Collins v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

REBECCA C.,1 Case No. 2:23-cv-01235-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Rebecca C. (“Plaintiff”) brings this appeal challenging the Commissioner of Social

Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her applications for Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security

Act. The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the parties

have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the

reasons explained below, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision because it is free of

harmful legal error and supported by substantial evidence.

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last

name of the non-governmental party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court may set aside a denial of benefits only if the Commissioner’s findings

are “not supported by substantial evidence or based on legal error.” Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

882 (9th Cir. 2006)). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995)).

The district court “cannot affirm the Commissioner’s decision ‘simply by isolating a

specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). Instead, the district court

must consider the entire record, weighing the evidence that both supports and detracts from the

Commissioner’s conclusions. Id. Where the record as a whole can support either the grant or

denial of Social Security benefits, the district court “may not substitute [its] judgment for the

[Commissioner’s].” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152

(9th Cir. 2007)).

BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS

Plaintiff was born in September 1983, making her thirty-four years old on February 2,

2018, her alleged disability onset date.2 (Tr. 74, 993.) Plaintiff alleges disability due to anxiety,

2 To be eligible for DIB, “a worker must have earned a sufficient number of [quarters of

coverage] within a rolling forty quarter period.” Herbert v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-01016, 2008 WL

4490024, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citation omitted). Workers accumulate quarters of

coverage based on their earnings. Id. Typically, “the claimant must have a minimum of twenty

quarters of coverage [during the rolling forty-quarter period to maintain insured status]. . . . The

termination of a claimant’s insured status is frequently referred to as the ‘date last insured’ or

post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) with panic attacks, migraines, bulging discs in her

cervical spine, and bilateral tingling in her hands and feet. (Tr. 75, 254-61.)

Plaintiff initially filed her applications in February 2018. After the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled, the Appeals Council denied

review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1058-60.)

Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Tr. 1064-65.) On March 22,

2022, the Court reversed and remanded so that the ALJ could reevaluate Plaintiff’s symptom

testimony and lay witness testimony. (Tr. 1066-87.)

On remand, the ALJ held an administrative hearing on February 13, 2023, at which

Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) appeared via telephone and testified. (Tr.

1005-29.) On April 27, 2023, the ALJ issued another written decision denying Plaintiff’s

applications. (Tr. 976-95.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s 2023 decision.

II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five

‘DLI.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of September 30, 2018

(Tr. 977) reflects the date on which her insured status terminated based on the previous

accumulation of quarters of coverage. If Plaintiff established that she was disabled on or before

September 30, 2018, she is entitled to DIB. See Truelsen v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:15-

cv-02386, 2016 WL 4494471, at *1 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016) (“To be entitled to DIB,

plaintiff must establish that he was disabled . . . on or before his date last insured.” (citing

Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999))).

steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed

impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the

claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

at 724-25.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.

Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any

of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of

proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. If

the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d

at 954.

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is

disabled. (Tr. 976-95.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since February 2, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 978.) At step

two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe, medically determinable

impairments: methamphetamine abuse disorder, PTSD with paranoid features, migraines,

cervical degenerative disc disease, and hand numbness consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome.

(Id. at 979.)

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or

medically equals a listed impairment. (Id. at 981.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light work” except she “needs a sit/stand

option, meaning she must be allowed to change position from standing to sitting and vice versa

approximately every [thirty] minutes for about five minutes but staying at the work station.” (Id.

at 984.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff could “never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds” but that

she could “frequently handle and finger bilaterally.” (Id.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff needs

to “avoid unprotected heights and exposure to bright sunshine or flashing lights, although

computer monitors are okay”; “[s]he is limited to low-stress work, meaning no production pace,

conveyor belt work, (non-worker controlled pace) in a predictable work environment”; and

“[s]ocial functioning is limited to no more than brief and superficial interaction with the public,

coworkers, and supervisors, although interaction with supervisors may increase to occasional

when necessary for training.” (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant

work. (Id. at 993.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because a

significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that she could perform, including

work as a router, marker, and routing clerk. (Id. at 994.)

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to (i) provide specific, clear,

and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony (Pl.’s Opening Br. (“Pl.’s

Br.”) at 5-7, ECF No. 12); and (ii) provide germane reasons to discount the lay witness testimony

of Cadie H., Plaintiff’s friend. (Id. at 7-8.)

As explained below, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is free of harmful legal

error and supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore affirms the Commissioner’s

decision.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S SYMPTOM TESTIMONY

A. Applicable Law

The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to

which a claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited[.]” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,

678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce

the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, “[i]f the

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the

claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and

convincing reasons for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted).

B. Analysis

There is no evidence of malingering here and the ALJ determined that Plaintiff provided

objective medical evidence of underlying impairments which might reasonably produce the

symptoms alleged. (See Tr. 984, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”) The ALJ was

therefore required to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom

testimony. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. The Court concludes that the ALJ met that standard

here.

1. Specificity

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to “link evidence to specific testimony”

and instead “relied on generalities” to discount her testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 5, citing Brown-

Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015).)

Plaintiff is correct that Ninth Circuit case law “requires the ALJ to specifically identify

the testimony from a claimant she or he finds not to be credible and explain what evidence

undermines that testimony.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (simplified

and first quoting Treichler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014);

and then citing Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493); see also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138

(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that general findings are insufficient because the ALJ “must identify

what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints,” and

concluding that the ALJ’s findings were “insufficient to meet ‘our requirements of specificity’”)

(simplified). That does not mean that an ALJ must “perform a line-by-line exegesis of the

claimant’s testimony,” or “draft dissertations when denying benefits.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at

1277. But Ninth Circuit precedent “plainly requires” that an ALJ do more than “offer[] non-

specific conclusions that [the claimant]’s testimony [is] inconsistent with her medical treatment.”

Id. (citations omitted).

In Lambert, the Ninth Circuit addressed the ALJ’s use of “boilerplate” language and

found that the “ALJ never identified which testimony she found credible, and never explained

which evidence contradicted that testimony.” Id. (simplified). Here, in contrast, the ALJ

specifically acknowledged Plaintiff’s symptom testimony regarding her headaches, neck and

back pain, and mental health symptoms, and found that “[t]he objective medical evidence and

[Plaintiff]’s treatment history are not entirely consistent with the allegations of the severity of

physical and mental functional limitations.” (Tr. 985.) In support of discounting Plaintiff’s

symptom testimony, the ALJ cited specific medical evidence from the relevant period and did

not merely summarize the record. (See id. at 985-89.)

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First, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her “extreme limitation in

standing, walking, sitting, and lifting[.]” (Id. at 985.) The ALJ then cited records of physical

examinations finding that Plaintiff had “normal gait and station, full motor and grip strength, and

grossly intact sensation and coordination” in her physical exams throughout 2018-2022. (Id.)

Further, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s reports of “constant pain of a burning nature that is

aggravated with bending and twisting” related to her cervical spine, such that she was

“prescribed Tramadol for pain, as well as a muscle relaxer and a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory

medication.” (Id., citing Tr. 690, 696, 1346.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff received magnetic

resonance imaging in March 2018 that “showed a disc bulge at C4-C5 with mild central stenosis

but no foraminal narrowing, a disc bulge at C5-C6 with mild to moderate central and bilateral

foraminal stenosis and uncovertebral hypertrophy, and a mild disc bulge at C6-C7 with mild

central stenosis.” (Id., citing Tr. 742.) The ALJ pointed out, however, that “[Plaintiff] told care

providers in April 2018 that treatment provides moderate relief and that her symptoms were

gradually improving” (id., citing Tr. 722)—which Plaintiff does not dispute.

Next, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her “ongoing neck pain and

headaches [that she experiences] three to five days per week.” (Id. at 986, citing Tr. 837.) The

ALJ cited specific medical records that were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony (id.

at 986-88), and did not merely provide “summar[ies of] some of the medical evidence” as

Plaintiff contends. (Pl.’s Br. at 6.) For example, with respect to Plaintiff’s migraines, the ALJ

noted that Plaintiff reported to her neurologist, Dr. Lim, in March 2020, that “[she] is responding

well with Botox injection in combination with sumatriptan to abort her headaches” and “[s]ince

starting her Botox injections, headaches are decreased to 2-3 times per week instead of 4-5 times

per week[.]” (Id. at 987, citing Tr. 1370.) In addition, the ALJ cited the following evidence from

the relevant period: in July 2020, Plaintiff reported “good headache relief after having a Botox

injection in March 2020 along with her other medications” and despite having a migraine during

the physical exam, the results revealed Plaintiff’s “alert appearance without acute distress, as

well as normal postural, steady gait, intact coordination, and no visual disturbances.” (Id., citing

Tr. 1384-85.) The ALJ also noted that in March 2022, Plaintiff reported worsening headaches to

her neurologist, and that her medications were adjusted. (Id., citing Tr. 1423). The ALJ then

found that at a follow-up appointment in April 2022, Plaintiff told her providers that “her

migraines are usually under control with medication.” (Id., citing Tr. 1921.) The ALJ also noted

that in August 2022, after engaging in physical therapy, Plaintiff told care providers that “she

was having less intense, shorter, and less frequent headaches since starting physical therapy.”

(Id., citing Tr. 1894.)

Finally, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s allegation “that she has very bad anxiety that makes

it hard to work with other people and often has panic attacks” and that she “struggles in her head

[]dealing with people for long periods of time and does better in her home in her comfort zone.”

(Id. at 988, citing Tr. 254, 1021.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s medical treatment records from

the relevant period and found that they, paired with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, generally

indicate that “although [Plaintiff] can get anxious at times in public, she was managing her

symptoms well.” (See Tr. 989, citing specific medical records from 2018 through 2022.)

In sum, this is a not a case in which the ALJ “never identified which testimony she found

not credible, and never explained which evidence contradicted that testimony.” Lambert, 980

F.3d at 1266 (simplified). As noted above, the ALJ specifically addressed Plaintiff’s complaints

of debilitating neck and back pain, as well as her mental health symptoms (see Tr. 985-90), and

cited specific medical records from the relevant period that appeared to be inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms. (See id.) The ALJ therefore met the Ninth Circuit’s

specificity requirements. Cf. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (noting that an “ALJ must identify the

testimony that was not credible, and specify what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints” and finding that an “ALJ’s vague allegation that a claimant’s testimony is not

consistent with the . . . medical evidence, without any specific findings in support of that

conclusion is insufficient for our review”) (simplified).

2. Clear and Convincing Reasons

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s “decision does not appear to contain a single link

between evidence and specified testimony[,]” and therefore “no clear and convincing reasons

were offered for rejecting [P]laintiff’s credibility.” (Pl.’s Br. at 7.) The Court disagrees and finds

that the ALJ appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on the objective

medical record (including improvement with treatment) and Plaintiff’s daily activities, and

therefore provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons for the rejection.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d

at 1163 (simplified).

Clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony “include conflicting

medical evidence, effective medical treatment, medical noncompliance, inconsistencies in the

claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct, daily activities inconsistent with

the alleged symptoms, and testimony from physicians and third parties about the nature, severity

and effect of the symptoms complained of.” Bowers v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-583-SI, 2012 WL

2401642, at *9 (D. Or. June 25, 2012) (first citing Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040

(9th Cir. 2008); then citing Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040; and then citing Light v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)).

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a. Objective Medical Evidence

As discussed above, the ALJ discounted the severity of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms

based on objective medical evidence in the record. See Young v. Saul, 845 F. App’x 518, 520

(9th Cir. 2021) (“An ALJ may consider inconsistency between a claimant’s symptom testimony

and the objective medical evidence in the record in determining whether to discount the

claimant’s symptom testimony.” (first citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(2); and then citing

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012))).

Plaintiff argues that after the ALJ “summariz[ed] some of the medical evidence[,]” he

“concluded that it did not support the ‘allegations of extreme limitations’” and such an

explanation fails to comply with this Court’s prior remand opinion. (Pl.’s Br. at 6; see also Tr.

1066-87.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that her “migraine disorder is incredibly well-documented”

and that the ALJ “did not make a contrary finding.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

“acted erroneously as his own medical expert in deciding to place more reliance on mental status

exams than other evidence of profound mental health impairment.”3 (Pl.’s Br. at 6-7.)

The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for

discounting the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s migraines and mental health symptoms based on

inconsistencies with the objective medical record. See Metcalf v. Berryhill, No.

316CV05432RSLJRC, 2017 WL 2270254, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 14, 2017) (“Based on the

3 In her eight-page opening brief, Plaintiff challenged only the objective medical

evidence related to her migraines and mental health impairments, the ALJ’s evaluation of her

activities of daily living, and the lay witness testimony. Plaintiff did not challenge the ALJ’s

other grounds for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, such as the objective medical

evidence related to her back and neck pain or her improvement with treatment, and therefore she

waived those arguments. See, e.g., Garza v. Kijakazi, 857 F. App’x 280, 281 (9th Cir. 2021)

(explaining that the claimant “waived any challenge to the ALJ’s determination that her

testimony was not entirely credible and to the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence

by failing to raise them in her opening brief”) (citation omitted).

record as a whole, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for

his failure to credit fully the plaintiff’s testimony regarding her limitations based on

inconsistencies contained in plaintiff’s medical records.”), report and recommendation adopted,

2017 WL 2256892 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2017).

Addressing Plaintiff’s migraines, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that “she

struggles with migraines despite getting Botox injections and has also tried additional treatment

modalities.” (Tr. 985, citing Tr. 1017-19.) Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to link

specific testimony to any objective evidence, the ALJ found that “the treatment notes

demonstrating good control of headaches with treatment are inconsistent with [Plaintiff]’s

allegations of disabling headaches.” (Id., citing Tr. 943, 949, 1312, 1370, 1416, 1432.) In further

support, the ALJ cited several inconsistencies between what Plaintiff reported to her providers

and her hearing testimony. For example, the ALJ cited an August 2021 treatment note reflecting

that Plaintiff told her providers that “a Botox injection in June 2021 provided good relief of

headache symptoms for 10 to 11 weeks.” (Id. at 987, citing Tr. 1411.) At Plaintiff’s follow-up

visit in December 2021, Plaintiff again told her neurologist that “she was only having headaches

two days per week and that they typically last only three hours and that recent Botox injections

provided good relief.” (Id., citing Tr. 1415-16.) In March 2022, Plaintiff reported to her

providers that her migraines were worsening and her providers adjusted her medication and

stated that she was a “good candidate to address headache and neck pain with physical therapy.”

(Id., citing Tr. 1923.) By August 2022, Plaintiff reported that “she was having less intense,

shorter, and less frequent headaches since starting physical therapy.” (Id., citing Tr. 1894.) The

ALJ then explained that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s

allegations of extreme limitations in standing, walking, sitting, lifting, and disabling pain:

These findings generally demonstrating normal gait and strength, intact sensation

and coordination, and good control of headaches with treatment are inconsistent

with [Plaintiff]’s allegations of extreme limitations in standing, walking, sitting,

and lifting and disabling pain.

. . .

[Plaintiff]’s migraine impairment further imposes the need to avoid bright

sunshine and flashing lights. However, these impairments do not preclude

[Plaintiff] from performing a limited range of light work[.]

(Id. at 987-88.)

With respect to her PTSD symptoms and anxiety, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “acted

erroneously as his own medical expert in deciding to place more reliance on mental status exams

than other evidence of profound mental health impairment.” (Pl.’s Br. at 6-7.) Plaintiff asserts

that the ALJ never specified which testimony he was undermining in reliance on the mental

status exams. (Id., citing Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.) On the contrary, the ALJ specifically

identified several inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and her mental status

exams, provider observations, and conservative treatment:

Further, mental status exams during other medical care visits on occasion showed

an anxious affect but also generally showed unremarkable findings as well,

including normal mood and affect, alert and fully oriented cognition, normal

speech and behavior, normal thought content, and normal judgment. Moreover,

the record does not indicate that [Plaintiff] sought emergency or inpatient

psychiatric treatment. Nonetheless, [Plaintiff]’s mental impairments are accounted

for in the limitation to low-stress work with typically no more than brief and

superficial interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors, as found in the

residual functional capacity. However, greater mental limitations are not

warranted by the generally mild mental status exam findings and routine mental

health treatment in the record.

(Id. at 989) (simplified); see Stein v. O’Malley, No. 23-16115, 2024 WL 3581189, at *2 (9th Cir.

July 30, 2024) (holding that the ALJ appropriately discounted the claimant’s testimony about her

“brain fog and inability to focus” because the alleged severity of those symptoms was

“inconsistent with the fact that her mental health treatment plan was not especially aggressive”

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v))). The ALJ acknowledged that some of Plaintiff’s

psychotherapy appointments demonstrated her “anxious mood, agitated affect, paranoid and

overwhelmed attitude[,]” but the ALJ also noted that several mental health status exams reflected

Plaintiff’s “euthymic mood and affect, cooperative attitude, appropriate dress, adequate

grooming, fair to good eye contact, good attention, normal speech and language, fully oriented

cognition, linear and logical thought process, normal memory and intellectual functioning, and

fair insight and judgment.” (Id. at 988, citing psychotherapy treatment notes from 2018 through

2022.) The ALJ discussed that Plaintiff’s providers adjusted her medication regimen, and in June

2019, Plaintiff reported that her “medication was helpful for controlling nightmares and her

mental health was improving.” (Id., citing Tr. 870, 872.) The ALJ further observed that Plaintiff

“told care providers in late 2019 and early 2020 that she was feeling better after her psychotropic

medications were adjusted following a period of depression and that she was feeling better

overall.” (Id., citing Tr. 888, 892, 1470, 1483, 1487.)

The Court concludes that the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and

the objective medical evidence in the record, including conservative treatment, was a clear and

convincing reason to discount her testimony and was supported by substantial evidence.

b. Activities of Daily Living

The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on inconsistencies

between Plaintiff’s reported daily activities and her alleged inability to work. (Tr. 989-90.) In

discounting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s ability to care for her household

with three children “by herself, including a new baby” with only some help from a neighbor and

her older children. (Id. at 989, citing Tr. 1011-13.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had no

problem driving, completing personal care activities, making dinner daily, cleaning her home

and doing laundry, shopping, paying bills, counting change, handling a savings account, and

regularly taking her children to the park and socializing at friends’ homes. (Id., citing Tr. 254-

61.)

The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s activities related to a job she began in December 2018 to

be at odds with her testimony, finding that the job “involv[ed] heavy lifting” and she stopped

working not due to “physical or mental conditions[,]” but because of a failed background check.

(Id., citing Tr. 1347, 1353.) The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff reported during the relevant time

period that she was working for a caterer, was unable to work because of a lack of childcare, and

was interested in working but preferred to be a stay-at-home mom:

[Plaintiff] told care providers in April 2019 that she was working for a caterer and

told care providers in August 2020 that although she had was interested in

working, she was unable to work at the time because of lack of childcare, rather

than her physical or mental conditions. Vocational rehabilitation records from

November 2020 also state that although the claimant was interested in working,

she preferred to be a stay-at-home mom after having her third child. [Plaintiff]

also told care providers in June 2022 that she had started running on the track.

(Id. at 989-90) (simplified).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to make findings concerning the nature, extent,

frequency, and duration of the activities” and that the ALJ “failed to determine whether the

activities were performed [during] a substantial part of [her] day and whether they had workplace

transferability.” (Pl.’s Br. at 6.) However, although “transferability of daily activities to the work

setting is a valid reason to discredit [a p]laintiff’s testimony . . . it is equally reasonable for [an]

ALJ to rely on the extent that a [p]laintiff’s daily activities ‘contradict claims of a totally

debilitating impairment.’” Cook v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:16-cv-00061-FVS, 2017 WL

1479430, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1455008 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2017). It was therefore

appropriate for the ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on Plaintiff’s daily

activities that contradicted her claims of total disability. (See Tr. 985, 989.) In any event, Plaintiff

mischaracterizes the ALJ’s statements, as the ALJ also correlated Plaintiff’s activities of daily

living to workplace transferability:

These activities require an ability to stand and walk for short stretches, lift and

carry light items, complete familiar mental tasks at an unhurried pace, and handle

some limited social interaction. Thus, a limitation to light work with a sit/stand

option in a low-stress setting with typically no more than brief and superficial

social interaction additional climbing, handling, fingering, and workplace

environmental limitations adequately accounts for the claimant’s reported range

of physical and mental limitations.

(Id. at 990.)

The Court further finds that it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s work

activities, as “an ALJ may consider any work activity, including part-time work, in determining

whether a claimant is disabled.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ also

properly considered Plaintiff’s reports that she was not working because she preferred to be a

stay-at-home mom, as a “basic program principle is that a claimant’s impairment must be the

primary reason for his or her inability to engage in substantial gainful work.” Social Security

Ruling 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *1 (Jan. 1, 1982); see also Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824,

828 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the ALJ appropriately discounted the claimant’s symptom

testimony because, inter alia, “[the claimant] stated at the administrative hearing and to at least

one of his doctors that he left his job because he was laid off, rather than because he was

injured”); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the ALJ

properly discounted a claimant’s testimony due to evidence of self-limitation and lack of

motivation to work); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

that the ALJ properly found that the claimant’s poor work history and lack of propensity to work

in the claimant’s lifetime was inconsistent with her alleged inability because of disabling

limitations).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided clear and convincing

reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony. See Sims v. Berryhill, 704 F. App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming the ALJ’s

discounting of the claimant’s testimony because the ALJ “provided at least one clear and

convincing reason supported by substantial evidence” for doing so).

II. LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the lay witness testimony provided by

her friend, Cadie H. (Pl.’s Br. at 7-8.) Specifically, she asserts that it was insufficient for the ALJ

to discount the lay testimony on the ground that it is inconsistent with objective medical

evidence. (Id.)

A. Applicable Law

The new regulations “provid[e] that an ALJ is ‘not required to articulate how [he]

considered evidence from nonmedical sources[.]’” Stephens v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35998, 2023 WL

6937296, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(d),

416.920c(d)). The Ninth Circuit recently held that an “ALJ did not err in discounting the lay

witness statement . . . without articulating germane reasons” because “under the revised

regulations applicable to this claim, the ALJ is ‘not required to articulate how [he] considered

evidence from nonmedical sources.’”4 Trogdon v. O’Malley, No. 22-16461, 2024 WL 3949081,

4 The Court notes that the “majority of district courts in this circuit,” including this Court,

have “conclude[d] that the new regulations have not eliminated an ALJ’s obligation to consider

and address lay witness testimony.” Tracy Q. v. Kijakazi, No. 6:22-cv-00692-SI, 2024 WL

706963, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2024) (citing, inter alia, Christopher M. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 6:22-cv-01378-SB, 2023 WL 8827678, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2023) and Joseph L.

S. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:23-cv-00006, 2023 WL 5611408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2023)).

at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(d)). However, the Ninth Circuit

went on to find that “even if the requirement that the ALJ provide germane reasons for

discounting lay witness testimony still applies, any error was harmless.” Id. (citations omitted);

see also Kennedy v. O’Malley, No. 22-35866, 2024 WL 242992, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024)

(finding that “[t]he ALJ did not articulate how he evaluated the statement of a Social Security

Administration employee” and noting that “an ALJ is ‘not required to articulate how [she]

considered evidence from nonmedical sources’ under the new regulations” (quoting 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(d), 416.920c(d))).

B. Analysis

In light of the Ninth Circuit’s most recent guidance, the Court finds that the ALJ was not

required to articulate his evaluation of the lay witness testimony. See Trogdon, 2024 WL

3949081, at *1. However, in an abundance of caution, the Court further finds that if the ALJ was

required to articulate germane reasons for discounting Cadie H.’s statements, he satisfied that

standard here.

The ALJ discounted Cadie H.’s statements on the ground that they were “inconsistent

with the objective medical record,” including “the physical exams demonstrating normal gait and

station, full motor and grip strength, and grossly intact sensation; the treatment notes

demonstrating good control of headaches with treatment; including the generally mild mental

status exam findings and routine mental health treatment in the record, as well as the treatment

notes demonstrating adequate control of mental health symptoms with treatment.” (Tr. 992,

citing several specific treatment notes from 2018 through 2022.)

Plaintiff argues that a “lack of support from medical records is not a germane reason to

give ‘little weight’” to lay witness testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 7-8, quoting Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874

F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2017).) However, Plaintiff “mistakes inconsistency (an acceptable

‘germane reason’) for lack of support, (which is not).” Tonyia P., 2024 WL 36713, at *2. “The

Ninth Circuit has clarified that generalized conclusions that lay witness testimony lacks support

from the overall medical evidence is not a proper basis for disregarding it.” Id. (simplified and

quoting Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 640). However, “[i]nconsistency with the medical record is.” Id.

(citations omitted); see also Campbell v. Saul, 848 F. App’x 718, 722 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Here, the

ALJ rejected the lay witness testimony in part because it was ‘not consistent with the

preponderance of the objective medical evidence[.]’ This is a germane reason for rejecting the

testimony.”); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give

germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with medical

evidence is one such reason.” (citing Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001))). Here,

“[s]ince the ALJ relied on several inconsistencies with the medical record, not a generalized

‘lack of support,’ the ALJ did not err.” Tonyia P., 2024 WL 36713, at *2.

In any event, Cadie H.’s statements were substantially similar to Plaintiff’s testimony

regarding her physical and mental limitations. (Compare Tr. 263-79 with Tr. 254-61.) Cadie H.

reported that Plaintiff’s “anxiety causes her to avoid the public” and that it “makes concentration

very difficult” and “remembering simple things is a strain.” (Tr. 263, 268.) Similarly, Plaintiff

testified that she has “a hard time focusing and concentrating” and her anxiety makes it “hard for

[her] to work well with others.” (Tr. 254, 259.) Thus, even if the ALJ erred in evaluating the lay

witness testimony here, the ALJ’s clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s

testimony also apply to the lay testimony and any error was harmless. See De Mello v. Kijakazi,

No. 22-35111, 2022 WL 17583054, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022) (“[A]ny claimed error was

harmless because, given the similarity between [the lay witness’s] report and [the claimant’s]

testimony, the lay testimony did not alter the ultimate nondisability determination.”) (simplified);

Jacob vy. Berryhill, 756 F. App’x 709, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the ALJ provided clear

and convincing reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony, which “overlap[ped]

substantially with that of [the lay witness],” and holding that “any error was harmless” in

discounting the lay witness testimony because the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s

testimony applied with equal force to the lay witness).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision because it is

free of harmful legal error and is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 14th day of January, 2025.

SF Havic 7, [pecerma

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 20 — OPINION AND ORDER