in habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held”
How later courts described this case
- in habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held”
- explaining that district courts may take judicial notice of public state records
- stating that authorization by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is a “prerequisite under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) . . . to the filing of a second or successive habeas petition”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
AARON CORNELL ROBINSON, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-CV-238 CDP
)
GREGORY HANCOCK,1 )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on self-represented Petitioner Aaron Cornell Robinson’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. For the reasons
discussed below, the petition will be denied and dismissed as successive. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Additionally, Robinson’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be denied as moot.
ECF No. 2.
Background
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center in Charleston,
Missouri. On March 25, 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of first-degree murder
and armed criminal action. State v. Robinson, Case No. 0722-CR07110 (22nd Jud. Cir., City of St.
Louis).2 On April 23, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of probation or
1 The filing named Bill Stange as the Respondent, who is no longer Petitioner’s custodian. At present, Gregory
Hancock is the warden of Southeast Correctional Center. See https://doc.mo.gov/facilities/adult-institutions/warden-
listing (last visited Jan. 8, 2025). Therefore, Gregory Hancock has been substituted as the proper party respondent.
See Rule 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In The United States District Courts (“the petition must name as
respondent the state officer who has custody”); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (in habeas
challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the
warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held”).
2 Petitioner’s underlying state court cases were reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management system.
The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that district courts may take judicial notice of public state records); and Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2
parole. Id. Petitioner appealed his conviction, which was denied. State v. Robinson, 330 S.W.3d
867 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). Petitioner filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.
Robinson v. State, Case No. 1122-CC01665 (22nd Jud. Cir., Cty. of St. Louis). The motion was
denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Robinson v. State, 519 S.W.3d 815 (Mo. App. E.D.
2017).
On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory sentences
of life without parole for juvenile offenders. On May 31, 2013, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas
corpus in state circuit court based on the Miller decision. Robinson v. Russell, Case No. 13SF-
CC00109 (Cir. Ct., St. Francois Cnty.). The circuit court denied relief. Petitioner then filed a writ
of habeas corpus with the Missouri Court of Appeals. In re Aaron Robinson, Case No. SD33155
(Mo. Ct. App. S.D.), which denied Petitioner’s claim as procedurally barred on October 15, 2014.
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer on March 31, 2015.
On January 27, 2016, while Petitioner’s habeas action was pending before the Missouri
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), holding that Miller applied retroactively. On March 15, 2016, the
Missouri Supreme Court ordered that because the Missouri General Assembly had yet to enact a
constitutionally valid sentencing provision for juveniles mandatorily sentenced to life without
parole, Petitioner and similarly situated offenders would be eligible to apply for parole after 25
years’ imprisonment unless their life without parole sentences were brought into conformity with
Miller and Montgomery by legislative or gubernatorial action. The Missouri Supreme Court’s
(8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records”).
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order also denied without prejudice “all other claims alleged in the petition and pending motion.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 25, 2016.
On July 13, 2016, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed into law Missouri Senate Bill No.
590, codified at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047, eliminating mandatory life sentences for juveniles and
providing juveniles serving mandatory sentences of life without parole an opportunity to petition
the parole board for a sentencing review after serving 25 years. On July 19, 2016, the Missouri
Supreme Court issued an order vacating its March 15, 2016 order, overruling Petitioner’s motion
for rehearing as moot, and denying Petitioner’s state court petition.
On January 3, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Robinson v. Lewis, Case No. 4:17-CV-4-HEA (E.D. Mo.). He
filed his first amended petition on January 4, 2018. Id. at ECF No. 13. Petitioner sought relief on
three grounds: (1) his sentence remains unconstitutional under Miller in spite of the enactment of
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 and Missouri Supreme Court’s July 19, 2016 decision; 2) a Batson claim
involving the strike of an African American juror; and 3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to offer a modified self-defense jury instruction hypothesizing “multiple assailants.”
On March 26, 2020, the Honorable Judge Henry E. Autrey stayed the amended petition
pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state court remedies. Id. at ECF No. 27. Petitioner’s Batson and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were properly exhausted in state courts on direct appeal
and post-conviction relief proceedings, respectively. However, the Court found Petitioner’s
arguments in support of his first claim were unexhausted. Petitioner’s last pleading filed before
the Missouri Supreme Court, his motion for reconsideration, was filed on March 25, 2016, months
before § 558.047 became law. Because Petitioner had not presented the issues regarding
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deficiencies of § 558.047 before Missouri state courts, the Court found it could not rule on
Petitioner’s unexhausted claims and ordered the stay until Petitioner exhausted his state court
remedies.
On September 18, 2023, this Court denied Petitioner’s amended habeas petition. Id. at ECF
No. 65. As to the first claim, the Court found that he failed to exhaust it in state court despite being
given ample opportunity to do so. As to the remaining claims, they were denied on their merits.
Id. Petitioner was instructed that if he “desire[d] further review of his motion, he may request
issuance of a certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.”
Id. Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal.
Instant Petition
On December 30, 2024, Petitioner filed a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF
No. 1. The caption identified the case number as “4:17-cv-0004-HEA.” Within, Plaintiff appears
to argue issues related to his state criminal case, specifically that he was “denied a competency
hearing, evidentiary hearing, due process and a mental evaluation due an ineffective assistance of
counsel trial court error” and “illegal waiver by counsel without [his] consent or signature.” Id. at
4.
Discussion
Petitioner is a self-represented litigant who brings the instant habeas petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons discussed below, the petition must be denied and dismissed
because it is successive. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
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A. Successive Petition
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to all
petitions for federal habeas relief filed by state prisoners after the statute’s effective date of April
24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). Under the AEDPA, there is a “stringent
set of procedures” that a state prisoner “must follow if he wishes to file a second or successive
habeas corpus application challenging that custody.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152 (2007).
Generally, a claim presented in a “successive habeas corpus application under section 2254
that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). For claims
in a successive application that were not presented in a prior application, however, “the applicant
shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider
the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). See also Boyd v. United States, 304 F.3d 813, 814
(8th Cir. 2002) (stating that authorization by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is a “prerequisite
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) . . . to the filing of a second or successive habeas petition”).
In this case, as noted above, Petitioner filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on January
3, 2017. See Robinson v. Lewis, Case No. 4:17-CV-4-HEA (E.D. Mo.). The petition was denied
on September 18, 2023. Because Petitioner has filed a prior petition, the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254
amended petition is successive. To the extent that Petitioner seeks to relitigate claims he brought
in his original 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, those claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(1). To the extent that Petitioner seeks to bring new claims for habeas relief, he must first
obtain leave from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit before bringing those
claims in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner has not been granted leave to file a
successive habeas petition by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the petition must be
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denied and dismissed as successive. Further, if it is Petitioner’s intent to file this action in lieu of
an appeal of the first habeas petition, such an attempt is not appropriate.
B. Summary Dismissal
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides
that a district court shall summarily dismiss a § 2254 petition if it plainly appears that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief. Here, it plainly appears Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has
previously filed a habeas petition in this Court, making the instant petition successive. Moreover,
Petitioner has not received authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, meaning that the Court cannot consider his petition.
C. Certificate of Appealability
The Court has considered whether or not to issue a certificate of appealability. In order to
issue such a certificate, the Court must find a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right.
See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). “A substantial showing is a showing
that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or
the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997).
Petitioner has not made such a showing, so the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1] is DENIED AND DISMISSED AS SUCCESSIVE. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [ECF No. 2] is DENIED as moot.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.
Dated this 15th day of January, 2025.
CATHERINE D. PERRY 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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