The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CODY ALLEN CARR, :
Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-2192
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
SEAN BORAN, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s claims against all defendants other
than Sean Boran will be dismissed without prejudice, and he will be granted
leave to file an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Cody Allen Carr, brings the instant case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 alleging civil rights violations during his pretrial detention in Dauphin
County Prison (“DCP”). He filed the case on December 19, 2024. (Doc. 1).
According to the allegations in the complaint, sometime in March or
April of 2023, Carr “privately and confidentially” informed a correctional
officer named Kevin Edwin1 that he was being bullied, threatened, and
extorted by another inmate. (Id. ¶17). Carr told Edwin that he did not want to
leave his housing block to remedy the situation. (Id.) Edwin purportedly told
him that if he did not give him the other inmate’s name and did not wish to
leave the housing block he could not help him. (Id. ¶18).
Sometime in May or June of 2023, Edwin allegedly observed a “very
heated argument” between Carr and another inmate, “D.S.” (Id. ¶19). Edwin
asked Carr if everything was alright. (Id.) Carr responded that it was, but
when D.S. was out of sight, he requested to speak with Edwin privately. (Id.)
Carr told Edwin that the situation he had previously informed him about had
“gotten severely out of hand” and requested help. (Id. ¶20). Carr stated that
he again did not want to leave his housing block to remedy the situation. (Id.)
While Carr and Edwin were speaking, defendant Boran, a unit
manager in the prison, came out of his office to join the conversation. (Id.
¶21). Edwin asked Carr to repeat to Boran what he had told him, and Carr
did so. (Id.) Carr stated that he feared for his life and safety. (Id. ¶22). Boran
allegedly stated that this was not the first report he had gotten about D.S.
bullying, threatening, and extorting other inmates on the block, and stated
1 Edwin is not named as a defendant.
that he was going to inform the prison’s classification department that D.S.
needed to be moved to a different block. (Id.) D.S., however, was allegedly
not moved out of the housing block following this conversation. (Id. ¶23).
On September 15, 2023, Carr allegedly wrote an anonymous letter to
defendant Cuffaro, the prison’s director of treatment and unit management,
informing her of the situation with D.S. (Id. ¶24). Carr stated that Boran was
supposed to move D.S. but did not do so. (Id.) He further stated that there
was an ongoing “race war” on the block that was being instigated by two
correctional officers and that one of these correctional officers and D.S. had
engaged in “inappropriate touching.” (Id.) Carr put the letter in a sealed
envelope and placed it in the request box in the housing unit. (Id. ¶25).
The next morning, an unknown inmate allegedly informed D.S. that
Carr had placed a letter addressed to Cuffaro in the request box. (Id. ¶26).
D.S. woke Carr up and asked him whether he had written the letter, but Carr
denied doing so. (Id.) Later that day, D.S. opened the request box, removed
the letter, and read it. (Id.) D.S. again asked Carr if he had written the letter
and Carr denied doing so. (Id.) After several other inmates denied having
written the letter, D.S. began comparing the handwriting in the letter to
inmates’ handwriting. (Id. ¶27). After doing so, he concluded that Carr had
written the letter. (Id.) D.S. allegedly “confronted” Carr about the letter and
then punched him twice, first on the right side of his head above his ear and
then on the left side of his face below his eye, which caused a bruise and
knocked out two of Carr’s teeth. (Id.)
Later that night, D.S. allegedly arranged for an unknown translator on
the housing block to tell Carr that he needed to “check out,” i.e., tell
correctional officers that he did not feel safe and wished to leave the block.
(Id. ¶28). The translator told Carr that if any correctional officers asked him
what happened, that Carr was supposed to tell them that another inmate
other than D.S. had hit him. (Id.) The translator purportedly told Carr that
D.S. had “connects” throughout the prison and that if he told any prison
officials what D.S. had done, that it “would not be pretty for” Carr. (Id.)
The complaint alleges that Carr suffered a concussion from the assault
by D.S. and that he continues to experience head pain, dizziness, blurred
vision, and nausea as a result. (Id. ¶29). On May 9, 2024, Carr was given an
MRI, which purportedly revealed that he had a concussion and a traumatic
brain injury. (Id. ¶¶30-31).
Carr allegedly did not inform any members of DCP’s staff that he had
been assaulted by D.S. until December 8, 2023, when he “vaguely informed”
defendants Ray and Welden of the assault. (Id. ¶33). After making several
requests to Cuffaro and defendant Lucas, a major in the prison, to meet with
Cuffaro and the internal affairs staff, Carr “fully informed” Cuffaro and a
member of the internal affairs staff of the assault on February 23, 2024. (See
id. ¶¶34, 46-53).
The complaint names as defendants Boran, Cuffaro, Ray, Welden,
Lucas, and several supervisory defendants against whom Carr does not
make any specific allegations, including defendants Briggs, Pierre, LeValley,
Fitz, Bey, Bateman, Douglas, Hartwick, Pries, Chardo, Lavery, Evans,
Johnson, and Chimienti. (See id. ¶¶5-15). The complaint asserts violations
of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, various
provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and a state statute, 61 Pa.C.S.
§1724. (See id. ¶¶76-79). Carr seeks damages and declaratory relief. (Id.
¶¶80-87).
II. DISCUSSION
The court has screened plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. §1915A3 and concludes that it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted against all defendants other than
Boran.
2 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if
the court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
3 28 U.S.C. §1915A provides:
(a) Screening.--The court shall review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing,
a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint--
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
Carr’s federal constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights
and provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by
a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). By its terms,
Section 1983 does not create a substantive right, but merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights conferred by the United States
Constitution and the federal statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
A defendant cannot be liable for a violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights
unless the defendant was personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v.
Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant’s
personal involvement cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat
superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather,
for a supervisor to be liable for the actions of a subordinate, there must be
allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id.
Although Carr alleges violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, the substance of all of his federal claims appears
to be that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would
be assaulted by D.S. (See Doc. 1). Because Carr was a pretrial detainee at
the relevant time, this claim is governed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and will be analyzed on that basis. Thomas v.
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing A.M. ex rel.
J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims are governed by the
same substantive standard as failure to protect claims asserted pursuant to
the Eighth Amendment. Id. Thus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
prisoner “has a valid failure-to-protect claim if the prison official shows
‘deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.’”
Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). To successfully
plead a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege both an
objectively serious risk of harm and that the defendant had subjective
knowledge of the harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official’s “failure
to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not”
cannot be considered deliberate indifference. Id. at 838.
In this case, the only defendant who was allegedly aware of a risk that
D.S. would assault Carr prior to the assault occurring was Boran. (See Doc.
1). The complaint accordingly fails to state a deliberate indifference claim
against any of the other defendants because it fails to allege that they had
subjective knowledge of any risk of harm to Carr. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837. To the extent Carr is attempting to hold the other defendants liable
because they were Boran’s supervisors, this is not a sufficient basis to allege
personal involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Thus, the court will dismiss
the deliberate indifference claim against all defendants other than Boran.
Carr’s other claims for relief plainly fail. First his claim for declaratory
relief fails because he alleges only past harms and declaratory relief is not
available as a remedy for past harms. Yaw v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 49
F.4th 302, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2022). Second, his claim seeking damages for
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution fails because Pennsylvania law
does not allow plaintiffs to recover damages for violation of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Mt. Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue & Eileen McNulty, 154
A.3d 268, 280 n.11 (3d Cir. 2016). Finally, his claim for violation of 61 Pa.C.S.
§1724 fails because the court cannot discern any factual basis for the claim.
Section 1724 specifies the powers and duties of county jail oversight boards.
See Pa.C.S. §1724. Here, Carr has sued several members of the Dauphin
County Prison Board of Inspectors, (see Doc. 15), but he does not make any
factual allegations against any of them beyond naming them as defendants.
Thus, because the court cannot determine what facts give rise to the claim
or whether the claim would be appropriate, it will be dismissed.
Before dismissing a civil rights claim for failure to state a claim, a district
court must permit a curative amendment unless the amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d
Cir. 2008). The court will grant Carr leave to file an amended complaint
because it cannot say as a matter of law at this stage of litigation that
amendment of his claims would be inequitable or futile.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss without prejudice all
claims in the complaint except Carr’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against defendant Boran. Carr will be granted leave to file
an amended complaint. An appropriate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
Malachy E. Mannion
United States District Judge
Dated: January 21, 2025
24-2192-01