Opinion

Carlos Calderon-Escobar v. Attorney General United States of America

Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jan 10, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.6%

noting that evidence must evaluated for “relevance and reliability”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that evidence must evaluated for “relevance and reliability”
  • holding that BIA overlooking material evidence of mental illness put forth in a motion to remand was an error of law
  • holding that a question over the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determination is a “quintessential mixed question of law and fact.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 23-2164

_______________

CARLOS CALDERON-ESCOBAR,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

On Petition for Review of an

Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A209-308-021)

Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 12, 2024

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 10, 2025)

_______________

OPINION 1

_______________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

1

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not

constitute binding precedent.

Carlos Calderon-Escobar petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) order dismissing his appeal of the denial of his application for cancellation of

removal and denying his motion to remand for consideration of new evidence. We will

grant his petition, reverse the BIA’s order to the extent that it denied the motion to

remand, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Calderon-Escobar is a native and citizen of Mexico. A6. He entered the United

States without authorization or inspection in March 2001. He and his wife, Caren, a

native and citizen of Guatemala, have two school-age children. A6. The family lives in

Pennsylvania where they own a home and a car. Calderon-Escobar established, owns,

and operates a successful tree removal business, which employees five people. A6-7. He

has filed state and federal income tax returns and has paid additional taxes as required.

A10. He has maintained his continuous physical presence in the United States for over

20 years. A12.

In 2016, the Department of Homeland Security charged Calderon-Escobar as

subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). A5. He conceded his removability

but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), claiming that

his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S.

citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1129b(b)(1)(D). In 2021, after a hearing, an immigration

judge (IJ) denied the application for cancellation of removal and ordered him removed.

The IJ concluded that although Calderon-Escobar was physically present for a

continuous period of more than twenty years, that he was of good moral character, and

2

had not been convicted of any disqualifying offenses, he failed to establish that his two

U.S. citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship because of

his removal. 2 A13-15. The IJ reasoned that Calderon-Escobar’s success in establishing

a tree removal company and the assets he accumulated in doing so would provide his

children with a comfortable life, and that the children’s ages, health, and ability to speak

Spanish would allow them to acclimate to life in Mexico with some ease. A16-19.

Calderon-Escobar appealed. A39. While his appeal was pending, however, his

wife and two-year old son were robbed at gunpoint outside a grocery store. A42. As a

result of this assault, his wife and son were transported to the hospital. A42. Shortly

after this incident, Calderon-Escobar’s son experienced marked behavioral changes

including “twitching or nervous movement[s],” “shakes,” “nightmares,” and trouble

eating and sleeping. A42-43. Calderon-Escobar and his wife took their son to see a

family physician who preliminarily diagnosed him with an “anxiety/behavioral change,”

and prescribed some medication. AR61. After another doctor’s visit, he was further

diagnosed with “Anxiety/Panic Episodes.” AR54. The doctor noted that Calderon-

Escobar’s son was exhibiting symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and referred

him to the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia’s (CHOP) “Psychiatry and Behavioral

Clinic” for evaluation and treatment. A52.

2

To be eligible for cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization

Act, the applicant must: (1) have been physically present in the United States for a

continuous period of at least ten years, (2) be of good moral character during that time,

(3) have not been convicted of certain criminal offenses, and (4) demonstrate that

removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [a qualifying

relative].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

3

Based on his two-year old son’s changed circumstances and diagnoses of anxiety,

behavioral change, and panic episodes, as well as likely, though not yet diagnosed,

PTSD, Calderon-Escobar a filed a motion to remand for consideration of new evidence.

A37. In his motion, he urged that his son had been diagnosed with a serious medical

condition and that adequate medical care was unavailable in Mexico. A45-46. To

support that his son was suffering from a serious medical condition, he submitted his

son’s doctor’s notes and prescription, affidavits providing testimony about the effect that

the robbery and assault had on his son, and the police report of the incident. He further

cited to various medical journal articles relating to the behavioral and emotional effects

of violence on minors. A44-45. To support that medical care would not be adequate in

Mexico to treat his son’s condition, he submitted a 2010 article titled “Child and

Adolescent Mental Health Services in Mexico” which detailed the lack of mental health

treatments for children in Mexico. A69-71.

Despite this new evidence of changed circumstances, the BIA denied the motion

to remand and dismissed the appeal in a two-page order. A1-2. As to the motion to

remand, the BIA concluded that he had not established prima facie eligibility for the

requested relief, stating that he “has not provided evidence that a serious medical

condition has been diagnosed or that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico.” AR4.

In reaching this conclusion, the BIA did not discuss any of the doctor’s notes, affidavits,

the police report, or reference any of Calderon-Escobar’s citations to medical journal

articles relating to the psychological effects of violence on young children. A2. The BIA

also did not explain why the scholarly report he submitted to show that Mexico’s mental

4

health services were not equipped to handle his son’s serious medical condition was

insufficient to establish prima facie entitlement to relief. A2.

Regarding Calderon-Escobar’s appeal on the merits, the BIA recounted the

findings of the IJ, and agreed that he did not present sufficient evidence that the

“conditions in Mexico would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his

children” and that he would be able to create a good life for his family in Mexico. AR4.

Calderon-Escobar petitioned for review.

II. 3

Before this Court, Calderon-Escobar urges that (1) the BIA abused its discretion

when it denied his motion to remand without providing a rational explanation for

rejecting the evidence he presented concerning his son’s serious medical condition and

the inadequacy of Mexico’s mental health system to treat the serious medical condition;

and (2) the BIA and IJ failed to consider arguments and evidence regarding the “double

level of separation” that the qualifying relative’s would experience. 4 We agree that the

BIA abused its discretion.

3

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.

209, 212 (2024) (holding that a question over the “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” determination is a “quintessential mixed question of law and fact.”).

The Court reviews a BIA decision to deny a motion to remand for abuse of discretion.

Darby v. Attorney Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021).

4

As we conclude that the BIA erred denying Calderon-Escobar’s motion to remand, we

need not reach this argument regarding “double level of separation.”

5

To succeed on a motion to remand, the movant must establish “prima facie

eligibility” for relief. Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004). “To make a

prima facie case, the applicant must ‘produce objective evidence showing a “reasonable

likelihood” that he can establish [that he is entitled to relief].’” Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1

F.4th 151, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). “Reasonable

likelihood” simply means “a realistic chance.” Guo, 386 F.3d at 566. An applicant does

not need to “establish” the existence of “extraordinary and extreme unusual hardship” but

only that there is “a realistic chance that such a finding could be made on remand.” Id. at

565 (emphasis added).

“Discretionary decisions of the BIA will not be disturbed unless they are found to

be ‘arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.’” Tipu v. I.N.S., 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir.

1994). Serious mischaracterization of evidence or the failure to consider key evidence

may constitute an error of law. See, e.g., Paucar v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71, 84 (2d Cir.

2023) (holding that BIA overlooking material evidence of mental illness put forth in a

motion to remand was an error of law). While the BIA is not required to consider every

piece of evidence with the utmost scrutiny, when such evidence is central to “the subtle

determination” of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” test, such as here,

failure to consider that evidence is an error of law and an abuse of discretion. Mendez v.

Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009).

Here, we conclude that the BIA abused its discretion by summarily concluding

that Calderon-Escobar had not established “prima facie eligibility for the relief he seeks”

because he did not provide evidence “that a serious medical condition ha[d] been

6

diagnosed or that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico.” AR4. The BIA’s

conclusion that Calderon-Escobar’s son had not been diagnosed with a serious medical

condition was plainly contrary to the record evidence. Indeed, two doctor’s notes

memorialized that a physician had affirmatively diagnosed his son with “anxiety,”

“behavioral change,” and “panic episodes.” A52-54. And this doctor further noted that

the son exhibited symptoms of PTSD and required specialized psychiatric evaluation and

treatment at CHOP. While the BIA alluded to the evidence in a perfunctory footnote, it

did not expressly address the affidavits, the police report, nor Calderon-Escobar’s

citations to various medical literature in his brief. See A2 n.2 (discounting all evidence

under “Tab A” as insufficient “to establish a serious medical condition,” without

explanation). The BIA, thus, clearly erred in finding that he had not submitted evidence

to show that his son had been diagnosed by a physician and recommended for further

evaluation and treatment at one of the nation’s top pediatric hospitals.

Similarly, the BIA’s conclusion that Calderon-Escobar had “not provided evidence

. . . that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico” for his son’s anxiety, behavioral

change, panic episodes, and likely PTSD, was contrary to the evidence. A2. In moving

for remand, Calderon-Escobar submitted a 2010 article detailing the dearth and

inadequacy of mental health care for children in Mexico. A55-57. But the BIA

overlooked this somewhat dated medical article in concluding that no evidence

demonstrated that “treatment would be unavailable in Mexico.” A2. To succeed on his

motion to remand based on new evidence, Calderon-Escobar was required only to show

his prima facie eligibility for relief, not his actual eligibility. That is, he was required to

7

submit just enough evidence to show that he would have a “realistic chance” of

establishing his entitlement to relief on remand. The evidence before the BIA regarding

the pediatric mental health system in Mexico showed that the system is inadequate to

treat Calderon-Escobar’s condition. It was required to consider, but did not, whether that

evidence was relevant and reliable despite its age. See, e.g., Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I&N

Dec. 808, 812 n.6. (BIA 2020) (noting that evidence must evaluated for “relevance and

reliability”). It was, therefore, clearly erroneous for the BIA to find, in the face of

documentary evidence to the contrary, that treatment would be available for Calderon-

Escobar’s son’s ailments in Mexico.

IV.

For these reasons, we will grant the petition for review, reverse the BIA’s order to

the extent that it denied the motion to remand, and remand the case to permit the IJ to

reconsider Calderon-Escobar’s application for cancellation of removal in light of the new

evidence.

8

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.