The opinion
J-S38034-20
2020 PA Super 219
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SAMMY HILL : No. 377 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-31-CR-0000713-2019
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the February 25, 2020, Order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County dismissing, with prejudice,
charges arising from Appellee, Sammy Hill’s, possession of marijuana and
drug paraphernalia while in prison.1 After careful review, we reverse and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The trial court set forth its “Facts & Analysis” herein as follows:
[Appellee] is serving a life sentence for First Degree
Murder. He now faces one felony and two misdemeanor charges
arising from his possession of a small amount of synthetic
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellee was charged with one count each under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a.2),
Possession of controlled substance, contraband by inmate prohibited; 35
P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), Intentional possession of a controlled substance; and
35 P.S. § 780-113 (a)(32), Use/possession of drug paraphernalia. The first
charge listed above is a felony, while the others are misdemeanors.
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marijuana in his cell at SCI Smithfield.1 If convicted (which
appears likely) he faces an additional twelve years in prison. Not
surprisingly, he has rejected the District Attorney's plea offer,
which would force this matter to a jury trial.
The Pennsylvania State Police have properly and
appropriately investigated and initiated these charges. The
District Attorney is now waiting to shoot his proverbial fish in a
barrel, the [c]ourt -appointed defense attorney is preparing to
go through the motions on a case he knows he is going to lose
(and which distracts from matters truly needing his attention),
and the [c]ourt's staff is dutifully processing the filings,
assembling a jury pool, and preparing for trial.2
What nobody is apparently doing is asking the most basic
of questions: “Why?” Is it really worth all this time and cost to
taxpayers to tell a life inmate that once he dies, he will have to
serve an additional twelve years?
This [c]ourt (and this community) is all too familiar with
the risks and problems presented by illicit drugs in our prisons.
Prosecuting and sentencing [Appellee], however, serves none of
the goals of our criminal justice system. There is no additional
deterrence, protection of the public, or retribution to be had
here.
[Appellee’s] conditions of confinement will not change, nor
will he have any fewer privileges-the DOC does not maintain
different levels of confinement based on the total number of
years (or total number of sentences) to be served. Parole is
unavailable to inmates serving life sentences, so there is no
chance that [Appellee] will be released sooner if his offense is
not prosecuted. In sum, winning this case cannot even be
characterized as a pyrrhic victory, as there is simply no victory
to be had.
The Commonwealth's budget problems are well known,
and cases like this represent a misguided attempt by the
Commonwealth to address internal prison discipline problems for
which they currently lack a solution. Additional prosecution
through the courts only exacerbates, rather than addresses,
those problems. While we appreciate the danger that drugs
create within an institutional setting, the Department of
Corrections should focus its resources more on effective methods
to reduce the influx of (and demand for) narcotics in its facilities
than on futile prosecutions that serve no real purpose.
We therefore respectfully suggest that the Department of
Corrections should endeavor to establish an internal disciplinary
program that constructively addresses and modifies inmate
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behavior, and that the General Assembly needs to provide a new
statutory scheme that addresses the realities of modern prison
life.3 It has been said that insanity is doing the same thing over
and over again, but expecting a different result. It is time for a
new approach.
____
1 He has since been transferred to the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas, meaning transporting him back to
Huntingdon County for trial increases the cost of prosecuting him
even further (along with the attendant security risks).
2 While Huntingdon County is reimbursed for the costs of
prosecution by the Commonwealth, we are not reimbursed for
the time and resources these cases take. Additionally, although
Huntingdon County taxpayers are spared from the direct
expense of prosecuting these cases, Pennsylvania taxpayers, as
a whole, foot the bill for thousands of [d]ollars spent on each of
these meaningless cases.
3 The most logical resolution of such cases is to develop a series
of summary offenses for conduct that occurs within the walls of
State Correctional Institutions. Summary offenses do not entitle
a defendant to representation by counsel or trial by jury, and the
punishments would emphasize fines over additional
incarceration. Upon conviction, these fines (and the associated
court costs) could be deducted from an inmate's institutional
account, and it would likely take a significant amount of time for
an inmate to pay them off. Such punishment could conceivably
have an impact on future similar conduct, and ultimately serve
as a stronger deterrent.
Order and Opinion, filed 2/25/20, at 2-3.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on February 28,
2020.2 The Commonwealth filed its Concise Statement of Matters
____________________________________________
2 Although the Commonwealth filed a Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) Certification and
stated in its appellate brief that the appeal was from an interlocutory order,
the instant appeal is, in fact from a final order dismissing the charges with
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Complained of on Appeal on March 17, 2020, and the trial court filed its
Opinion in Support of Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 30, 2020.
In its brief, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing
charges sua sponte?
2. Did the trial court violate the doctrine of separation of
powers in dismissing charges sua sponte?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 3. As these issues are interrelated, we will
consider them together.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently observed the following as to
the Separation of Powers Doctrine:
The separation of powers doctrine is essential to our
triparte [sic] governmental framework and is the cornerstone of
judicial independence. It is inherent in the Pennsylvania
Constitution and makes manifest that the three branches of
government are co-equal and independent, and divides power
accordingly. The governing structure of our Commonwealth, like
the federal government, is divided into three equal branches, the
legislative, see Pa. Const. art II, § 1 (“The legislative power of
this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly ....”);
the executive, see Pa. Const. art. IV, § 2 (“The supreme
executive power shall be vested in the Governor ....”); and the
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
prejudice. A party may appeal from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final
order includes an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.”
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). “Often, an order dismissing criminal charges is not a
final order, as the Commonwealth may refile charges. Commonwealth v.
Waller, 453 Pa.Super. 36, 682 A.2d 1292, 1294 (1996) (en banc). If,
however, ‘the defect which requires the dismissal of [the] charges is
uncurable, then the order dismissing the charges is final, and appellate
review is proper.’ Id.” Commonwealth v. Ligon, 219 A.3d 1181, 1185
(Pa. Super. 2019).
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judicial, see Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 (“The judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system ....”).
The rationale underlying this separation of powers is that it
prevents one branch of government from exercising, infringing
upon, or usurping the powers of the other two branches. Thus,
to “avert the danger inherent in the concentration of power in
any single branch or body,” no branch may exercise the
functions delegated to another branch. Jefferson County Court
Appointed Employees Association v. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, 985 A.2d 697, 706-07 (Pa. 2009); see
generally Markham v. Wolf, 190 A.3d 1175, 1183 (Pa. 2018).
The prohibition on one branch of government encroaching upon
a sister branch’s powers is, in turn, related to the system of
checks and balances, which prevents one branch from acting
unchecked. Jefferson County, 985 A.2d at 706. For checks and
balances to properly work, each branch must be kept from
controlling or coercing the other. Insuring that each branch is
co-equal and independent is the foundation of the separation of
powers doctrine, and the avoidance of the concentration of
governmental powers in one branch is essential to our freedom
and liberty.
In our Commonwealth, the roots of the separation of
powers doctrine run deep. The delineation of the three branches
of government, each with distinct and independent powers, has
been inherent in the structure of Pennsylvania’s government
since its genesis — the constitutional convention of 1776. Indeed
for most of our Commonwealth’s history, our Court has
vigorously maintained separation of the powers of the branches,
primarily relying on Article V, Section 1. See, e.g., Greenough
v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849) (finding the separation of
powers doctrine, and the inherent powers of the judicial branch,
were distributed in the Constitution in such a way that the
legislature could not exercise any judicial power). Article V,
Section 1’s perhaps rudimentary expression of the separation of
powers doctrine became concrete with the 1968 amendments to
the Pennsylvania Constitution. While Article V, Section 1
remained virtually unchanged in the 1968 Constitution, Article V,
Section 10(a) was added, granting to the Supreme Court general
supervisory and administrative authority over the judicial
branch. Moreover, Article V, Section 10(c) was also added,
granting to the Supreme Court the power to enact rules
governing all aspects of the judiciary. These newly-minted
provisions expressly made the separation of powers between the
branches of government explicit.
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Michael Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, County
of Lehigh, John J. Sikora and Mark Surovy, 2020 WL 4102756 at *5-6
(Pa. July 21, 2020) (footnotes omitted).
A trial court cannot be permitted, as here, to ignore the separation of
powers doctrine and to usurp the power not only of the District Attorney but
also of the Legislature, the Department of Corrections, defense lawyers and
juries as well.
At the outset of its Order and Opinion entered on February 25, 2020,
the trial court explained the rationale underlying its dismissal of the instant
charges with prejudice sua sponte as follows:
The [c]ourt bases its action upon no statute, Pennsylvania
rule of court, or common law theory, other than the inherent
power of the [c]ourt to manage its docket and avoid absurd
results. This case is a perfect example of the kind of misuse of
the courts and failure to act by the General Assembly that has
become endemic over several decades. This [c]ourt’s docket has
become overburdened by drug possession cases that occur
within the walls of the State Correctional Institutions at
Smithfield and Huntingdon. Going forward, we will perform a sua
sponte review of every such case that emanates from these
institutions to determine if prosecution is merited.
Apparently, the Department of Corrections is of the opinion
that it has no adequate institutional remedy to deter such
conduct within its system other than a referral to the
Pennsylvania State Police, and as a result, its burden becomes a
burden on the resources of the Pennsylvania State Police, the
Huntingdon County District Attorney's Office, the Huntingdon
County Public Defender's Office, and the court system. To say
this has become a Sisyphean endeavor is putting it lightly.
Prosecuting this [Appellee] on these facts is a colossal waste of
the already strained resources of these over-stretched agencies,
and absent direction from the legislature or the appellate courts,
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we will continue to analyze these cases through a common-
sense lens.
Order and Opinion, filed 2/25/20, at 1.
In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court found the abuse of
discretion standard to be “inapplicable” herein because the trial court
conceded it acted under no statutory authority and added that “the line at
which it becomes imperative for the judiciary to act has been crossed.”
Opinion in Support of Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 4/30/20, at
1-2.
The line that has been crossed here is the authority of the trial court.
The trial court conceded it acted without statutory authority or according to
any binding precedent, and speculated, without providing due process to the
Commonwealth and to the Appellee, that Appellee likely would be convicted
of each crime. It further decreed that it will usurp the discretion of the
District Attorney in such cases “going forward,” and, thus, interfere directly
in the District Attorney’s decision-making process.
The trial court ignored the well-settled principle that the
Commonwealth retains discretion regarding the prosecution of criminal
matters. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 708 A.2d 81, 84 (Pa. 1998) (“[a]
District Attorney has a general and widely recognized power to conduct
criminal litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to
decide whether and when to prosecute, and whether and when to continue
or discontinue a case.”).
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The responsibility of the District Attorney includes the safety of prison
staff and other inmates concerning illicit drug use in prison and it is not for a
trial court to make its own determinations about these legitimate
considerations sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Pachipko, 677 A.2d
1247, 1249 (Pa.Super. 1996) (“It is clearly inappropriate for a trial court to
raise an issue on behalf of a party, thereby acting as an advocate.”); see
also Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 75 (Pa. 2008).
Further, the trial court injects itself into policy decisions of the
Legislature and Department of Corrections. See Opinion filed 4/30/20 at 3-
4. Appellee is serving a life sentence on a previous first-degree murder
conviction. Notwithstanding the trial court’s admonishment of the
Legislature for “misuse of the courts” and for having an “endemic” failure to
act over “decades,” it is within the province of the Legislature to enact a
statute that makes it a felony for an inmate to possess a controlled
substance or contraband.
Significantly, the specific language of the statute states that no
amount of contraband is inconsequential and omits any mention of the
relevance of a previous sentence an inmate charged under the statute may
be serving. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a.2) (stating “[a] prisoner or inmate
commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession
or under his control any controlled substance in violation of section
13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act [35
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P.S. § 780-113(a)(16)]. For purposes of this subsection, no amount shall be
deemed de minimis”). See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2704.
Moreover, the trial court characterizes the discretion of the District
Attorney to bring charges as “insanity” and “misguided” and delves into
perceived budgetary problems of the District Attorney’s offices. Opinion in
Support of Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed 4/30/20, at 3-4.
However, the cost of a trial cannot justify the dismissal of charges. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 312.
Understanding that the three branches of government are independent
but yet, at times, have overlapping responsibilities, and understanding that
the trial court is frustrated with the process in the types of cases as herein,
we cannot allow a trial court to bypass the constitutional processes in our
system of government.
As such, respectfully, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the charges against Appellee and violated the separation of
powers doctrine by exceeding the scope of its own authority under the
Constitution of the Commonwealth.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/09/2020
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