The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
January 17, 2025
9:34 AM
In re C. YOUNG, Minor.
No. 370649
Lenawee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 22-000222-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RICK and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor child, CY, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue
to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition
requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction over CY and remove him from respondent’s care.
DHHS alleged that respondent lacked suitable housing and was providing improper supervision
for CY. DHHS alleged that, after CY had been removed from his father’s care due to allegations
that the father had sexually abused two minor children,1 respondent agreed to multiple safety plans
for CY’s care but had willfully ignored and violated those safety plans. In particular, respondent
had permitted unsupervised contact between CY and his father, had continued to reside with CY’s
father despite agreeing to reside with her sister following CY’s removal from his father’s care, and
1
These child protective proceedings initially began in October 2022 when DHHS filed a petition
to terminate the parental rights of CY’s father to CY at initial disposition, alleging that CY’s father
sexually abused two minor children, but respondent was not named a respondent in the proceedings
until DHHS filed a petition against her in November 2022. CY’s father voluntarily relinquished
his parental rights to CY in February 2024 and is not involved in this appeal.
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had permitted unsupervised contact between CY and respondent’s friend despite the friend’s
involvement with Children’s Protective Services (CPS) for her abuse of her own child. DHHS
also alleged that respondent maintained that CY did not need protection from CY’s father because
even if the sexual-abuse allegations against him were true, unsupervised contact between CY and
his father did not present any risk of harm to CY. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court
authorized the petition, removed CY from respondent’s care and placed him with a relative (the
mother of CY’s two older half-brothers),2 and granted respondent supervised parenting time.
The trial court conducted an adjudication hearing in January 2023, and respondent pleaded
no contest to the allegations in the petition and to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL
712A.2(b)(1) (reason to believe child at substantial risk of harm) and (b)(2) (unfitness of parental
home). As a factual basis for the plea, the court relied on prior testimony from a CPS investigator,
CY’s relative placement, and respondent, all of which was provided at the preliminary hearing and
further addressed the allegations in the petition. The trial court accepted respondent’s pleas,
exercised jurisdiction, continued respondent’s supervised parenting time, and ordered DHHS to
engage in reasonable efforts toward reunification. DHHS created a case service plan, which the
trial court adopted. The court ordered respondent to comply with her case service plan and
participate in and benefit from mental-health and parenting-education services. The court also
ordered respondent to complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations from
that evaluation, obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, refrain from
contact with individuals with a criminal or central-registry history in her home, and consistently
participate in parenting time.
Respondent struggled to progress on her case service plan. Respondent’s housing was
unstable throughout the case; respondent frequently moved between Adrian, Michigan, and
Toledo, Ohio, and she was often homeless in both locations. Respondent’s frequent moves made
it very difficult for DHHS to locate and refer services for respondent, but even when DHHS
provided referrals for mental-health and parenting-education services in Toledo, respondent did
not attend them. Respondent’s frequent moves and unreliable transportation also affected her
parenting time with CY; although respondent communicated with CY via phone and video calls
on a fairly regular basis, she only attended approximately 25% of her scheduled in-person
parenting times. Despite indicating that it was difficult for her to attend services when she was
traveling between Michigan and Ohio, respondent declined DHHS’s assistance with relocation to
Lenawee County so that she could be closer to CY for in-person visits and have easier access to
readily-available services.
In January 2024, DHHS—at the trial court’s direction—filed a supplemental petition
requesting termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j).3 At
the termination hearing in April 2024, respondent’s caseworker testified that DHHS provided
2
The mother of CY’s two half-brothers constituted a “relative” in this context because she was a
“parent who shares custody of a half-sibling[.]” MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i).
3
DHHS also requested termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care
and custody), but as made clear by the parties’ and the trial court’s statements at the termination
hearing, the court did not find sufficient grounds for termination under subsection (g) in this case.
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numerous services to respondent, but respondent failed to participate in the services, and mental
health, housing, employment, and parenting skills all remained barriers to reunification. The
caseworker testified that respondent had been noncompliant with her case service plan throughout
the entire case, noting that respondent provided “no verification of engagement in any services, no
verification of stable housing, [and] no verification of employment” and had “sporadic and
inconsistent contact with and visitation with” CY. The caseworker emphasized that for “all of the
services that were required at the outset of the case[,] none of them have been engaged in,
completed, and no benefit has been shown.” Respondent also repeatedly refused to meet or
communicate with her caseworker about her services throughout the case.
Regarding respondent’s mental health, DHHS repeatedly referred respondent for
individual counseling throughout the case, including while respondent resided in Toledo, but
respondent never engaged with those services. Respondent also never completed her
psychological evaluation, cancelling one scheduled appointment and failing to appear for the other.
Respondent voluntarily admitted herself into an inpatient mental-health and substance-abuse
treatment facility in September 2023 to address her self-reported substance abuse, but she was
released from the program four days later for violating the facility’s rules, and she never “engaged
in any follow up substance abuse services since then.” Respondent attended a follow-up case
management meeting, but she failed to attend her follow-up psychiatric appointment at
Community Mental Health (CMH), and CMH eventually closed her case for failure to participate.
Respondent reported to her caseworker that she “more recently” attempted to reengage in services
at CMH, but she was unable to do so because she no longer qualified for the services. DHHS
thereafter referred respondent to another program for mental-health services, but DHHS never
received verification that respondent had ever “contacted them or started services” there.
Regarding respondent’s housing and employment, respondent reported that she obtained
housing approximately one month before the termination hearing, but she never provided any
documentation to verify that she lived there, and the caseworker was never able to complete an
assessment of the home to verify that it was appropriate for CY to live in. Additionally, respondent
indicated that she obtained her housing through her romantic partner, who was incarcerated, and
it was unclear what would happen to respondent’s housing upon her partner’s release from
incarceration because the home actually belonged to her partner’s father. The caseworker also
testified that she was unsure whether respondent actually had access to the home that she claimed
to be living in because, when she dropped respondent off at the home a few weeks before the
termination hearing, she saw respondent enter the home by “open[ing] a window and crawl[ing]
in[.]” Respondent was unemployed throughout most of the case and asked CY’s relative
placement for money on several occasions. Although respondent reported that she had obtained
part-time employment at McDonald’s approximately one week before the termination hearing, she
never provided any documentation to verify that she worked there.
Regarding respondent’s parenting skills, DHHS referred respondent for parenting
education services in both Michigan and Ohio, but respondent did not engage in the services until
shortly before the termination hearing. Although respondent spoke to CY on the phone on a fairly
consistent basis, she had a “tendency” throughout the case “to reach out to [CY’s placement] not
only to speak to the child . . . but also to get emotional support from the [placement] and to ask for
financial help.” Additionally, although respondent generally behaved appropriately when she
attended parenting-time visits in person, respondent attended less than 25% of the offered
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parenting-time visits.4 Given the regular communication between CY’s relative placement and
respondent, CY’s relative placement offered respondent great flexibility with parenting-time visits,
but respondent never rescheduled or set up additional visits with CY. Respondent also
occasionally brought CY gifts or food to prepare a meal for him at the placement’s home during
an in-person visit, but she did not consistently provide for CY’s material needs or provide any
financial support for necessities such as clothing, shoes, and school supplies, and she asked CY’s
placement for money on several occasions.
At the close of proofs, the trial court found that DHHS had established grounds for
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) by clear and convincing evidence. The court
found that mental health, employment, housing, and parenting skills all remained barriers to
reunification and that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify those
conditions within a reasonable time considering CY’s young age. The court found that respondent
had intermittently been able to obtain housing and employment but had not shown either to be
stable. The court observed that, throughout the proceedings, respondent had been relying on CY’s
placement for “emotional and financial support” and was “still at a place where she has to prioritize
her own needs over her child’s needs.” The court also noted respondent’s failure to comply with
various aspects of her case service plan, including failing to complete a psychological evaluation
and participate in mental-health and parenting-education services. The court emphasized that it
had been 16 months since the start of this case and that, while respondent had shown some recent
signs of progress, respondent would still need at least an additional six months to demonstrate to
the court that the progress was lasting and that she was “gainfully employed, steadily housed, ha[d]
appropriate housing” for CY, knew what CY’s needs were, and knew how to adequately take care
of CY’s needs. Given the amount of time that respondent had already had at that point, as well as
CY’s young age, the fact that for “approximately one third of his life he has been flux,” and his
immediate need for stability and permanency, the court found it was unreasonable “to wait six
months to a year to see if this particular stage of stability for [respondent] is one that she can
maintain.” The trial court also found that CY faced a reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to
respondent for the same reasons already mentioned as well as respondent’s continued drug use.
The trial court next found that, for many of the same reasons, DHHS had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination was in CY’s best interests. The court emphasized
that given CY’s young age and the fact that he had been in his relative placement for approximately
one third of his young life, CY needed stability and permanency, and respondent had not
demonstrated that she could provide for those needs. The court also emphasized that CY was
“very bonded” with his relative placement and his two brothers, was “doing excellent” in his
placement, and had “thrived since he ha[d] been in that home.” The court also noted that CY had
expressed that he wanted to remain with his relative placement and that there was “a very high
likelihood of [CY] being adopted” by his relative placement. The court considered CY’s relative
placement but found that termination was still in his best interests because there were still
4
Respondent’s parenting-time participation rate had dropped below 25% by the time of the
termination hearing because respondent had only attended one in-person visit during the three
months between when DHHS filed a court report in January 2024 and when the hearing occurred
in April 2024.
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“significant concerns” regarding respondent’s ability to adequately care for CY and the safety and
stability of respondent’s living situation. The trial court thereafter issued an order terminating
respondent’s parental rights to CY. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that a statutory ground
for termination of parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that
termination is in a child’s best interests. In re Lombard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 4. A finding is clearly erroneous if, even if some evidence
supports the finding, the reviewing court is nevertheless left with the firm and definite conviction
that the lower court made a mistake. Id. “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich
App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court gives deference to “the special ability of the trial
court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 227; 894 NW2d
653 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence supported termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). We
disagree.
A court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “after 182 days have elapsed, the conditions resulting in adjudication
remain present and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In re MJC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2023) (Docket No. 365616); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court has
upheld termination under this subsection when “the totality of the evidence amply supports that
[the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions” that led to the
adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009), and would not be
able to rectify those conditions “within a reasonable time considering the child’s age,” MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). What constitutes a “reasonable time” requires consideration of how long the
parent will take to improve the conditions and how long the child can wait for the improvements
to occur. See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991). “Even if conditions
improved in the months before the termination hearing, a trial court may look to the totality of the
evidence to determine whether a parent accomplished meaningful change in the conditions that led
to adjudication.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 334; 985 NW2d 912 (2022).
In this case, there is no question that more than 182 days elapsed between the issuance of
the initial dispositional order in February 2023 and the issuance of the termination order in April
2024. The conditions that led to adjudication were primarily respondent’s mental-health issues,
parenting skills, and unstable housing and employment. Based on the totality of the evidence
before the trial court at the time of termination, we see no reversible error in the court’s conclusion
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that these conditions continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering CY’s age.
As summarized previously, ample evidence supported the trial court’s findings that
respondent had failed to adequately rectify her mental-health issues, parenting skills, and unstable
housing and employment. DHHS referred respondent to multiple different mental-health services
in Michigan and Ohio, but respondent never engaged with those services until immediately before
the termination hearing. Even then, however, respondent had only just signed up for counseling
and had not yet participated in any sessions. Respondent also never completed her mandatory
psychological evaluation and was dismissed from a mental-health and substance-abuse treatment
facility for violating the facility’s rules four days after she had voluntarily admitted herself to the
facility. Respondent also did not participate in any parenting-education services, despite referrals
in multiple locations, until immediately before the termination hearing and had yet to complete the
program. Respondent was homeless and unemployed throughout much of the case, and although
respondent reported that she had obtained housing and a job shortly before the termination hearing,
she never provided her caseworker with any documentation to verify either. The caseworker was
also never able to complete an assessment of the home to verify that it was safe and appropriate
for CY. Additionally, the caseworker was unsure whether respondent was actually permitted to
reside in the house because, although respondent reported that she could continue to live there
while her partner was incarcerated, the caseworker saw respondent gain access to the house by
crawling through a window. Respondent also made little effort to engage in scheduled parenting
times with CY, having only attended less than 25% of the offered visits. Respondent indicated
that it was difficult for her to engage in services when she was traveling between Michigan and
Ohio, but respondent refused DHHS’s assistance with relocation to Lenawee County, which would
have allowed her to be closer to CY and have easier access to readily-available services.
The record also amply supported the trial court’s finding that there was no reasonable
likelihood that respondent would rectify these conditions within a reasonable time considering
CY’s age. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The caseworker testified that respondent was largely
noncompliant with the case service plan for approximately 16 months. Respondent was offered
numerous services to enable her to reunite with CY during these 16 months, but she did not engage
in any services until a few weeks prior to the termination hearing and failed to demonstrate benefit
from any of the services. Although respondent reported that she had obtained part-time
employment and stable housing and had begun parenting-education and mental-health services by
the time of the termination hearing, she did not do so until only a few weeks before the termination
hearing, and she did not provide any sort of documentation through which her caseworker could
verify any of these things. Given respondent’s lack of participation in her services during the 16-
month pendency of this case, respondent’s caseworker did not believe that respondent would
consistently participate in services and rectify her barriers if given additional time.
Respondent stresses that she was making progress by the time of the termination hearing.
As noted, however, “[e]ven if conditions improved in the months before the termination hearing,
a trial court may look to the totality of the evidence to determine whether a parent accomplished
meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication.” Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340
Mich App at 334. Here, the totality of the record before the trial court at the time of termination
provided ample basis for the court to conclude that, despite any recent improvements respondent
may have made in certain respects, clear and convincing evidence demonstrated she had not
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“accomplished meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication” and there was no
reasonable likelihood that she would rectify those conditions within a reasonable time given CY’s
young age. Id.; MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Respondent has failed to show that the trial court
reversibly erred in reaching this conclusion.5
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in CY’s
best interests. We disagree.
When determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child, the court should
place its “focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890
NW2d 676 (2016). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the
children’s best interests,” and it should consider a variety of factors when making its
determination. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Such factors include
the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, and the child’s need
for permanency, stability, and finality. Other factors that the court may consider
include the parent’s history, the parent’s psychological evaluation, the age of the
child, and a parent’s substance-abuse history. The court may also consider whether
the parent can provide a permanent, safe, and stable home. Additionally, the court
may consider the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption. [MJC, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 9-10 (quotation
marks, citations, and alteration omitted).]
“The trial court may also consider how long the child was in foster care or placed with relatives,
along with the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parents’ home within the
foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted). “[A] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the
trial court is required to consider when making its best-interests determination, and a child’s
placement with relatives weighs against termination.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Respondent argues that the trial court gave inadequate weight to the fact that she was
“proactive at the beginning and end of the case.” As previously discussed, however, ample
evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that respondent had not accomplished meaningful
change in the conditions that led to adjudication, including mental health, parenting skills, and
unstable housing and employment. See MJC, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10; Jackisch/Stamm-
Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 334. Respondent also argues that the trial court gave inadequate weight
to the fact that she was bonded with CY, maintained communication with CY via phone and video
calls, and did not display abusive or neglectful behavior during in-person parenting times.
5
Because only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate a respondent’s parental rights, we need not address respondent’s arguments regarding
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). See Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 333-334.
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Respondent, however, did not consistently attend in-person visits and attended less than 25% of
her offered visits throughout the case. Additionally, although respondent regularly communicated
with CY over the phone and generally acted appropriately during in-person visits, the caseworker
testified that there were still “observable concerns” regarding the bond between CY and
respondent. In particular, the caseworker noted that respondent’s interactions with CY typically
centered around herself, that respondent was unaware of important matters regarding CY’s
schooling even though he had attended the same school since before the case began, and that CY
“ran to [the caseworker] and hugged [her but] did not do the same” with respondent. Conversely,
CY had a very strong bond with his two brothers and his relative placement, who had cared for
CY throughout the entire case and had expressed interest in adoption. The caseworker also
testified that although CY did not call his relative placement “mother or mom” when he spoke
directly to her, CY always referred to his placement “as mom when talking to his friends, neighbors
and peers.” CY was thriving in his relative placement and had expressed a desire to remain in her
home, and CY’s relative placement indicated that she intended to maintain a relationship between
respondent and CY even after termination.
The court found—and the record supports—that even though CY was placed with a
relative, termination was still in his best interests because respondent could not provide CY with
the stability and permanence that he needed in his young life, but CY’s relative placement could
provide—and had provided—for those needs. The record reflects that the trial court properly
weighed all the evidence available to it at the time that it made its best-interests determination,
White, 303 Mich App at 713, and we see no clear error in its findings, see Lombard, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 5-6.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
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