Sheffield v. Doe 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ANDRE L. SHEFFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-93-MMH-SJH

JOHN DOE #1, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Andre L. Sheffield, an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDC), initiated this action on January 18, 2024,1

by filing a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1).2 He is

proceeding on a Second Amended Complaint (SAC; Doc. 83) with attachments

(Doc. 83-1). In the SAC, he names the following Defendants: (1) Sergeant

Austin Fowler, (2) Sergeant Patrick Williams, (3) Sergeant D. Robinson, (4)

Warden Davis Allen, (5) Colonel Matthew Handley, (6) Dr. Angel Acevedo, and

(7) three John Does. See SAC at 3–5. Sheffield raises claims of excessive force

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).

2 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

and deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, as well as state law

claims. See id. at 12–13.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sergeant Fowler,

Sergeant Williams, Sergeant Robinson, Warden Allen, and Colonel Handley’s

(collectively Corrections Defendants) Motion to Dismiss. See Motion to Revoke

In Forma Pauperis Status and to Dismiss (Motion to Dismiss; Doc. 86). In

support of the Motion to Dismiss, the Corrections Defendants have submitted

exhibits. See Docs. 86-1 through 86-3. Sheffield filed a response in opposition

to the Motion, see Plaintiff Brief in Opposition to Defendants[’] Motion to

Dismiss (Response; Doc. 92), and also submitted exhibits, see Doc. 92-1.

Also before the Court is Sheffield’s request to file a third amended

complaint. See Motion for Leave to File [Third] Amended Complaint (Motion

to Amend; Doc. 91). The Corrections Defendants oppose this request. See

Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint

(Response II; Doc. 95). The Motions are ripe for review.3

3 On August 29, 2024, the Court directed Sheffield to show cause why this case

should not be dismissed without prejudice as an abuse of the judicial process for his

failure to comply with the Local Rules and orders of the Court. See Order to Show

Cause (Doc. 88) at 4–5. In response, Sheffield submitted a Motion to Excuse Plaintiff’s

Inartful Pleadings (Doc. 98), asserting that he is unskilled in the law and moved for

clarification of the Local Rules but never received a response from the Court.

Considering his response, the Court grants the Motion (Doc. 98) to the extent that

the Order to Show Cause (Doc. 88) will be discharged.

II. Sheffield’s Allegations4

Sheffield alleges that on January 4, 2024, “security had set up a[] murder

by having gang members dress out in white sheets covering themselves from

head to toe to run into [Sheffield’s] assigned cell and beat, stab[] and rape him

for filing injunctions for protection . . . .” SAC at 8. According to Sheffield, the

gang members stood outside his cell “waiting for an[] opportunity to run in[]

and commit[] this ritual style murder . . . .” Id. at 9. “After being held off into

the hours of January 5, 2024,” Sergeant Fowler, Sergeant Williams, and

Lieutenant John Doe approached Sheffield’s cell. Id. They advised Sheffield

that if he did not allow the inmates into his cell, Sergeant Fowler, Sergeant

Williams, and Lieutenant John Doe “were coming in to do it . . . .” Id. Sheffield

refused, and they responded, “F*** that were [sic] going in[], I’ve been wanting

his a** anyway!” Id.

Sheffield asserts that approximately ten minutes later, Sergeant Fowler,

Sergeant Williams, Sergeant Robinson, Lieutenant John Doe, and two other

John Does entered his cell. Id. Sergeant Fowler grabbed Sheffield’s head and

slammed it into the concrete while Sergeant Williams punched Sheffield in the

4 In considering the Corrections Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court must

accept all factual allegations in the SAC as true, consider the allegations in the light

most favorable to Sheffield, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from such allegations. Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir.

2022). As such, the facts recited here are drawn from the SAC, and may well differ

from those that ultimately can be proved.

eyes, forehead, jaw, and neck. Id. at 10. He alleges that throughout the assault,

the Corrections Defendants threatened to kill him and used racial slurs. Id.

Sheffield maintains he did not resist. Id.

“Several minutes later [Sheffield] was snatched off the cell floor and

dragged . . . to [the] medical area leaking blood from [his] right eye area . . . .”

Id. Sheffield alleges he received eight sutures over his right eyebrow and ten

Tylenol. Id. at 11. However, according to Sheffield, Dr. Acevedo “has refused to

refer [him] to an[] eye specialist concerning the right eye injury since that date,

although [there have been] multiple complaints thereafter.” Id.

Based on the above, Sheffield alleges: (1) Sergeants Fowler and Williams

violated the Eighth Amendment when they used excessive force; (2) Sergeant

Robinson and three John Does violated the Eighth Amendment when they

failed to intervene during the use of force; (3) Warden Allen and Colonel

Handley violated the Eighth Amendment when they failed to take disciplinary

action “to curb the known pattern of physical abuse of inmates by [D]efendants

Fowler[] and Williams”; and (4) Dr. Acevedo violated the Eighth Amendment

when he was deliberately indifferent to Sheffield’s serious medical need. Id. at

12–13. He also brings state law claims of assault, battery, and negligence. Id.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and

original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as

recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

IV. Summary of the Corrections Defendants’ Arguments

In their Motion to Dismiss, the Corrections Defendants argue that

Sheffield: (1) is not entitled to proceed as a pauper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g), (2) failed to accurately disclose his litigation history, (3) failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, (4) is not entitled to punitive damages,

and (5) fails to state a deliberate indifference claim against Warden Allen and

Colonel Handley. See generally Motion to Dismiss.

V. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Exhaustion

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of

administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed

before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.

Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012)5 (noting that exhaustion is “a

‘threshold matter’ that we address before considering the merits of the case”)

(citation omitted). Therefore, the Court turns first to the question of whether

Sheffield properly exhausted his administrative remedies. It is well settled

that the PLRA requires an inmate wishing to challenge prison conditions to

first exhaust all available administrative remedies before asserting any claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 524 (2002). A prisoner such as Sheffield, however, is not required to plead

exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

States Supreme Court has recognized that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative

defense under the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative

remedies is “a precondition to an adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory

under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not

only is there an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA “requires proper

exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal

with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative

law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so

that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Pozo,[6] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an

6 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for

the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th

Cir. 2007)).

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, the Corrections Defendants bear “the burden of proving that

[Sheffield] has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Id. at

1082. In accordance with Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a

two-step process when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance

procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response

to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to

dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to

exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,

541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we

established a two-step process for resolving motions to

dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541

F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual

allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the

prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of

the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts

as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.

Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s

view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to

resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based

on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to

exhaust. Id. at 1082–83; see also id. at 1082

(explaining that defendants bear the burden of

showing a failure to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider facts

outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and the

parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record.7 Bryant, 530 F.3d

at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838–39 (11th Cir. 2020).

In evaluating whether Sheffield has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the

Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that a “prisoner need

not name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust

his claim.” Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2010).

B. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218

7 In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that a pro se

plaintiff must receive notice of his opportunity to develop the record on exhaustion.

See Kinard v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-10359, 2024 WL 4785003, at *7 (11th Cir.

Nov. 14, 2024) (per curiam). Here, the Court notified Sheffield that he had forty-five

days to respond to any motion to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 34) at 3. Sheffield

responded to the Corrections Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and addressed the

exhaustion argument by relying on grievance records that he attached to his

Amended Complaint and SAC. See Response at 4–5. He does not request discovery or

suggest that he needs any additional information to respond to the Motion to Dismiss.

As such, Sheffield has received notice and an opportunity to develop the record on

exhaustion.

(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDC provides an internal grievance

procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001 through 33-

103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner

must complete a three-step sequential process. First, an inmate must submit

an informal grievance at the institutional level to a designated staff member

responsible for the specific problem. See Fla. Admin. Code R.

33-103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal

grievance at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the

matter is not resolved through formal and informal grievances, the inmate

must file an appeal to the Office of the FDC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code

R. 33-103.007. However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can

bypass the informal-grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the

institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). Or

an inmate can completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly to

the Office of the FDC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisal are

types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of the FDC

Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).

Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for

the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within

twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.

See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be received

no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the informal

grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). Similarly, grievance

appeals to the Office of the FDC Secretary must be received within fifteen days

from the date that the response to the formal grievance is returned to the

inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(c). According to Rule

33-103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or

grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without further processing if,

following a review of the grievance, one or more . . . conditions are found to

exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule provides an enumerated

list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance without a response on the

merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)–(y). A grievance can be

returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses more than one issue or

complaint”; is “so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly

investigated, evaluated, and responded to”; is “not written legibly and cannot

be clearly understood”; is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance

that has been accepted for review; does not “provide a valid reason for by-

passing the previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not

acceptable”; or does not include the required attachments. See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.014(1).

C. The Parties’ Positions Regarding Exhaustion

The Corrections Defendants argue that Sheffield failed to complete the

FDC’s three-step grievance process before he filed the initial Complaint on

January 18, 2024. See Motion to Dismiss at 10–15. In support of their failure

to exhaust assertions, the Corrections Defendants submit declarations from

Jeffrey R. McClellan, Assistant Warden of Programs at Florida State Prison,

and Lawanda Sanders-Williams, FDC Operation Analyst. See Docs. 86-2,

86-3.

In his declaration, McClellan states that between January 5, 2024, and

January 18, 2024, Sheffield filed only two informal grievances and one formal

grievance. Doc. 86-2 at 1. However, “[n]one of the grievances . . . complain of

excessive use of force on January 5, 2024.” Id. The grievance log attached to

McClellan’s declaration confirms that the three grievances concerned medical

and confiscation of personal property. See id. at 4–5. In her declaration,

Sanders-Williams states that between January 5, 2024, and January 18, 2024,

Sheffield filed “no appeals of any kind.” Doc. 86-3 at 1. The grievance log

attached to Sanders-Williams’s declaration confirms that Sheffield filed no

appeal grievances during that time. See id. at 3.

Sheffield responds that he properly exhausted his available

administrative remedies. See Response at 4–5. He contends that he submitted

an informal grievance on January 9, 2024, a formal grievance on January 12,

2024, and a grievance “to the Secretary” on January 19, 2024, but he never

received responses to them. Id. at 4. According to Sheffield, he only received a

response to a medical grievance that he submitted on January 12, 2024. Id. In

support of his assertion, Sheffield seemingly refers to the grievances attached

to his Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 13), SAC, and Response. See id. at 4–5.

Sheffield further argues that “[g]rievance coordinators and asst. warden of

program[] refuse to acknowledge staff assaults,” and as a result, the grievance

process was unavailable to him. Id. at 4.

D. Turner Step One

Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the

allegations in the Motion to Dismiss and Response and accept as true

Sheffield’s allegations. See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209. If Sheffield’s allegations

in the Response show a failure to exhaust, then dismissal would be

appropriate. See id.

Accepting Sheffield’s view of the facts as true, the Court finds dismissal

of the claims against the Corrections Defendants for lack of exhaustion is not

warranted at the first step of Turner. Thus, the Court proceeds to the second

step of the two-part process and considers the Corrections Defendants’

arguments about exhaustion and makes findings of fact.

E. Turner Step Two

As dismissal would not be appropriate based on the allegations in the

Motion to Dismiss and Response, the Court next turns to the second prong of

the Turner analysis and finds Sheffield had available administrative remedies

that he failed to properly exhaust before filing this action. Sheffield maintains

that he submitted grievances regarding the January 5th use of force, but he

never received responses to them. See Response at 4. However, reliable

evidence, such as sworn declarations and grievance logs, supports the

conclusion that Sheffield never submitted any relevant grievances at the

institutional or appeal levels. See Docs. 86-2, 86-3. And as evidenced by the

attachments to his AC, SAC, and Response, Sheffield has filed numerous

grievances since January 11, 2024, that produced responses. See AC at 22–32,

35–36, Docs. 83-1 at 1–2, 6–9, 92-1 at 1–8. Sheffield’s history of filing

grievances, by itself, is “evidence that the defendants did not make

administrative remedies unavailable to him or . . . destroy his grievances.”

Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2018). Further, as

established by McClellan and Sanders-Williams’s sworn declarations, a

grievance system was in place at FSP and the appeal level at the relevant time.

Docs. 86-2 at 2, 86-3 at 2. Considering the pleadings and the record evidence,

the Court credits the Corrections Defendants’ declarations and exhibits over

Sheffield’s assertions and exhibits.

Insofar as Sheffield argues that the grievances attached to his AC, SAC,

and Response demonstrate exhaustion, his argument is unavailing. Indeed,

Sheffield submitted most of these grievances after he filed the initial

Complaint. See AC at 22–23, 26–35, Docs. 83-1 at 1–9, 92-1 at 1–7. “[A]n

inmate alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and

exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983

lawsuit.” Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis

added). Sheffield filed his Complaint on January 18, 2024. Complaint at 1; see

Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying the mailbox

rule to a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 complaint). Accordingly, any grievances filed

after that date are not pertinent to the Court’s determination of whether

Sheffield satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Smith v. Terry, 491

F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“The only facts pertinent to

determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement are those that existed when he filed his original complaint.”).

Moreover, those grievances that Sheffield did submit before initiating

this action do not complain of the January 5th use of force. See AC at 25

(grieving the failure to remove sutures over his right eye), 36 (same), Doc.

92-1 at 8 (grieving confiscation of personal property). Those grievances instead

focused on the sufficiency of medical care after the incident and the loss of

personal property. See id. As such, they did not suffice to alert officials to the

excessive force claims raised in the SAC. See Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287

(explaining that the purpose of administrative exhaustion “is to put the

[administrative authority] on notice of all issues in contention and to allow the

[authority] an opportunity to investigate those issues.” (quotations and citation

omitted) (alterations in original)). Considering the above, the Corrections

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted based upon the contention

that Sheffield failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.8

VI. Sua Sponte Frivolity Review

The Court is obligated to conduct an independent frivolity review of

Sheffield’s deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Acevedo. The Prison

Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss a case at any time if the

Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Eighth

Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

8 Because the Court has determined that Sheffield did not exhaust his

administrative remedies using the FDC’s three-step grievance process, the Court will

not address the Corrections Defendants’ remaining arguments. Moreover, based on

Sheffield’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his excessive

force claims, the Court will dismiss those claims against the three John Does as well.

See Escobar v. Crosby, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting dismissal

of prisoner’s claims against unserved defendants was appropriate based in part on

prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies).

U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an

objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v.

Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has

described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence

standard” in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference

to that serious medical need. See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d

1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than

gross negligence.”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Wade v. McDade,

106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit

determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision

in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective

recklessness” standard as used in criminal law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).9

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, the law is

well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). The

9 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a

constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his

own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well

established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute

deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).

Here, Sheffield’s allegations of inadequate medical care do not amount

to a constitutional violation. Sheffield maintains that he received sutures and

Tylenol for the injury to his right eye, but Dr. Acevedo did not refer him to an

eye specialist. See SAC at 11. According to Sheffield, Dr. Acevedo’s failure to

refer him to a specialist constitutes deliberate indifference. See id. at 13. But,

as pled, these allegations amount to no more than a difference in medical

opinion between Dr. Acevedo and Sheffield as to the appropriate course of

treatment, which does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Harris v.

Prison Health Servs., 706 F. App’x 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[Defendant]

provided [plaintiff] with some treatment—an examination in the emergency

room and giving him Tylenol—while [plaintiff] wanted other treatment, such

as x-rays, immediately. This alone does not establish deliberate indifference.”).

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Sheffield’s claim against Dr. Acevedo as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

VII. State Law Claims

In the SAC, in addition to his federal § 1983 claims, Sheffield also asserts

claims for relief under Florida state law, including claims of assault, battery,

and negligence. See SAC at 12–13. However, the Court has determined that

Sheffield’s federal § 1983 claims over which the Court has original subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are due to be dismissed. Thus,

the Court must now consider whether to continue to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

“The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pend[e]nt state

claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),

the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State

law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court has

original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).10 Notably, “[a]ny one of the section 1367(c) factors is

sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss a case's supplemental

state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743

(11th Cir. 2006). However, upon determining that it has the discretion under

§ 1367(c) to decline jurisdiction, “[a district court] should consider the

traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and

convenience in deciding whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer v.

Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994). Upon due

consideration, the Court finds that judicial economy and convenience would

not be served by retaining jurisdiction over Sheffield’s state law claims. Thus,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court has determined that the § 1983

claims in the SAC, over which the Court has original jurisdiction, are due to be

dismissed. What remain are uniquely state law claims that are best addressed

by the state courts. The Court has not issued any dispositive rulings pertaining

to the state law claims, and no discovery deadlines have been set. Thus, the

procedural posture of the case weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction to allow

10 In § 1367, Congress codified the concepts of pendent and ancillary

jurisdiction under the umbrella label of supplemental jurisdiction. Artis v. District of

Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018).

the case to proceed fully in state court. Moreover, when, as here, the federal

claims are dismissed prior to trial, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

“encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims.” Raney, 370

F.3d at 1089; Busse v. Lee Cnty., 317 F. App’x 968, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Since the district court ‘had dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction,’ it therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over [Appellant’s] state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Furthermore, we expressly encourage district courts to take such action when

all federal claims have been dismissed pretrial.”); see also Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).

Upon consideration of the § 1367 factors and the “traditional rationales

for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and convenience,” see

Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Sheffield’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly,

Sheffield’s state law claims, including those for assault, battery, and

negligence, are due to be dismissed without prejudice to Sheffield refiling these

claims in the appropriate state court.

VIII. Motion to Amend

Finally, Sheffield requests leave to file a Third Amended Complaint

(TAC; Doc. 93) because he “has determined that the name[s] of two John Doe

Defendants [are] Captain Randall Smith and Captain Mason.” See Motion to

Amend at 1. Because Sheffield has twice been permitted leave to amend, he

may only amend with the Court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although

[l]eave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, a motion to

amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue

prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.” Haynes v. McCalla

Raymer, LLC, 793 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)

(quotations and citation omitted). Here, amendment would be futile as the

Court has determined Sheffield failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with regards to his excessive force claim before filing suit. Amendment will not

change this historical fact. See Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir.

2012) (per curiam) (finding prisoner’s supplemental complaint could not cure

his failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement because it “did not change the

important historical fact: his administrative remedies were unexhausted when

he filed his original complaint.”).

As to his deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Acevedo, the proposed

TAC suffers from the same deficiency as the SAC. See TAC at 13, 15. Sheffield’s

proposed amendment, liberally construed, still does not support a viable claim

of deliberate indifference because he alleges a mere disagreement as to his

course of medical treatment. Therefore, Sheffield’s Motion to Amend is due to

be denied.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff Andre Sheffield’s Motion to Excuse Plaintiff’s Inartful

Pleadings (Doc. 98) is GRANTED to the extent that the Order to Show Cause

(Doc. 88) is DISCHARGED.

2. Defendants Sergeant Austin Fowler, Sergeant Patrick Williams,

Sergeant D. Robinson, Warden Davis Allen, and Colonel Matthew Handley’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 86) is GRANTED to the extent the Corrections

Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them for Sheffield’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies. In all other respects, the Motion is

denied.

3. Sheffield’s claim against Defendant Angel Acevedo is

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b), and his state law claims are

DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state court.

4. Sheffield’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 91) is DENIED.

5. Sheffield’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 83) is DISMISSED

without prejudice as to all Defendants.

6. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of

January, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-9 1/9

C: Andre L. Sheffield, #116194

Counsel of record

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