The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MATHEW KING, Case No. 8:24-cv-01391-JWH-PD
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF
No. 16]
14 GRAPHIC PACKAGING
INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
15 ROBERTO VENTURA, and
DOES 1-100, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Matthew King to remand this
action to Orange County Superior Court.’ Defendants Graphic Packaging
International, LLC (““GPI’’) and Roberto Ventura oppose the Motion,’ and the
4|| matter is fully briefed.* The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for
5|| resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons
|| detailed herein, the Court DENIES the Motion.
7 I. BACKGROUND
8 King originally filed this action in Orange County Superior Court in May
9|| 2024.* King asserts the following 12 state and common law claims for relief:
10 e age and disability related discrimination in violation of California’s Fair
11 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et
12 seq., against GPI;
13 e age and disability related harassment in violation of FEHA against GPI;
14 e failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA against GPI;
15 e retaliation in violation of FEHA against GPI;
16 e failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA
17 against GPI;
18 e failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA against
19 GPI;
20 e retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”),
21 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2, against GPI;
22 e violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 against GPI;
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Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “ Motion”) [ECF No. 16].
2 Defs.’ Opp’n to Motion (the “Opposition”’) [ECF No. 18].
26 Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 19].
4 See Notice of Removal (the ‘Notice of Removal”) [ECF No. 1] 7 1; see
|| also id., Ex. B (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-1].
1 e violation of Cal. Labor Code § 232.5 against GPI;
2 e violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 6310 & 6311 against GPI;
3 e wrongful termination in violation of public policy against GPI; and
4 e intentional infliction of emotional distress against both GPI and Ventura.°
5 Although all of King’s claims for relief are based upon state law,
6|| Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 &
7|| 1446, asserting federal question jurisdiction because— Defendants allege—
&|| King’s claims require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, so
9|| they are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
10|| U.S.C. § 185 (the “LMRA”’). King disagrees, and he filed this Motion
11|| accordingly.°
12 Il. LEGAL STANDARD
13 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v.
15|| Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “The right of removal is
16 || entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain
|| there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.”
18 || Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation
19|| marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those
|| statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal
jurisdiction. See zd.
22 “Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal
|| court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v.
24|| Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To remove an action to federal court under
25|| 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the removing defendant “must demonstrate that original
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* See generally Complaint.
° See generally Motion.
1 subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33.
2 Accordingly, a defendant may remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal
3 question exists; or (2) complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
4 exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 &
5 1332. “Complete diversity” means that “each defendant must be a citizen of a
6 different state from each plaintiff.” In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation,
7 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008).
8 “The party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden
9 of burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
10 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). “The presence or absence of federal-
11 question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which
12 provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented
13 on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S.
14 at 392. “A defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his
15 or her claim.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998).
16 “The Ninth Circuit ‘strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal
17 jurisdiction,’ and ‘[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as
18 to the right of removal in the first instance.’” Leon v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., 76
19 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citation omitted). In other words, any
20 doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in
21 favor of remand. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
22 III. ANALYSIS
23 The parties agree that Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th
24 Cir. 2007), sets the standard for removal pursuant to LMRA preemption. The
25 Burnside court held as follows:
26 [F]irst, [the Court must conduct] an inquiry into whether the
27 asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee
1 the right exists solely as a result of the [collective bargaining
2 agreement], then the claim is preempted, and our analysis ends
3 there. If, however, the right exists independently of the [collective
4 bargaining agreement], we must still consider whether it is
5 nevertheless “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-
6 bargaining agreement.” If such dependence exists, then the claim is
7 preempted by section 301 [of the LMRA]; if not, then the claim can
8 proceed under state law.
9 Id. at 1059–60 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394) (internal citations omitted).
10 In his Complaint, King alleges: “In late February, [King] was informed
11 by [name] that he was going to be demoted from First Press Operator to Second
12 Press Operator with a reduction in pay from $36.66/hr. to $32.51/hr. The
13 demotion violated Teamsters Handbook Section 14.2, 16, and 16.2.2.”7 The
14 notion that King’s demotion was wrongful—as must be determined pursuant to
15 the collective bargaining agreement—underlies many of King’s claims for
16 relief.8
17 The Court also notes that King’s Complaint directly implicates non-
18 LMRA federal questions that Defendants did not address. For example, King
19 alleges as follows:
20 [d]uring the course of [his] employment, [King] disclosed
21 information regarding conduct and/or actions by Defendants’
22 employees/supervisors that [King] reasonably believed
23 constitute[ed] a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of
24 or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation . . .
25 [including, with respect to federal law,] . . . Title VII of the [federal]
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27 7 Complaint ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
1 Civil Rights Act; . . . the Family Medical Leave Act; the Fair Labors
2 Standards Act; [and the Health Insurance Portability and
3 Accountability Act].9
4 King also reports that he filed a complaint about Defendants’ allegedly unlawful
5 conduct, including under the above-listed federal laws, with agencies including
6 the National Labor Relations Board.10 Further, King avers that Defendants
7 terminated him because he “refused to participate in an activity that would have
8 resulted in a violation of state or federal [law].”11 And, in his eleventh claim for
9 relief, King asserts that his termination was effected in violation of public policy
10 because Defendants violated various state and federal laws including “Title VII
11 of the [federal] Civil Rights Act; . . . the Family Medical Leave Act; the Fair
12 Labors Standards Act; [and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
13 Act].”12
14 In his Motion, King argues that his claims are not substantially dependent
15 upon the collective bargaining agreement, so removal pursuant to LMRA
16 preemption was improper.13 Specifically, King avers that “whether Defendants
17 failed to follow the grievance policies [dictated by the collective bargaining
18 agreement], or whether any violation of the [collective bargaining agreement]
19 occurred is irrelevant” to the resolution of his claims and that “there is no
20 dispute regarding the meaning of any provision of the [collective bargaining
21 agreement].”14
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23 9 Id. at ¶ 114.
24 10 Id. at ¶ 116.
25 11 Id. at ¶ 117 (emphasis added).
26 12 Id. at ¶ 141.
27 13 See generally Motion.
1 Because King’s claims for relief are “substantially dependent upon”
2|| federal labor laws and the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement,
3|| this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and remand is
4|| inappropriate. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059-60.
5 IV. DISPOSITION
6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that King’s instant
7\| Motion to remand [ECF No. 16] is DENIED.
8 IT ISSO ORDERED.
10|| Dated:__January 2, 2025 _ ae ta
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