Rahman v. Jones, Jr. Esq

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FARIDA B. RAHMAN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01962

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

THOMAS JONES, ESQ.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court in this pro se civil rights lawsuit filed by Farida Rahman

(“Rahman”) is the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson (“the

Report”), dated April 3, 2024. (Doc. 14). The Report addresses a motion to dismiss filed by

Attorney Thomas Jones, Jr. (“Attorney Jones”). (Doc. 12). Rahman filed timely objections

to the Report on April 16, 2024. (Doc. 15). Having conducted the requisite de novo review of

the record and the Report, the Court agrees with the sound reasoning in the Report and finds

no clear error. (Doc. 14). Rahman’s objections to the Report will be OVERRULED, and the

Report will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Defendants’ motion to dismiss shall be

GRANTED. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff’s complaint shall be DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As described in the Report, this matter involves an attorney fee dispute in the amount

of $2,700, which has been fully addressed by the state court. (Doc. 14). Rahman complains

that Attorney Jones was retained to represent Rahman in a state case in 2015, received a

retainer to do so, but then, according to Rahman, “killed [the] case.” (Doc. 1). Rahman

pursued a claim relating to the fee dispute but was unsuccessful; he attributes his lack of

success to judicial corruption, an allegation made without factual support. (Doc. 1). It appears

that Rahman is pursuing a federal civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various

state law claims. (Doc. 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

days of being served a report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the magistrate judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)). For those sections of the report and recommendation to

which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that

there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. Adv. Comm. Note Rule 72(b).

B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a

complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff

must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the

assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken

as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,

662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider

the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v.

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions…’”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court also need not assume

that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of

Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp.,

609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the

complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

III. DISCUSSION

As stated supra, Rahman’s complaint alleges § 1983 and state law claims against

Attorney Jones. (Doc. 1, at 1). The Report recommends that Rahman’s § 1983 claims be

dismissed as Rahman has not alleged a constitutional violation, Attorney Jones is not a state

actor and any claims under § 1983 are time-barred. Rahman objects to the Report’s finding

that her § 1983 claim is insufficient, but still fails to base her claim on a constitutional

violation. (Doc. 15, at 1; Doc. 15-1, at 2-3). Rahman also objects to the Report’s conclusion

that her § 1983 claims are time-barred, arguing that there is no statute of limitations in the text

of § 1983. (Doc. 15-1, at 1). Rahman also objects to the Report’s conclusion that Attorney

Jones is not a state actor. (Doc. 15, ¶ 5).

The Report further recommends that Rahman’s state law claims be dismissed as the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations, as the amount in controversy does

not reach the requisite $75,000 jurisdictional threshold, and both Rahman and Attorney Jones

are citizens and residents of Pennsylvania. Finally, the Report recommends that Rahman’s

claims be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 14).

A. RAHMAN’S FEDERAL CLAIMS

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations of

federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute

states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through

which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of

Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.

273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)

the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2)

the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't., 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Section 1983 civils rights claims arising from events

that occurred in Pennsylvania are governed by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations

for personal injury actions. Moore v. Walton, 96 F.4th 616, 622 (3d Cir. 2024).

As the Report correctly states, § 1983 does not create an independent cause of action,

and Rahman does not allege a specific constitutional violation upon which her § 1983 claim

is based. (Doc. 14, at 7-8). As such, this Court must dismiss her § 1983 claim. Further, the

Court agrees with the Report that Attorney Jones is not a state actor. (Doc. 14, at 8-9). The

Report correctly relies on applicable Third Circuit precedent, which establishes:

[a]ttorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state

actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court. See, e.g., Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S.Ct. 445, 450, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)

(“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the

court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”);

Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir.1983) (“[P]rivate attorneys, by

virtue of being officers of the court, do not act under color of state law within

the meaning of section 1983.”).

Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999).

As the Report correctly concludes, Rahman has not sufficiently alleged that Attorney Jones

is a state actor within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, her § 1983 claim against

Attorney Jones fails.

Finally, this Court agrees with the Report that Rahman’s § 1983 claim is barred by the

appropriate statute of limitations. In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations period is two

years pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(7). English v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 22-2477, 2023

WL 2400698, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2023). As the Report correctly concludes, the alleged fee

dispute occurred in 2015. According to the complaint, Rahman actively pursued the dispute

in state court beginning in 2017. As such, this is when the statute of limitations for any federal

civil rights action would have begun to run. The two-year limitations period would have

elapsed by 2019, several years before Rahman filed the instant lawsuit.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will overrule Rahman’s objections, adopt the

Report, and dismiss Rahman’s § 1983 claim as without merit and time-barred.

B. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS

The Report recommends dismissing Rahman’s state law claims as the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 14, at 11). In her objections, Rahman concedes that there is

no diversity jurisdiction in this Court, and further that she “did not invite Federal Court to

help” with her state law claims. (Doc. 15, ¶ 5). However, in her brief in support of her

objections, Rahman notes that her claims exceed $75,000.00. (Doc. 15-1, at 2).

For a Court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a presented issue, the plaintiff must

establish either diversity of citizenship or a federal question. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest

and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State

and citizens or subjects of a foreign state ... (3) citizens of different States and

in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a

foreign state ... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a).

The Court agrees with the Report that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Rahman’s state law claims. (Doc. 14, at 11-13). As already determined, Rahman’s federal

claims fail; as such the remaining claims are Rahman’s state law claims which are subject to

diversity jurisdiction. As the Report correctly states, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction

in this case. Both Rahman and Attorney Jones are citizens and residents of Pennsylvania.

Further, Rahman’s complaint states that the amount in controversy is $3,724.50, an amount

far below the statutorily-prescribed jurisdictional threshold of $75,000. (Doc. 1, at 1-2; Doc.

14, at 12-13); see Boldrini v. Bruno, No. 3:11-1401, 2013 WL 619610, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19,

2013) (finding that if a federal court is to have jurisdiction over state claims the parties must

have complete diversity). As this Court lacks jurisdiction over Rahman’s state law claims, it

will adopt the Report and dismiss Rahman’s state law claims.

C. RAHMAN’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE.

Finally, the Report recommends that the Court find that Rahman’s claims are barred

by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rahman does not address this issue in her objections to the

Report. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is a judicially-created doctrine that bars lower federal

courts from reviewing certain state court actions.” Goodson v. Maggi, 797 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597

(W.D. Pa. 2011). The doctrine arose in the wake of two Supreme Court Cases, Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983), and stands for the proposition that:

... a United States District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review

final judgments of a state court, because only the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction to review state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Goodson,

797 F.Supp.2d at 597 (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303).... “This

doctrine applies even where the challenges to the state court judgment allege

that the state court's action was unconstitutional, such as a deprivation of due

process and equal protection rights.” Goodson, 797 F.Supp.2d at 597 (citing

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (citation omitted)).

Conklin v. Anthou, No. 1:10-CV-2501, 2012 WL 124989, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan.

17, 2012), aff'd, 495 F. App'x. 257 (3d Cir. 2012).

Claims by “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments”

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 Fed. App’x. 238, 242 (3d

Cir. 2007). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where “(i) the federal plaintiff lost in state

court; (ii) the plaintiff claims the judgment(s) of the state court caused his injuries; (iii) the

state court rendered its judgment(s) before plaintiff filed his federal suit; and (iv) the plaintiff

is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great Western Mining &

Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).

The Court agrees with the well-reasoned conclusion of the Report that Rahman is

barred from asking this Court to revisit a state court decision pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Report’s finding that Rahman’s claims are

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and having conducted the requisite de novo, the Court

agrees with the sound reasoning in the Report and finds no clear error in the Report. As such,

Rahman’s objections to the Report are OVERRULED, and the Report is ADOPTED IN ITS

ENTIRETY. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 12). Rahman’s complaint

shall be DISMISSED with prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: January 7, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge