State of Tennessee v. David Walter Troxell

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 18, 2001

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DAVID WALTER TROXELL

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County

No. CR-4933 Robert Burch, Judge

No. M2000-01100-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 8, 2001

Defendant, charged with possession with intent to sell and/or deliver a controlled substance and

possession of drug paraphernalia, filed a motion to suppress over 300 grams of cocaine,

paraphernalia, and U.S. currency discovered during a search of his vehicle. The trial court, Dickson

County, granted Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search

impermissibly exceeded the scope of Defendant’s consent. The State appealed. After a review of

the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.

THOMAS T. WOODALL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JERRY

L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Marvin E. Clements, Jr., Assistant Attorney

General; Dan M. Alsobrooks, District Attorney General; and Kim Menke, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

William B. (Jake) Lockert, III, District Public Defender, Ashland City, Tennessee, for the appellee,

David Walter Troxell.

OPINION

I. Facts

Trooper Mark Norrod of the Tennessee Highway Patrol testified at the suppression hearing

that on November 11, 1999, he stopped Defendant, David Walter Troxell, for driving his pick-up

truck at a speed of 78 to 80 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. Consistent with standard

police procedure, Norrod first questioned Defendant regarding ownership of the truck. Defendant

responded that the vehicle was owned by Defendant’s employer but Norrod testified that, in fact, the

vehicle was registered to Defendant’s wife. Defendant did not deny that he had been speeding.

Norrod explained to Defendant why he had been stopped, then issued him a warning ticket for the

speeding violation. By this time, an additional officer, Trooper Ferrell, had also arrived on the scene.

Norrod further testified that prior to giving Defendant the warning ticket, he asked him

whether he had “any weapons in the vehicle.” Trooper Ferrell was present and standing nearby when

Norrod made this request. When Defendant replied, “No,” Norrod requested permission to take a

look and Defendant replied, “Go ahead.” Norrod testified that Defendant did not place any

limitations on where Norrod was permitted to search, and Norrod did not limit his request other than

by specifying that he desired to search “in the vehicle.” In Norrod’s mind, permission to search “in

the vehicle” implied that he could search the “entire vehicle.”

Norrod then proceeded to search the interior of the vehicle. After completing a search of the

cab area of the truck and the luggage contained therein, Norrod continued his search by examining

the underside of the vehicle. At this point, Norrod noticed that the gas tank had been tampered with;

it appeared that the tank had been “dropped.” Moreover, the hoses and the bolts holding the gas tank

both looked as though they “had been off recently.” Crawling underneath the trailer portion of the

truck with a flashlight and mirror, Norrod observed that “silicone [was] used to reinsert the sending

unit.” In addition, the gas tank did not resonate when Norrod tapped upon it, as a normal fuel tank

would do. Norrod testified that, according to his experience in drug-interdiction work, these

circumstances indicated that something other than gasoline was contained in the gas tank and “it

could have been [weapons].” Norrod acknowledged that modifications such as these, e.g., tampering

with the gas tank and silicone seals, are the sort of thing that police officers keep their eye out for

since they often indicate that contraband, including illegal drugs, has been stored or hidden in a

vehicle.

Norrod testified that he requested Defendant follow the troopers to a nearby gas station to

check the fuel tank because he believed that something was hidden inside. Defendant agreed to let

them inspect the fuel tank, and then voluntarily accompanied the troopers to the gas station for this

purpose. When they discovered approximately ten kilos of cocaine inside the fuel tank, Defendant

was arrested. Norrod testified that he did not threaten, coerce, or intimidate Defendant to secure his

cooperation in driving to the gas station. Norrod admitted that Defendant had asked the troopers to

seek permission to search the gas tank from the owner of the vehicle and that he had agreed but did

not comply. Instead, Norrod informed Defendant that no cost would be incurred by Defendant’s

employer or by Defendant himself.

During cross-examination, Norrod testified that Defendant “stood over to the side” with

Trooper Ferrell during the search. He explained that positioning Defendant in this manner allowed

the video camera which was mounted on the police car to accurately and completely videotape the

incident and was also prudent for security and safety reasons. Norrod admitted that he did not ask

Defendant whether he was carrying drugs but inquired only about weapons. Norrod also conceded

that the way his request was phrased, it was reasonable to construe it as one which concerned

weapons only. Norrod also admitted that he had a drug detection dog with him and that he

conducted a canine sweep of the vehicle after he examined the underside and tapped on the gas tank.

Although Norrod testified that when he requests permission to search a person’s truck he considers

the request to mean “anywhere,” he agreed that “most people might reasonably think that would

mean [he was] going to look inside the cab of their truck.” On redirect examination, Norrod testified

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that after Defendant granted him permission to search, Norrod began by searching Defendant’s

person. Defendant did not object to the search of his person or the vehicle at any point during the

encounter.

At the suppression hearing, Defendant testified that he had assumed Norrod’s search request

would include “just the area that [Defendant] had immediate access to, which would be the cab” and

his person. Defendant claimed that it never occurred to him that Norrod would look underneath his

truck with mirrors or that he would examine the gas tank. During cross-examination, Defendant

admitted that he did not object to Norrod patting him down and that he did not ask the troopers to

quit searching when Norrod began looking underneath the truck. In fact, Defendant conceded that

he made no objections to any part of the search. However, Defendant also claimed that from where

he was positioned during Norrod’s search, he was “not within verbal reach” of Norrod. Defendant

further conceded that he did not feel “threatened,” but that “to be pulled over on the side of the road

when conducting business, and have two highway patrol officers with a K-9 unit – to have you there

for any length of time, it’s intimidating.” Defendant stated that “when [the troopers] asked

[Defendant] to follow them to the station and said that they were going to contact the owner of the

vehicle, and for them to do so . . . that’s a form of coercion.” Contrary to feeling “threatened,”

Defendant claimed that the incident was a “nuisance” and “irritating, to say the least.”

The videotape recorded during Defendant’s encounter with Norrod was played for the court

at the suppression hearing and revealed the following relevant facts: contrary to Norrod’s testimony,

Norrod issued Defendant a warning ticket (effectively concluding the reason for the traffic stop)

before he began to question Defendant concerning weapons in his vehicle. Immediately after issuing

the ticket, Norrod asked Defendant, “Do you have any weapons in the vehicle?” and Defendant

replied, “Nothing.” Norrod then asked Defendant whether he could “take a look?” After Defendant

replied, “Yeah, go ahead,” Norrod asked Defendant, “You don’t have anything on you, do ya?”

whereupon Defendant responded that he did not. Norrod and Defendant then engaged in an

apparently amicable conversation as Norrod proceeded to pat him down. Afterward, Norrod turned

his attention to searching the vehicle.

The videotape also showed that approximately nineteen minutes transpired from the time that

Norrod began to search Defendant’s person to the moment Norrod began to explain to Defendant

that his gas tank looked suspicious. Also, contrary to Defendant’s testimony during the suppression

hearing, Defendant appeared to be located well within earshot of Norrod during the search of the

vehicle. Although the visual quality of the videotape leaves much to be desired, Trooper Ferrell

could also be seen standing to the right of Defendant’s vehicle, approximately five feet from the back

of the truck, during the search. If Ferrell and Defendant were standing together at this time, we can

reasonably infer that Defendant was in the immediate vicinity and, thus, also within “verbal reach”

of Norrod.

The videotape also raised doubt concerning Defendant’s claim about the condition he

allegedly imposed on his consent. In his brief, Defendant argues that he conditioned his consent to

search the gas tank on Norrod’s ability to secure permission from the “owner” of the truck.

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According to the videotape, however, Norrod’s discussion with Defendant concerning this matter

concluded with Defendant’s statement that the search was “O.K.” with him as long as Norrod

“notified” the owner what they were doing. Defendant then followed Norrod to the gas station where

the gas tank was “dropped” and ten kilos of cocaine were discovered.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that Trooper Norrod’s

search of the underside of Defendant’s truck exceeded the scope of Defendant’s consent. As a result,

the cocaine seized as a result of the search was inadmissible under Fourth Amendment principles.

The trial court stated that “when someone asks to look for weapons . . . they conduct [a search] for

weapons in the inside of the – of the vehicle.”

II. Standard of Review

The standard by which an appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of fact on

suppression issues is as follows:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the

evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters

entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in

the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the

evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable

and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. So

long as the greater weight of the evidence supports the trial court's

findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other words, a trial court's

findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). However, this Court is not bound by the trial

court’s conclusions of law. State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998). The application

of the law to the facts found by the trial court are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.

State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn.

1999) (citing State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997)).

In this case, the trial court heard the testimony of two witnesses, and the material facts

contained in the record which are necessary to decide the issue regarding the scope of the search are

basically undisputed. Both witnesses agreed that consent to search “in the vehicle” was given.

Where the facts are not disputed and, as a result, the trial court’s ruling on a particular matter is

based upon a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of the

case, de novo review is proper. See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24. Because the trial court’s

conclusion that the search in issue extended beyond the permissible scope is a conclusion of law

derived from an application of the law to the undisputed material facts, we apply de novo review in

determining whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress.

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III. Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the people shall “be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .

.” Similarly, Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees “that the people shall

be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures

. . . .” The respective constitutions are identical in intent and purpose. See State v. Downey, 945

S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)). The

purpose of this particular prohibition is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against

arbitrary invasions by law enforcement officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528,

87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Official action in the form of a search or seizure must

be authorized in the form of a warrant which particularly describes “the place to be searched, and

the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Unless a specifically established and well-delineated exception exists, a search conducted

without a warrant is per se unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct.

2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (citations omitted). Consequently, under both the federal and

state constitutions, evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State

demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly-defined

exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct.

2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998); State v.

Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tenn. 1996). The constitutional prohibitions against

unreasonable searches and seizures and the accompanying warrant requirement encompass stops and

searches of automobiles. Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865. And, when the state seeks to introduce evidence

seized as the result of a stop and warrantless search of a vehicle, the burden of proof rests upon the

State to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of the narrowly-defined exceptions to

the warrant requirement existed. Id.; State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). A search

that is conducted pursuant to a voluntarily given consent is one such exception, so long as the

consent was given freely and voluntarily. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49; Bumper v. North

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at

230.

As a preliminary matter, we observe that Norrod’s initial stop of Defendant’s truck was

proper based on Defendant’s violation of the posted speeding limit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-152

(1997). It is well-settled that the stop of an automobile is constitutionally reasonable, under both the

state and federal constitutions, if the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe

that a traffic violation has occurred. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396,

59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d

29, 30 (Tenn.1993). Since Defendant did not dispute that he was driving in excess of the posted

speed limit, Norrod clearly had probable cause for a traffic stop.

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After Norrod issued Defendant the warning ticket, the initial justification for the traffic stop

and seizure concluded. Moreover, when the traffic stop ceased to be a detention and Defendant

voluntarily consented to additional questioning, he was no longer “seized” for purposes of Fourth

Amendment analysis. See United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir.1997) (holding

that traffic stop ceases to become a detention and becomes a consensual encounter when police

officer returns license and registration unless driver has “objectively reasonable” cause to believe

that he or she is not free to leave); State v. Ashworth, 3 S.W.3d 25, 30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

(citing United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir.1998), for its holding that detention

ended when police officer returned driver’s license and registration and driver voluntarily consented

to additional questioning). The videotape shows that Norrod made the following statement to

Defendant: “What I did is wrote you a warning for your speed. There’s no fine, no court appearance;

it doesn’t go on your record. It’s just a warning. Now watch your speed limit.” Immediately after

Defendant acknowledged receipt of the warning, he voluntarily responded to additional questioning

when Norrod inquired whether Defendant had weapons in the vehicle. A “seizure” implicating

constitutional concerns occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a

reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. State v. Daniel, 12

S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented in the

videotape, a “reasonable person” would have believed that he or she was free to leave after Norrod

issued the warning ticket, and Defendant has not claimed otherwise.

The issue expressly before this Court is whether the trial court erred when it granted

Defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine discovered as the result of examining the underside of

Defendant’s vehicle. Specifically, the trial court determined that Trooper Norrod’s search of the

underside of Defendant’s truck exceeded the scope of Defendant’s consent, thereby rendering it

unreasonable under Fourth Amendment principles. The trial court stated that “when someone asks

to look for weapons . . . they conduct [a search] for weapons in the inside of the – of the vehicle.”

The State contends that the trial court erred, arguing that the underside of Defendant’s vehicle was

reasonably within the scope of a search for weapons and, even if Defendant’s initial consent did not

extend to the gas tank area, Defendant effectively extended his consent by not objecting at any time

during the contested procedure. For reasons which follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment

granting Defendant’s motion to suppress.

It is undisputed that Defendant consented to Norrod’s request to search his vehicle for

weapons. Consent does not have a talismanic effect on the fruits of a search, however. Even if it

is determined that consent was given and voluntary, it does not necessarily follow that the evidence

seized as a result will be admissible. When the police rely on consent in lieu of a warrant as the

basis for a search, they have no more authority than they have apparently been given by the consent.

See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.1(c) (3d ed. 1996). The scope of a consensual search

is determined by the terms of the actual consent. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th

Cir. 1990). And, the standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth

Amendment is “that of ‘objective’ reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have

understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,

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251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-1804 (1991). The understanding of a “typical reasonable person” will

generally depend, in turn, upon the expressed object of the search. Id.

Defendant argues that Norrod’s search of the underside of the vehicle was outside the scope

of his consent because at the time Defendant consented, he believed Norrod’s request to search for

weapons was limited to the interior of the cab of his truck. We disagree. In Jimeno, the United

States Supreme Court concluded that, when the officer informed the motorist that he was searching

for narcotics, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that a general consent to search

the motorist's vehicle included consent to search containers within the vehicle that might contain

drugs. Id. In a similar vein, it was objectively reasonable for Norrod to conclude that Defendant’s

consent to search “in the vehicle” would encompass a look at the easily accessible underside of

Defendant’s truck, an area which could reasonably contain or be used to hide weapons. See e.g.,

United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.1999) (a police officer did not exceed the

scope of a general consent when he removed an interior door panel of an automobile with his fingers,

dislocating two plastic clips; “a search does not exceed the scope of consent merely because an

officer forces open a secured compartment that may reasonably contain the objects of the search”);

United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1996) (where consent was obtained to search a car

for drugs, officers did not exceed scope when they lifted the carpet in the trunk); United States v.

Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (where defendant gave police officer permission to search the

vehicle for guns or contraband, the consent covered both the cab of the truck and the rear camper

shell area); United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1995) (where defendant gave general

permission to search his vehicle, a search of the area under the hood was permissible); United States

v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1992) (a general consent to search for specific items includes

consent to search any compartment or container that might reasonably contain those items). It makes

no practical sense to differentiate between searches of areas such as those previously ruled

“permissible” above and searches of the areas underneath a vehicle, as in Defendant’s case.

We are mindful that the scope of a search permissible by a general consent and constrained

by the “bounds of reasonableness” is defined by the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. For

example, searches during which the officer invades locked containers, destroys private property, or

investigates areas where the object of the search could not reasonably be found are in danger of

exceeding the scope. See e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804 (“It is very

unlikely to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of [the trunk of his car], has agreed to

the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk. . . . .”); United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d

1237, 1243 (11th Cir.1999) (“a search exceeds the scope of consent when an officer destroys a

vehicle, its parts, or its contents”); United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1990) (general

consent to search vehicle did not authorize officer to slash open the spare tire); State v. Garcia, 986

P.2d 491, 494 (N. M. App. Ct.) (“when the search involves intentional damage to property, the courts

require more certain evidence that the scope of the consent extended that far”); See generally Wayne

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.1(c), 610-614 (3d ed. 1996). After a review of the facts and the

relevant case law, we conclude that it is entirely feasible that weapons may be concealed on the

underside of a vehicle and, therefore, Norrod’s search did not exceed the “bounds of reasonableness”

for a constitutional search. In other words, since Defendant gave his consent to search “in the

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vehicle” for weapons, and Trooper Norrod confined his search to those areas wherein weapons might

be contained, the scope of Norrod’s search was not impermissibly broad.

Significantly, we note that Defendant failed to object to Norrod’s search of the underside of

the vehicle at any point while it was being conducted. Although a failure to object cannot be

unequivocally treated as expanding a limited consent, it is an indication that the search was within

the “scope” of the contemplated search. See United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 765 (10th Cir.

2000) (“we consistently and repeatedly have held a defendant’s failure to limit the scope of a general

authorization to search, and failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a

more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of the consent” (citations

omitted)); United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1995) (where defendant gave general

permission to search his vehicle, this was deemed to include the area under the hood in light of

absence of objection); State v. Garcia, 986 P.2d 491, 493-494 (N. M. App. Ct.) (“courts have given

broad scope to a consent to a general search of a vehicle for narcotics, interpreting the consent to

include non-destructive dismantlement of parts of the vehicle, particularly when the defendant was

present at the time and voiced no objection”); cf. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.

2000) (nonobjection by defendant not significant where failure to object stemmed from belief that

he was currently under arrest and therefore had no power to prevent the search).

Defendant responds by claiming that Norrod kept him “in a position where he could not

object.” Defendant argues that he was “detained” and, therefore, not within “verbal reach” of Norrod

during the portion of the search in issue. We disagree. As previously noted, the videotape suggests

otherwise, indicating that Defendant was located in the immediate vicinity during the search. The

videotape also reveals no indication that Defendant was “detained” or that he may have been

intimidated into compliance by the troopers’s conduct. Although the scope of Defendant’s initial

consent did not authorize Norrod’s removal of the gas tank, the record reveals that Defendant

consented to this also, and then voluntarily followed the troopers to the gas station in his truck so

that it could be accomplished.

We further observe that Defendant’s consent to search inside the gas tank was not necessary

under the circumstances in this case. To briefly recount, after Norrod completed a search of the cab

area of the truck and the luggage contained therein, he examined the underside of Defendant’s

vehicle which we have determined was within the permissible scope of a general consent to search

“in the vehicle for weapons.” At this time, Norrod noticed that the gas tank had been “dropped” and

that it did not resonate when Norrod tapped upon it, as a normal fuel tank would do. In addition, the

hoses and the bolts holding the gas tank both looked as though they “had been off recently.”

Crawling underneath the rear portion of the truck with a flashlight and mirror, Norrod observed that

“silicone [was] used to reinsert the sending unit.” Considered in toto, these circumstances indicated

to Norrod that something other than gasoline was contained in the gas tank, namely, “weapons or

other items, like drugs.” Norrod acknowledged during his testimony that peculiarities such as these

are the sort of thing that police officers keep their eye out for, since they often indicate that

contraband has been concealed. Since Norrod’s suspicions that criminal activity had been committed

were aroused during the legitimate performance of his duties, i.e., while conducting a search within

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the scope and pursuant to valid consent, he acquired probable cause to legally extend his search into

the area of the gas tank with or without Defendant’s permission. See Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional

Rights of the Accused; Pretrial Rights § 46 (1972) (“If in the process of giving the traffic citation the

officer gains probable cause as to another offense, he will be justified in arresting and carrying out

a reasonable search in regard to such offense.”). Trooper Norrod was experienced in drug-

interdiction work, and the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that the expertise

and experience of the officer are to be taken into account in applying the Fourth Amendment

probable cause test. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436

(1948)).

As a final matter, we observe that a search warrant was not necessary in Defendant’s case

once probable cause was established. See United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir.1972)

(“Exigent circumstances” exceptions to the general requirement for a search warrant include searches

of automobiles.); Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.1972) (warrantless search of vehicle was

valid because vehicle can be quickly moved out of locality or jurisdiction); Houston v. State, 593

S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992)

(warrantless search of vehicle allowed with consent of owner or where officer has probable cause

to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and that the vehicle may escape before a search

warrant can be obtained).

In sum, we hold that Defendant’s consent to search “in the vehicle for weapons”

encompassed the easily accessible areas underneath the vehicle. The officer then acquired probable

cause to extend the search to the interior area of the gas tank based on his observations during a

constitutional search conducted within the permissible scope. Having decided that the scope of

Norrod’s search was not impermissibly broad according to Fourth Amendment principles, we further

find that the seizure of cocaine was not improper, even though the search was initially for weapons.

See United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (though consent search of vehicle was

for weapons, when police saw plastic bundle wrapped in duct tape with white powder substance on

it, probable cause justified a seizure); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1997) (seizure of

evidence concerning crimes unrelated to reason for initial search may be allowable under plain view

doctrine).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress

the evidence and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

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