Brown v. Holzapfel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

AT BECKLEY

JUVAN JAMES BROWN,

Petitioner,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-cv-00062

WARDEN W. HOLZAPFEL,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending are Petitioner Juvan James Brown’s Letter- Form Motion for Extension of

Time to File Objection [Doc. 13] and Objections to Proposed Findings and Recommendations

[Doc. 14], both filed July 9, 2024.

I.

Juvan James Brown instituted this action on February 8, 2024, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed February 8, 2024. [Doc. 1]. Respondent Warden

Holzapfel’s filed a Motion to Dismiss contained in their response, filed March 13, 2024. [Doc. 8].

This action was previously referred to the Honorable Cheryl A. Eifert, United States Magistrate

Judge, for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation (“PF&R”). [Doc. 2]. Magistrate

Judge Eifert filed her PF&R on June 6, 2024. [Doc. 10]. Magistrate Judge Eifert recommended

that the Court grant the Warden’s Motion to Dismiss, deny Mr. Brown’s § 2241 Petition, and that

this case be dismissed and removed from the docket of the court. [Id.]. Objections to the PF&R

were due by June 24, 2024. No objections were initially filed. On July 1, 2024, the Court entered

an Order adopting the PF&R, and subsequently granted the Respondent’s Response/Motion to

Dismiss, denied Mr. Brown’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and removed the matter from

the docket. [Doc. 11]. The Court’s Judgment Order was filed the same day. [Doc. 12].

On July 9, 2024, Mr. Brown requested an extension of time for his objections [Doc.

13]. Mr. Brown’s request for extension asserts due to a facility lock down he “was not able to go

to commissary until June 24, 2024, to purchase mailing stamps to meet the deadline.” [Doc. 13].

On the same date, Mr. Brown filed his objections. [Doc. 14-1]. Mr. Brown’s

objections express his belief that (1) in light of Tinker v. Des Moines, his “single offense at age 15

did not cause disruption, and the subsequent lack of offenses supports the argument that the

petitioner has rehabilitated and is not longer a threat to society”, (2) he participated in a federal

judicial practice externship in 2023, and (3) our Court of Appeals “emphasize[s] the importance

of considering the context and facts of each case.” [Id. at 2].

On September 16, 2024, Mr. Brown filed a Letter-form Supplemental Response in

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 15]. He reiterates his allegations regarding his Prisoner

Assessment Tool and Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (“PATTERN”) assessment and his

conviction that the Adam Walsh Act is erroneously being applied to his sentence. [Id.]. He

contends “he should not have been assigned two points for the sentence imposed in 1993 because

that sentence was imposed more than ten years before [his] underlying offense.” [Id. at 1].

II.

The Court need not review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation

to which no objections are addressed. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” (emphasis

added)).

“Importantly, objections need not be novel to be sufficiently specific.”

Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023). “[T]o preserve for appeal an issue in a

magistrate judge's report, a party must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with

sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.”

United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007) “If the grounds for objection are clear,

district court judges must consider them de novo, or else run afoul of both § 636(b)(1) and Article

III.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460. Further, the Court need not conduct de novo review when a party

“makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the

magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th

Cir. 1982).

III.

Mr. Brown objects to Magistrate Judge Eifert’s findings inasmuch as he continues

to allege an erroneous Walsh application and he asks the Court “to waive the Public Safety Factor

(referred to as “SOPSF”) the BOP has applied to him.” [Docs. 14, 14-1]. Specifically, he asserts

that “[t]he Walsh application, filed 31 years ago, is based on a single sex offense committed at the

age of 15. The petitioner argues that the application should be removed due to the lack of

subsequent sex offenses as an adult and the significant passage of time since the offense.” [Doc.

14-1]. Magistrate Judge Eifert’s PF&R addressed (1) the application of FSA Time credits, and (2)

the expungement of juvenile conviction. [Doc. 10]. Mr. Brown does not address any contention

with the expungement in his objections.

Magistrate Judge Eifert exhaustively conducted an analysis in her PF&R regarding

the application of FSA time credits and the application of those credits regarding Mr. Brown. She

provided that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A)–(D),

[t]o apply the earned time credits, a prisoner must have (A) earned time credits

equal to the remainder of the imposed term of imprisonment, (B) shown a

demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or maintained a minimum or low recidivism

risk during the term of imprisonment, (C) had the remainder of the imposed term

of imprisonment computed, and (D) been assessed to be a minimum or low

recidivism risk level at the most recent assessment, or the two most recent

assessments.

[Id. at 5]. Mr. Brown asserts both in his petition and his objections that he is eligible for time

credits. Magistrate Judge Eifert assessed, “Brown is clearly incorrect, under the plain language of

the statute—only inmates with minimum or low recidivism risk levels are automatically eligible

to apply their FSA time credits.” [Id.]. Moreover, if an incarcerated individual lacks a minimum

or low recidivism risk level, a petition with the Warden for an individualized review and approval

must be submitted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(c)(2). Here, as

Magistrate Judge Eifert aptly pointed out, Mr. Brown is a medium recidivism risk level, and “he

has not had a petition to apply time credits approved by the Warden” and thus is not eligible for

the application of FSA credit. [Id. at 6].

However, Mr. Brown’s objection emphasizes, as did his complaint, that his score

would be low if not for the juvenile sex offense conviction from thirty years prior. [See generally

Doc. 14-1; see also Doc. 1 at 6]. Magistrate Judge Eifert addressed this concern in her PF&R when

she carefully examined the PATTERN assessment for Mr. Brown along with the FSA Recidivism

Risk Assessment. Mr. Brown purports the matter at the heart of his contention was a battery,

however, “records from the sentencing court indicate the conviction involved the sexual touching

of a female at a high school in 1993.” [Id. at 7]. As a result, the conviction was considered a “Walsh

w/Conviction” factor on Mr. Brown’s PATTERN worksheet, resulting in an additional two points

to his general recidivism score. [See Doc. 8-1 at 5]. Despite Mr. Brown’s continued efforts that the

Walsh application was in error, as Magistrate Judge Eifert noted, the application “[sic] comports

with BOP Policy Statement 5394.01, which states than an inmate with a conviction resulting from

unlawful sexual conduct will be designated as having a ‘Walsh Act History with Conviction.’”

[Doc. 10 at 7]. Furthermore, Mr. Brown stresses that juvenile status of the conviction precludes it

from his PATTERN assessment, yet, he (1) “does not cite any sources for this proposition” and

(2) Magistrate Judge Eifert could not “find any sources stating that, in assessing an inmate’s

recidivism risk, the BOP may not consider juvenile convictions and is limited to considering state

offenses which match the elements of a federal offense.” [Id. at 8].

Magistrate Judge Eifert noted Mr. Brown could be “referring to the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, which feature similar rules that apply when the sentencing court

determines a defendant’s criminal history score and career offender status.” [Id.; referencing

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b), Application Note 2; see also United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176, 180 (4th

Cir. 2021))]. Her hypothesis proved correct as Mr. Brown’s Letter-form Supplemental Response

suggests this was indeed what he was attempting to convey. [Doc. 15]. Specifically, Mr. Brown

states his belief that, “in accordance with the U.S.S.C. Guidelines Manual Section’s 4A1.2(k);

4A1.2(c)(2); 4A1.2(D); and 5H1.1, [he] should not have been assigned two points for the sentence

imposed in 1993 because that sentence was imposed more than ten years before [his] underlying

offense.” [Id. at 1]. Mr. Brown cites United States v. Vanderhost and implies his issue is similar

in nature. [Id.; see generally United States v. Vanderhorst, 927 F.3d 824, 824-830 (4th Cir. 2019)

(providing that a clerical error mischaracterizing a prior state conviction did not warrant a

resentencing)]. Despite his continuous efforts, Mr. Brown is mistaken -- the application of the

Walsh Act regarding his FSA is not clerical error. Thus, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36

and United States v. Vanderhost are not appropriate vehicles for the result Mr. Brown desires.

In addition to the thorough analysis within the PF&R, Magistrate Judge Eifert noted

even if Mr. Brown’s calculation was erroneous, “18 U.S.C. § 3625 seems to prohibit judicial

review of a prisoner’s PATTERN score or recidivism risk level.” [/d. at 9]. This Court agrees with

both Magistrate Judge Eifert and Respondent that “18 U.S.C. § 3625 excludes from judicial review

‘any determination, decision, or order’ made under Chapter 229, subchapter C—§§ 3621-3626.”

[/d.]. Notably, the “subchapter includes the implementation of the risk and needs assessment

system, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(h), and the BOP’s eligibility determinations with respect to the

application of FSA time credits. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1).” [7/d.].

Inasmuch as Mr. Brown relies on Tinker v. Des Moines, his reliance is

inappropriate. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 733-747

(1969) (providing students were protected under the First Amendment for certain rights of

expression and they did not lose this right unless substantial disruption to the educational

environment occurred)).

Based on the foregoing discussion and the contents of the PF&R, the Court

OVERRULES Mr. Brown’s objection.

IV.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion for an Extension of Time to Object

to the PF&R [Doc. 13], and DENIES Mr. Brown’s Objections to the PF&R [Doc. 14].

The Court directs the Clerk to transmit a copy of this Order to any counsel of record

and any unrepresented party.

ENTERED: January 2, 2025

BaZa