The opinion
[ECF No. 33]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
STULTZ G. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 24-4321 (CPO/EAP)
v.
SHEET METAL WORKERS’
NATIONAL PENSION FUND, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter having been opened to the Court on Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor’s Motion for
Reconsideration, ECF No. 33 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), of the Court’s October 11, 2024 Memorandum Opinion
and Order, ECF Nos. 29, 30; and Defendants Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund and the
Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, as Administrator of the
Pension Plan of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund (collectively, “Defendants”)
having opposed the Motion, ECF No. 38 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”); and the Court having considered the
parties’ submissions; and the Court deciding this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1; and for the following reasons; and for
good cause shown:
Relevant Background
1. The facts in the Complaint were set forth in detail in the Court’s October 11, 2024 Opinion.
Taylor v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 24-4321, 2024 WL 4471683 (D.N.J.
Oct 11, 2024). For purposes of judicial efficiency, the Court incorporates by reference the
recitation of facts therein. Id. at *1-3.
2. Generally, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff, a former union sheet metal worker and
member of the Fund, sought to receive an early retirement pension but was denied. Plaintiff
challenges the propriety of Defendants’ decision. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 11-71.
3. On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court setting forth the following
causes of action: (1) failure to provide benefits pursuant to Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”), ECF No. 23 (Count I), ¶¶ 73-78; (2)
breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), id. ¶¶ 79-93; (3) estoppel (Count III), id. ¶¶ 94-108; and
(4) failure to provide a full and fair review (Count IV), id. ¶¶ 109-117.
4. On June 17, 2024, the Court held an initial scheduling conference, at which time the parties
raised a dispute about the propriety of discovery outside of the administrative record. See
ECF No. 20. The Court ordered the parties to provide briefing on the issue. See id. ¶ 2.
Following review of that briefing, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for additional
discovery outside of the administrative record. Taylor v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension
Fund, No. 24-4321, 2024 WL 4471683 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2024).
5. On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed the current Motion for Reconsideration of that Order.
See ECF No. 33. Defendant has opposed the Motion. See ECF No. 38.
Standard of Review
6. “[R]econsideration is an extraordinary remedy, that is granted ‘very sparingly.’” Brackett
v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3988, 2003 WL 22303078, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (quoting Interfaith
Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d. 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002)); see also Langan
Eng’g & Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 07-2983, 2008 WL 4330048, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (explaining that a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule
7.1(i) is “‘an extremely limited procedural vehicle,’ and requests pursuant to th[is] rule[ ]
are to be granted ‘sparingly’” (quotation omitted)). To prevail on a motion for
reconsideration, the moving party must show at least one of the following grounds: “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court [made its initial decision]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
7. A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to relitigate old matters, nor to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001)
(citation omitted). Instead, reconsideration is only proper when “‘dispositive factual matters
or controlling decisions of law’ were presented to the court but were overlooked.” Buffa v.
N.J. State Dep’t of the Judiciary, 56 F. App’x 571, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Resorts Int’l
v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)).
Discussion
8. Plaintiff does not challenge the legal propriety of the Court’s ruling on his Count I claim of
denial of ERISA benefits under § 502(a)(1), thus conceding that discovery beyond the
administrative record is not proper as to that claim. See generally Pl.’s Mot. at 3-5. Instead,
Plaintiff alleges that the Court made two errors of law in denying his request for discovery
outside the administrative record. First, he asserts that the Court improperly construed his
allegations in Counts II to IV of the Complaint as state law claims that were likely preempted
by ERISA. Plaintiff contends that these Counts were actually claims under ERISA §
502(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty and § 502(a)(3) for equitable relief, to which the abuse
of discretion standard does not apply and for which he is entitled to discovery. See Pl.’s Mot.
at 3-11.
9. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Record is incomplete, and discovery should
be allowed to confirm what documents, if any, were provided to and considered by the
Appeals Committee. See Pl.’s Mot. at 11-12.
10. The Court considers each argument individually.
A. Whether the Court Erred in Finding Counts II to IV Were Likely Preempted
11. Plaintiff’s first argument is that the Court mischaracterized Counts II through IV of his
Complaint as state law claims likely preempted by ERISA. See Pl.’s Mot. 3-11. He asserts
that these Counts are, in fact, ERISA claims brought pursuant to §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3).
Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff avers that such claims are not subject to the more deferential
abuse of discretion standard based solely on the administrative record, but rather, they may
be the subject of additional discovery. Id. at 6-11. In light of these alleged errors of law,
Plaintiff claims that reconsideration is proper. Id.
12. Plaintiff’s arguments fail on one basic proposition: Counts II, III, and IV do not plead claims
pursuant to ERISA §§ 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3).
13. With respect to Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff labels his cause of action as “Breach of
Fiduciary Duty.” Although he cursorily references ERISA, he does not specifically cite to
ERISA § 502(a)(2) when he sets forth the following allegations:
80. The Board of Trustees and Jane Does, 1-10, are fiduciaries under
the Fund pursuant to ERISA.
81. As fiduciaries of the Fund, these defendants are required to
discharge their duties to the Fund in accordance with ERISA and the
documents and instruments governing the Fund.
82. As fiduciaries of the Fund, each of these defendants is required to
strictly comply with ERISA and the documents and instruments
governing the Fund.
83. As fiduciaries of the Fund, each of these defendants was
responsible for carrying out their duties for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries.
84. As fiduciaries of the Fund, each of these defendants was required
to discharge its duties in a manner of a prudent person with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence of a person acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters.
85. Mr. Taylor diligently and persistently sought advice from the
defendants concerning his eligibility for pension benefits.
86. The advice that the defendants provided to Mr. Taylor materially
misrepresented his status and the Fund’s requirements with respect to
his eligibility for pension benefits.
87. These material misrepresentations were made on multiple
occasions.
88. These material misrepresentations were made by fiduciaries and
those acting as agents of fiduciaries.
89. Mr. Taylor reasonably relied on these material misrepresentations
to his detriment.
90. These defendants have failed to meet each of their fiduciary duties
by misleading Mr. Taylor, by misrepresenting the terms of the Plan
Document, and by denying Mr. Taylor his right to a pension.
91. By failing to meet their fiduciary duties, these defendants have
breached their fiduciary duties in violation of ERISA and are
personally liable for these breaches under ERISA.
92. These breaches of fiduciary duties have damaged Mr. Taylor
financially and Mr. Taylor has lost retirement benefits owed to him
since January 1. 2022 and continuing.
93. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ actions, Mr.
Taylor has been caused to incur attorneys’ fees and costs in an attempt
to secure the payment of pension benefits due him.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor respectfully requests
that judgment be entered in his favor and against Defendants, Sheet
Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, the Board of Trustees of the
Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, as administrator of the
Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, and Jane Does, 1-10,
for unpaid benefits, to enforce his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the Plan Documents, for interest, for attorneys’ fees and
costs, and such other relief as this Honorable Court deems equitable
and just.
Compl. ¶¶ 80-93.
14. Even assuming Plaintiff’s reference to ERISA in paragraphs 82-83 and 91 can be liberally
construed to assert an ERISA cause of action, Plaintiff has not pled a breach of fiduciary
duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2). “ERISA entitles a participant in a defined contribution
plan to ‘the value of his account unencumbered by any fiduciary impropriety.’” Mator v.
Wesco Distrib., Inc., 102 F.4th 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys.
Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2007)). “A participant may sue a fiduciary who breaches
his duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), and the fiduciary is ‘personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1109(a)). “The elements of an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim are: ‘(1) a plan
fiduciary (2) breaches an ERISA-imposed duty (3) causing a loss to the plan.’” Id. at 184
(quotation omitted).
15. It is “abundantly clear” from a “fair contextual reading of the statute” that § 502(a)(2)
addresses “the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire
plan,” and not “the rights of an individual beneficiary.” Mass Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (footnote omitted). As such, Ҥ 502(a)(2) in effect allows
individual participants to sue ‘in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.’”
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Russell,
473 U.S. at 142 n.9). Where a plaintiff seeks to recover benefits allegedly owed to him in
his individual capacity, “the[] action is plainly not authorized by either § 409 [defining the
liability of ERISA fiduciaries] or § 502(a)(2).” Id.; see also Salvucci v. Glenmede Corp.,
No. 22-1891, 2022 WL 4692438, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2022) (dismissing claim under §
502(a)(2) where plaintiff sought only individual relief); Advanced Orthopedics & Sports
Med. Inst. ex rel. MS v. Anthem Blue Cross Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 20-13243, 2022 WL
13477952, at *12 n.5 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2022) (“[W]hile Plaintiff may pursue a breach of
fiduciary duty claim in conjunction with a claim for recovery of benefits under ERISA §
502, [that claim] should be dismissed because it is not based on an injury ‘separate and
distinct’ from the denial of benefits.”).
16. Plaintiff’s Complaint describes no fiduciary impropriety with respect to the Plan as a whole.
Rather, he alleges only that Defendants made material misrepresentations to him with respect
to his specific request for an early pension. Compl. ¶¶ 86-89. Moreover, his requested relief
seeks to recover benefits owed only to him in his individual capacity and not on behalf of all
Plan members. Id. at 13-14, Count II, Wherefore Cl. Thus, to the extent Count II is brought
under ERISA, it mirrors the relief sought by Count I and therefore, is subject to review under
the abuse of discretion standard. See Owen v. Soundview Fin. Grp., Inc., 208 F.3d 203, 2000
WL 287684, at *3 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (finding that where plaintiff
characterized his claim as a breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(2), but plaintiff sought
only a personal remedy, court would construe it as a claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)).
To the extent, however, that Count II is a state law breach of fiduciary duty claim, it is—as
noted in the Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion—likely preempted by ERISA. See Taylor,
2024 WL 4471683, at *7-8. In either event, Count II does not entitle Plaintiff to discovery
outside the administrative record.
17. Count III fares no better. The Complaint labels this claim as one for “Estoppel” and makes
no mention of ERISA. Count III sets forth the following allegations:
95. Mr. Taylor diligently and persistently sought advice from the
defendants concerning his eligibility for pension benefits.
96. The advice that the defendants provided to Mr. Taylor
materially misrepresented his status and the Fund’s requirements with
respect to his eligibility for pension benefits.
97. These material misrepresentations were made on multiple
occasions.
98. These material misrepresentations were made by fiduciaries
and those acting as agents of fiduciaries.
99. Mr. Taylor relied upon this advice to his detriment in making
decisions on how many hours he could work and the type of work he
could perform.
100. Despite complying with all of the advice given to him, the
defendants have denied Mr. Taylor his pension.
101. The defendants have breached their duty of loyalty.
102. The defendants mislead Mr. Taylor.
103. The defendants materially misrepresented the terms or the
administration of the Fund.
104. The Fund has impermissibly benefited from the
misrepresentations made by the defendants.
105. The events leading up to Mr. Taylor’s pension application the
processing of this application by the defendants, and the defendants’
actions constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting the relief
requested.
106. These material misrepresentations have damaged Mr. Taylor
financially and Mr. Taylor has lost retirement benefits owed to him
since January 1, 2022 and continuing.
107. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ actions,
Mr. Taylor has been caused to incur attorneys’ fees and costs in an
attempt to secure the payment of pension benefits due him.
108. The defendants should be equitably estopped from denying
Mr. Taylor his pension benefits.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor respectfully
requests that judgment be entered in his favor and against Defendants,
Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, the Board of Trustees
of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, as administrator
of the Sheet Metal Works’ National Pension Fund, and Jane Does, 1-
10, for unpaid benefits, to enforce his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the Plan Documents, for interest, for attorneys’ fees and
costs, and such other relief as this Honorable Court deems equitable
and just.
Compl. ¶¶ 95-108.
18. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA “authorizes ‘appropriate’ equitable relief.” Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court has noted,
however, that “where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury,
there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally
would not be ‘appropriate.’” Id. To determine whether the requested relief is appropriately
equitable under § 502(a)(3), “the Supreme Court has cautioned that a court must look past
the label attached by the plaintiff.” Miller v. Mellon Long Term Disability Plan, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 415, 423 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002)). “When, as here, a plaintiff seeks court review of a benefits
denial, ‘ERISA equitable estoppel claims are limited to the administrative record and no
discovery is permitted.’” Mullica v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., No. 11-4034, 2013 WL 5429295,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Cramer v. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., No.
11-49, 2012 WL 996583, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar.23, 2012) (collecting cases)).
19. Looking past the label here, it is clear that the alleged “equitable relief” requested by Plaintiff
in Count III “is essentially ‘a claim for benefits expressed in equitable language.’” Miller,
721 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (quoting Clark v. Feder Semo & Bard, P.C., 527 F. Supp. 2d 112,
117 n.1 (D.D.C. 2007)). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks unpaid benefits and to enforce his rights
for future benefits under the Plan. See Compl. ¶¶ 95-108 & Count III, Wherefore Cl.
Because ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) already provides a mechanism for ordering a plan to pay
benefits due, Count III—like Count II—is either another iteration of Plaintiff’s Count I claim
under § 502(a)(1), or it is a state law claim that is likely preempted by ERISA. In either
event, Plaintiff is not entitled to additional discovery.
20. Finally, Count IV of the Complaint alleges a “failure to provide a full and fair review.”
Compl. ¶¶ 109-17. Specifically, it states, in pertinent part:
110. ERISA requires that benefit plans “provide adequate notice in
writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits
under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for
such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by a
participant” and to give a ‘full and fair review.’”
111. The regulations promulgated under ERISA require that the
specific reason or reasons be given in both the initial and the appeal
denial letters.
112. Any decision that falls short of a full and fair review is not
evaluated under a deferential standard.
113. The Fund’s denial letter of May 23, 2022 based the denial on the
fact that Mr. Taylor continued to perform office work for STS.
114. The Board of Trustees denial letter of April 6, 2023 also based
the denial on the fact that Mr. Taylor continued to be employed by
STS.
115. The Board of Trustees unreasonably refused to consider
documents and other substantial proof that Mr. Taylor was advised on
multiple occasions that he would retain his pension eligibility while
continuing to work for STS for a maximum of forty hours per month.
116. The Board unreasonably failed to consider that in order for STS
to continue to operate, Mr. Taylor was required by New Jersey law to
maintain his Master HVACR license and to continue to be employed
by STS.
117. Mr. Taylor was denied his right to a full and fair hearing.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor respectfully
requests that judgment be entered in his favor and against Defendants,
Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, the Board of Trustees
of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, as administrator
of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund, and Jane Does,
1-10, for unpaid benefits, to enforce his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the Plan Documents, for interest, for attorneys’ fees and
costs, and such other relief as this Honorable Court deems equitable
and just. In the event this Honorable Court determines that Mr. Taylor
was not afforded a full and fair hearing, Plaintiff Stultz G. Taylor
respectfully requests that he be given the opportunity to supplement
the record of his appeal and order a remand to the Board of Trustees
ordering consideration of all additional documents and information.
Compl. ¶¶ 110-17 & Count IV, Wherefore Cl.
21. Although Plaintiff does not cite the pertinent ERISA provision—either in his Complaint or
in his brief in support of his Motion for Reconsideration—a liberal reading of the Complaint
suggests that Count IV sets forth a claim under ERISA § 503. That provision provides, in
pertinent part, that every employee benefit plan shall, “provide adequate notice in writing to
any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied,
setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant.” 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1). “The remedy for violation of § 503 is
to remand to the plan administrator so the claimant gets the benefit of a full and fair review.”
Syed v. Hercules, Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “Thus, while
complying with § 503 may be ‘probative of whether the decision to deny benefits was
arbitrary and capricious,’ § 503 itself does not provide an independent cause of action.”
Advanced Orthopedics & Sports Medicine Inst., No. 20-13243, 2022 WL 13477952, at *13
(D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2022) (quoting Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 851 (3d Cir.
2011)). Accordingly, this claim does not entitle Plaintiff to additional discovery.
B. Whether Discovery Is Permissible Where the Administrative Record Is Incomplete
22. As an alternative basis for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that “[s]ince the Court’s Order
of October 11, 2024, Plaintiff has discovered omissions from the Administrative Record
filed by Defendants in this matter.” Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the
“Administrative Record does not contain any version of the Plan Documents and
amendments in effect as of the date of the Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s pension benefits.”
Id. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that “it has recently been discovered” that certain other
documents are missing from the Administrative Record, including: (1) Plaintiff’s
handwritten notes concerning his teleconference with the Fund; (2) Plaintiff’s counsel’s
March 29, 2023 letter to Defendants’ counsel; and (3) any changes made to the Plan
documents between the date of Plaintiff’s January 1, 2022 application and the April 23, 2023
denial of his appeal. Id. at 12.
23. “Under the so-called ‘ERISA record rule,’ judicial review of an administrator’s adverse
decision is typically limited to the administrative record.” Stallman v. First Unum Life Ins.
Co., No. 23-20975, 2024 WL 4988603, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2024) (citing Noga v. Fulton
Fin. Corp. Emp. Benefit Plan, 19 F.4th 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2021)). “The administrative record
consists of the materials before the fiduciary who makes the benefit decisions on internal
review, and it typically contains relevant plan documents (such as an insurance policy), the
claim file (the claim, supporting information supplied by the claimant, as well as information
related to the claim that was considered, collected, or generated by the fiduciary), and the
fiduciary’s final determination with respect to the claim.” Noga, 19 F.4th at 272 (citation
omitted). To the extent there are specifically-identified gaps in the administrative record,
the appropriate remedy is not to allow “extra-record” discovery, but rather to require the
defendants to supplement the record. Stallman, 2024 WL 4988603, at *4 (declining to
permit extra-record discovery merely to confirm that the administrative record is complete);
see also Goble v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Bos., No. 12-6030, 2013 WL 5603871, at *9
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013) (finding extra-record discovery inappropriate when “[p]laintiff has
not shown that Defendants have selectively omitted information and produced an incomplete
administrative record”).
24. Here, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not explain why he did not identify such alleged
gaps in the record in his initial motion for discovery. A motion for reconsideration may not
be used to advance such new legal arguments. See P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., 161 F. Supp.
2d at 352.
25. That said, none of the identified “omissions” warrants discovery beyond the administrative
record. As to the pertinent Plan Document and any amendments thereto, Defendant avers
that the pertinent provisions applicable to Plaintiff’s claim for benefits are quoted in a
document within the administrative record, and that “[t]he complete Plan Document,
including amendments relating to Plaintiff’s benefits claim and determination, if any, will
be provided to the Court at the summary judgment phase, will be provided to Plaintiff to the
extent he does not already have it before summary judgment motions are filed, and in the
meantime can be found online at the citation previously provided by Defendants in their
opposition Plaintiff’s letter motion.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 18.
26. With respect to the missing March 29, 2023 letter, Defendant concedes that the letter and
attachments “were inadvertently omitted . . . from the administrative record filed with the
Court, for which the undersigned counsel apologizes.” Id. at 19. Defendants, however,
agree to supplement the administrative record with this document. Id.
27. Finally, Plaintiff’s handwritten notes of a call with the Fund’s staff were not considered by
Defendants and thus, are appropriately not part of the administrative record here.
28. In short, Plaintiff has established no basis for reconsideration of the denial of extra-record
discovery. And even though the supplementation issue is not properly before the Court on
this Motion, the Court will order Defendants to supplement the record with the production
of the limited documents identified above.
THEREFORE, it is this 3rd day of January 2025;
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 33, is DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ten (10) days from the date of this Order,
Defendants shall supplement the Administrative Record with (1) the complete Plan Document,
including amendments relating to Plaintiff’s benefits claim and determination; and (2) Plaintiff’s
counsel’s March 29, 2023 letter to Defendants.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Christine P. O’Hearn, U.S.D.J.