State of New Jersey v. Anthony J. Castillo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2311-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY J. CASTILLO, a/k/a

ANTHONY JAVIER MEDINA

CASTILLO,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted December 3, 2024 – Decided January 17, 2025

Before Judges Firko and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 20-09-0048.

Scott D. Finckenauer, attorney for appellant.

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Debra G. Simms, Deputy Attorney

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

A jury convicted defendant Anthony J. Castillo of second-degree

conspiracy to distribute heroin in a quantity of five ounces or more, N.J.S.A.

2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; and third-degree

possession of a controlled substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). The jury

acquitted defendant of first-degree possession with intent to distribute heroin in

a quantity of five ounces or more, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1). Defendant was

sentenced to six years imprisonment for the conspiracy to distribute heroin

conviction. Defendant's conviction for the third-degree possession of a

controlled substance was merged into the conviction for the conspiracy charge

for purposes of sentencing.

Defendant appeals his judgment of conviction arguing that: (1) the State

failed to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the

trial court erred in admitting defendant's statement at trial. We affirm

defendant's convictions.

I.

We discern the facts from the record, both at the pre-trial suppression

hearing and at trial. In December 2017, law enforcement was conducting a

drug trafficking investigation in the City of Paterson. The target of the

investigation was an individual named Ami Edwards. An undercover detective,

A-2311-22

2

testifying anonymously, 1 recounted that he made an undercover purchase on

January 19, 2018 from Edwards and arranged another for February 2018.

The detective and Edwards met again and discussed another narcotics

purchase. Edwards agreed to make the deal and they arranged the purchase for

February 8, 2018.

On February 8, 2018, Edwards arrived at the Bonfire, a local restaurant,

driving a Cadillac. He called the detective to let him know he was waiting for

someone to arrive. The detective believed Edwards was waiting for his supplier.

Moments later, Edwards called the detective and asked him to come to his car.

When the detective arrived at Edwards' car, he handed the detective a brown box

containing 200 bricks of heroin out of a blue laundry bag. The detective left,

signaling to the "take-down team" that an arrest could be made. Edwards was

thereafter arrested.

The detective noticed another vehicle, an Acura, arriving at the Bonfire

that day, but had no information as to this vehicle or its occupants. Lieutenant

Michael Giampietro, an officer with the Cliffside Park Police Department, was

involved in the drug trafficking investigation with Edwards. Giampietro was at

the Bonfire on February 8, 2018, and during the transaction, saw an Acura arrive

1

Defendant consented to the detective testifying anonymously at trial.

A-2311-22

3

at the restaurant. Giampietro testified that he observed Edwards enter the Acura

empty handed and exit the car carrying a blue laundry bag, which appeared to

be "squared off" and "weighted." The Acura was driven by another individual,

Ami Fernandez, defendant's pregnant girlfriend. Defendant was seated in the

passenger seat.

Edwards returned to the Cadillac with the bag and the undercover

detective entered the Cadillac. Defendant, Edwards, and Fernandez were

arrested at the scene and taken to the State Police Barracks in Totowa. The blue

laundry bag, containing a brown shoe box with 200 bricks of heroin, was seized

and secured. It was later submitted to a lab for testing.

After being taken into custody, defendant was advised of his Miranda2

rights twice and acknowledged those warnings by signing two Miranda cards:

one at 5:20 p.m. and the other at 6:56 p.m., on February 8, 2018. Defendant

waived his rights and gave a recorded statement to the officers.3 Because

defendant's primary language was Spanish and the interview was conducted by

Giampietro, who did not speak Spanish, communication between defendant and

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

Defendant's video-recorded interview is not contained in the record.

A-2311-22

4

law enforcement occurred through Detective Christopher Rios, who is fluent in

Spanish.

Defendant stated that earlier that day on February 8, 2018, he received a

call from an individual he only knew as a "black man," later identified as

Edwards, asking him to pick up 200 bricks of heroin. Defendant explained that

he took a bus to Manhattan to pick up the drugs and returned by bus to New

Jersey. The drugs were in a box, and when defendant returned home, he placed

the box in a bag. While he was arranging for a taxi to take him to the Bonfire,

defendant stated that his girlfriend, Fernandez, agreed to drive him to the

restaurant. Defendant stated Fernandez was unaware of what he was doing.

Defendant stated that he was short on money and expected to receive

$60.00 per brick, although he did not receive payment for the drugs. Defendant

stated that this was his second time delivering drugs and the first time he was

arrested.

Defendant admitted he met Edwards at the Bonfire, which was

prearranged, was driven there by Fernandez, and gave the drugs to Edwards. He

repeatedly stated that Fernandez was unaware that drugs were in the blue

laundry bag and that she was not involved in the matter.

A-2311-22

5

A. Motion to Admit/Suppress Defendant's Statement.

Defendant moved to suppress the statement he gave to law enforcement

on the day of his arrest, while the State moved to admit the statement at trial.

The court conducted a Miranda hearing to determine whether defendant's

statement would be admitted at trial. Detective Rios testified on behalf of the

State. Defendant did not testify on his own behalf and called no witnesses.

Detective Rios testified that on February 8, 2018, he was involved in the

investigation that led to the arrests of defendant, Fernandez, and co-defendant

Edwards at approximately 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Rios testified that he was not

present when defendant signed the first Miranda card, but no statement was

taken from him at that time. Rios testified that he advised defendant of his

Miranda rights before taking his statement, and defendant acknowledged

understanding his rights. Defendant then signed the second Miranda card before

he gave his statement. He told Rios he wished to speak with the officers.

According to Rios, defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any

drugs or alcohol and no threats, coercion or force were used to compel

defendant's statement. Further, defendant agreed that no promises or threats

were made to him. Defendant was given the opportunity to ask questions, and

he had none.

A-2311-22

6

Defendant's statement was video-recorded and lasted approximately thirty

minutes. A transcript of the interview was created and reviewed by Rios for

accuracy. Rios testified that the video recording captured defendant's entire

statement. The interview was conducted in English and Spanish.

Following the hearing, the court advised that it intended to admit

defendant's statements into evidence at trial and would supplement its decision

the following day. In its supplemental decision, the court found Detective Rios'

testimony credible and began the analysis by noting that there was no question

that defendant was in custody. The court found that defendant was advised twice

of his Miranda rights. The court determined that defendant read and understood

those rights and signed two Miranda cards acknowledging those rights. The

court also found that defendant "knew why he was being questioned." The court

concluded that there was no prior questioning of defendant before he was

administered his Miranda rights.

During the interview, the court found that neither Rios nor Giampietro

"ever raised their voices, threatened, coerced or otherwise intimidated . . .

defendant." The court further found that defendant was not subjected to "mental

exhaustion, physical stress" nor was defendant's will overborne in any fashion.

A-2311-22

7

The court found that defendant, who was then twenty-eight years of age,

with some college education, was able to read, write, and understand the Spanish

language. He was not under the influence at that time of the interview .

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's

custodial interrogation, the court found, the State met its burden, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

waived his Miranda rights. Thus, the court granted the State's motion to admit

defendant's statement and conversely, denied defendant's motion to suppress.

B. Trial.

Dawn Klarin, a forensic scientist with the Department of Law and Public

Safety's Office of Forensic Sciences, testified, without objection, as an expert in

the field of drug analysis. Klarin testified that the evidence seized in defendant's

case was submitted to the lab for analysis. She explained that there were 1,001

bundles of suspected narcotics submitted to the lab for analysis. Based upon

Klarin's analysis, she determined the bundles contained 146.92 grams of heroin

in 9,979 glassines, with an uncertainty of 0.74 grams.

Klarin explained that rather than test every single glassine individually,

she used a scientifically accepted extrapolation method called hypergeometric

sampling to determine the net weight of the drugs. This method involves

A-2311-22

8

weighing a sample of twenty-nine glassines and using statistical methods to

extrapolate the weight of the entire amount.

The State played the video recording of defendant's statement at trial. The

undercover detective, Giampietro, and Rios testified on behalf of the State.

Defendant, Fernandez, and Patricia Rojas, Fernandez's mother, also

testified at trial as defense witnesses, offering an alternative version of events

from that offered by defendant in his statement to law enforcement. Defendant

and Fernandez testified that on the day of their arrests, they woke up at their

apartment in Paterson and decided to visit Rojas’s home also located in Paterson,

where other family members resided. At the time of their visit, Rojas' boyfriend

Franklin Tervares was at Rojas' home. While at Rojas' house, Fernandez, who

was nine months pregnant, told defendant she was having contractions and was

not feeling well, and wanted to go to the hospital. Before leaving, Tervares

asked them if they could do him a favor on the way to the hospital by dropping

a bag off at the Bonfire restaurant. Defendant and Fernandez agreed and

testified they believed the bag contained clothing.

Defendant additionally testified at trial to an alternative version of events

from his recorded statement. Defendant testified he was taken to a room at the

police station and asked to sign a card, which he did. Rios then spoke to him in

A-2311-22

9

Spanish and told him he needed to take responsibility for the drugs or his wife

would stay in jail and his daughter would be born in prison. Defendant then said

he wanted to make a call and that he wanted a lawyer, and that Rios responded

that he needed to decide as to whether he would take responsibility or let his

wife give birth in jail.

Defendant then testified that what he said in his recorded statement was

not the truth and that he only said what Rios told him to say because he promised

to help him and release Fernandez if he admitted his involvement. Defendant

testified that he did not go by bus to and from Manhattan to pick up drugs.

The State recalled Rios as a rebuttal witness, who contradicted defendant's

testimony regarding his custodial interview. Rios testified there was no pre-

interview conducted with defendant prior to him giving his recorded statement.

Rios denied defendant was fed information about the case. Rios testified that

he avoided asking leading questions and instead asked open-ended questions to

give defendant the opportunity to tell his story, and the drug terminology used

by defendant was his own words. Rios also reiterated that while he filled out

the second Miranda card pertaining to this case, he was not involved in

defendant signing the first card.

A-2311-22

10

Rios testified he had no knowledge of anything that may have occurred

from the time of defendant’s arrest until the time the detective interacted with

defendant prior to the taking of his statement, including the hour and thirty -

minute gap between the time defendant signed the first Miranda card and the

time he signed the second card.

Defendant now appeals from his convictions.

II.

On appeal, defendant presents the following two arguments for our

consideration:

POINT I: THE STATE FAILED AT TRIAL TO

PROVE THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT-

APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

ADMITTING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT[']S

STATEMENT AT TRIAL.

A. Jury's Verdict Against the Weight of the Evidence.

Defendant contends that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the

evidence because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the weight

of the drugs alleged to have been possessed by defendant. Defendant argues

there "was no evidence that the hypergeometric method [used by the State's

expert] was scientifically reliable or accepted." Defendant notes that only

A-2311-22

11

twenty-nine or 0.29% of 9,979 glassines were tested, a sample size "clearly

insufficient for purposes of extrapolating the total weight of the drugs."

"We do not consider a weight-of-the-evidence argument on appeal unless

the appellant moved in the trial court for a new trial on that ground." State v.

Fierro, 438 N.J. Super. 517, 530 (App. Div. 2015); see R. 2:10-1. Here,

following the jury's verdict, defense counsel stated that he may want to file a

motion prior to sentencing to address the perceived "inconsistency" in the jury's

verdicts. While the court stated that it was not prejudging any such motion, the

"instructions that were given to the jury and the law is quite clear." Therefore,

the court denied defendant's motion.

The record does not clearly support that defense counsel affirmatively

moved for a new trial. However, in light of the colloquy and in the interest of

justice, we can and do consider the merits of defendant's argument . State v.

Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 511 (App. Div. 1993) ("[T]he issue of whether a

jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall not be cognizable on

appeal unless a motion for a new trial on that ground was made in the trial court."

(quoting R. 2:10-1)).

"In considering whether a jury verdict was against the weight of the

evidence, our task is to decide whether 'it clearly appears that there was a

A-2311-22

12

miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Smith, 262 N.J. Super. at 512 (quoting

R. 2:10-1). "We must sift through the evidence 'to determine whether any trier

of fact could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential

elements of the crime were present.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86,

96 (1982)). "But an appellate court may not overturn the verdict 'merely because

it might have found otherwise upon the same evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting State v.

Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. 127, 134 (App. Div. 1985)).

"On a motion for a new trial, the objective is not to second-guess the jury

but to correct [an] injustice that would result from an obvious jury error." State

v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 524 (App. Div. 1997). Thus, "[a]ppellate

intervention is warranted only to correct an 'injustice resulting from a plain and

obvious failure of the jury to perform its function.'" Smith, 262 N.J. Super. at

512 (quoting Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. at 134).

A bedrock legal principal of our criminal justice jurisprudence is that the

State must prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). The State acknowledges that the weight

of a controlled dangerous substance is a material element of the offense. State v.

Florez, 134 N.J. 570, 595 (1994).

A-2311-22

13

Defendant was charged with and convicted of, among other crimes,

second-degree conspiracy to distribute heroin in a quantity of five ounces or more,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. N.J.S.A.

2C: 35-5(b)(1) requires the State to prove defendant possessed heroin in a quantity

of five ounces or more. Defendant disputes only the weight of the drugs he was

convicted of possessing. Specifically, he argues that the sample size of twenty-

nine out of 9,979 glassines tested and weighed was insufficient for purposes of

extrapolating the total weight of the drugs and for the expert's conclusion as to

the total weight.

At trial, the State offered the testimony of Klarin, a forensic chemist in the

State's forensic sciences lab. Defendant stipulated to the expert's qualifications

and the court qualified Klarin as an expert in the field of drug analysis. Defendant

offered no evidence, either expert testimony or otherwise, to counter or rebut

Klarin's testimony.

Klarin explained the process she undertook to analyze the drugs, which

included checking the operability of the instruments and having her results peer

reviewed. Klarin further explained the hypergeometric sampling method, which

is a statistical approach to determining the weight of the drugs. According to

Klarin, this method is reliable and generally accepted in the scientific community.

A-2311-22

14

Defendant argues the twenty-nine individual glassines tested are a small

percentage of the larger total and seems to suggest that the expert needed to test

every glassine to support his conviction. However, defendant did not present any

rebuttal evidence; he did not offer the testimony of an expert to counter Klarin's

testimony, nor did he offer evidence to discredit Klarin's analysis. His contentions

are not supported by the record. Thus, defendant has not established there was a

clear "miscarriage of justice under the law." Smith, 262 N.J. Super. at 512

(quoting R. 2:10-1).

B. Admission of Defendant's Statement at Trial.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting his recorded

interview because the police did not comply with Miranda. He also asserts the

police conducted an unrecorded interview prior to conducting the taped

interview, where he was pressured into taking responsibility for the crimes and

given information as to what he should say during the interview . Therefore,

defendant argues he did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights

because the police made threatening statements regarding his girlfriend going to

jail and giving birth in prison to pressure him into confessing, and he did not

know the meaning of the card he signed. Finally, defendant contends the police

ignored his request for an attorney.

A-2311-22

15

In reviewing a court's denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court

"must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as

those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State

v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243

(2007)). Factual findings "should be overturned 'only if they are so clearly

mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State

v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 426 (2017) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Legal interpretations are owed no deference and thus,

are reviewed de novo. State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529, 543 (2017).

The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment

of the United States Constitution and New Jersey law. See U.S. Const. amend.

V; N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503. In State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266 (2022),

our Supreme Court articulated the principles governing a defendant's right

against self-incrimination as follows:

The Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment, see State in Int. of A.A., 240

N.J. 341, 351 (2020), guarantees that "[n]o person . . .

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself," U.S. Const. amend. V. Although not

included in the New Jersey Constitution, the right

against self-incrimination is deeply rooted in New

Jersey common law and is codified by statute and the

A-2311-22

16

Rules of Evidence. See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E.

503.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States

Supreme Court held that individuals who are "subjected

to police interrogation while in custody . . . or otherwise

deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant

way" must be appropriately advised of certain rights so

as to not offend the right against self-incrimination. 384

U.S. at 477-79. Miranda warnings include advice as to

the right to remain silent and of the right to the presence

of an attorney during any questioning. Id. at 479.

Pursuant to Miranda, if an "individual indicates in any

manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that

he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must

cease." Id. at 473-74. Furthermore, "[i]f the individual

states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must

cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474.

[Clark, 251 N.J. at 291-92 (alterations and omissions in

original).]

"The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right

against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of

custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019). To admit a

statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293,

316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also State v.

A-2311-22

17

Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 405 n.11 (2009) (emphasizing the totality of the

circumstances analysis).

To determine whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, the court

considers "the totality of the circumstances." A.M., 237 N.J. at 398. These

include a defendant's "age, education and intelligence, advice as to

constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated

and prolonged in nature[,] and whether physical punishment or mental

exhaustion was involved." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402 (quoting Presha, 163

N.J. at 313) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

"A court may consider on a case-by-case basis attendant circumstances

such as the length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interrogation,

the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police[,] and all other relevant

circumstances." State v. Choinacki, 324 N.J. Super. 19, 44 (App. Div. 1999).

An investigator's statements must not be "manipulative or coercive" because it

could deprive a defendant of the "ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous

decision to confess." State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257 (1990) (quoting

Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986)).

"Efforts by a law enforcement officer to persuade a suspect to talk 'are

proper as long as the will of the suspect is not overborne.'" State v. Maltese,

A-2311-22

18

222 N.J. 525, 544 (2015) (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 403 (1978)). A

false promise of leniency is not an inherently coercive lie. State v. L.H., 239

N.J. 22, 44-45 (2019) (noting a false promise of lenience may be coercive if the

lie, "under the totality of circumstances, ha[s] the capacity to overbear a

[defendant's] will").

Here, after carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied the court did

not err in admitting defendant's recorded interview at trial. To determine the

admissibility of defendant's recorded interview, the court conducted a pre-trial

hearing at which Rios testified on behalf of the State. Defendant called no

witnesses. The court credited the testimony of Rios, finding his testimony "was

wholly consistent on both direct and cross-examination and was not contradicted

by any other evidence." The court thus found Rios’s testimony was "reasonable,

inherently believable, and therefore credible."

The court noted defendant's signature appeared on two Miranda cards and

the cards articulate the Miranda warnings in both English and Spanish. The

court also found that defendant appeared on the video reading aloud and

acknowledging each right. When asked by Rios if "knowing your rights, do you

wish to speak with us?" defendant replied "yes." The court found no evidence

during the thirty-minute interview of the police pressuring or coercing defendant

A-2311-22

19

to speak to the officers, and defendant had no difficulty understanding or

communicating with the detective. The court considered defendant's personal

characteristics, such as his age and educational background.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the court found, the State

met its burden, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and thus, the court

granted the State's request to admit defendant's recorded interview. As a result

of the court's decision, defendant's recorded interview was played for the jury.

In examining the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied the

evidence sufficiently supported the court's findings that defendant knew why he

was arrested and being questioned. While defendant had not previously been

arrested, his age, educational background, intellect, length of his detention and

interview, demeanor during the interview and responses to the questioning

counter defendant's assertion that he was pressured into making a statement.

Further, the evidence did not demonstrate the officers subjected defendant to

threats, mental exhaustion, or physical stress.

Defendant's assertion that he was pressured into waiving his Miranda

rights to protect his girlfriend and unborn child from involvement in the criminal

justice system is without support in the record. Moreover, "[u]nlike the use of

A-2311-22

20

physical coercion, . . . use of a psychologically-oriented technique during

questioning is not inherently coercive." State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654-

55 (1993) (citing Miller, 76 N.J. at 405). "The real issue" is whether defendant's

decision to confess was a result of the officers "overbearing" defendant's will.

Id. at 655. Other than defendant's assertion, the evidence does not support the

contention that defendant's will was overborne, resulting in his confession.

In sum, based on the record before us, we are satisfied the court properly

admitted defendant's statement at trial. Law enforcement adhered to defendant's

constitutional protections before conducting the custodial interrogation. The

court conducted an evidentiary hearing and made adequate findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 1:7-4. We are satisfied those findings are

supported by competent and credible evidence in the record and discern no basis

to reject the court's ruling on this issue.

Affirmed.

A-2311-22

21