The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY HERRERA, :
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-202
v. (JUDGE MANNION)
FILED
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., : SCRANTON
Defendants : JAN | 3 202s
pen JKC
MEMORANDUM DEPUTY CLERK
Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case are
defendants’ motions to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the motions
will be granted, and this case will be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff's
right to file a new case if he subsequently obtains a court order invalidating
his underlying criminal sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Herrera, is an inmate in the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections, currently housed in Laurel Highlands State Correctional
Institution (“SCl-Laurel Highlands”). He filed this case on February 5, 2024.
(Doc. 1). According to Herrera’s complaint, he was sentenced to a criminal
sentence of 10-24 months on April 22, 2020. (/d. at 2). Herrera asserts that
at some point during this sentence, he should have been released to home
confinement. (/d. at 2-3). Herrera asserts that the government's failure to do
so during the sentence violated his constitutional rights. (/d. at 2-4). He
names as defendants various institutions of the Pennsylvania government
and the United States government. (/d. at 1).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Pennsylvania Parole
Board moved to dismiss the complaint on June 1, 2024. (Doc. 20). The
United States of America, United States Department of Justice, and United
States Bureau of Prisons filed a separate motion to dismiss on June 28,
2024. (Doc. 22). Herrera has not responded to either motion, and the
deadline to do so has expired under the Local Rules. M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6. Both
motions to dismiss are accordingly ripe for the court’s review.
Il. |§ STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual
allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” /d. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]Jabels and conclusions” are not
enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” /d.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts “a two-part
analysis.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. /d.
at 210-11. Second, the court determines “whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 211 (quotations omitted).
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.
Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Ill. | DISCUSSION
The court liberally construes Herrera’s complaint as advancing two
alternative theories of liability: (1) that he had a due process right to release
to home confinement during his sentence; and (2) that the government's
failure to release him to home confinement during the sentence made the
sentence unlawful.
Both claims are plainly meritless. To the extent Herrera alleges that he
had a due process right to be released to home confinement during his
sentence, he is incorrect. Inmates incarcerated by the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections do not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in being paroled before they have been released from prison.
Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2015).
To the extent Herrera is alternatively asserting that his sentence was
unlawful, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Under Heck, a plaintiff seeking to “recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,”
must “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” /d. at 486-87. Here, any
challenge to the legality of Herrera’s previous sentence is clearly barred by
Heck. The court will accordingly dismiss this claim.
Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, a district court must permit a curative
amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips,
515 F.3d at 245. The court will deny leave to file an amended complaint in
the instant case as futile because Herrera’s claims clearly fail as a matter of
law. Dismissal of the case, however, will be without prejudice to Herrera’s
right to file a new case if he subsequently obtains a court order invalidating
his underlying criminal sentence. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss will be
granted and this case will be dismissed. An ap#ropriate order shall issue.
| United States District Judge
Dated: ope
24-202-01