Opinion

State of Tennessee v. Ryan Reese Leath

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jan 8, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.6%

stating that the appellant has the burden of preparing a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues raised on appeal

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the appellant has the burden of preparing a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues raised on appeal
  • “[W]hen the record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for meaningful review[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

01/08/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 19, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RYAN REESE LEATH

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. 90429 Don Ash, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2024-00441-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The Defendant, Ryan Reese Leath, pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”),

third offense with the trial court to sentence him. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court

sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation

after the service of six months in confinement. The trial court ordered that the DUI

sentence be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for theft of property valued over

$10,000. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered

consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Darren Drake, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ryan Reese Leath.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney

General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Brent L. Pierce and Allyson S.

Abbott, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the Defendant’s driving under the influence of alcohol on

November 30, 2022. For this offense, the Rutherford County grand jury indicted the

Defendant for DUI, third offense, and for DUI per se.

A transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not included in the record. The factual

basis for the Defendant’s conviction is therefore gathered from the indictment and the

evidence at the sentencing hearing. See State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983)

(stating that the appellant has the burden of preparing a fair, accurate, and complete account

of what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues raised on appeal); see also T.R.A.P.

24(b). Although appellate review is fostered by including the transcript of the guilty plea

in the appellate record, we will, in this case, consider the appeal based on the record before

us. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012) (“[W]hen the record does not

include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should

determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for meaningful

review[.]”)

The arresting officer described in the affidavit of complaint the events surrounding

the DUI as follows:

On November 30, 2022, at approximately 0320 hours, I was driving a fully

marked black/tan THP patrol vehicle wearing a fully approved short sleeve

THP uniform driving northbound New Salem from Interstate-24 eastbound.

I executed a left turn at a steady green light regulating traffic from Interstate-

24 eastbound when I observed the suspect vehicle traveling southbound at a

high rate of speed. I looked through my driver-side mirror and observe[d]

the suspect vehicle fail to stop for a steady red light, a violation of T.C.A.

55-8-109 (failure to obey traffic signal/device). I cleared the southbound

lane and conducted a U-turn and accelerated after the suspect vehicle

traveling southbound on New Salem. I initiated an enforcement stop for the

observed violation by activating my patrol vehicle’s emergency lights and

siren. The suspect vehicle did not slow down and continued to the

intersection of Warrior Drive where I observed the suspect vehicle turn right

onto Warrior Drive. As I closed the distance between my patrol vehicle and

the suspect vehicle, I observed the suspect vehicle turn right into the

RaceTrac gas station where it pulled in front of the first set of gas pumps. I

pulled in immediately and observed the driver exit from the driver seat of the

suspect vehicle and ordered him back into the vehicle. The driver

disregarded my instructions and [I] made several more requests for the driver

to get back into the vehicle. Eventually, the driver complied as he handed a

Tennessee driver’s license identifying him as Ryan Reese Leath with a date

of birth of 06/04/1985.

I made a driver-side approach and contacted the driver through the open

driver-side window and was immediately impacted by the strong and distinct

odor of an alcoholic beverage being emitted from within the vehicle. I

advised the driver o[f] the reason for the stop and requested his driver’s

license and registration. As the driver retrieved his driver’s license, I asked

him if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages and he said, “Yes.” I

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advised the driver to exit the vehicle and move to the front of my patrol

vehicle. The driver asked about his registration, and I related at the moment

it was not of importance. The driver complied and exited the vehicle and

walked over to the front of my patrol vehicle where I advised him I would be

asking him a series of pre-field sobriety test questions and administering a

series of Field Sobriety Tests which he was unable to perform as explained

and demonstrated.

At approximately 0342 hours, I placed [the Defendant] under arrest for being

in violation of T.C.A. 55-10-401 (DUI). I contacted the Nashville

Communications Center (NCC) and requested a driver’s license check on

[the Defendant’s driver’s license]. NCC advised a match had been located .

. . with a valid driving privilege with two prior DUI convictions . . . .

On March 11, 2024, the Defendant pleaded guilty to DUI, third offense, and the trial

court subsequently held a sentencing hearing.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court articulated the basis of

its findings and then made the following ruling:

The Court finds the following convictions shall be used to calculate

the appropriate range. And in that, the State filed in Exhibit 4, which lists all

of those. The reckless endangerment, the D.U.I., the theft over $10,000, the

theft over $1,000, and then the D.U.I. second. And then, obviously, this

offense. So, I’m taking all of those into consideration.

In that the enhancement factors the Court is considering the first one

is applicable. The Defendant has a previous history of criminal conviction

or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the range. I

think that’s really the sole [factor].

[A]s the [Attorney] General said, the minimum [service] is 120 days. And I

think they are requesting a year.

In mitigating factors . . . based upon the D.U.I., there was nothing

there that caused or threatened serious bodily injury or there wasn’t an

accident as [Defense Counsel] said.

On consecutive sentencing, in order to do that, TCA 40-35-115, the

Defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. And,

sadly, these four things are extensive. [I]t makes no sense to me. Seeing [the

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Defendant] in court, he’s always been very polite to me, which I appreciate.

Reading . . . about his jobs and stuff like that, he has an impressive job

history.

I think his mother came up and testified about him, what a good person

he was. [T[his doesn’t make any sense to me how someone with this kind of

resume can just start on this path. . . .[T]here is something else going on, I

guess that’s what I’m saying. And I don’t understand that.

So, in making this determination, I considered the presentence report,

the nature and circumstances of criminal conduct. And I think confinement

is necessary to protect society by restraining the Defendant who has a long

history of criminal conduct.

So, based upon that, I’m going to sentence him . . . to six months in

jail [followed by six months of probation]. I think under the statute, the 120

days he has to serve that day for day. And then the other balance, I think that

that is applicable. And whatever the figure is, the State comes up with that

or the Department of Correction[s].

I think this is an appropriate sentence for it to be run consecutive. And

that bothers me to say that. But I think I am obligated to follow the law in

regard to that. We have to follow the law in regard to that. So, this will run

consecutive to his six-year sentence as [Defense Counsel] pointed out to me,

that he will get jail credit for every day he’s served on the six-year sentence

on this D.U.I. . . . I’ll make sure that he gets all of that jail credit.

I’m going to fine him $2,000. His license will be suspended for six

years.

It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to

serve his sentence consecutively to his prior theft sentence. The Defendant concedes that

he was on probation at the time he received the DUI in this case, but he points out that the

trial court did not articulate that as a basis for his consecutive sentencing. Further, he

contends that his prior criminal history was not an appropriate basis for consecutive

sentencing. The State counters that the record supports the trial court’s decision. We agree

with the State.

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When an accused challenges the length of a sentence or manner of service, this court

reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion standard

accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707

(Tenn. 2012). The Bise standard of review also applies to consecutive sentencing

determinations. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860-61 (Tenn. 2013). The party

challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court has the burden of establishing that the

sentence is erroneous. T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; see also State v.

Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001).

A trial court may order multiple offenses to be served consecutively if it finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant fits into at least one of the categories in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). “Any one of these grounds is a sufficient

basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 862 (citing

State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 748 (Tenn. 2013)). This court must give “deference to

the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences if it

has provided reasons on the record establishing at least one of the . . . grounds listed in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b).” Id. at 861.

“So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive

sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be

presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Id. at 862

(citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705). When imposing consecutive

sentences, the court must still consider the general sentencing principles that each sentence

imposed shall be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense,” “no greater

than that deserved for the offense committed,” and “the least severe measure necessary to

achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(1), -103(2),

-103(4); State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002).

Section 40-35-115(b)(2) authorizes consecutive sentencing for an offender “whose

record of criminal activity is extensive.” This classification is not self-defining, and the

Sentencing Act does not define what constitutes an “extensive” record of criminal activity.

In State v. Perry, the Tennessee Supreme Court discussed the meaning of this term. 656

S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2022). After looking at multiple sources, it provided the following

guidance:

Thus, in making the finding that an offender has an extensive record

of criminal activity, courts should look to those facts from which they can

determine that the defendant’s record of criminal activity is considerable or

large in amount, time, space, or scope. . . . This appeal presents an

opportunity for this Court to offer guidance on relevant considerations that

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ordinarily will inform the determination of whether an offender’s record of

criminal activity is extensive. To that end, and with the general definitions

of “extensive” in mind, courts should look to the following non-exclusive

considerations in evaluating whether the proof establishes that the defendant

is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive:

(1) The amount of criminal activity, often the number of

convictions, both currently before the trial court for sentencing

and prior convictions or activity;

(2) The time span over which the criminal activity occurred;

(3) The frequency of criminal activity within that time span;

(4) The geographic span over which the criminal activity

occurred;

(5) Multiplicity of victims of the criminal activity; and

(6) Any other fact about the defendant or circumstance

surrounding the criminal activity or convictions, present or

prior, that informs the determination of whether an offender’s

record of criminal activity was considerable or large in amount,

time, space, or scope.

These considerations very well may intersect in a given case, such that

one consideration is best understood in reference to another.

Id. at 129-30.

A defendant need not have prior criminal convictions or activity apart from that for

which the defendant is being sentenced to qualify as an offender whose record of criminal

activity is extensive. Id. at 131. But prior convictions or criminal activity “may

demonstrate ‘a consistent pattern of operating outside the confines of lawful behavior’ and

provide some stronger measure of justification for finding that a defendant is an offender

whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Id. (quoting Dickson, 413 S.W.3d at 748).

Here, the trial court did not explicitly address each of the Perry factors at sentencing,

but it followed the appropriate sentencing procedure, identified facts related to the amount

and scope of the Defendant’s criminal activity, and stated its reason for imposing

consecutive sentencing. The trial court provided an adequate basis for meaningful

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appellate review. Therefore, the trial court’s findings were sufficient to warrant the

presumption of reasonableness, and we must uphold the trial court’s decision absent an

abuse of discretion. See Perry, 656 S.W.3d at 133 (holding that the trial court’s failure to

specifically address the time span and frequency of the criminal activity did not negate the

presumption of reasonableness when the trial court followed “appropriate sentencing

procedure,” identified multiple facts related to the amount and scope of the defendant’s

criminal activity, and stated its reasons for ordering partial consecutive sentencing, thus

providing a basis for meaningful appellate review); see also State v. Brown, No. E2022-

00577-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 5498983, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2023), no perm.

app. filed.

III. Conclusion

We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination that the

Defendant had an extensive criminal history and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in

imposing consecutive sentences based on that determination. The Defendant is not entitled

to relief on this issue. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

____________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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