Shawnqiz Lee v. Eric Harris

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-1053

SHAWNQIZ LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ERIC HARRIS, BRANDON POFELSKI and CITY OF ROCKFORD,

ILLINOIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 3:21-cv-50199 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2025

____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Cir-

cuit Judges.

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Shawnqiz Lee was detained and

charged as a murder suspect. Over a year later the charges

were dismissed, and he was released. Lee filed a variety of

§ 1983 claims, asserting the police arrested and imprisoned

him without probable cause. But the existence of probable

cause is presumed because Lee was arrested and detained

2 No. 24-1053

based on an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate and

a grand jury indictment. Because Lee has not rebutted those

presumptions, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the police officers.

I. Background

In February 2018, two men invaded a home in Rockford,

Illinois in which Julian Young, Jr. and Jasmine Meneweather

were living. Meneweather escaped, but the assailants killed

Young. Rockford police officers interviewed Meneweather

immediately after the attack. She gave general descriptions of

the two perpetrators but could not provide their photos or

names.

During their investigation, officers learned that Me-

neweather may have been romantically involved with the

purported driver of the assailants’ getaway car. Specifically,

officers listened to a recorded jail phone call in which Young’s

brother said Meneweather had sexual relations with the

driver. Based on this development, officers decided to re-in-

terview Meneweather. Shortly after the second interview, she

sent Detective Eric Harris a text message, providing a photo

of one of the perpetrators. Neither Harris nor other Rockford

police offers could identify the person in the photograph, so

no further action was taken.

Over a year later, in April 2019, Harris met with Young’s

aunt, who gave him a photo identifying the two assailants.

She told Harris the two men in the photo were brothers. An-

other officer recognized one of the men as Cortez Lee, and

No. 24-1053 3

Harris eventually identified the second man as Cortez’s

brother, Shawnqiz Lee. 1

Illinois State Police were also involved in the murder in-

vestigation. In August 2019, they issued a lab report conclud-

ing that fingernail clippings taken from Young’s body during

the autopsy contained DNA from an unknown person. That

same month, Harris invited Meneweather to the police station

to view photo arrays. Brandon Pofelski, another Rockford de-

tective, met with Meneweather to present them. He had not

been involved in the investigation up to that point.

Meneweather was advised that the suspect may or may not

be in the arrays. Pofelski then showed her two six-person

photo arrays—one included Cortez and the other included

Lee.

Meneweather recognized Lee thirteen seconds after view-

ing the first array. After identifying him, she “was visibly

shaking and emotional.” Police interviewed Lee five weeks

after the identification. He told the officers he was at work at

the time of the home invasion, but police did not attempt to

corroborate his alibi until after his arrest.

In November 2019, Winnebago County State’s Attorney

Marilyn Hite Ross requested that the Rockford police put to-

gether a criminal complaint against Lee. Pofelski drafted the

complaint charging Lee with home invasion and Young’s

murder. After obtaining Hite Ross’s approval, the complaint

was presented to an Illinois judge. Pofelski testified about Me-

neweather’s identification and the unprocessed DNA sample

taken from Young’s fingernails. But Pofelski did not testify

1 Although Shawnqiz and Cortez share a last name, we refer to

Shawnqiz as “Lee” for the remainder of this opinion.

4 No. 24-1053

about Lee’s possible alibi or Meneweather’s reliability. The

judge issued an arrest warrant for Lee, and Rockford police

arrested him the same day.

A week after his arrest, two of Lee’s family members met

with Rockford police and produced his timecard from his

workplace. It showed Lee had clocked in about 45 minutes

before the first 911 call on the day of the murder. Police went

to the workplace and spoke to Lee’s supervisor, who con-

firmed the timecard was authentic. The supervisor told police

that it was not possible for Lee to have been gone or unac-

counted for at the time of the crime. Police requested video

from his workplace’s surveillance system for that day, but

due to a failure no footage was available. The officers in-

formed Hite Ross of Lee’s potential alibi and their follow-up

investigation. They then prepared a written report of the in-

terview of Lee’s supervisor and placed the timecard in evi-

dence, providing copies of both to Hite Ross.

In December 2019, Harris testified before a grand jury. It

returned an indictment charging Lee with first-degree mur-

der and armed robbery.

Two weeks later, the Illinois State Police issued a lab report

that concluded Lee’s DNA did not match the DNA found un-

der Young’s fingernails. The prosecution disclosed this report

to Lee. He then sought release from pretrial custody, citing as

evidence the timecard and the DNA report. The judge denied

the motion.

In December 2020, the newly elected State’s Attorney re-

viewed the case against Lee and decided to dismiss the

charges against him. Lee was released from custody after be-

ing held for just over thirteen months.

No. 24-1053 5

After his release Lee sued Harris and Pofelski, among oth-

ers, alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment rights

against unlawful arrest and detention. He also alleged the of-

ficers maliciously prosecuted him, violating both the Fourth

Amendment and Illinois law. The district court granted sum-

mary judgment to the officers. It reasoned that probable

cause, which the officers had after Meneweather’s identifica-

tion, is an absolute defense to all of Lee’s claims. This appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

We review a court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

“construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving parties and drawing all reasonable inferences in

their favor.” Navratil v. City of Racine, 101 F.4th 511, 518 (7th

Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-

titled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Probable cause “is an absolute defense” to Lee’s § 1983

claims. Madero v. McGuinness, 97 F.4th 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Lawson v. Veruchi, 637 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011))

(analyzing a false arrest claim). So, he carries the burden of

demonstrating that police lacked probable cause to arrest and

detain him. Id.

When a neutral magistrate issues an arrest warrant, “we

presume the validity of the warrant and the information of-

fered to support it.” Johnson v. Myers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1068 (7th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Dollard v. Whisenand, 946 F.3d 342, 354 (7th

Cir. 2019)). A plaintiff can rebut this presumption in a couple

of ways. The plaintiff may show that “the warrant application

was ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

6 No. 24-1053

official belief in its existence unreasonable.’” Id. at 1069 (quot-

ing Whisenand, 946 F.3d at 354). The presumption can also

give way if the plaintiff shows “that the officer who sought

the warrant knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless

disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial

officer, and that the false statements were necessary to the ju-

dicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed.” Id.

(quoting Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010))

(internal quotations omitted). Omissions are included in this

category, such as when the “officer intentionally or recklessly

withheld material facts from the warrant-issuing judge.” Id.

These “exceptions are narrowly drawn by design.” Id.

Similarly, a grand jury “indictment is prima facie evidence

of probable cause.” Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351

(7th Cir. 2019). To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff

must advance “evidence that law enforcement obtained the

indictment through improper or fraudulent means.” Id. In

other words, he must show “defendants knew they lacked

probable cause to arrest him.” Id.

A. False Arrest Claims

Lee initially takes aim at the presumption of the arrest

warrant’s validity. He contends that Meneweather’s identifi-

cation of him was insufficient to establish probable cause, and

thus that any conclusion of probable cause was unreasonable.

But our court has held repeatedly that a single eyewitness

identification is enough to provide a defense against Fourth

Amendment claims. Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432,

No. 24-1053 7

439-40 (7th Cir. 1986); see also McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703,

707 (7th Cir. 2009).

Gramenos is instructive. There, a supermarket security

guard held a customer he mistakenly thought was shoplifting

until police arrived. 797 F.2d at 433–34. The guard was the sole

eyewitness to the crime and the state’s only witness at trial.

Id. at 434. The customer brought a § 1983 claim against the po-

lice for his arrest. Id. In affirming summary judgment for the

officers, this court concluded that “one reliable eyewitness is

enough” to give the police probable cause to arrest. Id. at 440.

Indeed, “a single eyewitness’s statement—without further in-

vestigation or a narration of contrary evidence—can support

a warrant.” Id.; see also Moorer v. City of Chicago, 92 F.4th 715,

721 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[I]dentification by even one eyewitness

who lacks an apparent grudge against the accused person is

sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.”).

Gramenos is distinguishable, Lee argues, because Me-

neweather’s photo-array identification occurred over a year

after Young’s murder. True, the court in Gramenos cautioned

that probable cause may not exist “if the person claiming to

be an eyewitness strolls into the police station and describes a

crime from long ago, or if the person leveling the accusation

is babbling or inconsistent.” Id. at 439. But Meneweather pro-

vided a photo of Lee to Harris in March 2018, just weeks after

the murder. After Meneweather’s later identification in Sep-

tember 2019, officers ensured the person she identified in the

photo array matched the photo she initially produced. So, this

is not an instance where a random eyewitness “stroll[ed] into

the police station and describe[d] a crime from long ago,” but

rather a putative victim identifying a perpetrator in a timely

manner. Id.

8 No. 24-1053

Because there was no reason for the judge to question Me-

neweather’s identification, the application was not “so lacking

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Whisenand, 946 F.3d at

354). Lee’s challenge on this front fails.

This presumption can also be overcome by showing that

the officers recklessly withheld material facts which, if

included in the warrant application, “would have negated

probable cause.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 411. When considering

materiality, this court has emphasized “that probable cause is

a common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of crim-

inal activity.” Id. A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the “mis-

leading omissions were collectively a but-for cause of the

judicial determinations of probable cause to detain” him.

Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 873 (7th Cir. 2024).

Lee identifies five categories of evidence he argues were

recklessly withheld from the judge. First, he contends his al-

ibi—that he was at work during the time of the murder—

should have been disclosed at the warrant hearing. But at the

time of the warrant application, Rockford police had only

Lee’s oral assertion that he was at work. Not until the follow-

ing week did his relatives provide his timecard.

Unsurprisingly, “criminal suspects frequently protest

their innocence.” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733,

744 (7th Cir. 2003). A bare “denial of guilt generally is not

enough to trigger a duty to investigate in the face of a reason-

ably believable witness and readily observable events.” Id.

Further, police are not required to thoroughly investigate a

suspect’s alibi before an arrest. Jackson v. City of Peoria, 825

F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2016). Thus, Pofelski was under no ob-

ligation to investigate or disclose Lee’s alibi to the judge.

No. 24-1053 9

Second, Lee asserts that authorities should have disclosed

his lack of prior connections with either victim before the

home invasion. He cites no authority for how this information

would be relevant, much less material, to the probable cause

analysis. And we have found no cases providing that lack of

prior knowledge defeats probable cause.

Third, Lee submits that police did not tell the judge that

the photo array identification occurred over a year after the

murder. But as discussed above, Meneweather provided

Lee’s photo to Detective Harris just weeks after the home in-

vasion. Lee is therefore not correct that the delay reduced the

reliability of Meneweather’s identification.

Fourth, Lee notes that Meneweather first estimated the

suspect to weigh forty pounds more than Lee. But inconsist-

encies “between a witness’s description and an officer’s ob-

servation of the suspect are not unusual and do not automat-

ically negate probable cause.” Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d

898, 909 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that a difference of a few

years in age and three inches in height did not negate proba-

ble cause). Indeed, probable cause is based only on “reasona-

bleness, not perfection.” Id. (quoting Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty.

Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2001)). And a war-

rant application need not “include all information, or even all

inconsistencies, discovered in a preliminary investigation.”

Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2023).

Fifth, Lee argues the police should have disclosed

Meneweather’s possible credibility issues. Her identification

was not reliable, he posits, due to a possible sexual relation-

ship with the purported getaway driver. Of course, if “officers

entertained serious doubts as to the truth of their statements,

[or] had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the

10 No. 24-1053

information reported,” that is enough to negate probable

cause. Edwards v. Jolliff-Blake, 907 F.3d 1052, 1061 (7th Cir.

2018) (quoting Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743). Yet it is not enough

for a § 1983 plaintiff to show merely that “a judge or jury

could choose to disbelieve the witness[]”—that is a question

for trial. Moorer, 92 F.4th at 722.

There is no evidence that the Rockford police entertained

“serious doubts” about Meneweather’s reliability at the time

of the arrest warrant. So, instead, Lee falls back on speculation

as to the officers’ states of mind. Specifically, he argues that

police had serious doubts about Meneweather’s truthfulness

because they re-interviewed her after finding multiple inti-

mate text conversations on her phone with an unidentified

person. But although police may have harbored suspicion of

bias before re-interviewing Meneweather, further investiga-

tion did not confirm doubts about her reliability. Lee’s asser-

tion that the officers “clearly” possessed doubts about

Meneweather’s veracity is therefore unsubstantiated “conjec-

ture,” which “will not overcome the presumption that the ar-

rest warrant was valid.” Johnson, 53 F.4th at 1070.

Moreover, the officer whose testimony Lee relies on to

demonstrate “serious doubt” became aware of the case only

in August 2020, nearly a year after the arrest warrant issued.

But this is irrelevant for a probable cause determination. We

consider only “what the officer knew at the time he sought the

warrant, not at how things turned out in hindsight.” Washing-

ton, 98 F.4th at 875 (quoting Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743).

Lee makes a last-ditch effort to speculate about the

officers’ frame of mind, claiming we can infer doubt from a

two-month gap between the photo array identification and

the issuance of the arrest warrant. He did not, nor could he,

No. 24-1053 11

cite any authority for the proposition that police must pursue

an arrest warrant as soon as they obtain probable cause. Exec-

utive officials enjoy substantial discretion in how they con-

duct investigations. See, e.g., In re United States, 503 F.3d 638,

641 (7th Cir. 2007). It would thus be improper for us to impose

an artificial requirement that they must seek an arrest warrant

as soon as the bare minimum for probable cause is met.

There are no facts, individually or in the aggregate, to

overcome the “‘great deference’ [owed] to the issuing judge’s

‘determination of probable cause.’” Johnson, 53 F.4th at 1069

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). Lee’s false

arrest claim accordingly fails.

B. Manuel Claim

Even if police had probable cause to arrest him, Lee con-

tends additional facts arose later in the investigation to make

his continued detention unlawful. A plaintiff can pursue a

Fourth Amendment claim “even beyond the start of legal pro-

cess.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). If an

individual’s initial detention is proper but probable cause dis-

sipates before his release, a constitutional claim exists for any

detention until he “is either convicted or acquitted.” Kuri v.

City of Chicago, 990 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2021).

But the grand jury’s indictment, obtained while Lee was

detained, is prima facie evidence of probable cause. Coleman,

925 F.3d at 351. Plaintiffs can overcome this presumption only

by showing “that law enforcement obtained the indictment

through improper or fraudulent means,” and they “knew

they lacked probable cause to arrest.” Id.

As discussed above, Lee cannot show the defendants

knew they lacked probable cause when the warrant issued.

12 No. 24-1053

And the grand jury issued its indictment not even one month

after Lee’s arrest. The only additional evidence police

obtained between those two events was Lee’s timecard. The

officers immediately followed up with Lee’s manager, who

confirmed the timecard’s authenticity and that Lee could not

have been gone from work or unaccounted for at that time.

But, despite their requests, the officers were unable to ob-

tain video of Lee at work during that time. And after reading

the officers’ report on the interview, Hite Ross said she was

familiar with suspects creating fraudulent records. So, the rec-

ord undercuts the claim that Rockford police ignored “con-

clusively established exculpatory evidence.” Madero, 97 F.4th

at 523. Rather, the investigation shows the officers did what

our precedent requires—“to act in a reasonable fashion and

not to take an ostrich-like approach to exculpatory evidence

that is obvious in nature.” Id. The timecard, while it would

have supported Lee’s defense at a trial, did not undermine

probable cause. Indeed, “there is a meaningful distinction be-

tween disregarding potentially exculpatory information and

disbelieving it.” Whisenand, 946 F.3d at 355 (quoting Mahnke v.

Garrigan, 428 F. App’x 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2011)). Lee makes no

persuasive argument that the police decided to disregard the

timecard, as opposed to question its veracity. Accordingly,

Lee has not overcome the presumption that the arrest warrant

was valid. Nor has he shown that law enforcement obtained

the indictment through improper or fraudulent means. So, he

has not defeated the presumption of probable cause. 2

2 It is also relevant that the officers “consulted with” Hite Ross when

deciding whether to pursue the arrest warrant. See Johnson, 53 F.4th at 1070

n.2. The State’s Attorney requested and approved the warrant application.

Hite Ross did not conduct her “own independent fact-gathering” before

No. 24-1053 13

After the indictment, the sole additional fact that could

have eliminated authority to detain him was the Illinois State

Police report, which found the DNA under Young’s nails did

not match Lee’s DNA. Although this report failed to confirm

that Lee was at the crime scene, it did not conclusively exclude

him from it. There was no evidence that Young touched the

perpetrator, so there was no reason to believe the DNA under

his fingernails was from one of the perpetrators. The report

therefore does not render probable cause unreasonable, as the

standard requires “only a probability of criminal activity.”

Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 411. At the pretrial detention stage, the

officers need not “have evidence beyond a reasonable doubt

that [Lee] committed the crime.” Moorer, 92 F.4th at 722. Alt-

hough the lack of a DNA match would have been a good “ar-

gument[] at trial,” it does not negate probable cause. Id.

C. Malicious Prosecution Claims

In addition to his Fourth Amendment unlawful detention

claims, Lee brought federal and state malicious prosecution

claims against the officers. A malicious prosecution claim un-

der the Fourth Amendment requires a plaintiff to demon-

strate that (1) the judicial proceeding was instituted without

probable cause; (2) the motive for the proceeding was mali-

cious; and (3) the prosecution ended in the plaintiff’s favor.

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022). The elements for an

Illinois state-law malicious prosecution claim mirror those

federal requirements. See Martinez v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d

838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Howard v. Firmand, 880 N.E.2d

the application, so her approval does not serve as an independent dispos-

itive basis to support probable cause. Washington, 98 F.4th at 873.

Nonetheless, her approval bolsters the defendants’ assertion that they

acted reasonably.

14 No. 24-1053

1139, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)); Miller v. Rosenberg, 749 N.E.2d

946, 952 (Ill. 2001).

The existence of probable cause therefore also serves as a

defense against both federal and state-law malicious prosecu-

tion claims. Martinez, 900 F.3d at 849; see also Washington, 98

F.4th at 878. Lee identifies no facts beyond those discussed

above that would eliminate probable cause at any stage of the

proceedings. Although the prosecution “ended without a

conviction,” the government here never lacked the minimum

evidence needed to pursue the indictment. Thompson, 596 U.S.

at 49. The district court was thus correct to grant summary

judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. 3

* * *

Probable cause is an absolute defense against Lee’s Fourth

Amendment and state-law claims. Because it existed here, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

3 Because we hold that the defendants here committed no legal viola-

tions, we need not reach the issue of qualified immunity. See Madero, 97

F.4th at 524.