(PC) Johnson v. Nugent

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SHAWN PIERRE JOHNSON, Case No. 1:24-cv-949-JLT-BAM (PC)

12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED

13 v. COMPLAINT

14 KEVIN NUGENT, et al., (ECF No. 1)

15 Defendants. THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

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Plaintiff Shawn Pierre Johnson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

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forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is

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currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

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I. Screening Requirement and Standard

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous

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or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret

9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully

10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility

11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

13 Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) in Delano, CA where

14 the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Pat

15 Horn, Warden at KVSP, (2) Kevin Nugent, chairman, Religious Review Committed, KVSP, (3)

16 Ruben Carriedo, Chief Deputy Warden, KVSP, (4) Jeremy Custer, Associate Warden, KVSP, and

17 (5) J. Moeckly, correctional officer and reviewing officer of appeals.

18 In claim 1, Plaintiff maybe alleging a violation of the First Amendment and the Religious

19 Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Plaintiff alleges as follows. Pat Horn is responsible

20 for supervision and operations at KVSP and neglected the participating Muslims of Ramadan

21 access to practice the Religion of Islam in its totality. Ruben Carriedo is the Chief Deputy

22 Warden who refers pending matters and discrepancies to the Warden. Mr. Carriedo possesses full

23 knowledge of the denial of chapel use during the month of Ramadan. Jeremy Custer is Associate

24 Warden whose decision also led to the denial of chapel use during Ramadan. Keven Nugent,

25 chairman, Religious Review Committee, provided the memorandum denying chapel use during

26 Ramadan with full knowledge of its essential use during Ramadan. J. Moeckly is the reviewing

27 authority of appeal who upon review of the grievance, neglected and denied the claim without

28 proper due diligence and due process.

1 As remedies, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to prevent the denial of future services during

2 the month of Ramadan and seeks monetary damages.

3 III. Discussion

4 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to

5 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because he is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff will

6 be granted leave to amend his complaint to the extent that he can do so in good faith. To assist

7 Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards that appear relevant to his claims.

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

9 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

10 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations

11 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must

13 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

14 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations

15 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss,

16 572 F.3d at 969.

17 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims showing

18 that he is entitled to relief. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not state what happened,

19 when it happened, or which defendant was involved. General assertions regarding Plaintiff’s

20 appeals are not sufficient, and Plaintiff may not merely state he was denied rights without stating

21 the factual support for denial of those right. Plaintiff must state factual allegations to support his

22 claims. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be a short and plain statement of his

23 claims and must include factual allegations identifying what happened, when it happened and

24 who was involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

25 While “much liberality is allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot

26 simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect the court to sift through them to

27 determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be

28 unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.” Lam v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No.

1 1:23-CV-01167 BAM PC, 2023 WL 8701254, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2023), report and

2 recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-1167 JLT BAM PC, 2024 WL 201269 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18,

3 2024). “The Court will not comb through attached exhibits seeking to determine whether a claim

4 possibly could have been stated where the pleading itself does not state a claim. In short,

5 [Plaintiff] must state a claim, not merely attach exhibits.” Stewart v. Nevada, No. 2:09-CV-

6 01063-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL 588485, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2011). Here, the Court has reviewed

7 the exhibits, but did not evaluate whether their contents state a claim on Plaintiff's behalf.

8 Plaintiff cannot Represent Others

9 It is unclear from the allegations, but it appears Plaintiff seeks to represent other inmates

10 who were not permitted chapel during Ramadan. Plaintiff may not do so. A non-attorney

11 proceeding pro se may bring his own claims to court, but he may not represent others. Johns v.

12 County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (constitutional claims are personal; non-

13 attorney has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself); C.E. Pope Equity Trust

14 v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant simply cannot “fairly and

15 adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) Therefore, this action will

16 be construed as an individual civil suit brought by Plaintiff.

17 Linkage and Supervisor Liability

18 Most of Plaintiff's allegations fail to assert the requisite causal link between the

19 challenged conduct, a specific defendant, and a clearly identified constitutional violation. Under §

20 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the

21 deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676–7, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Ewing v. City of Stockton,

22 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

23 Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific facts as to

24 each individual defendant's” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

25 Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

26 Plaintiff fails to link the defendants to the alleged wrongful conduct. Plaintiff fails to

27 allege what each defendant did or did not do which violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

28 Plaintiff may not simply assert that a deprivation occurred and then accuse a group of defendants

1 of being “responsible” for that deprivation.

2 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Warden, Defendant Deputy Warden, or

3 any other defendant, based on his supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be

4 imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the

5 theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Simmons v. Navajo

6 Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218,

7 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

8 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or

9 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

10 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett,

11 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal

12 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

13 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”

14 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations

15 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

16 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1970).

17 Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Warden, Defendant Deputy Warden,

18 or other supervisor, participated in or directed any constitutional violation or that he implemented

19 a policy so deficient that it was the moving force of any constitutional violation.

20 First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion

21 A plaintiff asserting a free exercise claim must show that the defendant's actions

22 substantially burden his practice of religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir.

23 2015). “A substantial burden ... place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must

24 have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert

25 substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. (internal

26 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] prison policy that intentionally puts significant

27 pressure on inmates ... to abandon their religious beliefs ... imposes a substantial burden on [the

28 inmate's] religious practice.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal

1 quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the court has also recognized that limitations on

2 a prisoner's free exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological

3 objectives. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). For instance, under the

4 First Amendment, the penological interest in a simplified food service has been held sufficient to

5 allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely

6 kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993).

7 To state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must plausibly allege that a

8 prison official's actions (a) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate's exercise of a sincerely-held

9 religious belief; and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner—i.e., the official's actions were not

10 “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.

11 342, 348-50 (1987); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015); see Haynes v.

12 Orel, No. 2:19-CV-1988 AC, 2021 WL 4355431, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021).

13 Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient facts to support his free exercise of religion claim.

14 Plaintiff merely contends that his requests for access to chapel were denied. Plaintiff had not

15 sufficiently stated a claim because he failed to specifically allege that chapel access is necessary

16 for a “sincerely held” belief that is “rooted in religious belief.” Plaintiff has not alleged facts

17 showing that the chapel service or meeting was necessary to plaintiff's sincerely held belief or

18 religion, that any denial substantially burdened the practice of his religion, or, that any denial was

19 not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests or that he did not have alternative means

20 of practicing his religion. Leave to amend will be granted.

21 RLUIPA

22 A prisoner's ability to freely exercise his religion is also protected by the Religious Land

23 Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government

24 shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to

25 an institution, ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person

26 ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest ... and is the least restrictive means of

27 furthering that ... interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA defines ‘religious exercise’ to

28 include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious

1 belief.’ ” Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013);

2 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7).

3 As with the First Amendment, under the RLUIPA, the government imposes a “substantial

4 burden” on a prisoner when it puts “substantial pressure on [him] to modify his behavior and to

5 violate his beliefs.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted). RLUIPA is more protective

6 than the First Amendment, in that the availability of alternative means of practicing religion is

7 irrelevant to whether the Act has been violated. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 862. With

8 RLUIPA, the “ ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the government has substantially

9 burdened religious exercise ..., not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms

10 of religious exercise.” Id.

11 Money damages are not available under RLUIPA against the state or state officials sued in

12 their official capacities, Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 279 (2011), and RLUIPA does not

13 contemplate liability of government employees in their individual capacity. Wood v. Yordy, 753

14 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, a RLUIPA claim may proceed only for declaratory or

15 injunctive relief against defendants acting within their official capacities.

16 It appears that Plaintiff sues each of the individual defendants in their individual capacity

17 for violation of RLUIPA. RLUIPA, however, does not authorize Plaintiff's claim against the

18 individual defendants in their individual capacities. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904. Leave to amend

19 will be granted.

20 Processing of Appeals

21 To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about the appeal process, Plaintiff is informed that

22 he does not have a constitutionally protected right to have his appeals accepted or processed.

23 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

24 Cir. 1988). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates

25 and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. See also

26 Givens v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., No. 2:19-cv-0017 KJN P, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4

27 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) (“California's regulations grant prisoners a purely procedural right: the

28 right to have a prison appeal.”) Therefore, prison officials are not required by federal law to

1 process inmate appeals or grievances in a particular way. Consequently, the failure or refusal to

2 process a grievance or the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance does not violate any

3 constitutionally protected right. See Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC),

4 2018 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); Givens, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4; Wright v.

5 Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010)

6 (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a

7 cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Valles v. Gamboa, No. 1:22-CV-00355 BAM PC,

8 2022 WL 1294424, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2022) (no claim for failure to comply with timely

9 processing requirements).

10 Injunctive Relief

11 Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in this action. Federal courts are courts of limited

12 jurisdiction and in considering a request for injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the

13 requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an actual case or controversy. City of

14 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for

15 Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an

16 actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. Id.

17 Further, requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of

18 the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief

19 [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

20 Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

21 right.” In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must

22 be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires

23 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. §

24 3626(a)(2). Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that

25 goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about

26 issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly

27 favor the plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th

28 Cir. 1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir.

1 1984).

2 Plaintiff’s Declaration re Opened Mail

3 On September 9, 2024, a declaration from Plaintiff was filed stating that he “is receiving

4 mail from this Court opened without [him] being present.” (Doc. 9.)

5 The Court declines to address this issue because it was not included in the complaint.

6 Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend and may consider including this allegation. However,

7 Plaintiff is informed that, under federal law, “legal mail” entitled to First Amendment protection

8 is narrowly defined as confidential correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney. See

9 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail

10 from a prisoner's lawyer, is not legal mail.”). Non-legal mail may be opened outside of the

11 presence of an inmate. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211 (upholding dismissal of claims for opening of

12 non-legal mail). And Plaintiff is cautioned against joining unrelated claims. Plaintiff may not

13 bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2).

14 Plaintiff is further cautioned that he is required to exhaust administrative remedies before being

15 suit under the PLRA.

16 IV. Conclusion and Order

17 As discussed above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to comply

18 with Rules 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff will be granted an

19 opportunity to amend to attempt to cure the identified deficiencies, to the extent he is able to do

20 so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

21 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what

22 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556

23 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must

24 be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

25 (citations omitted).

26 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated

27 claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no

28 “buckshot” complaints).

1 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.

2 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended

3 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.”

4 Local Rule 220.

5 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

6 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

7 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

8 second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, or file a

9 notice of voluntary dismissal; and

10 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

11 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, consistent with the reasons

12 discussed in this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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15 Dated: January 10, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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