Mire v. Vector Disease Control International, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GLENN P. MIRE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 24-2352

VECTOR DISEASE CONTROL

SECTION: “J”(4)

INTERNATIONAL ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by

Defendant Arch Insurance Company, and an opposition filed by Plaintiff Glenn P.

Mire (Rec. Doc. 18), to which Arch replies (Rec. Doc. 19). Having considered the

motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that

the motion should be GRANTED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from injuries caused by a traffic accident between Plaintiff and

Malcolm Jacob, an insured motorist who rear-ended Plaintiff at a red light. At the

time of the accident, Plaintiff was driving a vehicle owned by his employer Vector

Disease Control International, LLC and insured by Arch. Contending that Jacob’s

policy-limited payments were insufficient to cover his bodily injuries, Plaintiff filed

this action for uninsured/underinsured (“UM/UIM”) insurance coverage against Arch

and Vector in the Twenty-Third Judicial District for the Parish of St. James.

Defendants timely removed the action pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction of 28

U.S.C. § 1332.

In their Notice of Removal, Defendants provide that Vector is a limited liability

company wholly owned by Vector Disease Acquisitions, LLC, which in turn is wholly

owned by Rentokil North America, Inc. (Rec. Doc. 5 at 6 ¶ 16). Following removal,

Vector moved for its dismissal because Plaintiff’s claim is for insurance coverage,

which is properly made against an insurance company, and is otherwise barred

against Vector, which is Plaintiff’s employer and, therefore, subject to the Louisiana

Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court granted the motion to dismiss as unopposed.

Remaining Defendant Arch now moves for summary judgment due to a waiver

of UM/UIM coverage in the policy at issue. Plaintiff opposes, contending the existence

of a material fact as to the authority of Rentokil’s risk manager to waive such

coverage.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see Little

v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a

dispute as to any material fact exists, a court considers “all of the evidence in the

record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”

Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th

Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but

a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations or

unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be

satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l

Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving

party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its

own, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not

persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”

Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing

out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts

to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out

specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may

not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine

issue for trial. See id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

DISCUSSION

Parties do not disagree that UM/UIM coverage can be rejected under Louisiana

law and that Rentokil Risk Manager Kathy Green’s electronic signature and initials

are on Louisiana’s standard Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury

Coverage Form. (See Rec. Doc. 17-5 at 592 (waiver)). Nonetheless, Plaintiff questions

the validity of the waiver on two grounds.

First, in a passing, undeveloped argument, Plaintiff insinuates the form at

issue could be a forgery: “[A]nyone could place her initials on the document and Arch

Insurance Company could have done that and not Kathy Green.” (Rec. Doc. 18 at 2).

This unsupported theory, however, falls short of overcoming Louisiana’s presumption

of coverage rejection: “A properly completed and signed form creates a rebuttable

presumption that the insured knowingly rejected coverage, selected a lower limit, or

selected economic-only coverage.” La. Stat. Ann. § 22:1295. Green’s UM coverage

waiver complies with “six tasks” necessary for a properly completed form. See Duncan

v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 2006-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So. 2d 544, 551 ((1) initialing the

selection or rejection of coverage chosen; (2) if limits lower than the policy limits are

chosen, then filling in the amount of coverage selected for each person and each

accident; (3) printing the name of the named insured or legal representative; (4)

signing the name of the named insured or legal representative; (5) filling in the policy

number; and (6) filling in the date). Moreover, in an affidavit attached to Arch’s

motion, Green states “she executed and initialed said form on September 16, 2022 . .

. and she filled in the date and printed her name on the form[.]” (Rec. Doc. 17-6 at 1–

2). Green further asserts she had the authority to reject such coverage in her role as

risk manager. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that affidavit evidence can

support a properly completed form at the summary judgment stage. See Gunter v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012-0562 (La. 5/4/12), 88 So. 3d 444, 445. Plaintiff’s

conclusory argument does nothing to undermine the properly completed form.

Second, and more substantively, Plaintiff contends Green could only act on

behalf of Rentokil if she had received formal authorization from its Board of Directors.

In November 2024, Plaintiff contends he requested production of such a resolution

but had not received a copy of an authorizing document.1 Continuing this line of

argument, Plaintiff insists a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Green’s

authority to execute the waiver.

Plaintiff’s contention is meritless. From the broadest scope, as Rentokil’s risk

manager, Green would have the authority to bind the corporation with regard to

third-party insurance coverage even if she were not so empowered. See Tedesco v.

Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 962–63 (La. 1989) (discussing apparent authority

of a corporate employee). This Court, however, need not extend the jurisprudential

search so widely because the Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the

very situation of authority to waive UM/UIM coverage. And in consideration of this

Louisiana law issue, the Court properly looks to the Louisiana Supreme Court for

guidance. See Howe ex rel. Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th. Cir.

2000). Put simply, without written delegation or Board resolution, a corporation’s

authorized agent or employee can execute a UM/UIM waiver.2 See, e.g., Havard v.

1 In its reply, Arch counters that it received no such request for production. (Rec. Doc. 19 at 1–2).

2 Curiously, Plaintiff directly rejects Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue. (Rec. Doc.

18 at 4). Instead, Plaintiff insists the state high court “apparently doesn’t understand” how

corporations act, citing the Louisiana Revised Statues chapter on nonprofit corporation law for

support. Assuredly, a corporation “only acts through its officers, employees, and other agents.” Kevin

Assocs., L.L.C. v. Crawford, 2003-0211 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So. 2d 34, 41; see also La. Stat. Ann. § 12:1-

302(11) (“Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual

Jeanlouis, 2021-00810 (La. 6/29/22), 345 So. 3d 1005, 1007 (“The legal representative

does not need prior written authority to sign on behalf of the corporate insured—such

authority may be verbal and subsequently established by affidavit.”); Voinche v.

Capps, 2014-1498 (La. 10/24/14), 150 So. 3d 297, 298 (employee effectively waived

coverage, as confirmed in affidavit); Harper v. Direct General Insurance Co. of

Louisiana, 08–2874 at p. 3 (La. 2/13/09), 2 So. 3d 418, 420 (“Liberty Mutual has

further established through an unrefuted affidavit that Mr. Jenchel is the Director of

Risk Management for Sears, and was authorized to reject UM coverage on behalf of

Sears.”); Gunter, 88 So. 3d at 445 (“[A]ffidavit testimony of the executive officer

acknowledging his signature on the rejection form and his authority to execute such

a form was sufficient proof of his authorization.”).

On the other hand, the Louisiana Supreme Court has demanded greater

scrutiny where the signatory has admitted to not having signed the waiver, but to

allowing another employee to affix his signature. Havard, 345 So. 3d 1005 (secretary’s

stamping of owner’s signature on coverage waiver unauthorized without written

conferral of authority). Such is not the situation here, as Green admits to signing the

waiver herself, acting within her authority as Rentokil’s risk manager. In the face of

a properly completed form, Plaintiff fails to rebut the legislative presumption that

Rentokil’s knowingly waived UM/UIM coverage through its risk manager. Put

duration and has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and

affairs, including without limitation power to do any of the following . . . [e]lect directors and appoint

officers, employees, and agents of the corporation, define their duties[.]” Legislation does not provide

a specific form for the establishment of employee duties, oversight, and authority. Job titles and tasks,

moreover, help clarify an employee’s role in carrying out the corporation’s affairs. See Doe v. Parauka,

97-2434 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So. 2d 701, 705.

another way, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the waiver at issue.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Arch’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec.

Doc. 17) is GRANTED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of January, 2025.

CARL J. BAR

UNITED ST DISTRICT JUDGE