finding that a plaintiff who knew of defendants’ identities but named them as “two unknown deputies” in original complaint did not constitute a mistake, and thus, amended complaint did not relate back
How later courts described this case
- finding that a plaintiff who knew of defendants’ identities but named them as “two unknown deputies” in original complaint did not constitute a mistake, and thus, amended complaint did not relate back
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RAYMOND WASHINGTON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-6820
GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY, et al. SECTION: “G”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants Crum & Foster Insurance Company and United States Fire
Insurance Company’s (collectively “Moving Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim.1 Moving Defendants move to dismiss this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Moving Defendants argue that, while Plaintiff’s original petition was timely
filed against John Doe I, II, and III, Plaintiff failed to name or serve any defendants, and therefore
failed to interrupt prescription.3 Moving Defendants also argue that the law of the case doctrine
applies, and this Court’s prior decision to dismiss other defendants under the same circumstances
should govern this matter.4
The motion was set for submission on September 4, 2024. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.5, an
opposition to the motion was to be filed on or before August 27, 2024. To date, Plaintiff has not
filed a response to the instant motion. As such, the motion shall be deemed unopposed. This Court
1 Rec. Doc. 41.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1–2.
4 Id. at 2.
has authority to grant a motion as unopposed, although it not required to do so.5 Considering the
motion, the opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants Moving Defendants’
motion.
I. Background
On or around June 19, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered serious bodily injury while
attempting to unload stage equipment from Defendant Clark Transfer Inc.’s truck.6 It is alleged
that the driver of the Clark Transfer, Inc. vehicle, which housed the equipment, illegally parked
the truck against traffic.7 Plaintiff contends that while attempting to unload the equipment, the
unstable load dislodged and fell onto Plaintiff, causing injuries.8
On June 18, 2023, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a petition in the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans naming John Doe I, II, and III as defendants.9 On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff’s
attorneys filed an amended petition naming Clark Transfer, Inc., Great West Casualty Company,
and ABC Company as defendants.10 The amended petition was served upon Defendant Great West
Casualty Company through the Secretary of State on October 23, 2023.11 On November 15, 2023,
Defendants Clark Transfer, Inc. and Great West Casualty Company removed the matter to this
Court.12 On November 21, 2023, Defendants Clark Transfer, Inc. and Great West Casualty
5 Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993).
6 Rec. Doc. 7-1 at 4.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 8.
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id. at 1.
12 Rec. Doc. 7.
Company filed a Motion to Dismiss.13 On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended and
Supplemental Complaint adding Saenger Theatre Partnership, LTD, The Ambassador Theatre
Group US Holdings, Inc., and United State Fire Insurance as defendants.14 On May 22, 2024, the
Court granted the motion dismissing Defendants Clark Transfer, Inc. and Great West Casualty
Company, finding that Plaintiff’s clams were prescribed.15
On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint against named Defendants
Saenger Theatre Master Tenant, LLC, The Ambassador Theatre Group North, Inc., and Crum &
Foster Specialty Insurance Company.16 On August 9, 2024, Moving Defendants filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss.17 To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the instant motion. As such, the
motion shall be deemed unopposed.
II. Moving Defendants’ Arguments in Support of Motion
First, Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are prescribed under Louisiana Civil
Code articles 3492 and 3462 because Plaintiff failed to bring an action against Moving Defendants
within the one-year prescriptive period.18 Moving Defendants argue that the injury-producing
event allegedly occurred on June 19, 2022, and thus, Plaintiff had until June 19, 2023, to file suit
against any joint tortfeasor.19 Moving Defendants contend that because no action was filed against
13 Rec. Doc. 10.
14 Rec. Doc. 22.
15 Rec. Doc. 26.
16 Rec. Doc. 38.
17 Rec. Doc. 41.
18 Rec. Doc. 41-1 at 3–4.
19 Id. at 4.
any named joint tortfeasor by June 19, 2023, Plaintiff failed to interrupt prescription, and the one-
year prescriptive period for delictual actions has prescribed.20
Next, Moving Defendants assert that the amended complaints do not relate back to the
original petition because Plaintiff initially named only fictitious parties as defendants.21 Moving
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims fail to interrupt prescription because there were no real
parties served within the prescriptive period, or within one year of the alleged injury.22
Finally, Moving Defendants argue that the doctrine of law of the case applies to the instant
motion.23 Moving Defendants contend that other defendants in this matter filed a motion to
dismiss on the same basis argued in the instant motion.24 As such, Moving Defendants assert that
because this Court has already ruled that Plaintiff’s claims have prescribed as to previous co-
defendants, the same ruling should govern its determination in the instant motion.25
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”26 A motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”27 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 6.
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
27 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
plausible on its face.’”28 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”29 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow
the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”30
On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,
and all facts pleaded are taken as true.31 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded
facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.32 “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”33
Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” will not suffice.34 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it
must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action.35 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”36 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough
factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each
28 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
29 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
30 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
31 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
32 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
33 Id. at 679.
34 Id. at 678.
35 Id.
36 Id.
element of the asserted claims.37 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”
bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.38
IV. Analysis
A. Law-of-the-Case Doctrine
Moving Defendants argue that the law-of-the-case doctrine is applicable and supports
dismissal. According to the law of the case doctrine, “‘when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issue in subsequent stages in the same case.’”39
“The doctrine is ‘based upon sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that
should be the end of the matter.’”40 “[H]owever, this doctrine is not mandatory,” because this
doctrine “is a matter of judicial discretion rather than judicial power when a court is reviewing its
own prior decision.”41
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit determined that “‘a district court is not precluded by the law-
of-the-case doctrine from reconsidering previous rulings on interlocutory orders such as summary
judgment motions.’”42 “[U]nder Rule 54(b), the district court ‘possesses the inherent procedural
power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be
37 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
38 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,
2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
39 Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d
321, 326 (5th Cir. 1999)).
40 Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. &
Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198 (1950)).
41 Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 169 F.3d 281,
283 (5th Cir. 1999)).
42 Lonatro v. Levee, 809 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (E.D. La. 2011) (citing Louisiana v. Guidry, 489 F.3d 692, 698
(5th Cir. 2007)).
sufficient.’”43 A court may revise an interlocutory order “‘at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.’”44 Ultimately, the law of
the case doctrine aims to ensure consistency and prevent unnecessary reexamination of issues
already decided within the same lawsuit.45
On May 22, 2024, this Court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim against
defendants, Great West Casualty Company and Clark Transfer, Inc., because Plaintiff’s claims
against these defendants were prescribed and did not relate back in accordance with Rule
15(c)(1)(C).46 Because this motion to dismiss does not concern the same defendants and the
previous motion to dismiss did not adjudicate all of Plaintiff’s claims, it was an interlocutory
order,47 and this Count is not bound to apply its previous interlocutory order. The doctrine of law
of the case provides that once a district court makes a noninterlocutory ruling on a legal issue, that
ruling binds that parties during the remainder of the case until the court modifies it based on a
proper request for reconsideration, or an appellate court reverses or modifies the ruling.48
Because this Court’s prior ruling was interlocutory, the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable.
43 Gulf Fleet Tiger Acquasition, L.L.C. v. Thomas-Sea Ship Builders, L.L.C., 282 F.R.D. 146, 151 (E.D. La.
2012) (citing Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1991)).
44 Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Palm Energy Offshore, L.L.C., No. 10-4151, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53534, at *9-10 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2013) (citing Gulf S. Mach., Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., No. 97-0065, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2078, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 1999)).
45 Id. at *9.
46 Rec. Doc. 26 at 12; Great W. Cas. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91544, at *14.
47 Ctr. for Restorative Breast Surgery, L.L.C., v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of La., No. 11-806, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48367, at *8 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2016).
48 Robert A. Matthews, Jr., § 38:105. Law-of-the-case doctrine, 6 Annotated Patent Digest § 38:105.
B. Prescription
Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are prescribed because the Amended
Complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original petition. The underlying incident which
allegedly caused Plaintiff’s injuries occurred on June 19, 2022.49 Plaintiff filed the original petition
on June 18, 2023, naming John Doe I, II, and III as defendants.50 On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed
a Third Amended Complaint naming Moving Defendants Crum & Foster Specialty Insurance
Company and United States Fire Insurance Company.51
Under federal law, adding a new defendant generally does not relate back to the filing of
the original complaint unless Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) applies.52 Also, under
Louisiana law the addition of a new defendant does not relate back to the original complaint unless
a misnomer situation as described in Rule 15(c)(1)(C) applies.53
Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, tort claims are subject to a one-year
prescriptive period. This period “commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained.”54
The Fifth Circuit has instructed that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of prescription
should not be granted unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
49 Rec. Doc. 7-1.
50 Id.
51 Rec. Doc. 38.
52 Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co. of Illinois, 445 F.3d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted)
(referring to old Rule 15(c)(3), which was renumbered in 2007 without substantive change “as part of the general
restyling of the Civil Rules,” at which time it received its current placement in Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Advisory
Committee’s 2007 Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15).
53 Id. at 806–07 (citing Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (La. 1983)).
54 La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”55 Pleadings and briefs of pro se litigants
are interpreted liberally “to afford all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from them.”56
An amended complaint may “relate back” to an original complaint for statute of limitations
(or prescription) purposes. Whether an amended complaint relates back to an original complaint is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which states in relevant part:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back
to the date of the original pleading when:
…
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on
the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it,
but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.57
Thus, for Plaintiff to establish that the amended complaint relates back to the original petition, he
must demonstrate that the amended complaint satisfies Rule 15(c)(1)(B)–(C).
First, the amended complaint does “assert[] a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.”58 The
amended petition and original petition both reference the June 19, 2022 incident whereby Plaintiff
was allegedly injured while unloading equipment.59 The parties do not dispute whether the
55 Abdul-Alim Amin v. Universal Life Ins. Co. of Memphis, Tenn., 706 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1983).
56 In re Tex. Pig Stands, Inc., 610 F.3d 937, 941 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 2002)).
57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
58 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
59 See Rec. Doc. 7-1.
amended complaint arises out of the same occurrence set forth in the original petition. As such,
the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) are satisfied.
Next, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) provides that within the period prescribed for serving a summons
and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment “(i) has received such notice of the action
that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits, and (ii) knew or should have known that
the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” If the statute of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is unable to show that the
defendant received notice within the Rule 4 service period, the proposed amendment will not be
allowed to relate back.60
As set forth in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i), the party to be brought in by amendment must receive such
notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits. Plaintiff filed
the original petition on June 18, 2023.61 The record indicates that summons were issued to
be served upon Moving Defendants on June 18, 2024,62 365 days after the original petition
was filed. Thus, Moving Defendants did not receive notice within the 90-day period for
service provided by Rule 4(m).
The Court turns to whether Moving Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff
would have brought the action against them but for a “mistake” concerning the proper party’s
identity. In considering this question, the Fifth Circuit has noted that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) permits an
amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint because:
a legitimate legal claim should not be squelched by a party mistakenly identifying
the party to be sued.... The classic example of mistake is misnomer; that is, when a
plaintiff misnames or misidentifies a party in its pleadings but correctly serves that
party. In these cases, relation back is appropriate because the defendant is already
60 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498.1 Relation Back of Amendments Changing
Parties—The Notice Requirement (3d edition, 2023).
61 Rec. Doc. 7-1.
62 Rec. Doc. 39.
before the court.... In some cases, a legal mistake can lead to misnomer, as when a
plaintiff names an institutional defendant because of confusion as to whether an
individual or an institutional defendant is the proper party, but the individual is
properly served and, therefore, has notice of the mistake. In contrast, a conscious
choice to sue one party and not another does not constitute a mistake and is not a
basis for relation back.63
One of the areas in which the courts have struggled in determining whether this last
requirement has been met involves complaints, similar to Plaintiff’s original petition, that include
“John Doe” defendants when the plaintiff later seeks to substitute the name of a real party for the
fictional defendant listed in the complaint. The Fifth Circuit has held that in these circumstances
it is clear that the plaintiff's failure to name the correct defendant at the outset was not due to a
mistake but resulted from a lack of knowledge, and thus, did not fall within the language of the
rule.64 As such, under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, Plaintiff’s naming of John Doe defendants
does not constitute a “mistake” as to Moving Defendants’ identities under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).65
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s naming of
John Doe defendants does not constitute a “mistake” as to Moving Defendants’ identities, and
thus, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original petition. As
such, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Crum & Foster Insurance Company and United States
Fire Insurance Company must be dismissed as they are prescribed.
63 Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 379.
64 See Balle v. Nueces County, Texas, 952 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133
F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 1998)) (“However, when a plaintiff names a John Doe defendant, there is no mistake in
identifying the correct defendant; rather, the problem is not being able to identify that defendant.”) (cleaned up); see
also Miller v. Mancuso, 388 F. App’x 389 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a plaintiff who knew of defendants’ identities
but named them as “two unknown deputies” in original complaint did not constitute a mistake, and thus, amended
complaint did not relate back).
65 Balle, 952 F.3d at 557.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Crum & Foster
Insurance Company and United States Fire Insurance Company are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 39th gay of December, 2024.
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12