Yaghoobi v. Tufts Medical Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

VESAL YAGHOOBI,

Plaintiff, No. 23-cv-12464-DLC

v.

TUFTS MEDICAL CENTER, INC.;

TUFTS MEDICINE, INC.;

MATTHEW SHORTELLE, JD; KARI

ROBERTS, MD; ADNAN QAMAR,

MD; ZAHRA JALALI, MD; JUSTIN

POPSO, MD,

Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (D. 57)

CABELL, U.S.M.J.

Plaintiff Vesal Yaghoobi has brought an action against

several individuals and entities for events arising from her time

as a pathology resident at Tufts Medical Center, Inc., (“Tufts

Medical Center” or “TMC”). Seven of the defendants move pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the operative amended

complaint against them for failure to state a viable claim. They

include (1) Tufts Medical Center (“TMC”); (2) Tufts Medicine,

Inc.1; (3) TMC Director of Health and Human Services Matthew

Shortelle (“Shortelle”); (4) TMC physician Kari Roberts, MD; (5)

1 According to its website, Tufts Medicine is a network of healthcare providers

that includes a number of hospitals and hundreds of doctor offices. About

Us, Tufts Medicine, https://www.tuftsmedicine.org/about-us (last visited Jan.

6, 2025).

TMC physician Adnan Qamar, MD; (6) TMC physician Zahra Jalali, MD;

and (7) TMC physician Justin Popso, DO. For the reasons that

follow, the defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in

part.

I. Relevant Background

Accepting the amended complaint’s salient allegations as

true, Yaghoobi in 2023 was a third-year pathology resident at Tufts

Medical Center. In early August 2023, she discovered what she

believed to be “systematic medical fraud,” including “non-standard

medical notes and pathology specimens.” On August 23, 2023, after

noticing “significant discrepancies” between a specimen she was

studying and the notes relating to that specimen, she conveyed her

misgivings to the chief resident, defendant Dr. Adnan Qamar, who

dismissed her concerns.

On the following day, August 24, Yaghoobi arrived at work and

discovered that TMC had revoked her access to her work email and

her ID badge had been deactivated. Shortly thereafter, TMC

personnel brought her to the emergency room and involuntarily

placed her under psychiatric observation and forced her to undergo

a mental health evaluation. Yaghoobi’s records were also

manipulated to reflect that her admission was voluntary.

2

Following the incident, Shortelle contacted Yaghoobi and

informed her that her employment was suspended indefinitely and

that she was prohibited from returning to TMC.

On August 25, TMC requested that the police conduct a wellness

check on Yaghoobi. Yaghoobi was not there when the police visited

her apartment, but her building concierge later apprised her of

the attempted wellness check.

A few weeks later, Yaghoobi filed a healthcare fraud complaint

against TMC with the Office of Inspector General for the Department

of Health and Human Services (“HHS OIG”).

On November 20, 2023, Shortelle notified the plaintiff on

behalf of TMC that she was considered to have voluntarily resigned

effective immediately.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an administrative

discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) and in May 2024 received a right-to-sue letter.2

II. The Amended Complaint

Against this backdrop, the amended complaint asserts the

following claims against the moving defendants:

2 The amended complaint did not include this allegation when initially filed

in March 2024 (D. 13), but the court on January 2, 2025 allowed the

plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the amended complaint to include it.

(D. 92). In so doing, and for administrative ease, the court did not

authorize the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. Rather, the

amended complaint remains the operative charging document, but it may now be

read to include the allegation that the plaintiff filed an administrative

complaint with the EEOC and thereafter received a right-to-sue letter.

3

Count One alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”) against TMC and Dr. Popso;

Count Two alleges a violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) against TMC;

Count Three alleges mail and wire fraud against TMC and Tufts

Medicine in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, respectively;

Count Four alleges that TMC, Shortelle, Dr. Qamar, Dr. Popso

and others conspired to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241;

Count Five alleges obstruction of justice and witness

tampering against TMC and Tufts Medicine, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1503 and 1512, respectively;

Count Six alleges that Shortelle violated the federal Freedom

of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248;

Count Seven alleges common law fraud against TMC;

Count Nine alleges that TMC and Dr. Popso violated the

plaintiff’s right to privacy;

Count Ten alleges breach of confidentiality against TMC and

Dr. Popso;

Count Eleven alleges defamation against TMC and “multiple

defendants”;

Count Twelve alleges intentional infliction of emotional

distress against TMC, Shortelle, and Dr. Popso;

4

Count Thirteen alleges false imprisonment against TMC and Dr.

Popso;

Count Fourteen alleges breach of an employment contract

against Shortelle and Dr. Roberts;

Count Fifteen alleges retaliation against TMC for voicing

concerns about medical fraud and patient care quality; and

Count Sixteen alleges that TMC interfered with the

plaintiff’s economic opportunities.

III. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a

plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief

that is plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The facts,

accepted as true, must “allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, the

allegations must be “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and must show more than “a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

Pro se litigants3 are held to a relaxed pleading standard “to

avoid inappropriately stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals.”

3 The plaintiff filed the amended complaint pro se but has since obtained

counsel.

5

Sergentakis v. Channell, 272 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224 (D. Mass. 2017).

However, “this cannot be taken to mean that pro se complaints are

held to no standard at all.” Id. at 224-225.

As discussed below, the court finds that Counts Two, Thirteen,

and Fifteen assert valid claims but the remainder of the referenced

claims do not and will be dismissed.

IV. Analysis

Count One - Violation of Section 1983

Count One alleges that TMC and Dr. Popso violated Yaghoobi’s

civil rights under Section 1983. Section 1983 creates a private

right of action against any person who, under color of state law,

“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the

jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under Section 1983 has two

elements: “1) that the conduct complained of has been committed

under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct worked a denial

of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st

Cir. 1999) (additional citation omitted). The plaintiff contends

here that the defendants violated her right to liberty and to

protection from an unwarranted seizure.

6

Even accepting the pled facts as true, Count One fails to

state a viable Section 1983 claim because the plaintiff fails to

allege facts showing that TMC, a private healthcare facility, and

Dr. Popso, one of its employees, were ever acting “under color of

state law.” See McEntee v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc., 685

F.Supp.3d 43, 50 (D. Mass. 2023) (“For [a] defendant to have acted

under color of state law, its actions must be ‘fairly attributable

to the State.’”). This matters because Section 1983 “does not

apply to ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or

wrongful.’” Grapentine v. Pawtucket Credit Union, 755 F.3d 29, 31

(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). As Count One appears to relate to merely

private conduct, it fails to assert a § 1983 claim against the

moving defendants and will be dismissed.

Counts Two and Fifteen – Violation of the ADA

Count Two alleges a violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-

12213. Among other things, the ADA prohibits an employer from

discriminating against “a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to the “advancement” or “discharge” of an

employee, or other “terms, conditions, and privileges” of their

employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The plaintiff contends

here that TMC treated her unfairly because it perceived her to

suffer from a mental health disability (Count Two). In addition

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to Count Two, Count Fifteen alleges unlawful retaliation. Although

Count Fifteen does not explicitly reference the ADA, TMC reads it

to allege wrongful retaliation in violation of the ADA. See 42

U.S.C. § 12203 (prohibiting discrimination against one who has

among other things opposed any act or practice made unlawful by

the ADA). In this regard, the plaintiff, who did not challenge

TMC’s characterization of Count Fifteen in her opposition to the

motion to dismiss4, alleges that TMC retaliated against her when

she raised concerns about medical fraud.

TMC argues that both claims fail because (1) the amended

complaint fails to allege that the plaintiff exhausted available

administrative remedies by filing an administrative charge with

the EEOC, and (2) the plaintiff’s pending EEOC charge indicates

she has not yet exhausted the available administrative remedies.

See Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 277 (1st.

4 To be clear, the plaintiff, in moving for leave to amend the amended

complaint (D. 79), did request that Count Fifteen be amended to allege a

violation of 41 U.S.C. § 4712 which among other things prohibits reprisals

against employees of federal contractors who have reported alleged wrongdoing

to an Inspector General, something the plaintiff contends happened here.

However, given that (1) the present motion to dismiss was pending at the time

the plaintiff filed her pro se motion to amend; (2) the plaintiff did not

make this assertion or challenge TMC’s characterization of Count Fifteen in

her opposition to the motion to dismiss; (3) the plaintiff has since obtained

counsel; and (4) the court has for now determined that Count Fifteen may go

forward, the court has in its discretion declined to act on this portion of

the plaintiff’s pro se motion. Assisted now by counsel, the plaintiff may

seek leave to amend Count Fifteen should it appear warranted. That said, the

court’s suggestion should not be interpreted as an advance ruling that any

such motion would necessarily be granted; that will turn on a consideration

of the facts of the case and the factors governing the amendment of

complaints set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

8

Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies

by filing an administrative charge with the EEOC or MCAD). The

arguments are without merit here.

First, while it is true that the plaintiff, to prevail, will

need to show that she properly exhausted administrative remedies,

most courts agree that there is no requirement that a complaint

plead satisfaction of this precondition to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. See, e.g., Robertson v. Barber Foods, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-

00455-NT, 2020 WL 3104047, at *4 (D. Me. June 11, 2020) (concluding

that a Title VII claim does not require plaintiffs to plead

exhaustion but that failure to exhaust may be an affirmative

defense); see also Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

812 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that the ADA incorporates

Title VII’s enforcement provisions). Further, assuming arguendo

that a complaint must plead exhaustion of remedies to withstand a

motion to dismiss, the amended complaint now satisfies that

requirement where the court has granted the plaintiff’s motion for

leave to amend to allege such facts. See D. 92. Moreover,

notwithstanding TMC’s assertion that the plaintiff presently has

a matter pending before the EEOC, the plaintiff avers that she has

nonetheless received a right-to-sue letter. As the court has

received no documentation from either party on this issue of fact,

the court will for now credit the plaintiff’s allegation that she

9

properly exhausted administrative remedies with respect to any ADA

claim, and thus finds that Counts Two and Fifteen are not deficient

on that ground and may for now go forward.

Counts Three - Five – Violation of Federal Criminal Statutes

Counts Three, Four, and Five assert claims against various

defendants for violating federal criminal statutes concerning mail

and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (Count Three); conspiracy

to violate constitutional rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count Four);

and obstruction of justice and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. §§

1503, 1512 (Count Five). All three counts fail summarily to assert

viable claims because none of the referenced statutes authorizes

an individual plaintiff to bring a private civil action against

another for a violation thereunder. See e.g., Wisdom v. First

Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 408–09 (8th Cir. 1999)

(complaint alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 dismissed because

there is no private cause of action under the mail fraud statute);

Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1178 (6th Cir. 1979) (18

U.S.C. § 1343 does not create a private right of action); Cok v.

Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“Only the

United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 241-242 . . .”); Scherer v. United States, 241 F.Supp.2d 1270,

1282 (D. Kansas 2003) (no private cause of action exists under

federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503); Reilly

10

v. Concentrex, Inv., No. CIV 99-983-HU, 1999 WL 1285883 (D. Or.

Nov. 19, 1999) (no private cause of action under § 1512). Counts

Three, Four, and Five therefore will be dismissed.

Count Six – FACE Violation

Count Six alleges that Shortelle violated the FACE Act, 18

U.S.C. § 248(a). The FACE Act protects all patients, providers,

and facilities that provide reproductive health services, and

imposes criminal and civil penalties for obstructing,

intimidating, or interfering with persons obtaining or providing

reproductive health services. The plaintiff alleges that

Shortelle “banned [her] from setting foot on [Tufts’] premises”

and “prevent[ed] her access to medical services through threats.”

Even accepting (solely for the sake of argument) that Shortelle

acted as alleged, Count Six fails to assert a viable FACE Act

violation against him because there is no suggestion, let alone an

allegation, that the plaintiff ever sought to enter the medical

center to obtain reproductive health services, or that any

defendant acted based on such a belief. Count Six will therefore

be dismissed.

Count Seven – Common Law Fraud

Count Seven alleges that TMC committed fraud by forging the

plaintiff’s signature, and in so doing “impact[ed] her civil

rights.” TMC argues that Count Seven must be dismissed because it

11

does not meet the heightened pleading standard set out in Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b). That Rule provides that “[i]n alleging fraud or

mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). More

specifically, to properly state a claim for common law fraud under

Massachusetts law, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant

made a false representation of material fact with knowledge of its

falsity for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act thereon,

and that the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representation

as true and acted upon it to [his/her] damage.” In re TelexFree

Sec. Litig., 626 F.Supp.3d 253, 269 (D. Mass. 2022) (quoting Taylor

v. Am. Chem. Council, 576 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2009)). To comply

with Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must also specify “the who, what,

where, and when of the allegedly false or fraudulent

representation.” Id. (quoting Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v.

Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2004)). The court is

mindful that the plaintiff was proceeding pro se when she filed

the amended complaint, but that fact does not absolve her from her

obligation to comply with the heightened pleading standard. See

McNeill v. Steward Health Care, LLC, No. 19-cv-10697, 2019 WL

2330423, at *2 (D. Mass. May 31, 2019).

Against that backdrop, Count Seven fails to adequately plead

a viable fraud claim against TMC. The amended complaint alleges

12

that the plaintiff’s signature was forged, and that her medical

records were manipulated and falsified to indicate that she

admitted herself voluntarily, but it does not allege who

specifically committed these acts, who made false representations

to the plaintiff to induce her to act, how she relied upon those

false representations, and how that reliance caused her to suffer

harm. See In re Telex, 626 F.Supp.3d at 269. As such, the

allegation that the plaintiff was forced to undergo an involuntary

evaluation that was subsequently mischaracterized as voluntary is

too vague and unspecific to put TMC (or any entity acting on its

behalf) on notice as to what it is alleged to have done, and fails

moreover because it does not suggest anyone induced the plaintiff

to behave a certain way. Count Seven therefore will be dismissed.

Count Nine – Invasion of Privacy

Count Nine alleges that TMC and Dr. Popso violated the

plaintiff’s right to privacy by sharing her personal and medical

information without her consent, presumably in violation of

Massachusetts’ invasion of privacy statute, M.G.L. ch. 214 § 1B.

That statute proscribes the “disclosure of facts about an

individual that are of a highly personal or intimate nature when

there exists no legitimate countervailing interest.” Ayash v.

Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 383 (2005) (citing Bratt

v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518 (1984)).

13

The amended complaint alleges that TMC shared “confidential

information beyond necessary billing details” with the plaintiff’s

insurer. Of note, the plaintiff infers this disclosure happened

because she subsequently received a voicemail from her insurer

offering mental health services and a letter from TMC after her

hospital visit. The plaintiff similarly infers that TMC must have

disclosed “confidential patient information” to the Boston Police

Department because they later came to perform a wellness check on

her.

The defendants argue that the amended complaint does not plead

sufficient facts to establish that any alleged privacy violation

was unreasonable and either substantial or serious. The court

agrees. The court acknowledges the plaintiff’s contention that

TMC shared confidential information “beyond necessary billing

details” to her insurer, but the amended complaint nonetheless

pleads no facts revealing what information was shared, what aspect

of the information was confidential, and why any disclosure went

“beyond” what was necessary. The fact that the plaintiff’s insurer

called her to offer mental health services does not suffice because

it at most “merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable

right of action.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Similarly, even

accepting that TMC asked the police to check on the plaintiff,

that contention does not reasonably suggest that TMC necessarily

14

must have first conveyed confidential information to the police,

as “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id. Count Nine will accordingly be

dismissed.

Count Ten – Breach of Confidentiality

Count Ten alleges that TMC and Dr. Popso exercised “improper

management and disclosure of [the plaintiff’s] sensitive

information.” The defendants read Count Ten as alleging a

violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act (“HIPAA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1181, which regulates the treatment of

personally identifiable health information and limits what

information institutions and providers may disclose to others.

The defendants argue that Count Ten fails to assert a valid HIPPA

claim because the statute does not create a private cause of

action. They are correct. See Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53,

59-60 (1st Cir. 2009). To the extent the plaintiff may be heard

to counter that Count Ten purports to allege something other than

a violation of HIPAA, or invasion of the plaintiff’s right to

privacy (Count Nine), it fails under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) to

provide to a clear statement demonstrating the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief from any of the named defendants. Count Ten

will thus be dismissed.

15

Count Eleven - Defamation

Count Eleven alleges that TMC, along with “multiple

defendants,” defamed the plaintiff. To prevail on a defamation

claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant published a

statement (2) concerning her that was both (3) defamatory and (4)

false, which (5) caused the plaintiff to suffer economic harm or

harm to her reputation. See e.g., Noonan v. Staples, 556 F.3d 20,

25 (1st Cir. 2009). The plaintiff claims that the defendants

defamed her here by making “false statements about her mental

health and professionalism,” which “pushed her into

whistleblowing,” and consequently damaged her reputation. The

plaintiff characterizes TMC’s call to the Boston Police Department

in particular as a defamatory incident meant to “stigmatize [the

plaintiff] with a mental health issue,” which ultimately damaged

her reputation in her building.

Count Eleven fails to plead a viable defamation claim because

the amended complaint does not identify what false and defamatory

statement(s) any defendant allegedly made and thereby fails to

provide any defendant with adequate notice of what they allegedly

did. This omission is especially critical here where the plaintiff

contends only that TMC “dispatched the police to conduct a wellness

check” at her apartment. As the court expressed above, the

plaintiff’s hunch that statements made to the police or others

16

must have been false and pejorative is too speculative to viably

allege that a defendant disclosed personal information regarding

the plaintiff, let alone false and defamatory information. Count

Eleven thus fails to plead a valid defamation claim and will be

dismissed.

Count Twelve – Intention Infliction of Emotional Distress

Count Twelve asserts a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) against TMC, Shortelle, and Dr. Popso.

To prevail on an IIED claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the

defendant intended, knew, or should have known that [his/her]

conduct would cause emotional distress; (2) that the conduct was

extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct caused emotional

distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe.” See,

e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.3d 1122, 1128 (Mass. 2014).

Count Twelve fails to state a valid IIED claim because it is

precluded by the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”),

M.G.L. ch. 152, § 26. The WCA bars common law personal injury

actions against employers when (1) the claimant is an employee,

(2) the condition is within the WCA’s definition of personal

injury, and (3) the injury arose out of and in the course of the

claimant’s employment. Id.; Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish,

696 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). As the defendants

correctly argue, the plaintiff was an employee at the time of the

17

incident and all of her salient allegations concern events arising

from her time as a TMC pathology resident. Thus, her IIED claim

fails as a matter of law. See Uwakwe v. Pelham Acad., 286 F.Supp.3d

213, 227-228 (D. Mass. 2017) (WCA’s exclusivity provision barred

plaintiff’s IIED claim).

Independently, Count Twelve fails to plead a viable IIED claim

against Dr. Popso where the amended complaint fails to state what

he is alleged to have done. It also fails against Shortelle

inasmuch as the core allegations against him –- that he reportedly

told the plaintiff that she was banned from entering the facility,

was indefinitely suspended, and later was deemed to have

voluntarily resigned –- fall short of amounting to conduct so

extreme and outrageous as to shock the conscience. This is

particularly the case where the amended complaint pleads no facts

suggesting that Shortelle understood there was no basis to make

the comments he allegedly made to the plaintiff.

Count Thirteen – False Imprisonment

Count Thirteen asserts a claim of false imprisonment against

TMC and Dr. Popso on the ground that the plaintiff was

“restrain[ed] without legal justification.” Under Massachusetts

law, the tort of false imprisonment consists of the (1) intentional

and (2) unjustified (3) confinement of a person, (4) of which the

confined person is directly or indirectly (5) conscious or is

18

harmed by the confinement. See Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 961

F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2020). Fundamentally, a false imprisonment

claim requires unlawful confinement by force or threat. Gallagher

v. South Shore Hosp., Inc., 197 N.E.3d 885, 831-832 (Mass. App.

Ct. 2022).

The defendants argue Count Thirteen should be dismissed

because (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

claim and (2) Yaghoobi’s allegations are too vague and conclusory

to state a claim for relief. Neither argument persuades here.

Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants argue

that the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this

state common law claim assuming all other federal claims asserted

in the amended complaint were dismissed. See e.g., United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the

federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims

should be dismissed as well.”). The defendants’ proposition is

legally correct, but the argument is unavailing here where the

court has declined to dismiss Counts Two and Fifteen.

Regarding the allegation that Count Thirteen is impermissibly

vague, the court agrees that the amended complaint surely could

benefit from some additional clarity but finds that it is

sufficiently clear on this claim to withstand Rule 12(b)(6)

scrutiny. In a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the amended

19

complaint may fairly be read to allege that TMC and its employees

intentionally confined the plaintiff against her will to force her

to undergo an examination. The amended complaint admittedly does

not explicitly identify Dr. Popso as the principal culprit, but

the court infers from his being named that he allegedly directed

or participated in the forced evaluation. The merits vel non of

this claim will be revealed through discovery but for now it may

go forward.

Count Fourteen – Breach of Contract

Count Fourteen alleges that TMC, Shortelle, and Dr. Roberts

“breach[ed] [the plaintiff’s] employment contract, violat[ed]

ACGME standards,5 and infring[ed] [upon the plaintiff’s] employment

rights through unjust suspension and denial of workplace access.”

For a breach of contract claim to survive a motion to dismiss,

a plaintiff must do more than allege in a conclusory fashion that

a defendant breached a contract. She must describe, “with

substantial certainty” the contractual term(s) the defendant

purportedly violated. Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assur. Co.,

480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007). The First Circuit has

interpreted Rule 12(b)(6) to “require[] that plaintiffs allege a

factual predicate concrete enough to warrant further proceedings.”

Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2007)

5 “ACGME” refers to the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education.

20

(upholding dismissal of contract claim that failed to allege

sufficient facts) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the

First Circuit has explained that in order to survive a motion to

dismiss, “the complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as

to who did what to whom, when, where, and why.” Educadores

Puertorriquenos en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st

Cir. 2004). “In a contract action, this irreducible minimum

requires the pleader to explain what obligations were imposed on

each of the parties by the alleged contract.” Buck, 476 F.3d at

38 (internal quotations omitted).

The amended complaint does not meet this standard. Putting

aside for the moment the amended complaint’s allusion to an

“employment contract,” the plaintiff does not allege, and there is

no basis to believe, that the standards of the ACGME created a

cognizable contract between the plaintiff and TMC. Similarly, the

plaintiff’s allegation that her suspension and denial of workplace

access infringed on her “employment rights” does not facially or

plausibly suggest the existence or violation of a specific

contract.

Returning then to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants

breached an “employment contract,” the claim fails summarily

against Shortelle and Dr. Roberts where the amended complaint fails

to plead facts showing that either defendant ever entered into a

21

contract with the plaintiff or committed an act that would

constitute a breach of a specific provision of an identified

contract.

That reduces Count Fourteen to alleging that TMC alone

breached an employment contract. In that regard, the plaintiff

neither identifies the contract, specifies its terms, nor

articulates how TMC reportedly breached it. To be sure, the

plaintiff alleges that the defendants effectuated her “unjust

suspension and denial of workplace access,” but this allegation is

insufficient where the plaintiff fails to identify the specific

source proscribing that conduct, e.g., an employee handbook or

other TMC document, or states how and why that source amounts to

an enforceable contract. The failure to do so deprives TMC of its

right to “fair notice of the . . . grounds upon which [the claim]

rests” and makes it impossible for them to investigate the

plaintiff’s claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In sum, Count Fourteen will be dismissed. Should the

plaintiff persist in contending that there are specific facts

supporting a viable claim of breach of an enforceable written

contract, she may always seek leave of court to amend.

Count Sixteen – Interference with Advantageous Relationships

Count Sixteen asserts a claim of “economic advantage

interference” against TMC for engaging in “severe retaliation

22

[that] forced [the plaintiff] into whistleblowing, [which]

adversely affect[ed] her career prospects and trust in the U.S.

medical system.” The defendants treat this count as alleging

tortious interference with contractual and advantageous business

relations, a characterization the plaintiff has not challenged.

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) she had

an existing contract with a third party; (2) the defendant

knowingly interfered with that contract by inhibiting a party’s

performance; (3) the defendant’s interference was intentional and

improper; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s

actions. ITyX Sols., AG v. Kodak Alaris Inc., No. 16-cv-10250-

ADB, 2018 WL 2392004, at *13 (D. Mass. May 25, 2018).

TMC reads Count Sixteen as alleging that the advantageous

relationship at issue here was not one between the plaintiff and

a third party, but rather the relationship between the plaintiff

and TMC itself. As such, TMC reads Count Sixteen as alleging that

TMC interfered with its own relationship with the plaintiff, to

the plaintiff’s detriment. TMC argues, correctly, that a plaintiff

may not assert a tortious interference claim against her employer

when the contract/relationship in question is the actual

employer/employee relationship itself. See Pierce v. Cotuit Fire

Dist., 741 F.3d 295, 304 (1st Cir. 2014).

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That said, and recognizing as noted elsewhere that the amended

complaint could be clearer, the court reads Count Sixteen somewhat

differently than TMC. To the court, Count Sixteen alleges that

TMC’s actions have harmed the plaintiff’s ability going forward to

obtain future employment with other institutions in the medical

field. The claim fails even under this interpretation, though,

because a plaintiff must nonetheless allege the existence of a

specific relationship or potential contract with an identified

entity that the defendant harmed. See Blackstone v. Cashman, 860

N.E.2d 7, 12 (Mass. 2007) (defining an advantageous relationship

as a present or prospective contract or employment relationship);

see also Sensitech Inc. v. LimeStone FZE, 548 F.Supp.3d 244, 258-

259 (D. Mass. 2021) (dismissing a tortious interference counter-

claim because the defendants failed to identify any specific

contract, relationship, or opportunity that was lost due to the

plaintiff’s actions). Even assuming that the incidents underlying

the amended complaint could impact the plaintiff’s future

employment prospects, that alone is insufficient to provide the

basis for a valid interference claim; a defendant cannot interfere

with a relationship that does not yet exist.

Count Sixteen thus fails to state a valid claim and will be

dismissed.

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V. Conclusion

The defendants’ motion to dismiss (D. 57) is denied with

respect to Counts Two, Thirteen, and Fifteen, and granted with

respect to Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, Ten,

Eleven, Twelve, Fourteen, and Sixteen. The amended complaint shall

for now be read to assert claims of violation of the ADA against

TMC (Counts Two and Fifteen6), and false imprisonment against TMC

and Dr. Popso (Count Thirteen). The complaint shall be dismissed

with respect to all other defendants. Defendants TMC and Dr. Popso

shall file an answer to the amended complaint within 14 days of

this Order.

So Ordered.

/s/ Donald L. Cabell

DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.

DATED: January 13, 2025

6 The court is mindful that the plaintiff may seek leave to amend Count

Fifteen to assert a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4712 rather than the ADA. For

the reasons noted in footnote 4, the court at present takes no position on

the merits or likelihood of that possibility.

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