HENDERSON v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EVAN WILLIAM HENDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-11-J

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by crafting a

mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”) that failed to account for all of his impairments

and the persuasive medical source opinions. (Doc. No. 6). Further, Plaintiff contends

the ALJ defectively analyzed his credibility and failed to consider his stellar work history.

(Id.). After careful review, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff. Accordingly, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

After reviewing all the evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

following RFC:

[T]he claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium

work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c), with the following additional

limitations: no exposure to moving mechanical parts and high exposed

places; can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions; can use

judgment to make simple work-related decisions; can have occasional

interactions with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public; can deal

with occasional changes in a routine work setting; cannot perform work

requiring a specific production rate, such as assembly line work or work

that requires hourly quotas.

(R. 1183). Plaintiff specifically takes issue with his mental RFC. (Doc. No. 6). In

crafting this mental RFC, the ALJ reviewed many medical source opinions and prior

administrative medical findings, including opinions from Mark Frederick, LPC, Jack

Thomas, Ph.D., Arlene Rattan, Ph.D., Roger Fretz, Ph.D., and Wayne D’Agaro, Psy.D.

(R. 1188-93). Drs. Thomas, Fretz, and Rattan found Plaintiff had mild to moderate

mental limitations. (R. 1192; Exs. 1A, 3A, 19F). The ALJ found these less-limited

opinions generally persuasive and somewhat persuasive. (R. 1192). Mr. Frederick’s

opinion was more limiting, as he assessed that Plaintiff had no useful ability to function

and was unable to meet competitive standards in several areas of mental functioning. (R.

1190-91; Ex. 14F). The ALJ found this opinion to be not persuasive. (R. 1191).

Additionally, Dr. D’Agaro conducted neuropsychological evaluations of Plaintiff and

assessed that he was somewhat limited, as he recommended that Plaintiff work at a slower

pace, recheck his work, avoid multitasking, and return to work only four hours per day to

start. (R. 1190; Ex. 4F). The ALJ found this opinion inconsistent with the record and

unsupported by Dr. D’Agaro’s findings of improved functioning and mild-to-moderate

severity of impairments. (R. 1190). After assessment of these opinions, the ALJ

determined, as stated above, that Plaintiff had the mental RFC to remember and carry out

simple instructions and use judgment to make simple work-related decisions. (R. 1183).

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Plaintiff first takes issue with the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. D’Agaro’s

neuropsychological exams. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by not incorporating any of

Dr. D’Agaro’s opined limitations into the RFC and by ignoring the “inconvenient facts” in

Dr. D’Agaro’s examinations. (Doc. No. 6 at 14-16). Plaintiff references Dr. D’Agaro’s

findings that Plaintiff had mild and moderate difficulty in several areas of mental

functioning and that he required help when doing basic paperwork, had a poor memory,

was unable to multitask, required a slow pace of work to minimize mistakes, and had an

inability to work with customers. (Id. at 16). Plaintiff’s argument overlooks that the

ALJ found Dr. D’Agaro’s restrictive recommendations to be inconsistent with the rest of

the record and not supported by Dr. D’Agaro’s own findings. (R. 1190). Moreover, as

Defendant correctly points out, Plaintiff points to many findings, such as needing help

when doing basic paperwork, that derive from Plaintiff’s own testimony rather than

medical findings. (See Doc. No. 6 at 16 (citing R. 98, 108-9)). The other findings,

including Plaintiff’s poor memory, his inability to multitask, his requirement of a slow pace

of work, and his inability to work with customers, were all considered by the ALJ and

ultimately reflected in the RFC, which limited him to occasional interactions, work not

requiring a specific production rate, simple instructions, and only occasional changes. (R.

1183). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ did not fully account for Therapist Frederick’s

opinion. Specifically, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ’s RFC should have included Mr.

Frederick’s restrictive limitations, as they were consistent with the overall moderate level

of limitation supported by the record. (Doc. No. 6 at 17). Mr. Frederick opined that

Plaintiff was “unable to meet competitive standards” and had “no useful ability to function”

in several areas of mental functioning. (Ex. 14F/5-6). However, the ALJ fully

considered Mr. Frederick’s opinion; he found it, though, to be unpersuasive. (R. 1190-

91). The ALJ determined this after explaining that this opinion was inconsistent with

other evidence and unsupported by Mr. Frederick’s clinical record. (Id.). Moreover, as

Defendant correctly points out, the ALJ noted that Dr. Thomas, addressing Mr. Frederick’s

opinion in his interrogatories, stated that Mr. Frederick’s opinion “is a mental impairment

rating from a counselor who has treated the claimant since September 14, 2021. The

ratings do not appear supported by the clinical record. The claimant’s difficulties overall

are mild to moderate and would not yield any marked ratings.” (R. 1191 (quoting Ex.

19F/6)). Thus, the ALJ determined that Mr. Frederick’s opinion was inconsistent with

the wider record, showing moderate limitations, and logically excluded his opined

limitations from Plaintiff’s RFC.

Likewise, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by not

incorporating all of Dr. Thomas’ opined limitations after finding this opinion generally

persuasive. (Doc. No. 6 at 12, 18). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to incorporate

any limitation recognizing Plaintiff’s limitations in carrying out instructions,

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, adapting or managing himself, and

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responding appropriately to usual work situations. (Id.). Plaintiff overlooks the

limitations the ALJ included in his RFC, including limitations to simple work-related

decisions; understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions; occasional

interactions with coworkers, supervisors, and the public; and occasional changes in a

routine work setting. (R. 1183). These limitations incorporate Dr. Thomas’ opined

limitations, including that Plaintiff had mild to moderate limitations regarding

understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, interacting with others and

responding appropriately to usual work situations, and to changes in a routine work setting.

(R. 1191-92 (citing Ex. 19F/8)). This RFC adequately reflected the ALJ’s finding of no

more than moderate limitations in mental functioning and, therefore, Plaintiff’s argument

on this point is without merit.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in analyzing the state agency

administration findings from Drs. Rattan and Fretz and by not incorporating their opined

one-to-two step task limitation into his RFC. (Doc. No. 6 at 12). Dr. Rattan opined and

Dr. Fretz concurred that Plaintiff be limited to one-and-two step tasks. (R. 1192; Ex.

1A/5-6, 9-10; 3A/9-10, 15). The ALJ found this limitation inconsistent with the overall

moderate level of impairment evidenced by the record, but Plaintiff contends this

consistency analysis was not supported by any authority. (Doc. No. 6 at 18-19).

Plaintiff ignores that the ALJ fully explained her reasoning as to these opinions, stating:

[T]he claimant’s mental health impairments were generally controlled

solely with medication management by his primary care provider more

recently, and the more recent mental status examinations were generally

unremarkable. (23F). Therefore, the undersigned rejects the limitation

to one-and two-step tasks. The conservative, routine and somewhat

minimal mental health treatment records and generally mild to moderate

overall mental status examinations are not consistent with any limitations

beyond those indicated by the residual functional capacity assessment in

this Finding.

(R. 1192). Moreover, previously in her decision, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff suffered

moderate impairments in mental functioning after surveying all of the medical evidence.

(See R. 1188 (explaining Plaintiff’s neuropsychological testing and how it showed that

Plaintiff’s “impairment remained in the mild to moderate range”)). Accordingly, the

ALJ’s analysis of these opinions and decision to omit the limitation to one-and-two step

tasks is supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ defectively analyzed his credibility and erred

by failing to consider his stellar work history. Plaintiff posits that his testimony was

consistent with the medical opinions of record and, therefore, should have been credited.

(Doc. No. 6 at 19-22). Plaintiff’s argument disregards that the ALJ explained why she

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 5) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak, J.

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

found Plaintiff’s complaints not credible. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s testimony as to

memory, attention, concentration, and understanding difficulties was not supported by the

record or Plaintiff’s testimony, which showed that Plaintiff had only mild to moderate

mental limitations and could answer all questions asked. (See R. 1184-93). Moreover,

Plaintiff was not entitled to heightened credibility based solely on his work history. See

Corley v. Barnhart, 102 Fed. Appx. 752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004); Thompson v. Astrue, No. 09-

519, 2010 WL 3661530, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010) (stating “a claimant’s work history

alone is not dispositive of the question of his credibility, and an ALJ is not required to

equate a long work history with enhanced credibility.”). Here, the ALJ acknowledged

Plaintiff’s prior work history as an automobile salesman and his attempt to return to work

after his accident. (R. 1188, 1193). The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms

and explained why she found these to be inconsistent with the evidence of record. (R.

1184-93). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

For these reasons, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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