Ofer v. Roher

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 24-cv-22349-BLOOM/Elfenbein

RAZIEL OFER, individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARK S. ROHER, ESQ., individually

Defendant.

_________________________/

SECOND OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon four Motions: (1) Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Count II of Amended Complaint, ECF No. [102], (“Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment”); Plaintiff filed a Response, ECF No. [109], to which Defendant

filed a Reply, ECF No. [110]; (2) Plaintiff Raziel Ofer’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment as to Counts II and III (“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment”), ECF

No. [74]; Defendant Mark S. Roher (“Defendant”) filed a Response, ECF No. [85], and Exhibits

in Support, ECF No. [101], to which Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. [96]; (3) Plaintiff’s Motion

for Reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order of October 28, 2024, ECF No. [103],

(“Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration”); Defendant filed a Response, ECF No. [104], to which

Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. [106]; (4) Defendant’s Motion to Deem Raziel Ofer a Vexatious

Litigant and for the Imposition of Sanctions, ECF No. [32], (“Defendant’s Motion for

Sanctions”); Defendant filed a Response, ECF No. [41]. The Court has reviewed the Motions,

the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is denied, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and

denied in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Defendant’s Motion for

Sanctions is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendant: Legal

Malpractice that occurred during Defendant’s representation of DRO and Penn 942 (Count I);

Conversion for the unauthorized purchases on the credit card (Count II); and Breach of Fiduciary

Duty (Count III). ECF No. [35]. The Court dismissed Counts I and III pursuant to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, see ECF No. [97], leaving only Count II before the Court. Both Plaintiff and

Defendant seek summary judgment on Count II. ECF Nos. [74], [101].

Plaintiff asserts the following facts, ECF No. [74]. Defendant denies all the alleged facts

but does not challenge the facts with specificity. ECF No. [85] at 2-3. The following facts are

disputed:

Plaintiff owns two entities, 942 Penn RR, LLC (“942 Penn”) and DRO 15R, LLC

(“DRO”). Each entity was subject to claims in state court, that included foreclosures. Plaintiff

was referred to Defendant, a lawyer, and consulted with him on available options to defend the

entities. Plaintiff was advised by Defendant that Chapter 11 reorganization was the best option

for his companies to resolve their financial commitments. Defendant represented 942 Penn and

DRO as counsel for the debtors in bankruptcy. During litigation, Plaintiff entrusted Defendant

with a credit card to pay expenses associated with the bankruptcies, which included

compensation and filing fees.

Defendant made unauthorized purchases which were in excess of $200,000.00. Such

purchases were perfumes, clothes, dining, and other luxuries which were not authorized by

Plaintiff and not in conjunction with expenses associated with the entities. Plaintiff also

purchased a luxury watch for Defendant, valued at approximately $10,000.00 for which

Defendant was to repay him. Defendant failed to do so, claiming it was a gift after Plaintiff

demanded the return of the watch. Ultimately, Defendant failed to adequately advise Plaintiff in

a competent and direct manner, failing to foresee the mistake of filing the bankruptcies in the

first instance. Defendant placed Plaintiff in a position to sign various documents, such as a First

Stipulation for Settlement which Plaintiff signed under duress just before a hearing which

Plaintiff refused to sign. Defendant forwarded the Stipulation for Settlement to Plaintiff’s phone

and electronically signed it without consent by Plaintiff.

DRO, by being placed into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, ended up losing its real property. 942

Penn was liquidated at below market value and was liquidated. Defendant billed the entities for a

combined $249,000.00 in legal fees. Defendant obtained charging liens to collect the fees from

942 Penn knowing he converted $200,000.00 of extravagant purchases from Plaintiff’s credit

card and failed to return the watch when demanded.

In addition to generally contesting those allegations, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s

“Allegations of Material Fact Not in Dispute” in his Motion for Summary Judgment are merely

an identical or somewhat rephrased version of the allegations in the Amended Complaint. ECF

No. [85] at 2-3.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

The court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual dispute is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, and ‘genuine’ if a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for

the non-moving party.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235,

1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).

The moving party shoulders the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once this burden is

satisfied, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.’” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App’x 819, 825 (11th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must make a sufficient showing on each essential

element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must

support the assertion by:”

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support the fact.

Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “In such a

situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.’ ” Id. at 322–23. Even “where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about

the factual inferences that should be drawn from those facts,” summary judgment may be

inappropriate. Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296

(11th Cir. 1983). This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment

stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). “[I]f factual

issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Warrior Tombigbee,

695 F.2d at 1296.

“In cases … where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324. However, “even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in

controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence

on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed.” L.S. by

Hernandez v. Peterson, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citation omitted). In the

context of affirmative defenses,

On a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendant bears the initial

burden of showing that the affirmative defense is applicable. See Blue Cross and

Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1552 (11th Cir.1990); Office of Thrift

Supervision v. Paul, 985 F.Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.Fla.1997); Chatham Steel

Corp. v. Brown, 858 F.Supp. 1130, 1154 (N.D.Fla.1994). Only upon such a

showing does the burden shift to the plaintiff regarding that affirmative defense.

See Weitz at n. 13. The reason is that the defendant bears the burden of proof on

his or her affirmative defense at trial.

Special Purpose Accts. Receivable Co-op Corp. v. Prime One Cap. Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d

1093, 1098–99 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

B. Motion for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.”

Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8,

2002). “The burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances supporting

reconsideration.” Saint Croix Club of Naples, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-00468-JLQ,

2009 WL 10670066, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2009) (citing Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v.

Sarasota/Manatee Airport Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (M.D. Fla. 1993)).

A motion for reconsideration must do two things. First, it must demonstrate some

reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision. Second, it must set forth

facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior

decision. Courts have distilled three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1)

an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and

(3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.

Cover v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 294, 295 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citations omitted). “Such

problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.” Burger King Corp.,

181 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.

Because court opinions “are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and

reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure,” a motion for reconsideration must clearly “set forth facts

or law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the Court the reason to reverse its prior

decision.” Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339, 1340

(M.D. Fla. July 25, 2003) (citations omitted). As such, a court will not reconsider its prior ruling

without a showing of “clear and obvious error where the ‘interests of justice’ demand

correction.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1637-Orl-31, 2013

WL 425827, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2013) (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess &

Assoc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985)). “When issues have been carefully considered and

decisions rendered, the only reason which should commend reconsideration of that decision is a

change in the factual or legal underpinning upon which the decision was based.” Taylor

Woodrow Constr. Corp., 814 F. Supp. at 1072-73; see also Longcrier v. HL-A Co., 595 F. Supp.

2d 1218, 1247 n.2 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2008) (noting that reconsideration motions are to be used

sparingly, and stating, “imagine how a district court’s workload would multiply if it was obliged

to rule twice on the same arguments by the same party upon request”). A motion for

reconsideration “is not an opportunity for the moving party … to instruct the court on how the

court ‘could have done it better’ the first time.” Hood v. Perdue, 300 F. App’x 699, 700 (11th

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Thus, a motion to reconsider is “appropriate where, for example, the Court has patently

misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the

Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Kapila v. Grant

Thornton, LLP, No. 14-61194-CIV, 2017 WL 3638199, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2017) (quoting

Z.K. Marine Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1992) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be

equally rare.” Burger King Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. Ultimately, reconsideration is a

decision that is “left ‘to the sound discretion’ of the reviewing judge.” Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v.

BP Inv. Partners, LLC, No. 6:18-cv-1149-Orl-78DCI, 2020 WL 5534280, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr.

1, 2020) (quoting Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800,

806 (11th Cir. 1993)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II -

Conversion

1. Release: First Affirmative Defense

The Court first addresses Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [102].

Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted on his first affirmative defense of release

because the Second Stipulation for Settlement demonstrates that Plaintiff released him from all

claims, as was also found by the Bankruptcy Court. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff responds that Defendant

forced Plaintiff to sign them and the Stipulations for Settlement are invalid. ECF No. [109] at 9-

10.1

1 Plaintiff includes portions of his Motion for Summary Judgment in his Response, and notably

Plaintiff and Defendant signed two Stipulations for Settlement, the first on June 27, 2022

(“the First Stipulation for Settlement”) and the second on December 14, 2022 (“the Second

Stipulation for Settlement”).

The Second Stipulation for Settlement states that “[Plaintiff] has taken the position that

[Defendant] has made unauthorized charges for personal items (“the Charges”) to a Discover

card issued to him under an account belonging to third party friend…” ECF No. [7-1] at 5. The

Second Stipulation then sets forth a broad release tethered to the use of the Discover Card. The

Second Stipulation states:

Ofer and Mendez agree to release Roher and MSRPA from any and all from any

and all [(sic)] past, present or future actions, claims, demands, causes, causes of

actions, liabilities, suits, obligations, damages, liens, contracts, agreements,

promises, losses, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, compensation, bills,

covenants, controversies, judgments, executions, rights, costs and expenses

(including, but not limited to, attorney fees), of any nature whatsoever, known or

unknown, fixed or contingent, whether at law or in equity, and in whatever form

denominated, from the beginning of this world to the day of this Release, which

DRO 15R, 942 Penn, Ofer and Mendez now have, could have had or hereafter

can, shall or may have, including, but not limited to, any and all claims arising

out of or in any way related to the Charges.

Id. at 6. The Charges refer to “unauthorized charges for personal items … to a Discover

card issued to [Defendant] under an account belonging to third party friend.” Id. at 5. The

Second Stipulation is dated December 14, 2022. Id. at 8. However, the record indicates the

purported conversion occurred with a different credit card that is not included in the release of

the Second Stipulation for Settlement. Defendant attaches numerous charges and statements from

the credit card at issue in the case, which demonstrate it was an AAdvantage card and not the

Discover Card covered by the Second Stipulation for Settlement. ECF No. [102] at 25-75.

Defendant fails to point to evidence demonstrating why that the Second Stipulation for

discusses affirmative defenses not raised by Defendant. Because Plaintiff’s burden as non-movant is

merely to survive summary judgment at this stage, the Court does not discuss the affirmative defenses

that Defendant did not raise.

Settlement covers charges incurred by the AAdvantage card. The record is further unclear as to

which credit card the watch was charged to, and therefore it is unclear if the watch is included in

the release of the Second Stipulation for Settlement.

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on his first affirmative

defense. Because Defendant has failed to point to credible evidence of release, the Court does

not reach Plaintiff’s argument that he signed the agreements under duress or that Defendant

breached the terms of the Stipulations for Settlement.

2. Lack of Standing: Fifth Affirmative Defense

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on his fifth affirmative defense

of lack of standing because the credit card did not belong to Plaintiff, and the credit card

statements are in the name of Joseph Beniftah. ECF No. [102] at 4. Plaintiff responds that there

was an agreement between Plaintiff and the account holder so that Plaintiff had authorization to

have the AAdvantage card and use it. ECF No. [109] at 14. Further, Plaintiff states that he has

made out a concrete injury, the unauthorized use of a credit card issued to Plaintiff that Plaintiff

had to repay. Id. at 15.

Defendant points to an email from Plaintiff to Defendant sent on December 12, 2022,

where Plaintiff states “[T]his credit card isn’t mine, I mean the account isn’t mine, it has nothing

to do with our accounts. My friend j[u]st gave me this cc to pay for court filings, nothing else.”

ECF No. [102] at 24, [7-1] at 110. Further, Defendant points to numerous statements and charges

from the AAdvantage card, showing the card belongs to Joseph Beniftah. Id. at 25-75. There is

no dispute that the credit card used by Defendant belonged to a third party. Plaintiff does not

contest that, and instead argues that the credit card was lent to him to pay for his litigation

expenses. But Defendant does not cite a legal basis or any cases indicating that this is insufficient

to constitute standing. Under the law, “certain harms readily qualify as concrete injuries under

Article III. The most obvious are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and

monetary harms.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). Plaintiff has stated a

monetary harm, insofar as he must reimburse the owner of the AAdvantage card account for

Defendant’s expenses on the credit card. The record is clear that Defendant was aware that

Plaintiff was the beneficiary of the credit card, as Defendant communicated with Plaintiff to

credit the credit card charges to Defendant’s invoice. See, e.g., ECF No. [101] at 13. Defendant

fails to meet his burden to establish that he “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” as to his

fifth affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

3. Collateral Estoppel: Seventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for Conversion is barred by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel, and this issue was fully litigated and determined by the United States

Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida (“Bankruptcy Court”). ECF No. [102] at 4-

5. Plaintiff responds that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the Second Stipulation for

Settlement refers to the Discover card and not the AAdvantage card. ECF No. [109] at 15-16.

“The ‘essential elements’ of collateral estoppel in Florida are that ‘the parties and issues

be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which

results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” In re Harris, 3 F.4th 1339, 1345

(11th Cir. 2021) (citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 945 So.2d

1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Here, Defendant points to an Order issued by

Judge Laurel Isicoff in the Bankruptcy Court that states:

The Ofer Objection also argues “gross malpractice” and that “we’ve a claim of

$8.5 million against him”, but the two reasons argued by Mr. Ofer at the Hearing

– the filing of the 942 Penn bankruptcy, and the use of Mr. Ofer’s credit card,

were both addressed, and any claims released, in the June Agreement or the

December Agreement.

ECF No. [7-1] at 15. Here, the Bankruptcy Court found that claims from Plaintiff to

Defendant were released when determining whether attorneys’ fees were reasonable and a

charging lien could be enforced. However, the Bankruptcy Court made no reference to one of the

bases underlying Plaintiff’s Conversion count, the purchase of the watch, which seemingly

occurred after the June 2022 Agreement. It is also unclear which credit card the Bankruptcy

Court was referring to, whether the Discover card or the AAdvantage card at issue. Only claims

pursuant to the Discover card were released in the Second Stipulation of Settlement, as discussed

above. Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is

collaterally estopped from prevailing on his Conversion count, as it is unclear if the Bankruptcy

Court’s Order covers identical issues and applies to the same facts.

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on his seventh affirmative

defense.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. [74].

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Count II pursuant to the use of an

AAdvantage card and a luxury watch which Plaintiff purchased for Defendant under promise of

repayment for which Defendant never repaid. ECF No. [74] at 7-8. Plaintiff argues that neither a

demand for return of the property and refusal, as well as knowledge or intent, are essential to

bring a claim of conversion. Id. at 6. Defendant responds that the Motion is procedurally

deficient and should be denied because Plaintiff does not reference any portion of the record,

there is not one single exhibit attached, and is not verified. ECF No. [85] at 2. Further, Defendant

contends the so-called undisputed material facts are disputed, Plaintiff authorized Defendant to

use the credit card, and Plaintiff merely attaches proof of a $7,987.52 unauthorized charge in

Exhibit A. Id. at 3. Defendant asserts there is no evidence as to the credit card charges and points

to evidence demonstrating that the watch was a gift. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff replies that procedural

deficiencies are not grounds to deny his Motion, as a motion for summary judgment can be

verified after the fact as to facts already known to the nonmoving party. ECF No. [96] at 1-2

(citing Pete’s Towing Co. v. City of Tampa, 378 F. App’x 917 (11th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff argues

he refers to the record, namely exhibits attached to the Amended Answer, ECF No. [7-1], in his

Motion. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also argues that he attached the credit card statements to his initial

Complaint, and Defendant does not refer to any exhibits in his Response. Id. at 6. Defendant

subsequently filed exhibits to accompany his Response, ECF No. [101].

1. Procedural Deficiencies

The Court first addresses Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied

because Plaintiff failed to attach exhibits to his Motion. Under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by:”

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Plaintiff fails to attach exhibits to establish his entitlement to summary judgment and

merely he cites to exhibits attached to the Amended Answer, ECF No. [7-1], throughout his

Motion, ECF No. [74] at 9, 10, 11.

Plaintiff also fails to file a Statement of Material Facts as required by Local Rule 56,1,

which states: “A motion for summary judgment and the opposition to it shall each be

accompanied by a separate and contemporaneously filed and served Statement of Material Facts.

The movant’s Statement of Material Facts shall list the material facts that the movant contends

are not genuinely disputed.” S.D. Fla. L. R. 56.1(a)(1). A Court “may in its discretion opt to

conduct an assiduous review of the record even where one of the parties has failed to file such a

statement[.]” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Holtz v. Rockefeller

& Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).2

The Court admonishes Plaintiff for failing to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules and considers Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

only with reference to the exhibits that Plaintiff points to from Defendant’s Amended Answer.

2. Conversion Count

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to summary judgment on his Conversion count.

[C]onversion occurs when a person asserts a right of dominion over chattel which

is inconsistent with the right of the owner and deprives the owner of the right of

possession. Under Florida law, the elements of conversion are (1) an act of

dominion wrongfully asserted; (2) over another's property; and (3) inconsistent

with his ownership therein.

In re Bentley, 600 B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

The Court finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant’s

purchase of the watch and use of the credit card were “an act of dominion wrongfully asserted

over, and inconsistent with, another's possessory rights in personal property.” Joseph v. Chanin,

940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether the parties agreed the charges on the credit card were to be discounted from Defendant’s

payment for legal services and whether the watch was a gift. Defendant points to an invoice from

2 Plaintiff simultaneously argues he correctly cited to the record by citing to the Amended

Answer and that the Amended Answer is a nullity because Defendant did not ask for leave of

Court to file it. ECF No. [96] at 4-5. Because the Court seeks to resolve the issues in front of it,

and Plaintiff cannot both seek to invoke and ignore the Amended Answer, the Court considers

the exhibits in the Amended Answer.

Panerai indicating that “Mr. Raziel Ofer paid for Mr. Mark Roher PAM01356.” ECF Nos. [85] at

4, [7-1] at 21. Further, Defendant points to an August 10, 2022 text message from Defendant to

Plaintiff stating “Thanks for lunch and the watch,” to which Plaintiff’s response was “Great.”

ECF Nos. [85] at 4, [7-1] at 22. Defendant refers to an email he sent to Plaintiff on September 1,

2022 stating: “I am not sure if the watch was a gift or payment, but I disclosed it as a payment

just to be safe. We will reconcile everything at a later date.” ECF Nos. [85] at 4, [7-1] at 28.

Plaintiff responded that same day: “It was a gift.” Id. Another email from Defendant to Plaintiff

states: “Please confirm that you will send me the credit card statements so that I can calculate the

credit on the open account for DRO where I am owed at least $70,000.” ECF No. [7-1] at 110. A

previous email from Defendant also states: “Please send me a list of all of my personal credit

card charges so that I may credit these invoices.” Id. at 111. Finally, two text messages

Defendant sent to Plaintiff on October 2, 2022 state: “Let’s go through all the charges on the card

when I get back ok[.] Email me all the credit card statements for that card so I can deduct all the

charges from the invoice.” ECF No. [101] at 13. This evidence raises a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether the watch was a gift, and the credit card charges were payment for

legal services so that both were not “an act of dominion wrongfully asserted...” over Plaintiff’s

property. In re Bentley, 600 B.R. at 118.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s knowledge or intent is not relevant to the conversion

tort, and he is entitled to summary judgment regardless of Defendant’s intent. Plaintiff is correct

that “knowledge or intent is not a necessary element of a cause of action for conversion.” Stearns

v. Landmark First Nat. Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 498 So. 2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).

Any act of a person in asserting a right of dominion over a chattel which is

inconsistent with the right of the owner and deprives the owner of the right of

possession to which the owner is entitled may constitute a conversion, whether

the act is accomplished with, or without, any specific wrongful mental intent.

City of Cars, Inc. v. Simms, 526 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). “The tort may be

established despite evidence that the defendant took or retained property based upon the

mistaken belief that he had a right to possession, since malice is not an essential element of the

action.” Seymour v. Adams, 638 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). While this may be a

case where Defendant was mistaken about his right to possession and still committed conversion,

a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff willingly relinquished the credit

card and paid for the watch to compensate Defendant for his legal services. The parties may have

agreed to the use of the credit card as a payment credit and that the watch was a gift. An element

of conversion is whether or not the conversion was “an act of dominion wrongfully asserted...”

In re Bentley, 600 B.R. at 118. Indeed, an “[e]ssential element of a conversion is a wrongful

deprivation of property to the owner.” Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers, 160 Fla. 130, 132

(1948) (emphasis added). There is a genuine dispute about whether wrongful deprivation

occurred here.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on Count II for Conversion.

3. Affirmative Defenses

The Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument that he is entitled to summary judgment as to

Defendant’s affirmative defenses. “A court may grant partial summary judgment on affirmative

defenses, so long as the movant meets its burden of showing that the defenses cannot be

maintained by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. for Superior Bank v.

Hall, No. 8:14-CV-834-T-24 TGW, 2016 WL 7325590, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2016)

(citation omitted). In other words,

On a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendant bears the initial

burden of showing that the affirmative defense is applicable. See Blue Cross and

Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1552 (11th Cir.1990); Office of Thrift

Supervision v. Paul, 985 F.Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.Fla.1997); Chatham Steel

Corp. v. Brown, 858 F.Supp. 1130, 1154 (N.D.Fla.1994). Only upon such a

showing does the burden shift to the plaintiff regarding that affirmative defense.

See Weitz at n. 13. The reason is that the defendant bears the burden of proof on

his or her affirmative defense at trial.

Special Purpose Accts., 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99.

a. Release: First Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s first affirmative defense asserts that all of the claims in the Complaint have

been released by the First Stipulation for Settlement and Second Stipulation for Settlement. ECF

No. [42] at 4. Plaintiff argues that the Second Stipulation for Settlement does not apply here as

that applies to a credit card issued by Discover and not the AAdvantage card at issue in the

Conversion count. ECF No. [74] at 8-9. Defendant does not specifically respond to this

argument.

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as there is a genuine dispute of material fact

as to whether the charges underlying the Conversion count have been released. At least some of

the charges underlying the conversion count may be covered by the release in the First

Stipulation for Settlement, while others are not. The First Stipulation for Settlement sets forth

that:

In exchange for MSRPA’s agreement to the Fee Reduction, Ofer and Mendez

agree to a mutual release between themselves and MSRPA as to any matters

whatsoever involving MSRPA’s representation of the Debtor in the Bankruptcy

Case through June 27, 2022, including, but not limited to, the recommendation to

the filing of the Bankruptcy Case as well as any claims which could give rise to a

Florida Bar Complaint except for and subject to the terms of this Settlement.

ECF No. [7-1] at 2 (emphasis added). Here, MSRPA refers collectively to Defendant

“Mark S. Roher” and “Law Offices of Mark S. Roher, P.A.” Id. at 1. The plain text of the First

Stipulation for Settlement only releases claims between the parties through June 27, 2022.3

3 Further, “[i]t is well settled that a valid release agreement acts retroactively to release all claims

arising out of conduct that occurred prior to the execution of the release.” Jankovich v. Bowen, 844 F.

Supp. 743, 747 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Pettinelli v. Danzig, 722 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1984)).

On one end, some of the charges underlying the Conversion count occurred after June 27,

2022 so are not released. ECF No. [102] at 25-75. Some of the credit card charges on the credit

card used by Defendant are dated from July and August 2022. ECF Nos. [7-1] at 2, [102] at 30,

32. Further, the credit card charges remained unpaid by Defendant until at least December 2022,

as evidenced by an email from Defendant to Plaintiff on December 12, 2022 stating:

I would like to resolve this open issue please. Please confirm that you will send

me the credit card statements so that I can calculate the credit on the open account

for DRO where I am owed at least $70,000.

ECF No. [102] at 24. The record is not clear as to whether Plaintiff’s purchase of

Defendant’s watch follows the release of the First Stipulation for Settlement, as the receipt of the

Panerai watch for $9,272 is not dated. ECF No. [7-1] at 21. However, a message from Defendant

stating “thanks for lunch and for the watch” dates from August 10, 2022. Id. at 2. That indicates

that the purchase of the watch may have occurred after the First Stipulation for Settlement and

may not be covered by the release of the First Stipulation for Settlement.

On the other end, some credit card charges occurred before June 27, 2022 and so may be

covered by the release in the First Stipulation for Settlement. ECF No. [102] at 61, 65.

Accordingly, what charges are covered by the release in the First Stipulation for Settlement, and

what charges are not, is a genuine dispute of material fact best left for determination for the jury.

However, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the Second

Stipulation for Settlement releases the Conversion claim between Plaintiff and Defendant as to

the AAdvantage card charges — but not as to the purchase of the Panerai watch. The Second

Stipulation for Settlement does not release a conversion claim based on the AAdvantage card

charges. As discussed above, the release in the Second Stipulation for Settlement applies only to

the Discover Card, whereas the bank statements demonstrate that the credit card charges

pertaining to the Conversion count were made on the AAdvantage card. The Second Stipulation

for Settlement states that “[Plaintiff] has taken the position that [Defendant] has made

unauthorized charges for personal items (“the Charges”) to a Discover card issued to him under

an account belonging to third party friend…” ECF No. [7-1] at 5. The Second Stipulation for

Settlement states:

Ofer and Mendez agree to release Roher and MSRPA from any and all from any

and all [(sic)] past, present or future actions, claims, demands, causes, causes of

actions, liabilities, suits, obligations, damages, liens, contracts, agreements,

promises, losses, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, compensation, bills,

covenants, controversies, judgments, executions, rights, costs and expenses

(including, but not limited to, attorney fees), of any nature whatsoever, known or

unknown, fixed or contingent, whether at law or in equity, and in whatever form

denominated, from the beginning of this world to the day of this Release, which

DRO 15R, 942 Penn, Ofer and Mendez now have, could have had or hereafter

can, shall or may have, including, but not limited to, any and all claims arising

out of or in any way related to the Charges.

Id. at 6. Here, the Charges refer to “unauthorized charges for personal items … to a

Discover card issued to [Defendant] under an account belonging to third party friend.” ECF No.

[7-1] at 5. The credit card at issue in the conversion count, as evidenced by the relevant bank

statements, is the AAdvantage card, ECF No. [102] at 25-75.

However, the record is unclear as to which credit card the Panerai watch was charged and

whether a conversion claim based on the purchase of the Panerai watch is released by the Second

Stipulation for Settlement.

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to Defendant’s first affirmative defense on

the issue of whether the Second Stipulation for Settlement releases the conversion claim as to the

AAdvantage card payments. Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

whether the Second Stipulation for Settlement releases the conversion claim as to the purchase of

the Panerai watch. Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether the First

Stipulation for Settlement releases the Conversion claim at issue, as there remains a genuine

dispute of material fact on this issue.

b. Unclean Hands: Second Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s second affirmative defense is that all of the claims asserted in the Complaint

are barred due to Plaintiff’s unclean hands, as Plaintiff bought the watch as a gift but fabricated

allegations that Defendant had taken the watch. ECF No. [42] at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that

Defendant has not met the elements of the unclean-hands defense because Plaintiff paid for the

watch and Defendant does not address how he was damaged or injured. ECF No. [74] at 9.

Further, Plaintiff argues that the email discussing a watch that was a gift was about a different,

much less expensive watch. Id. at 10. Defendant does not respond to this argument.

“To assert an unclean hands defense, a defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff's

wrongdoing is directly related to the claim, and (2) the defendant was personally injured by the

wrongdoing.” Bailey v. TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., 776 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 2015).

Here, “[D]efendant fails to come forward with evidence sufficient to … support [his]

affirmative defense.” Special Purpose Accts, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (citation omitted).

However, a question of fact exists on whether Plaintiff gifted the watch to Defendant, as

indicated by Plaintiff’s email that the watch that “[i]t was a gift[.]” ECF No. [7-1] at 28. Plaintiff

contends this referred to a different watch, but points to no evidence to this effect. Further, it is

unclear who wrote on the watch receipt that it was paid for by Plaintiff. ECF No. [7-1] at 21.

Accordingly, it is unclear if Plaintiff has unclean hands when bringing this claim because he

willingly paid for the watch and gifted it. It is also unclear that Defendant was injured by

Plaintiff’s wrongdoing such that “all of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted

material facts that the movant has proposed” i.e. that Plaintiff does not have unclean hands. L.S.

by Hernandez, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1314. Though Defendant does not respond on this point, “even

where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court

cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on the record

supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed.” L.S. by Hernandez v.

Peterson, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citation omitted). The Court is not so

satisfied and declines to grant summary judgment to Plaintiff on Defendant’s unclean hands

affirmative defense.

c. Fraud on the Court: Third Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s third affirmative defense is that all of the claims asserted in the Complaint

are barred due to Ofer’s fraud upon this Court. ECF No. [42] at 7-8. Plaintiff argues there was no

interference with the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate this matter by any

improper influence or unfair hampering of Defendant. As such, the elements of fraud on the

court are not met. ECF No. [74] at 11. Defendant fails to respond to this argument.

Here, “[D]efendant fails to come forward with evidence sufficient to … support an

affirmative defense.” Special Purpose Accts, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (citation omitted).

However, it is unclear if Plaintiff’s representation that the watch was not a gift and the credit

card charges were not payment is accurate or fraudulent, given the contradictory evidence on this

topic. As mentioned above, “even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged

material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all

of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has

proposed” i.e. that Plaintiff did not commit fraud on the court. L.S. by Hernandez, 420 F. Supp.

3d at 1314. The Court is not so satisfied and declines to grant summary judgment on Defendant’s

fraud on the court affirmative defense.

d. Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Fourth Affirmative

Defense

Defendant’s fourth affirmative defense is that all of the claims asserted in the Complaint

are barred under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. ECF No. [42] at 10. Plaintiff argues that the

fugitive disentitlement doctrine is inapplicable because there is no nexus between the current

action and the action for which Plaintiff is a fugitive. ECF No. [74] at 12-13. Defendant fails to

respond to this argument. Because Defendant has the burden of persuasion as to this affirmative

defense, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to the fugitive disentitlement affirmative

defense as “defendant fails to come forward with evidence sufficient to … support an affirmative

defense.” Special Purpose Accts, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (citation omitted). The Court has

previously ruled that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is inapplicable to the case at hand “as

there does not appear to be any connection between Plaintiff’s fugitive status and the present

action.” ECF No. [97] at 6 n. 2. “[A]ll of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted

material facts that the movant has proposed” i.e. that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not

bar Plaintiff’s claim, as the Court discusses further below. L.S. by Hernandez, 420 F. Supp. 3d at

1314.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Defendant’s fourth affirmative

defense on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.4

e. Lack of Standing: Sixth Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense is lack of standing. ECF No. [42] at 10-11. Plaintiff

argues that he has standing even if the credit card did not belong to him because there was an

agreement reached between Plaintiff and the account holder. ECF No. [74] at 13. Plaintiff asserts

he suffered a concrete injury, the unauthorized use of a credit card for over $200,000.00, which

Plaintiff had to repay. Id. at 14. Defendant responds that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a breach

of fiduciary duty claim because Plaintiff was never Defendant’s client. ECF No. [85] at 7-8.

4 The Parties do not discuss the fifth affirmative defense, which pertains to Count I, which the

Court previously dismissed.

Defendant asserts that “[Plaintiff] lacks standing to pursue a Count II for alleged

Conversion because the credit card did not belong to him as set forth in the email [Plaintiff] sent

to [Defendant] on December 12, 2022[.]” ECF No. [7] at 11. In his Response, Defendant merely

states that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim. ECF No. [85] ¶¶ 40,

46. However, the Court previously dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim against

Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to the lack of standing

affirmative defense as “defendant fails to come forward with evidence sufficient to … support an

affirmative defense” as to the Conversion count. Special Purpose Accts, 125 F. Supp. 2d at

1098–99 (citation omitted). Further, as discussed above, Plaintiff is asserting a concrete

monetary harm for which there traditionally is standing. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the sixth affirmative defense of

standing.

f. Collateral Estoppel: Seventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense is that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. ECF No. [42] at 11. Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel is

inapplicable as the Second Stipulation for Settlement refers to the Discover credit card and not

the AAdvantage card. ECF No. [74] at 14. Though Defendant does not respond to this argument,

ECF No. [85], Defendant seeks summary judgment on this affirmative defense in his Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. [102].

There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the issues considered by the

Bankruptcy Court were the same as the issues before this Court. As this Court previously stated,

the Bankruptcy Court made no reference to one of the bases underlying Plaintiff’s Conversion

count, the purchase of the watch, when it found that “the filing of the 942 Penn bankruptcy, and

the use of Mr. Ofer’s credit card, were both addressed, and any claims released, in the June

Agreement or the December Agreement.” ECF No. [7-1] at 15. It is also unclear which credit

card the Bankruptcy Court was referring to in its Order. Only claims pursuant to the Discover

card were released in the Second Stipulation for Settlement. Accordingly, there is a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is collaterally estopped, and Plaintiff is not entitled

to summary judgment as to Defendant’s collateral estoppel affirmative defense.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order

of October 28, 2024

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order, ECF No. [97],

dismissing Count II and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Plaintiff refers to facts stated in

response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and adds arguments in support of finding that there

was an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. ECF No. [103] at 2. Further,

Plaintiff argues that allowing Defendant to escape liability for his attorney-client relationship

would be a manifest injustice. Id. at 4-5. Defendant responds that Plaintiff is seeking a second

bite at the apple and seeks to relitigate old matters or a new legal theory, which is inappropriate

on a Motion to Reconsider under Rule 59(e). ECF No. [104] at 3.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any of the “three major grounds

justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of

new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Cover v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 294, 295 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citations omitted). Plaintiff either reiterates

arguments previously made in support of an attorney-client relationship, attempts to add facts to

arguments previously made, or merely asserts there would be manifest injustice from the Court’s

previous Order. However, Plaintiff falls far short of making a showing of “clear and obvious

error where the ‘interests of justice’ demand correction.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo.

Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1637-Orl-31, 2013 WL 425827, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2013).

Accordingly, the Court uses its “sound discretion” to deny Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order, ECF No. [103]. Arch Specialty Ins., No. 6:18-cv-

1149-Orl-78DCI, 2020 WL 5534280, at *2.

5. Defendant’s Motion to Deem Raziel Ofer a Vexatious Litigant and for

the Imposition of Sanctions

i. Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

Finally, the Court considers Defendant’s Motion to Deem Raziel Ofer Vexatious Litigant

and for the Imposition of Sanctions, ECF No. [32]. Defendant argues that the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine bars any relief to Plaintiff, who is a five-time convicted felon who has

fled the state of Florida to the United Kingdom, as set forth in the Arrest Warrant signed on April

28, 2023 by the Honorable Zachary N. James of the Miami-Dade County, Florida Circuit Court.

Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff responds that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not apply to him as

there is no nexus between the probation violation for worthless checks and grand theft that

Plaintiff is fleeing from and the current action. ECF No. [41] at 4.

“The fugitive disentitlement doctrine empowers courts to dismiss the lawsuits or appeals

of fugitives from the law.” Ener v. Martin, 987 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2021). “[A] fugitive

‘flouts’ the authority of the court by escaping, and [] dismissal is an appropriate sanction for this

act of disrespect.” Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 245, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1206,

122 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1993). “[T]he doctrine applies in both civil and criminal proceedings, Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Pharaon, 178 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 1999), and in district courts as

well as on appeal, see Magluta, 162 F.3d at 664.” Id. at 1332. “[T]he dismissal of a civil action

on fugitive disentitlement grounds requires that (1) the plaintiff is a fugitive; (2) his fugitive

status has a connection to his civil action; and (3) the sanction employed by the district court,

dismissal, is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying the fugitive disentitlement

doctrine.” Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff is correct that

Defendant has not identified that the second element applies to Plaintiff. There does not appear

to be any connection between Plaintiff’s fugitive status and the present action.

Accordingly, the Court does not dismiss the action under the fugitive disentitlement

doctrine.

ii. Sanctions

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s bad faith and false allegations must stop, and he should

be sanctioned in the form of being deemed to be a vexatious litigant and ordered to pay all

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in having to respond to false and bad faith allegations. ECF

No. [32] at 6. Plaintiff responds that the stipulations for settlement were signed under duress and

that he does not qualify as a vexatious litigant, ECF No. [41] at 5, 8. Defendant replies by

attaching emails sent to Defendant with profane and vile statements the same day that Plaintiff

filed his Response, ECF No. [45]. Defendant files a Supplement to this Motion, ECF No. [44],

indicating that United States Bankruptcy Judge Laurel Isicoff sanctioned Plaintiff for his

“unceasing misrepresentations to the Court.” Id. at 1.

The Eleventh Circuit “repeatedly has held that federal courts have the power to manage

their dockets and curb vexatious litigation.” United States v. Maass, No. 05-11632, 2005 WL

2298296, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005) (citation omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit has

explained, “a court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching

on the judicial machinery needed by others, and a litigant can be severely restricted as to what he

may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.” Maid of The Mist Corp.

v. Alcatraz Media, LLC, 388 F. App'x 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). As this Order demonstrates, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s case is

entirely meritless, unlike previous cases filed by Plaintiff with this Court. Accordingly, the Court

declines to curb Plaintiff’s access to the Court and to deem Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.

However, the Court has witnessed disturbing and profound unprofessionalism from

Plaintiff, including harassing emails and communications to Defendant, as mentioned in the

Court’s previous Omnibus Order, ECF No. [97] at 10. Defendant is a licensed attorney who is

currently representing himself pro se so he is not entitled to attorney’s fees. A party representing

themselves pro se is not entitled to attorney’s fees, even when they are attorneys. DeBose v. USF

Bd. of Trustees, 811 F. App'x 547, 556–57 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding “[a] pro se plaintiff cannot

recover attorney's fees for representing herself, even if she is a licensed attorney” in a

discrimination suit context under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Glenn v. Avala, No. 5:23-CV-146-MTT-

AGH, 2024 WL 5162843, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2024) (holding that “to the extent the

amount represents attorney's fees, Plaintiff—as a pro se party—is not entitled to recover those”

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37).

The Court firmly reminds Plaintiff that any further display of unprofessionalism will

result in sanctions, including dismissal with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [102], is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts II and III, ECF No.

[74], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, in ways consistent with this

Order;

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order of October 28,

2024, ECF No. [103], is DENIED;

4. Defendant’s Motion to Deem Raziel Ofer a Vexatious Litigant and for the Imposition

Case No. 24-cv-22349-BLOOM/Elfenbein

of Sanctions, ECF No. [32], is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, f 2, 2025.

BETH BEOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

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