Williams v. Century Security Services, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHELTON WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-00385

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

CENTURY SECURITY SERVICES,

INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Century Security

Services, Inc. (“Century”) on April 9, 2024. (Doc. 7). On March 4, 2024, Plaintiff Shelton

Williams (“Williams”) filed a complaint against Century alleging race discrimination,

discriminatory termination, and retaliation in violation of federal and Pennsylvania law.

(Doc. 1). For the following reasons, Century’s motion to dismiss shall be DENIED. (Doc. 7).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background and factual summary are derived from Williams’s

complaint. (Doc. 1). On or about April 1, 2022, Williams, an African American male, began

working as a security officer at Century, where he performed his duties satisfactorily until his

termination. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13-15). In August 2022, Century’s owner Mary Ruane (“Ruane”)

hired her longtime friend Phillip Luca (“Luca”), a white male, as a security officer. (Doc. 1,

¶ 16).

During their time working on shifts together, Luca repeatedly made harassing

comments to Williams about Williams’s race, including using the n-word to refer to African

Americans and blaming African-Americans for “looting” and “burning down your own

neighborhoods.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17-19). In September 2022, Luca said to Williams, “if there was

a race war, black guys would lose the war [. . .].” (Doc. 1, ¶ 18). On September 22, 2022, Luca

threatened Williams’s life. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 20-22). Luca began talking to Williams about a

potential German invasion and theoretical resulting draft. (Doc. 1, ¶ 21). When Williams said

he would be unable to be around weapons, Luca said “[i]f you can’t find a weapon, I’ll arm

you. And if you don’t take it, I’ll put my gun to your head and pull the trigger.” (Doc. 1, ¶

22). Williams alleges that he was so disturbed by the threats of violence that he requested to

leave work early. (Doc. 1, ¶ 23). The next day, Luca was not scheduled to work, but arrived

at work to return a company phone that he accidentally took with him. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 24-25).

Luca returned the phone to Williams while carrying a loaded gun. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 25, 29). Given

Luca’s past harassment and comments, Williams was scared when Luca approached him

with a loaded gun. (Doc. 1, ¶ 27).

On September 26, 2022, Williams met with Ruane to complain about Luca’s

discriminatory behavior and submitted a written complaint detailing Luca’s harassment.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 28-30). Ruane responded to the complaints by excusing Luca’s behavior because

Luca was “from a different era” and “just talks like that.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 31, 34). During the

meeting, Williams also mentioned that he had a criminal record to explain why Williams said

he was not able to be around weapons. (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). Ruane responded that she did not know

about Williams’s criminal record and that he was technically not supposed to be placed at his

current working location at the Guardian Insurance Building with a criminal record. (Doc. 1,

¶¶ 32, 35). However, Ruane then said, “if you don’t say nothing, I won’t say nothing,”

implying that she would say nothing about his continued employment with a criminal record

if Williams said nothing more about any race discrimination or harassment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 35).

After the meeting, Williams returned to work and continued to work without issue for

the month of October. (Doc. 1, ¶ 36). On November 1, 2022, Century’s general manager,

James Kokina, called Williams and fired him, citing his criminal record. (Doc. 1, ¶ 37).

Williams was confused by this, as he was hired eight months earlier, had worked satisfactorily

during that time, and completed a background check successfully in April. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13-15,

38-39, 42). Williams alleges that Century objected to Williams’s criminal record only after he

complained about race discrimination and that Century terminated his employment because

of his race and his complaints of harassment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 43-47). Williams contends that as a

result, he has suffered severe emotional distress and physical ailments, discrimination,

humiliation, embarrassment, and financial loss because of Century’s conduct. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 48-

51).

On March 4, 2024, Williams filed his complaint asserting claims of race discrimination

and retaliation in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act

(“PHRA”). (Doc. 1). On April 9, 2024, Century filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 7). On April

23, 2024, Century filed a brief in support of its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10). On May 7, 2024,

Williams filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 12). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss has been

fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 7; Doc. 10; Doc. 12).

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a

court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

III. DISCUSSION

A. WILLIAMS PROPERLY ALLEGED INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIS § 1981

CLAIM

The parties dispute whether Williams § 1981 claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. 1, at

8; Doc. 10, at 8-10; Doc. 12, at 11). Century argues that Williams has not stated a cognizable

claim under § 1981 because he does not allege purposeful discrimination and “does not

plausibly allege how his race could be the ‘but for’ cause of his termination” when Century

informed Williams that his criminal record was the reason for his termination. (Doc. 10, at

9). Williams responds that he sufficiently alleged illegal discrimination on the part of Century

by averring that (1) his “termination happened eight (8) months after his hire, and eight (8)

months after he participated in, and consented to, a background check [. . . and thus,] he

reasonably believed his termination was not due to his record” and (2) “that the reason

proffered, his criminal record, is race-based discrimination in itself due to disparate arrest and

incarceration rates among African-Americans.” (Doc. 12, at 12).

One of the purposes of § 1981 is to eliminate race-based discrimination in contracting.

See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 360, 367 (D. Del. 2009) aff'd, 621 F.3d

261 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees each person, regardless of race or

citizenship, freedom from discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts.”) (quoting

Thomas v. First F.S.B. of Ind., Civ. No. H 84–716, 1986 WL 15552, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 30,

1986)). A § 1981 claim is distinct from a breach of contract claim because a § 1981 claim

focuses on the discriminatory intent behind a party’s conduct that has interfered with the

making or performance of a contract. Cf. Anderson, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 367. To state a § 1981

claim, a plaintiff “‘must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is

a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant;

and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,]

which includes the right to make and enforce contracts....’” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250

F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Yelverton v. Lehman, No. Civ. A. 94–6114, 1996 WL

296551, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1996), aff'd. mem., 175 F.3d 1012 (3d Cir.1999)). The Third

Circuit has held that dismissal of a § 1981 is appropriate when “it appears to a certainty that

[a plaintiff] could not prove facts which would bring [them] within the intentional or

purposeful discrimination test.” Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 492

(3d Cir. 1977). Additionally, plaintiffs must initially plead that “but for race, it would not

have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned

Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020). However, the but-for burden is slightly less rigorous at the

motion to dismiss stage, with district courts in this Circuit emphasizing that multiple but-for

reasons for the same action are possible and at this stage, a “plaintiff must [only] allege facts

that are ‘sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for the

adverse [employment] action.’” AMY STANKIEWICZ, Plaintiff v. PUMP N' PANTRY, INC.,

& PUMP N' PANTRY, INC., Defendants, No. 3:20-CV-2021, 2022 WL 36238, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Jan. 4, 2022); see also Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2017)

(noting that but-for causation has a lower burden at the prima facie stage).

Williams has properly pled facts that allow this Court to infer that Century

intentionally discriminated against him. (Doc. 1). He contends that he successfully completed

a background check prior to beginning his employment relationship with Century and that he

had been working for Century for eight months with no issues related to his record arising.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-42). Williams provides that at one point, Ruane implied that she would “say

nothing” about his criminal record and eligibility for employment if he said nothing further

about race discrimination. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35-39). Williams additionally alleges that termination

for a criminal record can constitute intentional race discrimination because of race disparities

in the criminal justice system. (Doc. 1, at 6 n.2). Considering these allegations together, this

Court cannot say with certainty that Williams will be unable to prove facts that show purpose

or intent to discriminate. See Richardson, 561 F.2d at 492 (finding that allegations that an

employer used the results of racially discriminatory testing procedures to make employment

decisions may satisfy the purposeful element of § 1981 race discrimination and concluding

that, under the motion to dismiss standard, it is premature to dismiss a complaint where

plaintiff could later prove facts under the intentional or purposeful discrimination test); see also

Aquino v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-CV-00206, 2024 WL 4592346, at *10 (M.D. Pa.

Oct. 28, 2024) (“An invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality

of the relevant facts,” or in the context of a motion to dismiss, the alleged facts.) (citing

Richardson, 561 F.2d at 492).

Further, Century’s argument that Williams cannot state a § 1981 claim because he

does not allege that race was the “but-for” reason for his termination also fails. (Doc. 10, at

8-9). Williams’s allegations question that his criminal record was the rationale for his

termination when he contends that he completed a background check in April, worked

successfully for eight months, and was fired in November after experiencing and reporting

allegedly racist comments and threats by a coworker. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-42). See Stankiewicz, 2022

WL 36238, at *3 (holding that a plaintiff must merely allege facts that allow a court to infer

that discrimination was a likely reason for termination). It is true that Century gave Williams

an alternative rationale for his firing: that he had a criminal record. (Doc. 1, ¶ 37). However,

Williams’s allegation, taken as true, that Century “would not have harassed [him] but for his

race” coupled with the totality of Williams’s other factual allegations that question Century’s

proffered reason, allows this Court to infer that discrimination may have been a but-for

rationale involved in Century’s decision. (Doc. 1, ¶ 46); cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,

590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020) (“Often, events have multiple but-for causes.”).

Accordingly, Century’s motion to dismiss Count One on the grounds that Williams

did not allege purposeful discrimination or that his race was the but-for reason for his

termination is DENIED. (Doc. 7).

B. WILLIAMS ALLEGED THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED FOR HIS POSITION IN HIS

DISCRIMINATORY TERMINATION CLAIMS

The parties next dispute whether Williams has properly stated claims for

discriminatory termination. (Doc. 1; Doc. 10, at 9; Doc. 12, at 13).1 Century submits that

Counts One, Two, and Four of Williams’s complaint must be dismissed because Williams

has not properly shown that he was qualified for his position because of the existence of the

Pennsylvania Private Detective Act (“PPDA”), which prohibits Century from employing

individuals convicted of a felony as security guards. (Doc. 10, at 9). Williams responds that

he was qualified for the position, and that the role that the PPDA played in his termination

1 Century does not address Williams’ hostile work environment claims. The Court

therefore will consider this claim not disputed.

can be considered in a mixed-motive analysis, but that such an inquiry is not proper at the

motion to dismiss stage. (Doc. 12, at 14-15).

Discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the PHRA are analyzed under the

same standard. See Verma v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, No. 11-611, 2012 WL 1835727, at *7 (E.D.

Pa. May 18, 2012); see also Brennan v. Century Sec. Servs., No. 3:21-CV-01678, 2023 WL

2504760, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2023). To sufficiently allege a claim of unlawful

discrimination under both statutes, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that they are a member of

a protected class; (2) that they are qualified for the position they are employed to do; (3) they

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action was taken under circumstances

that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Lynch v. Tasty Baking Co., No. CV

23–4445, 2024 WL 2848295, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2024) (citing Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d

205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Williams satisfies the first element, that he is part of a protected class, by contending

that he is an African American male. (Doc. 1, ¶ 7). Williams also satisfies the third element

of his claims, that he suffered an adverse employment action, by alleging that he was

terminated. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37, 43). “An ‘adverse employment action’ under Title VII is an action

by an employer that is ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’” Artz v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 706,

712 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)). Courts

have consistently held that termination qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of Title

VII and the PHRA. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015)

(recognizing termination to be an adverse action for the purposes of Title VII and the PHRA);

see also LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing

termination of employment as an adverse action).

At issue here are only elements two and four. (Doc. 10, at 9-11; Doc. 12, at 14-15).

Century submits that Williams cannot satisfy element two, that he was qualified for his

position, because he had a criminal record which made his employment with Century illegal

under the PPDA. (Doc. 10, at 9-11). Williams alleges that he successfully took part in a

background check and that during his eight months of employment with Century, he

“completed his duties satisfactorily.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13-15). Williams also provides that even

after Ruane learned about Williams’s criminal record, he continued working Century without

issue for a month. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35-36). This Court previously noted that when an employee

performed their duties successfully, they were qualified for the position under Title VII and

the PHRA. See Rhodes v. Northumberland Cnty., No. 4:23-CV-01807, 2024 WL 3258208, at *5

(M.D. Pa. July 1, 2024) (holding that an employee sufficiently pled that she was qualified for

a position when she alleged that she performed her job duties well). Therefore, the Court is

satisfied that Williams has adequately alleged that he was qualified for his position.

Courts have also held that an employer cannot defend itself against Title VII liability

based by arguing that it had to fire an employee in order to comply with a state law. See Reese

v. Source 4 Tchrs., No. CV 17-4588, 2018 WL 3752987, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018)

(dismissing a Title VII claim on other grounds, but denying dismissal based on an employer’s

argument that it was required to fire an employee to comply with a state law that made it

illegal to hire individuals with certain criminal convictions, including the ones on plaintiff’s

record). Williams alleges that he was qualified for the position given that he completed his

job duties satisfactorily while working for Century. Notably, he also avers that even if the

PPDA was Century’s sole rationale for his firing, compliance with such a law would violate

Title VII given the disproportionate number of African American males with criminal

convictions. (Doc. 1, at 6 n.2). In accordance with the conclusions of other federal courts, this

Court finds that Title VII preempts state law, when compliance with such state law would

have a disparate impact on a protected class. See Reese, 2018 WL 3752987, at *6. Therefore,

Century’s compliance with the PPDA is insufficient to shield it from Williams’s claims at this

posture of the case.

Williams has additionally satisfied the fourth element, that Century’s actions “give rise

to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” See Lynch, 2024 WL 2848295, at *2. To determine

whether a plaintiff has pled facts that establish an inference of unlawful discrimination, courts

look to whether “the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than others because of

their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d

789 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 344, 352–353 (3d Cir. 1999)).

While a plaintiff need not “compare [himself] to a similarly-situated individual from outside

[his] protected class to raise an inference of unlawful discrimination,” he must somehow

connect the adverse action suffered to her protected class. Artz, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 713. As

discussed supra, Williams alleges that he completed a background check and worked

satisfactorily for Century for eight months with no issues related to his record or any other

complaints about his work arising. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-42). Williams also contends that Ruane

stated that she would “say nothing” about his criminal record and eligibility for employment

if he did not say anything about race discrimination at Century. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35-39). These

allegations allow this Court to infer unlawful discrimination and support the conclusion that

his termination occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination,

as he has established a link between his race and the bullying and harassment he suffered to

his termination. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 7-46); see Bhatti v. Republican Caucus of Pennsylvania House of

Representatives, No. 18-CV-2178, 2020 WL 3412661, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2020) (looking

to the history surrounding a plaintiff-employee's termination as well as alleged “overt acts of

discrimination” to determine plaintiff-employee had pled sufficiently facts giving rise to an

inference of discrimination); see also Abdul-Latif v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 990 F. Supp. 2d 517, 527-

28 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“Showing that similarly situated non-members of the protected class were

treated less favorably is one of a variety of methods to create an inference of discrimination”);

Rhodes, 2024 WL 3258208, at *5 (inferring unlawful discrimination based on allegations of

an employer conditioning sexism and racism and bullying based on race).

Accordingly, Century’s motion to dismiss Williams’s claims for unlawful termination

is DENIED. (Doc. 7).

C. WILLIAMS ALLEGED THAT HE ENGAGED IN A PROTECTED ACTIVITY IN HIS

RETALIATION CLAIMS

Century moves to dismiss Williams’s retaliation claims on the grounds that Williams

has not alleged that he engaged in a protected activity and Williams cannot show that there

was a causal link between any protected activity. (Doc. 10, at 12-15).2 Williams responds that

Williams’s complaint to the owner of Century, Ruane, is a protected activity. (Doc. 12, at 17-

18).

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision “‘protects those who participate in certain Title

VII proceedings [. . .] and those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII [. . .]”

2 Century also argues that it cannot be held liable for any retaliatory termination claims

because Century had no choice but to fire Williams under the PPDA. (Doc. 10, at 12-15).

Again, state law does not provide a defense to Williams’s claims. See Reese, 2018 WL 3752987,

at *6.

Ellingsworth v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 546, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citing Moore v.

City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) as amended (Sept. 13, 2006)). To plead

a claim for retaliation under both Title VII and the PHRA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1)

[the plaintiff] engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action

against [plaintiff]3; and (3) a causal link exists between [plaintiff's] protected conduct and the

employer's adverse action.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016).

Regarding the first element of Williams’s retaliation claims, Williams has sufficiently

pled that he engaged in protected activity. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 788. An employee

“engages in protected activity by complaining to his or her employer about conduct that is

prohibited by Title VII.” Ellingsworth, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 555 (citing Connelly, 809 F.3d at 792);

see also Wilson v. Columbia Gas of Pa., 676 F. Supp. 3d 424, 438 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (“‘opposition

to discrimination can take the form of informal protests of discriminatory employment

practices, including making complaints to management.’” (citing Moore, 461 F.3d at 343)).

Here, Williams alleges that “on September 26, 2022, [Williams] met with Ms. Ruane to

complain about Mr. Luca’s discriminatory and threatening behavior,” which included threats

to shoot Williams, repeatedly using the n-word, bringing a loaded gun to the workplace, and

commenting that “[i]f there was a race war, blacks would lose.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17-30). Such

allegations are sufficient for Williams to meet his burden as to the first element of his

retaliation claim. See Ellingsworth, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 555-56 (finding plaintiff had sufficiently

alleged protected activity in complaining to her supervisor about plaintiff's mistreatment and

harassment).

3 As discussed supra, termination is an adverse employment action. Daniels, 776 F.3d

at 196. Thus, the Court will not re-analyze element two here.

As for the third element of Williams’s retaliation claims, Century argues that Williams

cannot allege a causal link between Williams’s complaints and his termination because

Century was legally required to terminate Williams’s employment under the PPDA. (Doc.

10, at 12-15). As described supra, the PPDA does not shield Century from liability for

Williams’s retaliation claims. See Reese, 2018 WL 3752987, at *6. When determining whether

there is a causal connection between a plaintiff's protected activity and adverse action, courts

consider “whether there is an ‘unusually suggestive’ temporal proximity between the

protected activity and adverse action or ‘intervening antagonism or retaliatory animus,

inconsistencies in the employer's articulated reasons for [the adverse action], or any other

evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference of retaliatory animus.’” Sousa v.

Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-3043, 2023 WL 7486751, at *4 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (quoting

LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-33 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). This causation

analysis “is highly fact-based, and depends on the particular context in which the events

occurred.” Mercer v. Se. Pennsylvania Transit Auth., 26 F. Supp. 3d 432, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2014),

aff'd sub nom. Mercer v. SEPTA, 608 F. App'x 60 (3d Cir. 2015).

Williams alleges that he was terminated one month after complaining about racial

harassment, despite working successfully for Century for eight months and completing a

background check in April of 2022. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-45). Williams further avers that Ruane

implied that he would not be terminated due to his criminal record if he ceased speaking about

the racial harassment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 35). For the purpose of a motion to dismiss, these allegations

support that there was an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between Williams’s

complaints and his termination, as well as the ability to infer causation. See Ellingsworth, 247

F. Supp. 3d at 557 (finding plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection

between her protected activity and adverse employment action). Williams has sufficiently

pled there was a causal connection between his protected activity and termination. See

Connelly, 809 F.3d at 792-93 (finding that, in complaining to management about unwanted

advances from a coworker, plaintiff “alleged facts that could support a reasonable inference

of a causal connection between her protected activity in May 2010 and the gradual

deterioration of her relationship with her employer until she was laid off in October 2010.”).

As the Court finds that Williams has sufficiently pled enough facts to satisfy all three elements

of his retaliation claims, Century’s motion to dismiss Williams’s retaliation claims is

DENIED. (Doc. 7).

D. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION

Century submits that Williams’s PHRA claims must be dismissed for failure to

exhaust. (Doc. 10, at 15). However, Williams’s EEOC Complaint, filed on April 23, 2023,

indicates that he requested that his charge be dually filed with the PHRA. (Doc. 12, at 18;

Doc. 12-2, at 2). Therefore, he has begun the process of PHRA administrative exhaustion and

awaits a right to sue notice. (Doc. 12-2). Williams also denotes in his complaint that the

PHRA administrative claims are currently pending and that he has intent to raise PHRA

claims after exhaustion, thus giving notice to Century for those claims. (Doc. 1, at 2 n.2).

Thus, Century’s motion to dismiss the PHRA claims is DENIED at this juncture. See Chirico

v. Borough of Delaware Water Gap, No. 3:23-CV-00912, 2024 WL 1890299, at *5 (M.D. Pa.

Apr. 30, 2024) (declining to dismiss PHRA claims due to failure to exhaust when a plaintiff

received a right to sue from the EEOC but not the PHRC and “it is unclear at this point

whether the PHRC has received [plaintiff’s] complaint and initiated proceedings on his

behalf.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Century’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. (Doc. 7).

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Karoline Mehalchick

Dated: January 13, 2025

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge