staggering $2,459,262.50.

Plaintiff’s counsel appear to have forgotten that Holmes is entitled to recover only

her reasonable attorneys’ fees. Nothing more, nothing less.

Additionally, Holmes seeks to recover costs associated with this case. Given

the discussion above, it is no surprise that issues arose as the Court reviewed

Holmes’ requested costs. In her First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiff’s

breakdown of costs falls $1,094.30 short of what she requested.3 Holmes

miscalculated the following categories in her brief: Depositions (undercounted by

$414.004); Inside copying (undercounted by $441.35); and Computer Legal

Research (undercounted by $2.80).5 I modified the categories to reflect the amounts

contained in the Expense Report submitted in support of the First Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees.6 But there are issues with the following two entries:

Date Description Invoice No. Component Price

3/21/2024 Medical Records, Bills [Left Blank in MedRec $186.15

and Reports Documentation]

Thomas B. Anderson

Bordas & Bordas

Attorneys, PLLC

3 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees) at 3-4.

4 I note that this $414.00 is attributable to the cost of receiving the Trial Transcripts from the

Court Reporter. As this is a cost that can be recovered from Defendant, I simply keep it in the

“Depositions” category.

5 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees) at 3-4.

6 Id., Ex. B (Expense Reports).

Date Description Invoice No. Component Price

Travel Reimbursement

3/21/2024 Filing Fees [Left Blank in FF $50.00

Chase Card Services 0124 Documentation]

This $236.15 is unaccounted for in Plaintiff’s categorization of her costs.

Despite receiving no indication from Holmes as to how to label these costs, I

identified the $50.00 filing fee as the charge associated with Bordas’ Special

Admission to this Court.7 But it is unclear how Medical Records and Travel

Reimbursement are combined for the $186.15 or what relevance medical records

had to her counsel’s preparation of this case. As such, I exclude that cost.

Plaintiff’s costs in her Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees contained a

single issue: double counting a travel charge for $2,090.73.8 Accordingly, I construe

Plaintiff’s Motions as asking for a combined total of $25,702.37 in costs, as

summarized in the table below.

Plaintiff’s Requested Costs

Initial or Supplemental Description of Cost Cost Amount

Request

Initial Request Depositions9 $1,119.75

Initial Request Mediation $4,800.00

Initial Request Court Costs $452.00

7 Id. (Filing Fee date of March 21, 2024); Doc. 73 (Petition for Special Admission).

8 This April 24, 2024 charge was submitted in both the First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and the

Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. B (Expense Reports); Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’

Fees), Ex. B (Expense Report).

9 Again, the “Depositions” category contains $414.00 in costs attributable to receiving the

transcript from the Court Reporter.

Initial or Supplemental Description of Cost Cost Amount

Request

Initial Request Computer Legal Research $2,517.61

Initial Request Inside Copying $2,676.75

Initial Request Postage and Delivery $142.90

Initial Request Travel $4,285.58

Supplemental Request Computer Legal Research $8,160.98

Supplemental Request Inside Copying $1,148.10

Supplemental Request Court Reporter/Transcript $210.00

Supplemental Request Travel/Lodging10 $188.70

B. A Prevailing Party

Title 42 U.S.C. §1988 allows the Court to award the “‘prevailing party’ in a

civil rights action ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”11 “[T]o be

considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be

able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship

between itself and the defendant.”12 It is undisputed that Holmes is a prevailing party

under § 1988, but AHOM challenges what exactly post-trial issues she prevailed on.

This objection is dealt with separately below. Given her status as a prevailing party,

I must now determine what to award Plaintiff.

10 The supplemental request duplicates a travel charge for $2,090.73 that was accounted for in

the travel category of the First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Consequently, I limit the

Supplemental Request to the sole remaining travel expense.

11 Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App’x 93, 95 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)).

12 Tx. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 103

L. Ed. 2d 866 (1989).

C. The Lodestar

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s lodestar method

has become “the guiding light of fee shifting-jurisprudence.”13 “Under the lodestar

method, an[] attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is multiplied by the number of hours

the attorney reasonably spent working on a matter.”14 “Once the court determines

the reasonable hourly rate, it multiplies that rate by the reasonable hours expended

to obtain the lodestar.”15 “The lodestar is presumed to be the reasonable fee.”16 When

completing this analysis, I am to go “line-by-line” through the billing statement and

must conduct “a thorough and searching analysis” to ensure meaningful appellate

review is possible.17

At the December 16, 2024 evidentiary hearing, the parties seemed unfamiliar

with the “burden shifting” procedure I am to employ when evaluating a fee

petition.18 Under this procedure, the prevailing party first “‘bears the burden’ of

establishing the prima facie case by ‘producing sufficient evidence of what

constitutes a reasonable market rate[.]’”19 “If the plaintiff fails to meet her prima

facie case, the district court has the discretion to determine what award is

13 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010).

14 D.O. ex rel. M.O. v. Jackson Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. CV 17-1581 (TJB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

72875, 2019 WL 1923388, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019).

15 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).

16 Id.

17 Interfaith Cmty, Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005).

18 Carey v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 496 F. App’x 234, 236 (3d Cir. 2012).

19 Id. (quoting Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001)).

reasonable.”20 “Otherwise, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for

the requested hourly rate, the district court does not have the discretion to question

or change the rate absent record evidence” from the opposing party.21 But “[o]nce

the adverse party raises objections to the fee request, the district court has a great

deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light of those objections.”22

I emphasize that this limitation on my discretion comes into effect only after

the Court concludes the prevailing party has met its initial burden. To adopt

Plaintiff’s position would result in rubberstamped fee petitions where, for whatever

reason, inadequately supported aspects of the petition are not challenged. Of course,

it cannot be that the Court lacks an independent obligation to ensure that the

requesting party’s evidence meets this initial burden. Otherwise, for example, there

would be no reason for courts to independently review fee petitions in default

judgment cases.23

20 Id. at 237. See also Washington v. Phila. Cnty. Ct. of Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir.

1996).

21 Id.

22 Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.

23 E.g., Winn v. Hermani Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 18-4240, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216248 (E.D.

Pa. Dec. 17, 2019) (“Counsel has filed a detailed and well-documented petition, to which there

has been no response. Having independently reviewed the petition and its attachments,

including affidavits as to the appropriate market rate, I conclude that the petition should be

granted in its entirety”). See also Wilson v. Advanced Urgent Care, P.C., No. 4:16-CV-00214,

2018 WL 1315663, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41664, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2018) (“Even in

a default judgment case, therefore, Plaintiff must establish the threshold reasonable lodestar to

the Court’s satisfaction.”).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

First, I compare the reasonableness of an attorney’s hourly rate to the relevant

market rate. “A reasonable market rate is established ‘with reference to the

community billing rate charged by attorneys of equivalent skill and experience

performing work of similar complexity.’”24 Therefore, it is Holmes’ burden to

establish a reasonable market rate “for the essential character and complexity of the

legal services rendered.”25 The Third Circuit has instructed district courts to look to

the vicinage in which the Court sits as the relevant community.26 I therefore tailor

my analysis to the market rates in the Williamsport vicinage. Although I previously

set the reasonable market rates in this vicinage for experienced attorneys at a range

of $180 to $325,27 sufficient time has passed that these rates must be revisited.

“An attorney’s usual billing rate is a good starting point for assessing

reasonableness, though it is not dispositive.”28 To establish the reasonable market

rate, Holmes must produce evidence beyond affidavits from her own attorneys.29

This “evidence often comes in the form of affidavits from other attorneys.”30 I am to

also consider “the relative simplicity of the case, the quality of the counsel’s moving

24 Carey, 496 F. App’x at 236 (quoting Evans, 273 F.3d at 361).

25 Smith v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997).

26 E.g., Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 699.

27 Beattie v. Line Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-cv-02655, 2014 WL 3400975 (M.D. Pa. July 10,

2014).

28 Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2004).

29 Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 159 F. Supp. 3d 514, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2016).

30 Carey, 496 F. App’x at 236.

papers, and my ‘perception of counsel’s skill and experience during the trial of the

underlying matter.’”31 Although certainly tempting, the Court cannot simply rely on

rates awarded to Plaintiff’s attorneys in prior cases unless the work was

contemporaneously performed and of a similar nature.32

2. Reasonable Hours

The Court must also evaluate the evidence supporting the hours claimed.

Typically, the prevailing party can meet its burden through the submission of

detailed time records.

D. Requested Hourly Rates

As described in the tables above, the attorneys in this case have requested to

be compensated at the following hourly rates: $600 per hour for Anderson and

Bordas; $500 per hour for Monahan; and $300 per hour for Prasick. Johnson and

Karadeema both requested to be compensated at an hourly rate of $175. These rates

are notably higher than the rates I previously set for the Williamsport vicinage in

Beattie v. Line Mountain School District.33

31 Gillespie v. Dring, No. 3:15-CV-00950, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180019, at *29 (M.D. Pa. Oct.

17, 2019) (quoting Mantz v. Steven Singer Jewelers, 100 F. App’x 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2004)).

32 Carey, 496 F. App’x at 237 (“Notably, hourly rates that were set for a specific attorney in

previous court decisions do not generally constitute record evidence … unless those rates were

set for the same attorney and for the same type of work over a contemporaneous time period.”)

(citing Smith, 107 F.3d at 226 and Black Grievance Comm. V. Phila. Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648,

652 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1015, 107 S. Ct. 3255, 97 L. Ed. 2d

754 (1987)).

33 Beattie v. Line Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-cv-02655, 2014 WL 3400975 (M.D. Pa. July 10,

2014).

1. Use of a Current Hourly Rate

Before I reach whether Plaintiff has met her burden regarding her requested

hourly rates, I will address AHOM’s objection to the use of a current hourly rate. To

support its contention that this is an improper fee enhancement, Defendant relies

solely on Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,34 a 2010 decision from the Supreme Court

of the United States. In that decision, Justice Alito clearly differentiated these two

issues. Writing for the Supreme Court, he stated:

Third, there may be extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s

performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees. An

attorney who expects to be compensated under § 1988 presumably

understands that payment of fees will generally not come until the end

of the case, if at all. See ibid. Compensation for this delay is generally

made “either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the

fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value.” Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). But we do not rule out the

possibility that an enhancement may be appropriate where an attorney

assumes these costs in the face of unanticipated delay, particularly

where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense. In such a case,

however, the enhancement should be calculated by applying a method

similar to that described above in connection with exceptional delay in

obtaining reimbursement for expenses.35

This definitively precludes AHOM’s objection, and the Third Circuit’s

treatment of this issue reinforces this conclusion.36 Given Defendant’s extensive

34 559 U.S. 542, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010).

35 Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554.

36 E.g., Lanni v. N.J., 259 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (“When attorney’s fees are awarded, the

current market rate must be used.”) and Simring v. Rutgers, 634 F. App’x 853 (3d Cir. 2015)

(citing Lanni). See also L.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 373 F. App’x 294, 297 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“To the extent the District relied on the market rate during the period in which the majority

discussion of Perdue elsewhere,37 I find it perplexing that I must address this issue

at all. Without any citation for this proposition beyond Perdue itself, I will calculate

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees with a current hourly rate.38

2. Reasonable Hourly Rates

As previously noted, Holmes bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove

the reasonableness of her attorneys’ hourly rates. In support of her requested rates,

Holmes provided records from cases litigated in West Virginia and affidavits from

her own attorneys, Attorney Clifford A. Rieders, and Attorney Colleen E. Ramage.

Much of this evidence provides no insight into the market rate for comparable work

in the Williamsport vicinage.

a. Qualifications of Holmes’ Attorneys

i. Anderson

Thomas B. Anderson has been practicing law for approximately 28 years, with

a focus on employment law for the past 18 years.39 He counts amongst his

professional achievements two, recent multi-million verdicts in employment cases

billing occurred rather than the ‘current market rate’ at the time of the fee petition, this was

error.”).

37 Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 12.

38 Challenging every aspect of Plaintiff’s fees petition is an ineffective strategy when doing so

requires arguments that are clearly precluded by binding precedent. Perhaps Defendant and its

counsel would benefit from guidance found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: “So in war, the way

is to avoid what is strong, and strike at what is weak.” SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR, VI Weak

Points and Strong, para. 30 (trans., Lionel Giles, Fingerprint! Publishing, 2018).

39 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. C (Anderson Affidavit)

¶¶ 3; 8.

and membership of the Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County and the

Western Pennsylvania Employment Lawyers Association.40 In the Middle District

of Pennsylvania, Anderson has litigated eight employment and civil rights cases.41

According to Anderson, his and Bordas’ hourly rate of $600 and the hourly paralegal

rate of $175 are “fair and reasonable for the complexity of the issues involved in this

case and [are] comparable to the rates typically charged in the Middle District and

Western District” of Pennsylvania.42

ii. Bordas

James G. Bordas III has been practicing law for approximately 24 years, and

he is the managing partner at his firm.43 He is frequently the firm’s “chief settlement

negotiator,” and he has obtained verdicts “of $16.9 million and $10 million on behalf

of individual plaintiffs ….”44 Other examples of his professional achievements

include: membership on the Board of Governors for the West Virginia Association

for Justice; receiving the Super Lawyer designation for ten years; serving as lead

counsel in complex litigation; and speaking at continuing legal education seminars.45

As to the present case, Bordas participated in the mediation, assisted with the

development of Plaintiff’s trial strategy, and reviewed all of the depositions in this

40 Id. ¶¶ 5-7.

41 Id. ¶ 10.

42 Id. ¶ 12.

43 Id., Ex. D (Bordas Affidavit) ¶¶ 2, 6.

44 Id. ¶ 11.

45 Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-9.

case.46 Bordas “understand[s]” his hourly rate of $600 is “either commensurate with

[his] specialty, experience, background, and qualifications, or perhaps even slightly

low.”47

iii. Monahan

Richard Monahan has approximately 31 years of experience, and he

completed a three-year federal judicial clerkship.48 He has obtained multi-million-

dollar verdicts in West Virginia in non-employment cases and has been involved in

complex litigation.49 More notably, Monahan has “briefed and argued a case before

the Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in a unanimous decision in favor

of West Virginia class action plaintiffs in Smith v. Bayer Corp.”50 Further, he is a

member of the American Association for Justice and the West Virginia Association

for Justice, for which he serves on the Board of Governors.51 Finally, Monahan

asserts that he follows Bordas and Bordas’ “standard practice to contemporaneously

record billable time in 1/10-hour increments ….”52

46 Id. ¶ 18.

47 Id. ¶ 16.

48 Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. C (Monahan Affidavit) ¶ 6.

49 Id. ¶¶ 7-8.

50 Id. ¶ 9.

51 Id. ¶ 5. Monahan also notes that he has received an AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell since

2015; he has been a West Virginia Super Lawyer for the last four years; he has previously been

named a Top 100 Trial Attorney for plaintiff civil litigation and a Top 25 Attorney in Class

Actions and Product Liability by the National Trial Lawyers. Id. ¶ 10.

52 Id. ¶ 14.

iv. Prasick

Michael Prasick has been practicing law for 23 years, and he has litigated

complex products liability cases for over 13 years.53 Prasick has prior experience as

the supervising attorney of a regional office of a large nonprofit public interest law

firm, and he is a member of the American Association for Justice and the West

Virginia Association for Justice.54 He indicated that his hourly rate of $300 “is fair

and reasonable for the complexity of the issues involved in this case.”55 He notes

that this is half the rate sought by Anderson and Bordas and has recently been

approved by a state court in West Virginia.56 Finally, he notes that he too followed

Bordas and Bordas standard practice “to contemporaneously record billable time in

1/10 hour increments ….”57

b. The Other Evidence Provided

While these affidavits speak to Holmes’ attorneys’ qualifications and

experience, our Court of Appeals has clearly instructed that these affidavits alone

cannot satisfy a prevailing party’s burden.58 Accordingly, I turn to the remaining

evidence in the record.

53 Id., Ex. D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶¶ 3-4, 6.

54 Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.

55 Id. ¶ 8.

56 Id.

57 Id. ¶ 11.

58 E.g., Chaaban v. Criscito, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58051, 2013 WL 1737689, at *10 (D.N.J.

Apr. 3, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57300, 2013 WL

1730733 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2013) (“In satisfying a prima facie case of reasonable fees, attorneys

may not rest on their own affidavits.”). See also Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.

i. The West Virginia Documents

In this Circuit, district courts cannot simply rely on what fees an attorney has

been awarded in the past unless the work was similar and contemporaneously

performed.59 Here, the Court received two documents that were filed in federal and

state court, respectively, in West Virginia. Judicial approval of hourly rates in West

Virginia tells the Court nothing about the market rate in the Williamsport vicinage.60

For that reason, I set aside these documents. To consider them would require baseless

speculation. With no way to meaningfully compare the approval of those rates to the

relevant market rate here, I proceed to the next piece of evidence in the record.

ii. Ramage’s Affidavit

Much like the West Virginia court documents, Colleen Ramage’s declaration

provides no direction to the Court. First, I acknowledge that she has indicated she is

“generally familiar with hourly rates normally charged by experienced attorneys in

[the] Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania who handle employment

matters,”61 but aspects of her affidavit cause the Court to question her familiarity

with the rates charged in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In a rather telling

59 Pocono Mt. Sch. Dist. v. T.D., No. 22-1787, 2023 WL 2983501, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 9162,

at *11 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2023).

60 E.g., Shane T. v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-00964, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188850,

2021 WL 4478237, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Third, the opinions and orders from

other cases plaintiffs submit are unpersuasive because they are from the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania.”) (Mannion, J.).

61 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. F (Ramage Affidavit) ¶

6.

oversight, Ramage omitted her 2021 admission to the Middle District of

Pennsylvania from her affidavit.62 Ramage’s accolades and professional

memberships in this affidavit also trend towards the Pittsburgh area, if they are not

national in nature.63

Even more critically, she simply declares that “Anderson’s requested hourly

rate of $600 is eminently reasonable given his level [of] experience, knowledge, and

ability compared to attorneys of his caliber in the Western and Middle Districts of

Pennsylvania, in addition to the complexity of the case at issue.”64 Reasonableness

is not considered in a vacuum; it must be in reference to the market rate of the

relevant community. Nothing in this averment, or indeed the remainder of the

affidavit, allows the Court to conclude that Anderson’s proposed hourly rate is

reflective of a reasonable market rate in this vicinage. Ramage never evaluates

Anderson’s rate solely in reference to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, let alone

the Williamsport vicinage. Given these issues, I conclude that Holmes cannot rely

on Ramage’s Affidavit to meet her initial burden.

62 Id. ¶ 1 (“I am an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Pennsylvania since 1992 and before

the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.”).

63 Id. ¶¶ 1-4.

64 Id. ¶ 7.

iii. Rieders’ Affidavit

Consequently, I turn now to the remaining evidence before the Court: Clifford

Rieders’ Affidavit. In this affidavit, Rieders first describes his own professional

career. He has been admitted to practice in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District

of Columbia.65 As to his caseload, Rieders notes that he typically “represents clients

in personal injury and medical malpractice” but he “also handle[s] one or two civil

rights cases per year, the most recent one with litigation completed in early 2024 …”

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.66

Relevant to this analysis, Rieders contends that he has “knowledge about the

hourly rates charged by lawyers in the Middle District” of Pennsylvania due to: fee

petitions from his firm; his “examination of fee petitions filed by lawyers in other

cases;” his “role as an expert witness in several fee cases;” his “participation at Third

Circuit Judicial Conferences, in particular, the 1985 conference which focused on

the issue of court-awarded attorney fees;” his involvement with professional

organizations “such as the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association (“PaTLA”)

where the issue of fees has been the subject of discussion;” and “speaking with other

attorneys who refer civil rights cases to me or who do such work.”67

65 Id., Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶¶ 1-3. Other aspects of Rieders’ professional career are also

described.

66 Id. ¶ 19.

67 Id. ¶ 28.

Much of this background does little to credibly bolster Rieders’ ability to

speak to attorney’s fees in civil rights cases in this vicinage. The 1985 Third Circuit

Judicial Conference is certainly on a relevant topic, but it is now stale given the four-

decade passage of time. Further, there is no indication that Rieders’ has a familiarity

with civil rights cases beyond “speaking with other attorneys who refer civil rights

cases to me or who do such work” and his handling of “one or two civil rights cases

per year” in unknown forums.68 These vague statements fail to demonstrate that he

is familiar with the market rate for civil rights cases in the Williamsport vicinage.

Serving as “an expert witness in several fee cases” and examining fee petitions from

his own firm and other lawyers similarly fails for a lack of specificity.

Next, Rieders correctly notes that a district-wide rate will result in attorneys

being over-or-undercompensated depending on their location.69 That is undoubtedly

true since the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg vicinages of this Court contain

larger legal markets. Yet he fails to appreciate that the Third Circuit has instructed

this Court to look to the vicinage in which it sits, not the entire district, as the relevant

community. Instead, he indicates his background, as described above, makes him

“knowledgeable about the hourly rates charged by lawyers in the Middle District”

and that “it is preferable, in a fee petition, to review the results of the case, the

68 Id. ¶¶ 19, 28. The Rieders Affidavit indicates that the most recent civil rights case he

participated in occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. This does not support a

familiarity with the prevailing rates in the Williamsport vicinage.

69 Id. ¶ 47.

background and capability of counsel, the experience of counsel, and the rates

charged by other lawyers in the case, including the defense.”70 These averments

simultaneously make the very mistake he urges the Court to avoid and disregards

the Third Circuit’s instructions on evaluating the requested rates in the relevant

vicinage.

Turning then to the rate Anderson has requested, Rieders contends that

Anderson’s proposed hourly rate of $600 “is extremely reasonable.”71 As to his own

rates, Rieders provides the Court with a somewhat confusing description of his

billing practices. First, he notes that he bills at an hourly rate of $750.00 “when

billing hourly.”72 Ordinarily, this may serve as sufficient evidence to support

Anderson’s hourly rate.73 But he qualifies the relevance of this hourly rate in a way

that undermines its evidentiary value; “much of [his] work is contingent fee, but not

all. Sometimes [Rieders] will take cases on a fee basis, neither hourly nor contingent

fee. Other times, [Rieders] will charge less than $750.00 per hour, under special

circumstances.”74 While only “a minority of [Rieders’] work is billed on an hourly

basis, [Rieders] has charged $750.00 per hour and will do so when appropriate.”75

70 Id. ¶¶ 28, 46.

71 Id. ¶ 37. Reasonableness alone is not the standard. The question is whether the rate is

reasonable compared the relevant community’s market rate for similar services.

72 Id. ¶ 39.

73 E.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-CV-585, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44478, 2014 WL 1321116, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014).

74 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶

40.

75 Id. ¶ 41.

These averments are insufficient to meet Holmes’ burden. By his own

admission, Rieders practices in several federal courts; yet there is no indication that

he has billed at a rate of $750.00 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, much less

the Williamsport vicinage, for a civil rights case.76 The fact most of his practice is

comprised of medical malpractice and personal injury work reinforces this

conclusion. Further, the fact that only a “minority” of his work is billed on an hourly

basis, with some charged at less than $750.00 due to unknown “special

circumstances,” leads the Court to doubt the viability of this rate in the Williamsport

vicinage.77

Finally, I take a moment to discuss Rieders’ final averment: that “[t]here are

no attorneys, that [he] is aware of, who have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement

in a civil rights case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly

Williamsport, or who even have his degree of success in such cases and trial

experience on a regular basis in civil rights cases.”78 While certainly relevant to an

enhancement, this statement provides no evidentiary support to the validity of

Anderson’s rate in the Williamsport vicinage.

76 Evidence that the rate claimed has been awarded in the vicinage is sufficient to support a fee

petition. Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 207 F. Supp. 3d 454, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (Caputo, J.).

77 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶¶

40-41.

78 Id. ¶ 49.

iv. The Evidentiary Hearing

Given these concerns, I naturally concluded that an evidentiary hearing should

be held; this hearing was meant to provide Holmes with the opportunity to address

and supplement these deficiencies. In fact, the Scheduling Order for that hearing

clearly articulated this very concern:

Here, Defendant has not challenged the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s

attorneys beyond contending that the use of a current hourly rate is

improper. But the Court has an independent obligation to evaluate

whether Holmes has met her initial burden regarding the

reasonableness of her desired hourly rates in the Williamsport vicinage.

My review has raised questions as to whether the evidence

submitted is sufficient to establish her prima facie case. Consequently,

I must hold an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the

requested hourly rates.79

Despite providing this guidance and opportunity, Plaintiff declined to submit

any further evidence. Instead, her counsel continued to argue it was inappropriate

for the Court to evaluate whether she had met her initial burden. For the reasons

discussed above, I therefore conclude that Holmes failed to meet her initial burden

as to the hourly rates requested by her attorneys.

c. The Court’s Discretion

I now must set reasonable hourly rates for Holmes’ attorneys using my

discretion. To do so, two options emerge: rely on the fee schedule set out by the

Community Legal Services in Philadelphia or perform an in-depth review of recent

79 Doc. 160 (Scheduling Order for December 16, 2024 Evidentiary Hearing).

fee petition caselaw in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Rates set for attorneys

in Philadelphia provide little, if any, guidance as to the market rates in North Central

Pennsylvania. After all, I set aside Ramage’s declaration and the West Virginia

documents for a similar reason. Instead, I performed a review of fee petition cases

in the Middle District of Pennsylvania from the last five years.80

Between 2019 and 2024, attorneys in this District were regularly awarded

rates from $100 to $375 depending on the skill and experience of the attorney and

the complexity of the case, barring circumstances such as specialized expertise.81

The upper end of this range is $50 above the rates I established in 2014 for the

Williamsport vicinage. I find it now appropriate to increase this range by $50. As

such, the new range of hourly rates in the Williamsport vicinage is $230 to $375 for

experienced attorneys, with associates at a slightly lesser rate. While this seemingly

brings Williamsport in line with the Harrisburg and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre market

rates, it is nonetheless an appropriate range for this vicinage. The upper end of this

range has been in use since at least 2019 elsewhere in the Middle District; at this

80 As I previously set the appropriate range for attorney’s fees in the Williamsport vicinage, I

shall focus this review on the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg divisions. In doing so, I

remain cognizant of the differences between those locations and Williamsport, in particular the

size of the cities and their respective legal markets.

81 E.g., A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-02311, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469

(M.D. Pa. June 28, 2019); Katona v. Asure, No. 1:11-CV-1817, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24062

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019); Finnegan v. Smith, No. 3:16-CV-1416, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

35114 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019) and Beard v. Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-01162,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4753 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2024).

juncture, it is an underrepresentation of the rates in the larger markets in

Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg.

Looking at the skillsets and backgrounds of the various attorneys, Anderson

has the most specialized knowledge relevant to this case through his employment

law experience. As the lead attorney, he was also primarily responsible for

advancing the case forward. Bordas’ involvement in the mediation likely drew upon

his unique role as chief settlement negotiator for their law firm. Both he and Bordas

are also seasoned attorneys, with 28 years and 24 years of experience respectively.

Although this was a straightforward employment discrimination case, I adjust their

hourly rates downwards to the maximum in this vicinage: $375.

While Prasick is certainly an experienced attorney with 22 years of

experience, he lacks any specialized knowledge relevant to this case. His practice

has primarily focused on complex products liability work; before that he worked “as

the supervising attorney for the regional office of a large nonprofit public interest

law firm.”82 My review of the work he performed, as documented in the timetables

submitted by Holmes, reveals many simple and straightforward tasks. Consequently,

I adjust his requested hourly rate of $300 downwards to $250.

Monahan’s 31 years of experience has seemingly allowed him to develop

specialized expertise in appellate work. His time entries demonstrate he drew upon

82 Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶¶ 6-7.

this expertise in this case during its post-trial stage. But still many of his assigned

tasks involved straightforward issues. Given this, I find it appropriate to adjust his

requested rate downwards from $500 to $300 an hour.

No documentation has been provided regarding reasonable paralegal fees in

the Williamsport vicinage. Other cases in this district have established a range of

$75 to $170 per hour for paralegals depending on their experience and the

complexity of the work performed.83 Holmes’ requested rate falls slightly outside

this range. At the hearing, Anderson indicated that he could not state with specificity

how much experience Jessica Karadeema has, but the information he provided

suggests she has more than a decade of experience.84 Consequently, I slightly reduce

Karadeema’s hourly rate from $175 to $150. Although the tasks she performed were

relatively simple, I find it appropriate to award her this rate given her level of

experience. As to Donneshia Johnson’s hourly rate, I reduce it from $175 to $115.

This is approximately the midpoint of the range, which is appropriate given the

rather straightforward tasks she performed.85

83 E.g., A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-02311, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469

(M.D. Pa. June 28, 2019).

84 Doc. 163 (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript) ¶¶ 22:4-22.

85 At the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff’s counsel what level of experience Johnson has. The

transcript reveals that confusion arose as to whom the Court was inquiring about, as Anderson

responded with Ramage’s professional background. Id. at 22:1-3. Given this confusion, I am

guided solely by the nature of the work performed by Johnson. This work involved trial

assistance and technology preparation. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of Motion for Attorneys’

Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records).

Under these rates, Plaintiff has requested $311,223.75 in attorney’s fees.

Applying her desired enhancement brings her requested attorney’s fees up to

$1,556,118.75.

3. Reasonable Hours

Unlike the hourly rates, Plaintiff has met her burden of production regarding

her requested hours by providing detailed timesheets. Defendant has challenged

many aspects of the submitted time entries; I address each of these separately below.

a. Vague Time Entries

The Third Circuit has directed that “[a]ny hours to be used in calculating

attorneys’ fees … [must] be detailed with sufficient specificity.”86 “In other words,

the fee application must ‘be specific enough to allow the district court to determine

if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work.’”87

AHOM draws the Court’s attention to the following entries: 1.7 hours and 5

hours for “Analyze evidentiary issues regarding trial” on July 25, and July 26, 2023;

9 hours for “Prepare for mediation” spread over September 26, September 29, and

October 3, 2023; 4 hours for “Review article from Plaintiff regarding racial lynching

of black women that she thought about due to McCoy and trial preparation” on

86 Gelis v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 49 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

87 Id. at 379-380 (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190).

October 5, 2023;88 74 hours89 described as “Trial preparation” spread over March

14, March 15, March 21, March 22, March 28, 2024, April 1, April 2, April 4, April

5, April 6, and April 7, 2024; 11 hours billed for “Technology preparation, trial” on

April 8, 2024 and 18 hours for “Attend trial” on April 9 and April 10, 2024.90

Although the structure of Defendant’s brief suggests that it views vagueness as an

overarching issue, AHOM only specifically challenged 122.7 hours. As such, I limit

my vagueness analysis to the entries identified in Defendant’s papers.

Defendant is correct that the “fee application must ‘be specific enough to

allow the district court to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the

work performed.’”91 But all of Plaintiff’s records “included the date, a description

88 I reject Defendant’s argument that this is not billable time simply because Plaintiff thought

about this article. Holmes testified at trial to how the slur Coon “still carries the same

connotation. It still carries the same pain … And the word coon is dehumanizing. It’s telling

me or anybody of a person of color that you’re not an equal human as I am. I have to put these

labels on you to degrade you.” Doc. 104 (Apr. 9, 2024 Trial Transcript) at 68:23-69:6. She

further testified about how there is “[s]o much death and blood tied to that [Ku Klux Klan]

hood, so much death and blood tied to that ‘N’ word. The – the hood, what I understood, KKK

and how people were savagely treated at one point in time.” Id. at 97:6-9. It was reasonable for

Anderson to review an article regarding lynchings as it undoubtedly provided insight into the

emotional turmoil his client was facing.

89 In Defendant’s brief, it challenges 69.5 hours labeled as “Trial preparation” on these dates.

However, the Court’s review of the annotated spreadsheet indicates that there are in fact 74

hours related to “Trial preparation” that are challenged as vague. Presumably the missing entry

is from April 6, 2024 for 4.5 hours that is labeled as “Trial preparation with Plaintiff and

Eichelberger.” While this is slightly more detailed than the other entries, I include it here to

ease my analysis. Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. 2

(Annotated Spreadsheet).

90 Defendant also takes issue with whether this category reflects clerical work. I address that

separately below.

91 Gelis, 49 F.4th at 379-380 (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190).

of the activity, and the time expended.”92 Despite having generic descriptions, I

conclude that the challenged hours are reasonable. Spending 9 hours to prepare for

a mediation and 6.7 hours to analyze evidentiary issues is certainly reasonable. The

4 hours spent on the lynching article is similarly reasonable as it goes to counsel’s

ability to understand and articulate the emotional distress experienced by Holmes.

While 74 hours for trial preparation is borderline excessive in this case, it does not

cross the line from diligence to inordinance. Many tasks go into trial preparation:

voir dire preparation; witness preparation; preparation of the opening argument; and

anticipation of the various arguments and defenses likely to be put forth by one’s

opponent. Similarly, the 29 hours spent by Johnson with “Technology preparation,

trial” and “Attend Trial” are similarly reasonable for these broad tasks.

The Third Circuit has explained that a fee petition only needs to include “some

fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g.

pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of

attorneys ….”93 In fact, courts in this Circuit “have held that simple entries such as

‘research,’ ‘review’ and ‘prepare’ are sufficiently specific, so long as they explain

92 Brown v. Nutrition Mgmt. Servs. Co., Nos. 08-3840 and 09-1779, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5535,

at *13 (3d Cir. Mar. 17, 2020).

93 Gelis, 49 F.4th at 380.

who performed those activities and for how long.”94 Consequently, I decline to strike

the identified hours for vagueness.95

b. Clerical Work

Next, AHOM identifies what it contends is clerical work performed by

Karadeema and Johnson.96 “[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed

at a paralegal rate regardless of who performs them.”97 Clerical tasks include “filing

documents, preparing service packets, and completing or reviewing pro hac vice

paperwork.”98 These types of tasks are “usually absorbed in the attorney’s fee as

overhead … throughout Pennsylvania.”99

Upon a review of the challenged time entries, I conclude that many are in fact

clerical. As such, I reduce Plaintiff’s requested fee by 48.75 hours for clerical work

94 A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469, at *8.

95 The separate challenge to the hours also described as clerical is dealt with below.

96 Defendant identified time entries that it contends are “clerical” and “likely clerical.” Doc. 127

(Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. 2 (Annotated Spreadsheet).

97 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989).

98 Klein v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-1496, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88515, at *10 (M.D. Pa. July 8,

2016). Further examples of clerical tasks include “packaging attachments,” “scanning and

numbering exhibits,” “File maintenance,” “File management,” “Document management,”

“coordinating a conference call,” “Created binder of all documents in possession,” “Prepared

binder for expert,” “Telephone call to [individual] to schedule early neutral evaluation,”

“Various email correspondence … regarding scheduling of [] mediation,” “opening a file in a

database,” “entering case updates in a management system,” “mailing letters,” “calendaring

deadlines,” “confirming contact information,” and “talking with a process server or court

clerk.” See Elashi v. Sabol, No. 4:09-CV-2201, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116443 (M.D. Pa. Nov.

2, 2010); Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 903 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2018); Slantis v.

Capozzie & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:09-CV-049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67977 (M.D. Pa. June

24, 2011); and McGuire v. Neidig, No. 14-1531, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53488 (W.D. Pa. Apr.

7, 2017).

99 Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-1519, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7948, at *19

(M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2017).

performed by Karadeema, billed at a total of $7,312.50. Attached as Appendix A to

this Memorandum Opinion are the time entries that my review has deemed clerical.

They bear a remarkable similarity to entries identified by other courts in this Circuit

as clerical.

As to remaining entries, my reasoning is as follows. AHOM contends that

time spent by Karadeema on work related to the preparation of subpoenas is

clerical.100 Courts in this Circuit have regularly allowed the recovery of time spent

on subpoenas;101 therefore, I will not strike these hours. In a similar vein, I decline

to excise hours related to the notices of depositions,102 work on Plaintiff’s discovery

100 These challenged entries are found on the following dates: 0.5 hours on October 25, 2022; 0.8

hours on October 27, 2022; 1.0 hours on November 9, 2022; 0.4 hours on November 14, 2022;

1.2 hours on November 16, 2022; 0.2 hours on November 22, 2022; 0.4 hours on November

30, 2022; two entries for 0.25 and 0.5 hours, respectively, on February 16, 2024; 1.25 hours

on March 13, 2024; 0.5 hours on March 20, 2024; and 0.25 hours on April 4, 2024. Doc. 107

(Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records). Although some

of these hours may in fact be clerical, it was AHOM’s burden to put forth that argument. With

no references to caselaw, Defendant has made no effort to aid the Court in its evaluation of the

hours it has deemed clerical. Consequently, I decline to excise these hours given AHOM’s

failure to provide any caselaw that would cast doubt on the non-clerical nature of the

preparation and submission of the subpoenas and general correspondence concerning this task.

I have only excised hours related to subpoenas where the nature of the task is clearly clerical,

as identified in the chart in Appendix A.

101 E.g., Poff v. Prime Care Med., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-03066, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77271 (M.D.

Pa. June 14, 2016).

102 This consists of the following entries: 0.6 hours on November 1, 2022; and two entries for 0.4

hours on November 17, 2022. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees),

Ex. A (Billing Records).

responses,103 mediation preparation,104 and trial preparation.105 These tasks are

comparable to Karadeema’s work on the subpoenas. Finally, AHOM has challenged

time spent updating Holmes on the status of her case.106 I do not find the hours

requested on this task to be excessive, and I decline to conclude that updating a client

on the status of their case is a clerical task.

c. Travel Time and Expenses

Our Court of Appeals has previously clarified that the recovery of travel time

under § 1988 is limited to local counsel.107 For “counsel from outside of the forum

of the litigation,” the Third Circuit “prohibits” the recovery of “travel expenses”108

unless it can be shown that local counsel would have been unwilling to represent

Holmes. This has not been shown as Holmes has only pointed to a vague statement

from Rieders regarding the attractiveness of civil rights cases in the Middle District

of Pennsylvania.

103 This category is comprised of the following entries: 0.2 hours on July 21, 2022; 0.8 hours on

July 22, 2022; 0.4 hours on July 26, 2022; 0.5 hours on July 27, 2022; 1.5 hours on July 28,

2022; 0.2 hours on August 1, 2022; 1 hour on August 3, 2022; and 0.5 hours on August 4,

2022. Id.

104 This consists of a single entry on October 3, 2023 for 0.5 hours. Id.

105 This consists of 0.5 hours on November 8, 2023; 1 hour on February 13, 2024; two 0.25 entries

on March 20, 2024; 0.25 hours on March 26, 2024; 11 hours on April 8, 2024; 9 hours on April

9, 2024; and 9 hours on April 10, 2024. Id.

106 This category is comprised of the following entries: 0.25 hours on April 26, 2023; 0.25 hours

on June 19, 2023; 0.25 hours on November 16, 2023; 0.2 hours on January 23, 2024; and 0.5

hours on February 23, 2024. Id.

107 United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128, 136 n.8 (3d Cir. 2018).

108 Id.

Perhaps due to this restriction, Anderson contends that “he does not simply

hail from a legal community other than the Williamsport vicinage”109 because he

“practices primarily in the Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.”110 A

cursory review of Anderson’s professional history undercuts the veracity of this

statement.111 He was admitted to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania in 1997; he was not admitted to the Middle District of

Pennsylvania for another 21 years.112 Further, his practice is centered in the state and

federal courts located in the counties that comprise the Western District of

Pennsylvania.113 Consequently, it is more accurate to state that Anderson “practices

primarily in the Western District of Pennsylvania, with occasional appearances in

the Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Under these circumstances, I conclude that

Anderson is not local counsel, and Plaintiff’s attempt to bill his travel time is

inappropriate.114

109 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 9.

110 Id.

111 See Thomas B. Anderson, Litigation Analytics, Thomson Reuters – WestLaw Edge,

https://1.next.westlaw.com/Analytics/Profiler?docGUID=I1846081E1DD211B2AD58AC00

D20223FE&contentType=attorney&view=profile&dataOrchGUID=8c86eccaf23f47bfbc806f

f01576be8d&transitionType=LegalLitigation&contextData=(sc.Default)#/attorney/I1846081

E1DD211B2AD58AC00D20223FE/profile (last accessed January 15, 2025).

112 Id.

113 Id.

114 The travel time for the other attorneys and paralegals will similarly be excised from Holmes’

attorney’s fees. These individuals did not include any averment that they should be considered

local to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, let alone the Williamsport vicinage.

Even if Plaintiff was correct in her position, she has failed to meet her burden

to prove that “travel time should be compensated at the full rate.”115 She “has not

presented any evidence regarding the customary practice for the billing of travel time

in the local community.”116 Since Defendant challenged both Holmes’ billing of her

attorneys’ travel time and travel expenses, I also address the costs here as the same

analysis applies. Accordingly, I excise 59.4 hours from Holmes’ requested

attorney’s fees.117 Her recoverable amount has been reduced by $20,195.00 in fees

and $4,474.28 in costs, as identified in the tables in Appendix B.

d. Unsuccessful Claims

“It is true that when ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,’

a district court may reduce a fee award below the lodestar amount.”118 “However,

‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.’”119 “Indeed,

where, as here, a plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims arise out of a

common core of facts … ‘[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the

115 United States ex rel. Palmer, 897 F.3d at 136 n.8.

116 Id. Holmes raised an interesting argument concerning the recovery of travel expenses for the

mediation as it occurred outside of the forum of the litigation. I disregard this argument given

the lack of proof pertaining to the customary practice of billing for travel time in the

Williamsport vicinage of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

117 This reduces the recoverable amounts as follows: Anderson’s initial request has been reduced

to 427.15 hours; Anderson’s supplemental request has been reduced to 101.05 hours; Bordas’

initial request has been reduced to 23.75 hours; and Johnson’s sole request has been reduced

to 29 hours.

118 Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 358 F. App’x 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley, 461

U.S. at 436).

119 Id.

litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-

claim basis.’”120 The Third Circuit has “recognize[d] that a district court may reduce

the lodestar amount ‘even where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated,

nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.’”121 But at the same time I retain “discretion

in determining the actual fee[] award” so long as I “appl[y] the correct legal standard

….”122

Here, Defendant suggests reducing the lodestar amount by ten percent.

AHOM arrives at this figure by estimating that one-fourth of the time spent by

Plaintiff’s counsel occurred before this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and

Order disposing of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. However, I do not

find it appropriate to do so. AHOM is correct that I dismissed Holmes’ retaliation

and constructive discharge claims, but Defendant fails to recognize that most of the

facts supporting Plaintiff’s retaliation and constructive discharge claims remained

relevant to her hostile work environment claim. Therefore, I decline to impose a

percentage reduction for time spent on these unsuccessful claims.

e. Post-Trial Motions Prevailing Party

Related to this argument is AHOM’s contention that Holmes has largely not

prevailed on the post-trial motions filed by the parties. While there is certainly

120 Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).

121 Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).

122 Id. (citing Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995)).

precedential support for removing time related to independent claims, it is unclear

whether this logic extends to individual motions. But, from the Court’s perspective,

Holmes has largely prevailed on the critical motion filed by AHOM. I declined to

overturn the jury’s finding of liability, the amount of compensatory damages, and

the imposition of punitive damages. As the research supporting the preservation of

any award of punitive damages naturally overlapped with the size of that award, I

do not find it appropriate to deem the time spent researching this issue irrelevant.

Therefore, I remove the time I definitively related to the isolated issues Holmes has

not prevailed on: the fee enhancement; the demonstrative slides; and the time spent

on appellate work.123 Unlike many of the other post-trial motions, these aspects

contained no overlap with areas that Holmes prevailed on. These tasks accounted for

36.44 hours as identified in the table in Appendix C.124

f. Excessive Hours in the Supplemental Motion

The Court similarly finds that AHOM’s contention that the hours spent on the

post-trial filings are excessive has some merit. Defendant is correct that “[t]he

suggestion that post-judgment filings would reasonably require nearly 75% of the

time required from the filing of the case through trial is dubious.”125 Many of the

123 It is premature to award Holmes fees for any appellate work as she has not yet prevailed at the

Third Circuit.

124 This reduces the recoverable amount of hours in the Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees

as follows: Anderson’s request has been reduced to 92.75 hours; Monahan’s request has been

reduced to 169.135 hours; Prasick’s request has been reduced to 36.925 hours; and Bordas’

request has been reduced to 5 hours.

125 Doc. 156 (Brief in Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 5-6.

post-trial motions were not complex. Even in the most complicated motion, the

Court found it appropriate to only hold oral argument on two discrete issues. The

remaining aspects of that motion did not pose novel questions. I therefore find it

appropriate to impose a 10% reduction to each individual’s requested hours in the

Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees. This reduces the total amount of

compensable hours in the Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees to 273.609

hours.126

g. Quarter- and Half-Hour Billing

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s fees should be reduced by five percent

due to her counsel’s apparent use of quarter hour and half hour increments for billing.

Defendant acknowledges that there is “no prohibition on quarter hour billing in our

Circuit.”127 Although the practice is not banned, it clearly inflates fees. AHOM has

identified patterns that raise serious questions concerning the billing practices of the

attorneys and paralegals in this case.128 The Court sets aside the potential issues

concerning Monahan’s and Prasick’s billing as they both averred to follow a tenth-

hour billing system.129 Despite being suspect, I do not find the issues sufficient to

126 The recoverable amounts for each individual are as follows after applying this 10% reduction:

83.475 hours for Anderson; 4.5 hours for Bordas; 152.2215 hours for Monahan; 33.2325 hours

for Prasick; and 0.18 hours for Karadeema.

127 Rougvie v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., No. 15-724, 2016 WL 4784121, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12,

2016).

128 Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 7-8; Doc. 156 (Brief in

Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 6-8.

129 Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. C (Monahan Affidavit) ¶ 14 and Ex.

D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶ 11.

overcome the sworn statements made by both attorneys concerning their billing

practices. While they indicate that this is the standard billing practice at Bordas &

Bordas, Anderson’s and Bordas’ affidavits are conspicuously silent on this issue.130

Given the patterns identified by Defendant, I find it appropriate to reduce the hours

requested by Anderson and Bordas by 5% in both the First Motion for Attorneys’

Fees and Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Anderson is now requesting a

total of 485.09375 hours while Bordas is now requesting a total of 26.8375 hours.131

In reaching this decision, I decline to extend a similar reduction to Karadeema given

that the Court has already excised many of the suspect time entries identified by

Defendant.

4. Calculation of the Lodestar

As I have now resolved all of the challenges to Plaintiff’s hours, I am able to

calculate the lodestar. To do so, I multiple the appropriate hourly rates for each

attorney and paralegal by the number of hours that remain, as displayed in the table

below. This leads to a total award of $252,906.30 in attorney’s fees.

130 The absence of any sworn statements on this topic from Anderson and Bordas in the

Supplemental Motion is also noteworthy.

131 For Anderson, the breakdown is 405.7925 hours in the First Motion and 79.30125 hours in the

Supplemental Motion. Bordas has a breakdown of 22.5625 hours in the First Motion and 4.275

hours in the Supplemental Motion.

The Lodestar Calculation

Timekeeper Hourly Rate Hours Amount of Fees132

Anderson $375 485.09375 $181,910.16

Bordas $375 26.8375 $10,064.06

Monahan $300 152.2215 $45,666.45

Prasick $250 33.2325 $8,308.13

Johnson $115 29 $3,335.00

Karadeema $150 24.15 $3,622.50

E. Enhancement of the Lodestar

Finally, I turn to Holmes’ requested enhancement. Even with the reduced

award this Court is prepared to provide her, this requested enhancement would result

in $1,264,531.50 fees. In spite of her best efforts to argue otherwise, this case does

not present the “rare” or “exceptional” circumstances that justify any enhancement,

let alone one of this magnitude.

There is “a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar represents the ‘reasonable’

fee” for Plaintiff’s counsel.133 The Third Circuit has summarized the main

circumstances identified by the United States Supreme Court when an upward

adjustment of the lodestar calculation may be appropriate:

These circumstances include: (1) “where the method used in

determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does

not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value”; (2) “if the

attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses

and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; or (3) where there was

132 The Amount of Fees is rounded up to the nearest cent.

133 Dungee v. Davison Design & Dev., Inc., 674 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2017).

an “exceptional delay in the payment of fees … particularly where the

delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense.”134

When “presented with a ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ case, a district court must

tailor the method of enhancing the lodestar to that specific case.”135 “For instance, if

an attorney’s hourly rate is ‘determined by a formula that takes into account only a

single factor (such as years since admission to the bar),’ the district court may adjust

the hourly rate ‘in accordance with specific proof linking the attorney’s ability to a

prevailing market rate.’136

“The party requesting an enhancement to the lodestar carries the burden to

show that a multiplier is necessary to reach a fair and reasonable fee award.”137 “That

party must produce ‘specific evidence on the record’ supporting the

enhancement.”138 “Further, to ensure that the calculation ‘is objective and capable of

being reviewed on appeal,’ a district court must provide detailed findings justifying

any enhancement to the lodestar.”139

Here, Holmes has failed to carry her burden. She has argued that the lodestar

fails to capture her attorneys’ true market value. First, her argument focuses

exclusively on Anderson’s performance, yet she applies her enhancement to the

134 Id. at 156-57 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554-56).

135 Id. at 157.

136 Id. (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 555).

137 Id. (citing Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553).

138 Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565,

106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986)).

139 Id. (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553, 557-59).

entirety of the lodestar figure. More importantly, I conclude that Holmes has failed

to put forth sufficient evidence that would allow the Court to grant this enhancement.

The only evidence in the record that Holmes identified is the Rieders affidavit.

In relevant part, Rieders states:

Lawyers who handle primarily contingent fee cases face the

inevitable fact that they will win cases, settle cases, and lose cases. In

North Central Pennsylvania, unless the attorney can balance out losses

or negative results with very good results, it would be impossible to

handle contingent fee cases at all in the Middle District [of

Pennsylvania].

Significant costs must be laid out in contingency fee cases.

The overheard costs of operating a contingent fee practice in the

Wilkes-Barre, Harrisburg, and Williamsport areas are quite significant.

A verdict in federal court, Middle District of Pennsylvania, and

the amount set forth, and based on the facts related by the Court in its

Memorandum Opinion of July 3, 2023, is a notable accomplishment.

While the undersigned does not know Attorney Anderson

personally, the undersigned was impressed with Attorney Anderson’s

presentation, the results he obtained, and the information imparted by

him concerning the nature of his practice and other results.

The rate charged by Mr. Anderson, who presents himself as a

fine, accomplished, and responsible attorney, is extremely reasonable.

The lawyers in the Middle District of Pennsylvania are reluctant

to take civil rights cases at all because of the population in the veneer

and the exacting requirements of federal court.

The billing of $600.00 per hour for someone of Mr. Anderson’s

obvious ability and the results in this case seems modest, given the costs

associated with practicing law in the current environment, the

challenges of public opinion, and the conservativeness of the

jurisdiction.

There are no attorneys, that the undersigned is aware of, who

have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement in a civil rights case in the

Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly Williamsport, or who

even have his degree of success in such cases and trial experience on a

regular basis in civil rights cases.140

Much of this affidavit fails to provide any evidence at all regarding the

inadequacy of the lodestar. The first three paragraphs of the quoted sections concern

the logistics of operating on a contingency fee basis in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court has indicated that a contingency enhancement

“would likely duplicate in substantial part factors already subsumed in the lodestar”

method.141 It is therefore inappropriate to accept this argument in support of an

enhancement.

Next, the Court considers Rieders’ statements concerning the rate sought by

Anderson. Rieders first describes Anderson’s desired rate as “extremely reasonable”

and then notes that it is “modest” “given the costs associated with practicing law in

the current environment, the challenges of public opinion, and the conservativeness

of the jurisdiction.”142 Although the Court reduced Anderson’s hourly rate to an

amount in line with that charged by attorneys in the Williamsport vicinage, I have

already concluded that this is an appropriate rate given his qualifications, specialized

140 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit).

141 City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992).

142 Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶

42.

expertise, and the uncomplicated nature of this case. Rieders’ observations do not

move the needle on this analysis.

Finally, I consider the results Anderson achieved at trial. Rieders describes

the outcome of this case as “a notable accomplishment” and notes that he was

“impressed” with Anderson’s “presentation,” the “results he obtained,” and other

information concerning his practice.143 Further, Rieders asserts that “[t]here are no

attorneys, that [he] is aware of, who have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement in a

civil rights case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly Williamsport, or

who even have his degree of success … on a regular basis in civil rights cases.”144

These observations appear to be premised, at least in part, on the assumption

that “lawyers in the Middle District of Pennsylvania are reluctant to take civil rights

cases at all because of the population in the veneer and the exacting requirements of

federal court.”145 As civil rights cases regularly appear on my docket and the docket

of my colleagues in this Court, I set aside this observation.

Rieders’ discussion of the result Anderson achieved in this case is also

unpersuasive. The finding of liability in this case was not an unexpected outcome,

except perhaps to AHOM; as the Court has already explained at length elsewhere, a

jury easily could conclude that AHOM committed clear wrongdoing and fumbled

143 Id. ¶ 34.

144 Id. ¶ 39.

145 Id. ¶ 38.

its response to Holmes’ complaints. Under these circumstances, achieving a verdict

in Plaintiff’s favor was the extremely likely outcome. While the size of the verdict

was large, that alone is not a reason to enhance Plaintiff’s fees, especially once the

award the Court deemed constitutionally reasonable is considered.

Even if the Court were to expand its analysis to include the twelve factors

identified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.

Georgia,146 the outcome would remain unchanged. Many of these factors have

already been adequately accounted for in the lodestar;147 as to the nearly all of

remaining factors, Holmes has provided no evidence that would allow the Court to

evaluate them.148

As I have presided over this case for its entire duration, I am intimately

familiar with the performance of all counsel. This prompts me to simply observe that

I find it much more probable that the result in this case came down to “inferior

146 These factors were identified in Hensley. They are: “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the

novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)

the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by

the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10); the “undesirability” of the case; (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar

cases.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.

147 My review concludes that the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth factors were

already accounted for, either directly or indirectly, by the Court when calculating the lodestar.

Id.

148 Plaintiff provided no information concerning the fourth, seventh, tenth, eleventh, or twelfth

factors in this fee petition. Id. I do not consider Rieders’ assessment of the “reluctan[c]e” of

attorneys “to take civil rights cases” in this District to be persuasive given the frequency with

which these cases are brought before this Court. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for

Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶ 38.

performance by defense counsel, … an unexpectedly sympathetic jury, or simple

luck” rather than such a superior performance by Plaintiff’s counsel that the lodestar

is an inaccurate measure of their true market value.149

F. Requested Costs

As I have calculated the lodestar, I now turn to Plaintiff’s requested costs.

AHOM has only attacked Holmes’ request for travel costs, an issue resolved above,

and her legal research costs. But our Court of Appeals has indicated that “the same

standards apply to [my] review of costs as to [my] review of attorneys’ fees.”150

Accordingly, I must review Plaintiff’s submissions to ensure that she has met her

initial burden of production. Unlike her submitted time entries, all the Court has been

provided is a series of expense reports that merely list the date, description, and price

of each cost. The Third Circuit has reversed a district court that approved a prevailing

party’s costs based solely on a “one-page statement [that] contain[ed] dates and

descriptions, but [did] not include supporting data explaining the relevant purpose

of the expenditures.”151 The Court is faced with essentially an identical situation

here. Under these circumstances, I conclude that Holmes has failed to meet her initial

burden of production as she has “failed to provide the District Court with any

reasonable basis justifying the expenditures in this case.”152

149 Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554.

150 Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2001).

151 Id.

152 Id.

But that is not the end of my analysis. District courts in this Circuit have

compared the dates and descriptions from the expense reports to the submitted time

entries to ascertain whether the submitted costs are reasonable.153 Despite the

incredibly tedious nature of this task, I will do so now.

1. Legal Research Costs

As AHOM has challenged Holmes’ ability to recover any legal research costs,

I must first discern whether they are recoverable at all. In its Brief in Opposition to

the Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, AHOM correctly notes that courts

have declined to award legal research costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In making this

argument, Defendant fails to consider whether these expenses can be awarded under

42 U.S.C. § 1988. This silence seems peculiar given that one of the Defendant’s

cases specifically acknowledged “civil rights legislation … encompasses a broader

concept of expenses than the enumerated costs allowed under § 1920.”154 As some

courts in this Circuit have deemed legal research costs recoverable under § 1988, I

conclude that it is proper to award Holmes these expenses should they prove to be

properly documented after a comparison to the submitted time entries.155 This review

has indicated that some of these research costs cannot be aligned with the time spent

153 E.g., United States ex rel. Ibew Local Union No. 98v. The Fairfield Co., No. 09-4230, 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63169 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2020).

154 Nugget Distrib. Coop. v. Mr. Nugget, 145 F.R.D. 54, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

155 Courts in this Circuit have awarded legal research expenses to attorneys under 42 U.S.C. §

1988. E.g., Stadler v. Abrams, No. 13-2741, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126499 (D.N.J. July 27,

2018).

by her attorneys to determine their reasonableness.156 Consequently, I remove the

costs contained in Appendix D from Holmes’ petition.

The remaining research costs appear to have been a monthly legal research

bill from Westlaw. This allowed me to connect the appropriate hours spent by

Holmes’ attorneys to the associated legal research costs, as identified in Appendix

E.

2. All Other Costs

Since I have an independent obligation to ensure that Plaintiff has met her

burden of production, I do so regarding the remaining costs she has requested despite

AHOM’s failure to challenge these expenses. Again, all that Holmes provided to the

Court in support of these costs were various expense reports. I completed the

unenviable task of matching the costs to the appropriate time entries, as presented in

Appendix F.

The only costs I was unable to match to any time entries were photocopying

charges requested by Holmes and $33.95 in postal services incurred on April 30,

2024. While these photocopying costs would also be recoverable under § 1920, I

would have to conclude that “the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”

156 Holmes incurred online research expenses on a seemingly random basis that make it impossible

for the Court to discern which, if any, of her time entries are connected to the expenses in her

Supplemental Motion.

Plaintiff has provided no information that would allow me to do so.157 Therefore, I

decline to award her the requested reimbursement for her photocopies and scans.

Instead, I will award Holmes $9,074.16 in total for her costs in this case, as reflected

in Appendices E and F.

II. CONCLUSION

The Court has finally determined the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

Holmes is entitled to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This amount is adequately

supported by the record provided to the Court and represents a reasonable fee

given the complexity of the case, the experience of the attorneys, and the services

provided.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

157 I have no way to discern how many pages were copied and scanned. Thus, I have no ability to

discern the per page cost to determine if it is reasonable. Nor can I evaluate whether the amount

of copying performed was necessary.

Appendix A: Excised Clerical Hours

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

07/29/2022 Karadeema 1.1 Bates Stamping Analogous to $150.00 $165.00

documents for document

First Set of management

Interrogatories and exhibit

and Request for preparation

Production

10/12/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with counsel

regarding

scheduling of

depositions

10/13/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $75.00

with counsel filing

and defendant’s documents and

counsel scheduling

regarding filing correspondence

extension to

extend

discovery

10/14/2022 Karadeema 0.7 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $105.00

with counsel

regarding

scheduling of

depositions (.2),

extending

discovery

deadlines (.3),

correspondence

with Holmes

regarding

scheduling

deposition (.2)

10/17/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

with opposing filing

counsel documents and

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

regarding filing scheduling

of discovery correspondence

extension

10/21/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Analyze issues Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

regarding

change re

scheduled

depositions and

related matters

10/21/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Analyze Scheduling $150.00 $75.00

matters

regarding

scheduling

depositions of

additional

witnesses and

communication

with

defendant’s

counsel re same

10/24/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with Holmes

and counsel

regarding

scheduling

depositions

10/25/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with opposing

counsel

regarding

scheduling of

depositions,

locations of

depositions,

contact

information for

deposition

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

10/25/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Analyze issues Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

regarding

scheduling

depositions of

Beverly

Hibbert,

Tammy

Dunmire, Haley

Furros, Ron

Houtz, Tim

McCoy, Ms.

Dodson, and

Mr. Cattone

10/26/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with

defendant’s

counsel re:

scheduling

depositions

10/27/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $30.00

with

defendant’s

counsel

regarding

scheduling

depositions (.2)

10/28/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $75.00

with former

employees

regarding

depositions

10/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with

defendant’s

counsel

regarding

scheduling

depositions and

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

contact

information for

previous

employees

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Identify and Analogous to $150.00 $75.00

secure lodging scheduling and

for plaintiff’s related

counsel re logistics

depositions

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with Beverly

Hibbert,

Tammy

Dunmire, Haley

Furros

regarding

taking

depositions

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00

with Hyatt and related

Centre County logistics

Bar Association

regarding

reserving

conference

room

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.7 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $105.00

with Attorney related

Anderson and logistics

defendant’s

counsel and

Holmes

regarding

Notices of

Deposition,

reserving

conference

room

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with Hal[e]y

Furrow and

counsel

regarding

scheduling

deposition for

evening hours

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00

with related

defendant’s logistics

counsel

regarding

notices of

deposition,

room contract

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

with Plaintiff scheduling,

regarding related

verifying logistics, and

receipt of notice file and

of deposition document

management

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Compile and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

deliver to packaging

Holmes attachments

materials for and preparing

review in exhibits

preparation for

deposition

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00

with related

defendant’s logistics

counsel re:

plaintiff’s half

of fee for

conference

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

room and

related matters

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $75.00

with Holmes re:

scheduled day

for deposition,

scheduling

deposition

preparation

with attorney

Anderson

11/03/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $75.00

with Golkow communication

Litigation with a process

Services server or court

regarding clerk

scheduling

reporter of

depositions

11/03/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

process document

correspondence management

with

defendant’s

counsel

regarding

discovery

documents

11/04/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Upload and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

save documents document

provided by management

defendant’s

counsel

11/04/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

with Golkow communication

Litigation with process

Services server or court

regarding clerk

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

scheduling

reporter for

depositions

11/07/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

with court communication

reporter with process

regarding verify server or court

use of their clerk

services for

depositions

11/07/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Prepare travel Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00

arrangement for related

Attorney logistics

Anderson for

depositions in

State College

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with J&M

Reporting re

scheduling

reporter for

deposition for

November 14

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Research re Confirming $150.00 $75.00

additional contact

contact information

information for

Beverly Hibbert

and Tammy

Dunmire [0.50]

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with Haley

Furrow

regarding date

and time of

deposition

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Communication Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with counsel

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

regarding

scheduling

deposition of

Haley Furrow

and related

matters

11/11/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with J&M

Reporting

regarding

scheduled zoom

deposition for

November 14,

2022

11/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with defendants

regarding

scheduling

depositions for

Mark Cattron

and Lois

Dodson and

related matters

11/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00

with related

defendant’s logistics

counsel and

Haley

Eichelberger

regarding Zoom

link for

deposition and

exhibits

11/21/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Process and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

save deposition document

transcripts and management

documents for

Timothy

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

McCoy and

Ronald Houtz

11/23/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Making Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00

arrangements related

with Hyatt State logistics

College

regarding room

for depositions

11/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $60.00

with

defendant’s

counsel

regarding

scheduling

depositions

11/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

save deposition document

transcripts for management

Haley

Eichelberger

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $30.00

with J&M

Court

Reporting re

scheduling

reporter for

depositions

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Process invoice Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

Johnson and document

Mimless for management

deposition of

Haley

Eichelberger

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Reserving hotel Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00

room for related

depositions on logistics

December 5 &

6

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

11/30/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Analyze issues Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

re confirming scheduling,

receipt of related

subpoena by logistics, and

Beverly Hibbert file and

document

management

11/30/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Prepare check Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00

request for related

travel to State logistics

College for

depositions

12/02/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $30.00

with J&M re related

Zoom link for logistics

depositions

12/06/2022 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00

with Beverly related

Hibbert logistics

regarding

receipt of

subpoena,

scheduling

deposition, and

no longer

needing

deposition

12/12/2022 Karadeema 0.2 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

save AHOM’s document

Amended Rule management

26 Disclosures

12/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

with court correspondence

reporter and with process

related matters server or court

regarding clerk

exhibit from

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

Mark Cattron

deposition

12/19/2022 Karadeema 0.4 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

process document

deposition management

transcripts for

Lois Dodson

and Mark

Cattron and

invoice from

J&M

01/03/2023 Karadeema 0.2 Reviewed and Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

process Errata document

pages for management

deponents Mark

Cattron and

Lois Dodson

02/03/2023 Karadeema 0.4 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

save invoices document and

from Golkow file

Litigation management

Services, check

request for

Golkow

invoices

02/08/2023 Karadeema 0.4 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $60.00

process J&M document and

invoices file

management

03/14/2023 Karadeema 0.25 File Notice of Filing $150.00 $37.50

Change of Law documents

Firm

03/22/2023 Karadeema 0.5 Review and file Filing $150.00 $75.00

Plaintiff’s Brief documents

in Opposition

to MSJ

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

06/12/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

with Plaintiff document

regarding management

requested

documents for

review

07/03/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

save Opinion document and

from Judge to file

file management

07/05/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

save Order document and

dated 7/5/2023 file

to file management

09/07/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Process Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

deposition document and

invoice file

management

09/26/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Updating $150.00 $37.50

with Plaintiff contact

regarding her information

new address

and phone

number,

updating file

09/28/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Scheduling $150.00 $37.50

with Plaintiff

regarding

mediation

preparation

with TBA

10/02/2023 Karadeema 0.5 Booking hotel Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00

room for related

Plaintiff for logistics

mediation

10/02/2023 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $37.50

with Plaintiff related

regarding hotel logistics

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

reservations,

parking,

directions for

mediation

10/04/2023 Karadeema 0.7 Prepare and file Filing $150.00 $105.00

Letter from documents

Plaintiff to

Court

10/04/2023 Karadeema 0.2 Diary Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

conference call file

with Judge to management

TBA, JGBIII and

calendars calendaring

10/20/2023 Karadeema 0.2 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

diary file

Scheduling management

Order and

calendaring

11/06/2023 Karadeema 0.2 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $30.00

with JAMS document and

regarding file

invoice management

11/09/2023 Karadeema 0.5 Review and file Filing $150.00 $75.00

Motion to documents

Reschedule

Pretrial

Conference

11/17/2023 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $75.00

with Judge’s communication

chambers with process

requesting server or court

Word version clerk

of Exhibit List

01/02/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Reviewing and Filing $150.00 $75.00

filing Motions documents

in Limine

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

01/02/2024 Karadeema 1 Preparing Preparing $150.00 $150.00

exhibits for exhibits

brief

01/16/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Acquire and Preparing $150.00 $75.00

process brief exhibits

exhibits

01/29/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Discussion with Filing $150.00 $75.00

TBA regarding documents

Filing of Reply

Brief and

exhibits

01/30/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Refiling Brief Filing $150.00 $75.00

in Support documents

02/09/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $75.00

with JAMS document and

regarding file

mediation management

payment and

refund

03/12/2024 Karadeema 2 Prepare exhibits Preparing $150.00 $300.00

for uploading exhibits

into Trial

Director

program with

Bates numbers,

putting in

binder for TBA

for use at trial

03/13/2024 Karadeema 4 Gathering and Preparing $150.00 $600.00

preparing trial binders and

documents for documents

trial binders

03/21/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Matters Attorney $150.00 $75.00

regarding admissions

attorney Jamie

Bordas

admission to

district cour

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

03/21/2024 Karadeema 2.5 Prepare 24 Preparing $150.00 $375.00

exhibits and file exhibits

same

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

with Billing document and

associate at file

Thomson management

Rhodes and

Cowie

regarding

expense report

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Editing trial Preparing $150.00 $75.00

exhibits by exhibits

adding

additional

exhibit and

separating one

into two

documents

03/28/2024 Karadeema 1.5 Printing Preparing $150.00 $225.00

exhibits and exhibits and

putting together binders

three binders

for attorney and

court

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.5 Preparing Preparing $150.00 $75.00

exhibit binders exhibits and

for mailing to binders

court, putting in

mail

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.75 Update trial Preparing $150.00 $112.50

exhibits list exhibits

04/01/2024 Karadeema 0.25 Correspondence Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

with Billing document and

associate at file

Thomson management

Rhodes and

Cowie

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Clerical Rate Amount

Reason

regarding

expense report

04/01/2024 Karadeema 0.25 Review and Analogous to $150.00 $37.50

diary file

Scheduling management

Order and

calendaring

04/04/2024 Karadeema 0.75 Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $112.50

with IT to get related

Zoom meeting logistics

set up,

correspondence

with Plaintiff to

schedule time

for Zoom,

added Zoom

meeting to TBA

calendar

04/19/2024 Karadeema 4 Prepare billing Preparing $150.00 $600.00

entry exhibit for exhibits

Fee Petition

Appendix B: Excised Travel Time and Costs

Removed Travel Time

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Rate Amount

11/07/2022 Anderson 3 Travel to deposition $375.00 $1,125.00

of Patricia Holmes

in State College

11/08/2022 Anderson 3 Travel from $375.00 $1,125.00

depositions of

plaintiff and defense

witnesses in State

College

12/06/2022 Anderson 2.6 Travel to depositions $375.00 $975.00

of defense witnesses

in State College

12/06/2022 Anderson 2.6 Travel from $375.00 $975.00

depositions of

defense witnesses in

State College

10/02/2023 Anderson 5.5 Travel to mediation $375.00 $2,062.50

in Philadelphia

10/02/2023 Bordas 1 Travel to Pittsburgh $375.00 $375.00

airport for mediation

10/03/2023 Anderson 4 Travel from $375.00 $1,500.00

mediation in

Philadelphia

10/03/2023 Bordas 6 Travel to $375.00 $2,250.00

Philadelphia (3) and

travel back (3)158

158 This entry also contains six hours attributable to the mediation itself. This time is recoverable.

Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records).

Date Timekeeper Hours Description Rate Amount

03/18/2023 Anderson 7.75 Attend pretrial $375.00 $2,906.25

conference (includes

travel time)159

04/07/2024 Anderson 3.5 Travel to $375.00 $1,312.50

Williamsport for

trial

04/07/2024 Johnson 4 Travel to $115.00 $460.00

Williamsport for

trial

04/10/2024 Anderson 3.5 Travel from $375.00 $1,312.50

Williamsport

04/10/2024 Johnson 4 Travel home from $115.00 $460.00

Williamsport

07/25/2024 Anderson 8.95 Attend argument on $375.00 $3,356.25

post-trial motions,

includes travel

time160

Removed Travel Costs

Date Description Amount

10/31/2022 Travel Expense TBA $148.86

11/7/22 Hotel

Reservation … Re:

Deposition

11/07/2022 Travel Expense Parking $12.00

Fee at Hyatt Place

159 The Court removed the time it took to conduct the pretrial conference from the 10 hours listed

in this entry to arrive at the 7.75 hours in travel time. The length of the pretrial conference was

discerned from the Court’s internal Minute Sheet memorializing the pretrial conference.

160 The travel time is ascertained by subtracting the length of the oral argument, as noted in the

transcript of the oral argument, from the total hours listed for this entry. Doc. 150 (Oral

Argument Transcript).

Date Description Amount

12/06/2022 Travel Expense 12-26-22 $150.00

Mileage (240 Miles x

0.625)

10/02/2023 Travel $219.94

Chase Card Services

0124

10/03/2023 Travel $6.75

First National Bank of

Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)

5535

10/03/2023 Travel $231.45

First National Bank of

Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)

5535

10/03/2023 Travel $272.67

Chase Card Services

0124

10/03/2023 Travel $32.00

First National Bank of

Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)

5535

10/17/2023 Travel $362.66

Thomas B. Anderson

Bordas & Bordas

Attorneys, PLLC Travel

Reimbursement

04/11/2024 Travel $419.67

Thomas B. Anderson

Bordas & Bordas

Attorneys, PLLC Travel

& Trial Expenses

04/11/2024 Travel Donneshia $338.85

Johnson Bordas &

Date Description Amount

Bordas Attorneys, PLLC

Travel & Trial Expenses

04/24/2024 Travel $2,090.73161

Chase Card Services

0124

07/25/2024 Travel $188.70

Thomas B. Anderson,

Esq. Bordas & Bordas

Attorneys, PLLC Travel

Reimbursement

161 Again, I note that this request has been duplicated in the expense reports submitted to the Court.

Appendix C: Excised Hours Related to Isolated Issues

Date Timekeeper Hours Reason

04/18/2024 Monahan 2.5 (original entry Fee Enhancement

reduced by one-

third to account

for block billing)

04/19/2024 Monahan 3.33 (original Fee Enhancement

entry reduced by

one-third to

account for block

billing)

05/01/2024 Anderson 0.5 Demonstrative

Slides

05/06/2024 Prasick 1 Demonstrative

Slides

05/06/2024 Anderson 4.1 Demonstrative

Slides

05/06/2024 Monahan 6 (original entry Demonstrative

reduced by two- Slides

thirds to account

for block billing)

05/07/2024 Prasick 5.5 Demonstrative

Slides

05/09/2024 Prasick 0.575 (original Demonstrative

entry reduced by Slides

one-fourth to

account for block

billing)

05/09/2024 Monahan 2.125 (original Demonstrative

entry reduced by Slides

one-fourth to

account for block

billing)

05/16/2024 Prasick 3.3 Fee Enhancement

05/30/2024 Anderson 0.4 Demonstrative

Slides

Date Timekeeper Hours Reason

05/30/2024 Monahan 0.66 (original Demonstrative

entry reduced by Slides

one-third to

account for block

billing)

06/14/2024 Prasick 0.3 Demonstrative

Slides

06/14/2024 Anderson 0.7 Demonstrative

Slides

06/14/2024 Bordas 0.3 Demonstrative

Slides

06/14/2024 Monahan 1 Demonstrative

Slides

06/19/2024 Anderson 0.5 Demonstrative

Slides

09/11/2024 Anderson 1.5 Appellate Issues

09/17/2024 Anderson 0.6 Appellate Issues

09/17/2024 Monahan 1.55 (original Appellate Issues

entry reduced by

one-fourth to

account for block

billing)

Appendix D: Excised Legal Research Costs

Date Description Amount

04/04/2023 Online Research $3.60

Pacer Service Center Inv

# 5633158-Q12023

08/07/2023 Online Research $65.85

Thomson Reuters – West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#1000141823

08/11/2023 Online Research $11.90

Pacer Service Center Inv

# 566-158-Q32023

04/15/2024 Online Research $2.80

Pacer Service Center

Acct #5633158

05/22/2024 Online Research $1,488.66

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

05/22/2024 Online Research $1,606.49

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

06/18/2024 Online Research $1,016.70

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

06/18/2024 Online Research $1,169.67

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

06/18/2024 Online Research $1,873.43

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

07/17/2024 Online Research $61.30

Pacer Service Center Inv

#5633158-Q22024

Date Description Amount

07/22/2024 Online Research $866.80

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

07/24/2024 Online Research $77.93

Thomas Reuters-West

Publishing Corp. Acct

#100141823

Appendix E: Recoverable Legal Research Costs

Date Description Amount Relevant Time

Entries

04/01/2023 Online Research $302.21 Entries on March

Thomson Reuters 7, March 9, March

– West Publishing 10, March 15, and

Corp. Acct # March 20, 2023

1000141823

05/01/2023 Online Research $75.57 Entries on April 5,

Thomson Reuters 2023

– West Publishing

Corp. Acct

#1000141823

09/01/2023 Online Research $82.25 Entries on August

Thomson Reuters 10 and August 11,

– West Publishing 2023

Corp. Acct

#1000141823

10/01/2023 Online Research $47.42 Entries on

Thomson Reuters September 25,

– West Publishing September 26, and

Corp. Acct September 27,

#100141823 2023

11/01/2023 Online Research $329.63 Entries on October

Thomson Reuters 3 and October 11,

– West Publishing 2023

Corp. Acct

#1000141823

11/07/2023 Online Research $0.60 Entry on

Pacer Service November 7, 2023

Center Inv# 5633-

158-Q42023

Date Description Amount Relevant Time

Entries

12/01/2023 Online Research $89.33 Entry on

Thomson Reuters November 10,

– West Publishing 2023

Corp. Acct

#1000141823

01/01/2024 Online Research $95.15 Entries on

Thomson Reuters December 18,

– West Publishing December 19,

Corp. Acct# December 20, and

1000141823 December 21,

2023

02/01/2024 Online Research $283.51 Entries on January

Thomson Reuters 2, January 3,

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