Velasquez, L. v. Miranda, L.

J-A10021-23

2023 PA Super 111

LICELY JUAREZ VELASQUEZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

LIZARDO MARROQUIN MIRANDA :

:

Appellee : No. 2688 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered September 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Civil Division at No(s): CV-2021-002235

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2023

Appellant, Licely Juarez Velasquez (“Mother”), appeals from the order

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which declined to

find her minor children, S.M.J. (born in 2007) and E.M.J. (born in 2010)

(“Children”) eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”).1 We

affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and Appellee, Lizardo Marroquin Miranda (“Father”), are the biological

parents of Children. On March 5, 2021, Mother filed a custody complaint

seeking sole legal and physical custody of Children. Mother also attached to

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “The SIJ[S] statute, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(2)(J), provides that a juvenile who

qualifies [for SIJS] may apply for lawful permanent residency and thus relief

from deportation.” Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 476 (Pa.Super. 2022).

J-A10021-23

her custody complaint a proposed order asking the court to award Children

SIJS. The court scheduled a hearing for June 22, 2022. At the June 22, 2022

hearing, the court raised questions concerning its jurisdiction because neither

of the parties are citizens of the United States nor are Children citizens of the

United States.2 Mother subsequently briefed the jurisdictional issue and

argued that under Section 5402 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act, the court had exclusive jurisdiction over the custody matter

because Pennsylvania is the home state of Children.3 On July 7, 2022, the

court entered an order asserting that it lacked jurisdiction over the custody

matter. The next day, Mother filed a petition for reconsideration and an

evidentiary hearing. The court granted relief and scheduled a custody trial for

August 15, 2022.

The court held a custody trial on August 15, 2022, at which Mother

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2 The parties and Children are citizens of Guatemala. Mother moved to

Pennsylvania with Children in December 2018. Father still resides in

Guatemala.

3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421(a) (explaining that court of this Commonwealth

has jurisdiction to make initial custody determination only if Commonwealth

is home state of child on date of commencement of proceeding); 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5402 (defining “home state” as state in which child lived with parent for at

least six consecutive months immediately before commencement of child

custody proceeding). Mother further asserted that she and Children were not

unlawfully present in the United States because they have pending asylum

claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II) (stating no period of time in

which alien has bona fide application for asylum pending shall be taken into

account in determining period of unlawful presence in United States).

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testified.4 On September 20, 2022, the court granted Mother sole legal and

physical custody of Children, but the court declined to find Children eligible for

SIJS. On October 11, 2022, Mother filed a petition for reconsideration. While

the petition remained pending, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on

October 19, 2022. On October 27, 2022, the court denied the petition for

reconsideration. On November 14, 2022, this Court directed Mother to file a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal no later than November

28, 2022. Mother filed her statement on November 21, 2022.

Mother raises three issues on appeal:

Whether…Mother properly preserved the issues raised in her

Rule 1925(b) Statement?

Whether the trial court erred in denying [M]other’s request

to find that reunification of the minor children with their

father is not viable due to abandonment, abuse or neglect,

or a similar basis under state law because the trial court

construed both federal and state remedial statutes narrowly

and ignored or misapplied state definitions of abandonment,

abuse and neglect to reach its conclusions?

Whether the trial court’s refusal to conclude that it is not in

the best interest of the minor children to return to

Guatemala is unreasonable, and therefore an abuse of

discretion, given [M]other’s credible testimony and the trial

court’s findings of fact in support of its custody

determination?

(Mother’s Brief at 6).

____________________________________________

4 Although Father accepted service of the custody complaint and received

notice of the hearing, he declined to participate in the hearing or in any

proceedings involving this matter. Father also has declined to file an

appellee’s brief on appeal.

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In her first issue, Mother acknowledges that she failed to file her concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal contemporaneously with her

notice of appeal. Mother argues, however, that once this Court directed her

to file a concise statement, she complied with the timeframe set by this Court’s

order. Thus, Mother asserts that she cured any defect concerning her failure

to file the statement.

Additionally, Mother asserts that her concise statement clearly and

concisely identified the issues she sought to raise on appeal. Mother contends

that her concise statement discussed the trial court’s narrow construction of

relevant federal and state statutes, and the court’s misapplication of, or failure

to consider, the definitions of “abandonment,” “abuse,” and “neglect,”

relevant to a determination of SIJS. Mother claims these were the precise

challenges she planned to assert on appeal. Mother maintains her concise

statement further addressed the court’s failure to conclude that reunification

of Children with Father and a return to Guatemala would be against Children’s

best interests. Mother avers that she also raised in her statement that the

court’s failure to find Children eligible for SIJS contradicts its custody award

in favor of Mother. Mother insists this was another issue she intended to, and

does, raise on appeal. Mother concludes that she submitted her concise

statement in a timely fashion after receipt of this Court’s directive, and

properly preserved her issues such that we may review her issues on appeal.

We agree.

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Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) provides that in

a children’s fast track appeal, “[t]he concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal shall be filed and served with the notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). Nevertheless, this Court has held that “in all children’s fast

track cases, the failure to file a concise statement of errors complained on

appeal with the notice of appeal will result in a defective notice of appeal, to

be disposed of on a case by case basis.” In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747

(Pa.Super. 2009). In deciding whether to quash or dismiss an appeal for

noncompliance with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i), the K.T.E.L. Court directed us to the

guidelines set forth in Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 491 Pa.

601, 421 A.2d 1047 (1980). See id. In Stout, our Supreme Court stated:

The extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an

appellate court sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate

when there has been substantial compliance with the rules

and when the moving party has suffered no prejudice.

* * *

The Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted to insure the

orderly and efficient administration of justice at the

appellate level. They were not intended, however, to be so

rigidly applied as to result in manifest injustice, particularly

when there has been substantial compliance and no

prejudice.

Stout, supra at 604-05, 421 A.2d at 1049.

Additionally, we observe that:

A concise statement of errors complained of on appeal must

be specific enough for the trial court to identify and address

the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 provides

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that a Rule 1925(b) statement shall concisely identify each

ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with

sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.

Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are

waived.

This Court has considered the question of what constitutes

a sufficient Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on numerous

occasions and has established that an appellant’s concise

statement must properly specify the error to be addressed

on appeal.

S.S. V. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

“In essence, the purpose of requiring a concise statement of [errors]

complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is to allow the trial court to

easily discern the issues an appellant intends to pursue on appeal and to allow

the court to file an intelligent response to those issues in an opinion pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).” Id. at 1032. See also Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d

394, 401 (Pa.Super. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1048, 163

L.Ed.2d 858 (2006) (stating: “By raising an outrageous number of issues, the

Defendants have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule

1925(b) and have thereby effectively precluded appellate review of the issues

they now seek to raise”). “[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to

allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional

equivalent to no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Id. at 400.

Instantly, Mother did not file a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal contemporaneously with her notice of appeal, even though this

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case is designated as a children’s fast track case. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

Consequently, this Court entered an order on November 14, 2022, directing

Mother to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal no later

than November 28, 2022. Mother filed her statement on November 21, 2022.

Under these circumstances, we see no reason to dismiss Mother’s appeal for

her technical noncompliance with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i). Mother ultimately

complied with this Court’s directive, and her belated filing did not prejudice

Father (who has had no involvement in this case) or impede the trial court’s

ability to draft an opinion. See K.T.E.L., supra. See also Stout, supra.

Turning to whether Mother’s Rule 1925 statement properly preserved

her appellate issues, the trial court described Mother’s statement as “overly

verbose, generalized, and vague necessitating the court to guess and search

for the issues being raised and attempt to guess at [Mother’s] intended issues

to be framed for appeal.” (Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/29/22, at 13). The

trial court deemed all of Mother’s issues waived on appeal on this basis, relying

on S.K. v. C.K., No. 1311 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Nov. 22, 2022)

(unpublished memorandum)5 (holding father’s eight-page “concise”

statement raising 41 issues failed to comply with requirements of Rule

1925(b)(4), constituting waiver of issues on appeal).

While we acknowledge that Mother’s Rule 1925 filing is anything but

____________________________________________

5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive authority).

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concise and does not appear in the typical formatting of a concise statement

of errors, we cannot agree with the trial court that Mother failed to preserve

her claims for appeal. Specifically, upon our review of Mother’s Rule 1925

statement, we cannot say that the statement is vague or that it was

insufficient to permit the trial court to identify the issues Mother sought to

raise on appeal. See Kanter, supra. If anything, Mother’s statement is

overly specific and more detailed than necessary to preserve her claims.

Mother not only specified the issues she sought to raise on appeal, but she

cited the record and legal authority to support her claims. We further note

that Mother did not purport to raise an “outrageous” number of issues on

appeal. Compare id.; S.K., supra. Rather, Mother essentially raised one

issue: whether the trial court’s decision regarding Children’s eligibility for SIJS

was erroneous as against the facts of record, applicable law, and at odds with

the court’s custody decision in favor of Mother. Consequently, we decline to

deem Mother’s appellate issues waived and will proceed to a merits review of

her claims.

In her second and third issues combined, Mother argues that the court’s

denial of SIJS eligibility for Children is diametrically opposed to the trial court’s

custody decision in Mother’s favor. Specifically, Mother contends that the

court needed to decide whether reunification with Father was viable due to

Father’s abandonment, abuse, or neglect. If the court found that reunification

was not viable, Mother maintains the court was required to find Children

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eligible for SIJS. Mother complains that the court readily found evidence of

Father’s abandonment, abuse and/or neglect such that the court awarded

Mother sole physical and legal custody of Children. Nevertheless, Mother

emphasizes that the court failed to make the same findings relevant to SIJS

eligibility for Children. Mother insists that SIJS eligibility does not require the

initiation of formal proceedings against Father to support a finding of

abandonment, abuse, or neglect.

Further, Mother argues it is in Children’s best interests not to return to

Guatemala. Mother stresses that there are less educational opportunities for

Children in Guatemala. Mother asserts that neither Father nor Children’s step-

siblings would have any relationship with Children if Children were forced to

return to Guatemala. Mother contends that Children previously witnessed

Father’s physical abuse against Mother. Mother concludes that the trial court

abused its discretion concerning its findings regarding Children’s best

interests, and this Court must grant Mother relief. We disagree, albeit on

different grounds than the trial court.

When interpreting a federal statute, we apply the following principles:

The construction of a federal statute is a matter of federal

law. Under federal rules of statutory construction, in

determining the meaning of a federal statute, the courts

look not only to particular statutory language, but also to

the design of the statute as a whole and to its purposes.

Furthermore, when the courts confront circumstances not

plainly covered by the terms of a statute, suggesting that

Congress did not contemplate the issue, they endeavor to

give statutory language the meaning that advances the

policies underlying the legislation.

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Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632, 636 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Council 13,

American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO

ex-rel. Fillman v. Rendell, 604 Pa. 352, 379-80, 986 A.2d 63, 80 (2009))

(internal citations omitted).

SIJS is an immigration status that may be awarded to:

(J) an immigrant who is present in the United States—

(i) who has been declared dependent on a

juvenile court located in the United States or whom

such a court has legally committed to, or placed under

the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or

an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile

court located in the United States, and whose

reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s

parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,

abandonment, or a similar basis found under State

law;

(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative

or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best

interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous

country of nationality or country of last habitual residence;

and

(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security

consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status,

except that—

(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to

determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the

custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services

specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and

(II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of

any alien provided special immigrant status under this

subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue to such parentage,

be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this

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chapter[.]

8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added).

Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations provides:

§ 204.11 Special immigrant juvenile classification.

* * *

(b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a

special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the

Act as described at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they

meet all of the following requirements:

(1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the

petition;

(2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication;

(3) Is physically present in the United States;

(4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that

meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this

section; and

(5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland

Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile.

For [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”)] to consent, the request for SIJ classification

must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish

that a primary reason the required juvenile court

determinations were sought was to obtain relief from

parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis

under State law. USCIS may withhold consent if evidence

materially conflicts with the eligibility requirements in

paragraph (b) of this section such that the record reflects

that the request for SIJ classification was not bona fide.

USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of

consent.

(c) Juvenile court order(s).

(1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and

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parental reunification determination. The juvenile

court must have made certain judicial determinations

related to the petitioner’s custody or dependency and

determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with

their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,

or a similar basis under State law.

(i) The juvenile court must have made at least one

of the following judicial determinations related to

the petitioner’s custodial placement or dependency

in accordance with State law governing such

determinations:

(A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the

juvenile court; or

(B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner

under the custody of an agency or department of a

State, or an individual or entity appointed by a

State or juvenile court.

(ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial

determination that parental reunification with one or

both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment,

neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is

not required to terminate parental rights to determine

that parental reunification is not viable.

(2) Best interest determination.

(i) A determination must be made in judicial or

administrative proceedings by a court or agency

recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law

to make such decisions that it would not be in the

petitioner’s best interest to be returned to the petitioner’s

or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual

residence.

(ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering

the standards for best interest determinations that

juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant

State law.

(3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s).

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(i) The juvenile court must have exercised its authority

over the petitioner as a juvenile and made the requisite

judicial determinations in this paragraph under applicable

State law to establish eligibility.

(ii) The juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the

date the petitioner files the petition and continue through

the time of adjudication of the petition, except when the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the petitioner

terminated solely because:

(A) The petitioner was adopted, placed in a permanent

guardianship, or another child welfare permanency goal

was reached, other than reunification with a parent or

parents with whom the court previously found that

reunification was not viable; or

(B) The petitioner was the subject of a qualifying juvenile

court order that was terminated based on age, provided

the petitioner was under 21 years of age at the time of

filing the petition.

8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b), (c) (emphasis added).

To summarize, SIJS is a federal immigration status available to foreign

children in the United States who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected.

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J). To obtain SIJS, a child must first apply to

a state court for an order finding that he or she meets the statutory and

regulatory requirements. See id. (SIJS statutory requirements). See also 8

C.F.R. § 204.11 (SIJS regulatory requirements). See also Osorio-Martinez

v. Attorney General United States of America, 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d.

Cir. 2018) (stating: “Alien children may receive SIJ[S] only after satisfying a

set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria, including that a

juvenile court find it would not be in the child’s best interest to return to her

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country of last habitual residence and that the child is dependent on the court

or placed in the custody of the state or someone appointed by the state”).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the eligibility criteria for SIJS

in Osorio-Martinez as follows:

We begin with the requirements for SIJ[S] that show a

congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused

children to remain safely in the country with a means to

apply for [legal permanent resident] status, and that, in

effect, establish a successful applicant as a ward of the

United States with the approval of both state and federal

authorities[.]

This understanding of SIJ[S] is reflected in the very

definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile, i.e., a child “who

has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in

the United States or whom such a court has legally

committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or

department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed

by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and

whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s

parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment,

or a similar basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(27)(J)(i). It is also compelled not only by the

statute’s purpose and history, … but also by [the

Department of Homeland Security’s] own characterization

of SIJ[S] as a classification to provide humanitarian

protection for abused, neglected, or abandoned child

immigrants eligible for long-term foster care[.] And the

SIJ[S] statute’s implementing regulations indicate that, to

remain eligible for adjustment of status pending visa

availability, SIJ[S] designees must remain in the custody of

the state court or state agency to which they have been

committed. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5) (noting that to be

eligible for SIJ[S], an alien must “continue to be dependent

upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster

care” (emphasis added)); see also Special Immigrant

Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978-01, 54980 (proposed

Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R pts. 204-05, 245)

(noting that “dependency,” for purposes of SIJ status,

“encompasses dependency, commitment, or custody”).

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Importantly, that close, dependency relationship with the

United States is also borne out by the statutory criteria for

SIJ[S] eligibility. To qualify for SIJ[S], applicants not only

must be physically present in the United States, unmarried,

and under the age of twenty-one, but also, … they must

obtain an order of dependency from a state juvenile court.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). That

order requires the state court to find: (1) that the applicant

is “dependent on a juvenile court ... or placed under the

custody” of a state agency or someone appointed by the

state; (2) that “it would not be in the alien’s best interest to

be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of

nationality or ... habitual residence,”; and (3) that

“reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is

not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar

basis found under State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i),

(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c). Moreover, these

determinations must be “in accordance with state law

governing such declarations of dependency,” 8 C.F.R. §

204.11(c)(3), which, depending on the state, may also

entail specific residency requirements, e.g., [Pa.R.C.P.]

1915.2(a)(ii) (providing that the dependency action must be

brought in the child’s home county or a county “which had

been the child’s home county within six months before

commencement of the proceeding”). …

With that order in hand, applicants must then file an

application with USCIS, along with “sufficient evidence to

establish ... eligibility” and the associated filing fee. The

Secretary of Homeland Security must also consent to the

grant of SIJ[S], which functions as an acknowledgement

that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide—that is,

that the benefit is sought primarily ... for the purpose of

obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.

All of these requirements attest to SIJ[S] designees’

dependency and close ties with state and federal authorities,

the risk to their well-being in being removed to their

countries of origin, and a relationship to the United States

that far exceeds that of aliens on the threshold of initial

entry or apprehended within hours of surreptitiously

entering the United States.

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Id. at 168-70 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In Orozco, supra, on which Mother relies, this Court considered an

interlocutory appeal from a collateral order denying the mother’s petition

seeking the issuance of an order containing specific factual findings regarding

her minor child necessary to obtain SIJS. In that case, the mother had filed

a petition for sole custody along with a petition seeking specific findings

regarding SIJS for the child. The trial court stated that it intended to consider

only the mother’s custody issue raised in her complaint, but not the issue of

SIJS. On appeal, this Court held:

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.

Mother specifically requested SIJ[S] findings both orally

during the March 2019 hearing and in her October 2019

petition. The federal statutory scheme puts the factual

determinations necessary for SIJ[S] solely within the

purview of state courts. Yet the court flatly refused to issue

the SIJ[S] order. In this posture, the refusal was an abuse

of discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order

and remand for the trial court to enter a new order that shall

include factual findings with respect to [the child]…

Orozco, supra at 479.

Instantly, we initially note that Mother’s reliance on Orozco does not

afford her any relief. While the trial court in that case refused to make any

factual findings concerning eligibility for SIJS despite the mother’s requests to

do so, here, the trial court made factual findings concerning whether Children

were eligible for SIJS and simply did not find facts necessary to demonstrate

that Children were eligible for SIJS. Specifically, the trial court found: (1) the

record does not demonstrate that Father abused Children; (2) based on the

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evidence presented, the court was without sufficient information to decide

whether Mother informed Father of her intent to relocate with Children to the

United States or whether Father consented to relocation, such that the court

was unable to determine that Father abandoned Children; and (3) the record

did not definitively support a conclusion that it would be in Children’s best

interests to remain in the United States. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed

12/1/22, at unnumbered pp. 10-12). On appeal, Mother challenges these

findings as against the facts of record, applicable law, and inconsistent with

the court’s decision to award Mother sole legal and physical custody of

Children.

Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the trial court’s factual

findings set forth above were erroneous, because Children are not eligible for

SIJS on other grounds. The relevant federal law contemplates an award of

SIJS only where the child or children have been adjudicated dependent or the

child or children have been legally committed to the custody of a state agency

or an individual or entity appointed by the state or juvenile court. See 8

U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B). See

also Osorio-Martinez, supra.

Significantly, Children have not been adjudicated dependent or placed

in the legal custody of a state agency or an individual or entity appointed by

a state or juvenile court. Rather, the record makes clear that Children reside

with Mother and Mother’s two sisters, and the two children of one of Mother’s

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sisters. (See N.T. Trial, 8/15/22, at 7-8; R.R. at 116-17). Thus, Mother

focuses on only part of the relevant statutory and regulatory federal language

at issue (concerning whether reunification with one or both parents is viable

and whether it would be in the children’s best interest to remain in the United

States), but she ignores the eligibility requirement that Children must be

adjudicated dependent or under the custody of a state agency or individual or

entity appointed by the state or juvenile court.6 On this record, Children are

simply ineligible at this juncture for SIJS. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i);

8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(4), (c)(1)(i)(A-B); Osorio-Martinez, supra. See also

Zaleppa, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order declining to find Children

eligible for SIJS, albeit on other grounds. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Domtar Paper Co., 77 A.3d 1282 (Pa.Super. 2013), aff’d, 631 Pa. 463, 113

A.3d 1230 (2015) (explaining that this Court may affirm trial court’s decision

on any grounds supported by record on appeal).

Order affirmed.

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6 In response to a question concerning this point raised at oral argument,

Mother responded that she satisfied the relevant statutory language because

the court awarded her sole custody of Children. Nevertheless, the express

statutory language and the purpose of the statute do not support Mother’s

claims. See Zaleppa, supra. Notably, the statute contemplates a scenario

where the court appoints an individual or entity to have custody over the

child at issue. This scenario is consistent with the purpose behind the statute

to assist a limited group of abused children who are essentially “ward[s] of

the United States.” See Osorio-Martinez, supra. Here, the court did not

appoint Mother to have custody. Rather, Mother is the biological parent of

Children and she sought to exercise sole custody of Children over the rights

of Father. Mother’s interpretation of the statutory language is unavailing.

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J-A10021-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023

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