The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ns on nn nnn nnn nn enn nnn
DEVI NAMPIAPARAMPIL, MEMO ENDORSED
Plaintiff,
~against SECOND MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS
THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE __[K conference regarding the pending motions, Docs. 57, 60,
BOARD, AMY LOPREST, DAVID DUHALDE, g2. and 86, will be held on Thursday, January 16, 2025,
HANNAH EGERTON, FREDERICK SCHAFFER, _|fat 3:30 PM in Courtroom 619 at the Thurgood Marshall
BETHANY PERSKIE, MATTHEW SOLLARS, United States Courthouse. City is directed to respond to
JACLYN WILLIAMS & THE CITY OF NEW YORK|Nampiaparampil's motion, Doc. 86, by Thursday, January 9
Defendants 20285.
December 27, 2024 [tis SO ORDERED. Ze () )
Edgardo Ramos, U.S.D.J.
Dear Judge Ramos, Dated: 1/02/2025
New York, New York
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, | the Plaintiff, Devi
Nampiaparampil, respectfully move this Court for sanctions against Defendants and their
counsel for their repeated material misrepresentations of law and fact, destruction and
alteration of evidence, witness intimidation, and other intentional misconduct that have
prejudiced my ability to litigate this case. The cumulative effect of Defendants’ actions has
undermined the integrity of these proceedings, necessitating this Motion for Sanctions.
This case has been submitted to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML). On
December 19, 2024, I submitted a Motion to Stay Proceedings until the JPML could render
its decision. If the Court decides not to stay these proceedings, then I respectfully ask the
Court to grant my Motion for Sanctions. My first Letter-Motion for a conference on
Sanctions (filed September 19, 2024) is still pending, awaiting the Court's adjudication,
Introduction
Defendants have engaged in a pattern of misconduct designed to prejudice my case,
including submitting contradictory statements regarding their “lawyer ban,” destroying
critical evidence, and impeding my access to justice. These actions not only obstruct my
ability to litigate but also constitute a broader attempt to manipulate the judicial process.
Sanctions under Rule 11, judicial estoppel, and findings of fraud upon the court are
warranted to address this behavior.
Legal Standard
Rule 11 imposes a duty on parties to ensure that their submissions to the Court are
accurate, truthful, and not made for improper purposes. Courts may impose sanctions for
filings made in bad faith or with reckless disregard for the truth. Judicial estoppel prevents
a party from asserting inconsistent positions to gain an unfair advantage, while fraud upon
the court encompasses conduct that undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Factual Background
As detailed in Plaintiff’s Affidavit, Defendants have engaged in the following actions:
1. Contradictory Representations Regarding the Lawyer Ban1:
o In this case record, Defendants provided conflicting statements about
whether candidates could retain counsel post-election without facing
penalties. During the July 25, 2024 hearing, Defendants, through their
General Counsel Joseph Gallagher, asserted the existence of a lawyer ban,
stating to the Court that, “If you want to spend on a lawyer and your
campaign doesn’t have the finances to spend on that lawyer, you can’t pay for
it out-of-pocket unless you stay with the contradiction [sic] limit. So, in this
matter, it would have been $6000.” During the same hearing, I informed the
Court that I had already spent $6000 in 2021. This created the circumstances
necessary for the formation of a lawyer ban.
o The Defendants doubled down on their lawyer ban at various points in this
case record, including their Motion to Dismiss (MTD) the First Amended
Complaint (FAC), writing, “If a candidate wants to cover the costs of their
campaign’s legal fees, however, then the candidate is subject to the
candidate’s contribution limit, here, for Plaintiff, of $6000.” They asserted the
existence of the lawyer ban I described in my FAC a third time in their Reply
papers, writing to the Court, ““If a candidate wants to cover the costs of their
1 In the Affidavit accompanying this Motion, I have delineated the Defendants’ false, misleading and
inconsistent statements, with specific references to the court record.
campaign’s legal fees, however, then the candidate is subject to the
candidate’s contribution limit, here, for Plaintiff, of $6,000. N.Y.C. Admin.
Code §§ 3-703 (l)(f),(h).”
o In their Reply papers, the Defendants acknowledged their statutory policy
of retaliation, making an unconvincing argument, ““[A]lthough in theory a
candidate’s financing of their campaign’s post-election legal fees could be
permissibly the subject of the Board’s audit, such a scenario is extremely
unlikely because an audit must necessarily have a point certain from which it
looks back, otherwise it would never end.” Any insolvent campaign that
retains counsel to discuss its civil rights can—by statute—be penalized with
triple the attorneys’ fees, an action that can incapacitate the campaign’s
officers, automatically retaliates against the campaign’s officers, and deters
the campaign’s officers and others from ever running for office.
o The Defendants invoke the lawyer ban at numerous other points in the case
record, which I have detailed in my Affidavit. They appear to cite
preclusion—implying that since I was barred from speaking to any lawyers
in my earlier NYS Supreme Court case, I should be permanently barred.
o They also assert that I voluntarily agreed to these lifetime limits on free
speech, due process, and access to the courts.
o This Motion for Sanctions, however, specifically has to do with their
inconsistent statements in their Reply papers. They characterized their
earlier statements—which effectively chilled my First Amendment activity--
as “typographical errors,” and recognizing that I could not submit a Sur-
Reply, concluded for the Court, “[T]he only person continuing to hold Plaintiff
to a non-existent lawyer ban is Plaintiff herself.”
o These misrepresentations, along with other misconduct, have created
confusion, chilled my ability to retain counsel, chilled my mother’s ability to
retain counsel in her E.D.N.Y. case, intimidated at least one witness (2015
City Council candidate, Celia Dosamantes), and directly affected my litigation
strategy.
o The Defendants’ misrepresentations about the lawyer ban, presented during
hearings and in subsequent filings, amount to a deliberate attempt to
interfere with this Court’s ability to adjudicate impartially. As the Second
Circuit has held, fraud upon the court involves actions that ‘defile the court
itself,’ undermining the judicial process entirely. (Kupferman v. Consolidated
Res. Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072).
2. Destruction and Tampering with Evidence:
o The Defendants destroyed critical electronically stored information (ESI),
including past Voter Guides and audit reports for similarly situated
candidates. Despite having a duty to preserve this evidence, Defendants
altered and deleted records after this litigation commenced. “The obligation
to preserve evidence arises when a party has notice that the evidence is
relevant to litigation or when a party should have known that the evidence
may be relevant to future litigation.” (Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247
F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).
o The Defendants falsely claimed to the Court that I had access to these
materials, further obstructing my ability to present my case, and perhaps
impacting the Court’s decision to grant their Motion to Stay Discovery.
o By destroying critical evidence and later providing false explanations for its
unavailability, the Defendants engaged in conduct that ‘sentiently set in
motion some unconscionable scheme’ to hamper my ability to present my
claims. (Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Tech., LLC at al., No. 1:2008-cv-10986 in the
S.D.N.Y).
3. Misleading Statements Regarding Key Evidence:
o Defendants falsely denied the existence of a January 17, 2023 public
hearing where I testified to them about the unconstitutional nature of their
Rules. Furthermore, they destroyed all social media posts regarding this
hearing, effectively removing any trace of it on the public-facing government
websites. It was only after I rebutted their false statements by presenting
time-stamped screenshots of our joint participation in the hearing did
Defendants introduce new, contradictory justifications for their actions. Of
note, my request to enter the full time-stamped screen-recorded video into
evidence is still pending before the Court.
4. Procedural Abuses:
o Defendants have abused procedural rules, using the Stay of Discovery to
evade accountability while continuing their own improper Discovery under
the guise of regulatory compliance. “Where one party gains an unfair
advantage through asymmetrical access to information, the integrity of the
judicial process is compromised.” (Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin.
Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2002)). This one-sided application of
Discovery rules has placed me at a severe disadvantage. As I described in my
Affidavit, I have been repeatedly pressured to sign false confessions under
threat of economic injury in the form of campaign finance penalties.
“Discovery should be a two-way street, with neither party unfairly
withholding relevant evidence nor exploiting procedural mechanisms to gain
an undue advantage.” (In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65,
70 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Defendants’ ongoing audit serves as an impermissible
substitute for reciprocal discovery while they shield themselves behind a
Court-ordered Stay. See also, “The purpose of discovery is to level the playing
field and ensure that both parties can present their cases fully and fairly.”
(MacNamara v. City of New York, 249 F.R.D. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
o
Argument
1. The Defendants’ Misrepresentations Warrant Sanctions Under Rule 11
Defendants knowingly submitted false statements regarding the lawyer ban, including their
contradictory and misleading assertions during the July 25, 2024 hearing and subsequent
filings. These strategically-timed misstatements of fact and law have prejudiced my case by
creating procedural ambiguity and deterring me from seeking legal representation. Their
pattern of contradictory statements about material facts—now framed as “typographical
errors”—demonstrates reckless disregard for the truth and bad faith conduct. At a
minimum, these individuals are not coordinating truthfully. These behaviors suggest the
Defendants have been complicit in the perpetuation of this deceit. They failed to correct
their lawyers’ misstatements (as occurred in our July 25, 2024 hearing). Alternatively, they
may have provided false information to their counsel.
2. Judicial Estoppel Should Preclude Defendants’ Contradictory Positions
Defendants’ shifting narratives about the lawyer ban—from denying its existence to
invoking it to justify penalties—constitute the type of inconsistent behavior judicial
estoppel is designed to prevent. Allowing Defendants to adopt contradictory positions
undermines the integrity of these proceedings.
3. The Defendants’ Conduct Constitutes Fraud Upon the Court
The destruction of evidence, intimidation of a witness who experienced the lawyer ban
herself, coupled with their false statements about the availability of critical records,
amounts to fraud upon the court. By deleting numerous records relevant to my claims and
obstructing my access to evidence, the Defendants have deliberately impeded the truth-
finding process.
4. Cumulative Prejudice Requires Immediate Relief
The Defendants’ actions have caused me cumulative prejudice by delaying the resolution of
my claims, increasing my litigation costs (by interfering with my ability to earn income
practicing medicine and by decreasing the valuation of my medical practice), impaired my
ability to seek legal representation, and caused me additional stress. The Court’s
intervention is necessary to prevent further harm and restore fairness to these
proceedings.
Relief Requested
I respectfully request that the Court:
1. Impose Sanctions Under Rule 11 and the Court’s Inherent Power:
Sanction the Defendants and their Counsel for submitting false statements and
engaging in bad faith conduct. In Chambers v NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)), the
Supreme Court imposed severe sanctions on the bad actor, holding, “[T]he alleged
sanctionable conduct was that Chambers had (1) attempted to deprive the court of
jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly all of which were performed outside the confines
of the court, (2) filed false and frivolous pleadings, and (3) "attempted, by other
tactics of delay, oppression, harassment and massive expense to reduce [NASCO] to
exhausted compliance." The court deemed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 --
which provides for the imposition of attorney's fees as a sanction for the improper
filing of papers with a court -- insufficient to support the sanction against Chambers,
since the Rule does not reach conduct in the foregoing first and third categories, and
since it would have been impossible to assess sanctions at the time the papers in the
second category were filed, because their falsity did not become apparent until after
the trial on the merits.” See also Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) where the Court held,
“Sanctions for discovery abuses are intended to ensure that the judicial process is
not undermined by misconduct that disadvantages the opposing party.”
2. Invoke Judicial Estoppel:
Preclude Defendants from asserting inconsistent positions regarding the lawyer
ban. The Second Circuit has consistently held that judicial estoppel serves to protect
the integrity of the judicial process by preventing parties from asserting
contradictory positions to suit the exigencies of the moment. In this case,
Defendants’ conflicting statements regarding the lawyer ban—first denying its
existence, then affirming it to justify penalties, and later dismissing it as a
typographical error—constitute precisely the type of inconsistent behavior judicial
estoppel is designed to prevent. (Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.
748 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2014)). See also: “Judicial estoppel is not a mere technical
defense but a safeguard against the improper use of judicial machinery. Defendants’
shifting narratives on the lawyer ban not only prejudice Plaintiff but also erode
confidence in the fairness and consistency of judicial proceedings.” (Bates v. Long
Island R.R. Co. 997 F.2d 1028).
3. Find Fraud Upon the Court:
Make a determination of fraud upon the court based on Defendants’ misleading
statements, destruction of evidence and procedural misconduct. In Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), the Supreme Court ruled,
“[T]ampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown
here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the
institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud
cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society. Surely
it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always
wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of
public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless
victims of deception and fraud.”
4. Refer Defendants for Disciplinary Action:
Refer Defendants’ counsel to the appropriate disciplinary authorities for their role
in perpetuating this misconduct.
5. Issue an Injunction on the Knowledge Ban:
My Motion before the Court has been pending since September 20, 2024.
6. Issue an Order that the Defendants Clarify their Multifaceted Knowledge Ban
On the Record.
Denied the ability to spend money, I remain defenseless against the Defendants’
ongoing abuses of power.
a) Am I allowed to speak to a lawyer about my civil rights?
b) Can I retain a lawyer to represent my professional medical practice
“Metropolis Pain Medicine PLLC d/b/a Devi Nampiaparampil, M.D.” or my
campaign “Dr. Devi For NYC” without fear of campaign finance violations or
penalties?
c) Are the Defendants issuing a reprieve on their statutory policy for me
alone—or for anyone and everyone that might come forward with litigation
against the NYC Campaign Finance Board in this election cycle and any other
election cycle? If they are issuing a reprieve of their lawyer ban, is the
reprieve universal or selective? (Of note, my First Amended Complaint has
already asserted that their lawyer ban is currently selectively enforced
against political dissidents, particularly those from ethnic minorities). This
necessarily impacts the Multidistrict Litigation. Furthermore, it directly
impacts my well-being since—if my mother is not allowed to retain counsel
in her ongoing E.D.N.Y. case-- then I can still be penalized for any penalties
she accrues. We are jointly and severally responsible for any campaign
finance penalties that either of us may incur.
d) Are any and all campaign officers allowed to consult accountants, political
consultants, and other educational resources to address potential audit
findings, both during the campaign and after the campaign? Since the
statutory audit is foreseeable, it would make more sense for campaign
officers to speak with consultants during the campaign to avoid breaking the
law and potentially being sent to prison like Dosamantes.
Conclusion
The Defendants’ conduct in this case, and in our prior litigation, demonstrates a pattern of
misrepresentation, evidence tampering, and procedural abuse that has undermined the
integrity of these proceedings and prejudiced me. The Court’s intervention is necessary to
hold Defendants accountable and to ensure a fair and just resolution of my claims.
I affirm this 27th day of December, 2024, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of
New York, which may include a fine of imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, and I
understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Devi Nampiaparampil
Devi Nampiaparampil
Pro Se Plaintiff
111 John Street, Suite 2509
New York, NY 10038
Cell: 312-523-5935
Email: devichechi@gmail.com