The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LUIS ALCALA,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-CV-7331(EK)(LB)
-against-
MTA METROPOLITAN STATE AUTHORITY,
Defendant.1
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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Luis Alcala brings this damages action against the
Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”). Proceeding pro se, he
alleges public accommodation discrimination under both Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human
Rights Law. Alcala’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted. But for the reasons stated below, the action must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Background
The following allegations are drawn from Alcala’s
complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this order.
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).2
1 The caption of Alcala’s complaint refers to the MTA as the
“Metropolitan State Authority.” Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. But the balance of his
submission makes clear that he is suing the Metropolitan Transit Authority.
Id. at 2, 7. The Clerk is respectfully requested to modify the case caption
to reflect the MTA’s proper name.
2 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order
accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal
quotation marks.
Alcala’s allegations fall into three buckets.
First, Alcala alleges that ticketing machines in MTA
train stations “confiscated [his] money” when he attempted to
buy MetroCards (i.e., fare cards for the MTA system). See
Compl. 7-8, ECF No. 1. For example, he alleges that in June
2020, he deposited money into an MTA machine only for the
machine to freeze and return to its home screen. He also
alleges that in July 2020, he was attempting to combine $40
worth of expired MetroCards into a single card when a ticketing
machine took his old cards without providing him a new one. Id.
at 8. Alcala complained to MTA employees both times. Id. at 7-
8.
Second, Alcala alleges that MTA employees wrongly
accused him of attempting to defraud the MTA. In April 2021, an
MTA employee sent him a letter threatening an investigation into
reimbursement claims he had submitted to the MTA. Id. at 8-9.
And in November 2021, the MTA “refused to combine 16 MetroCards
[he] had sent them” and “stated that [it] would report [him] to
the police for suspicious activity.” Id. at 8.
Third, Alcala alleges that he entered into a
settlement agreement with the MTA, under which he would release
any claims against the agency in exchange for $275. Id. at 9.
During settlement negotiations, MTA attorneys and employees
“subjected [him] to verbal abuse based on [his] nationality and
age and ridiculed [his] attempts at justice.” Id.
Legal Standard
A district court may dismiss a pro se complaint at any
time if the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To state a
viable claim, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This requires the
plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57,
63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). Although all
allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true,
this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal 556
U.S. at 678.
However, pro se complaints are “held to less stringent
standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the court
will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still, a pro se
plaintiff is not exempt from “compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90,
95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Discussion
Alcala does not state a plausible claim under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title II”).3 And because
Alcala’s federal claim must be dismissed, the Court declines
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim under the New
York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”).
A. The Title II Claim
Title II prohibits “discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin” in any
“place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). To
bring a Title II claim, a plaintiff must plead “(1) that he was
deprived of equal use and enjoyment of a place of public
accommodation and (2) facts which demonstrate discriminatory
intent.” Akyar v. TD Bank US Holding Co., Case No. 18-cv-379,
2018 WL 4356734, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018). Title II
expressly lists the qualifying places of public accommodation:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment
which provides lodging to transient guests, other than
an establishment located within a building which
3 The Second Circuit has expressed doubt that the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. See Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 294 (2d
Cir. 1996). District courts have uniformly held that the Authority is
amenable to suit. E.g., A. Esteban & Co. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 02
CIV. 3615 (NRB), 2004 WL 439505, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004), Yourman v.
Metro Transp. Auth., No. 20-cv-0779, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020); Batista v.
Metro. Transportation Auth., No. 20-CV-1254 (LJL), 2021 WL 2894351 (S.D.N.Y.
July 9, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-1934-CV, 2022 WL 2442312 (2d Cir. July 5, 2022).
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and
which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally
engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such
facility located on the premises of any retail
establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or
entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically
located within the premises of any establishment
otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within
the premises of which is physically located any such
covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out
as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
Alcala does not plausibly allege that the MTA’s
alleged discrimination deprived him of the use or enjoyment of a
place of public accommodation. Train stations are conspicuously
absent from the list of public accommodations covered by Title
II. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). And that list is “exhaustive,
not illustrative.” Alexander v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
19-cv-10811, 2021 WL 1061833, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2021).
“Because Congress specified the establishments which constitute
places of public accommodation under § 2000a, courts in this
circuit apply the statute to only those covered establishments.”
Renxiong Huang v. Minghui.org, No. 17-cv-5582, 2018 WL 3579103
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2018); see also id. (collecting cases).
So, Alcala’s Title II claim stumbles at the first hurdle.
Even if train stations were covered by Title II, the
Court would still be obligated to dismiss Alcala’s claim. A
plaintiff may not seek monetary damages under Title II. See
Alexander, 2021 WL 1061833, at *3. Here, Alcala seeks $80,000
in damages, and does not seek injunctive relief. Compl. 6.
Thus, Alcala seeks relief that is not available under Title II.
B. The NYSHRL Claim
Given the dismissal of Alcala’s federal claim, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state NYSHRL claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has instructed that “when the federal-law claims
have dropped out of [a] lawsuit in its early stages and only
state-law claims remain, [a] federal court should decline the
exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without
prejudice.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988). Accordingly, the NYSHRL claim is dismissed without
prejudice.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Alcala’s complaint is
dismissed for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “[A] pro se litigant should be granted
leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated.” Curry-Malcolm v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 835 F.
App'x 623 (2d Cir. 2020). But here, Alcala’s complaint “fail[s]
as a matter of law” because train stations are not covered by
Title II and Title II does not permit financial damages. His
complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a
copy of this Memorandum and Order to Alcala, and to note the
mailing on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, and therefore
denies in forma pauperis status for purpose of any appeal.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Eric Komitee
ERIC KOMITEE
United State s District Judge
D ated: January 7, 2025
Brooklyn, New Yo rk