recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TAMARA L. SOBOLEWSKI, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01396
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd
)
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, )
)
Defendant. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tamara Sobolewski seeks damages for alleged employment
discrimination from Defendant Ford Motor Company, her former employer. Ford
moves to dismiss Ms. Sobolewski’s complaint on the grounds that her claims are time
barred and unexhausted. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
From 1992 to 2020, Ms. Sobolewski worked as a vehicle assembly technician
for Ford. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9 & 49, PageID #4 & #12.) In March 2020, Ford terminated
Ms. Sobolewski for allegedly making a threatening post on social media. (Id.,
¶¶ 45–51, PageID #11–12.) Ms. Sobolewski maintains that she did not make the post
and that it was the result of her account being hacked. (Id., ¶¶ 42–43, PageID #10.)
Ms. Sobolewski alleges that Ford terminated her in retaliation for grievances she
filed against the company and for other protected activity in which she engaged. (Id.,
¶¶ 19–187, PageID #6–40.) Also, she claims that Ford took a number of adverse
actions against her based on disability, age, and sex. (ECF No. 9, PageID #1377.)
Since her termination in 2020, Ms. Sobolewski filed numerous complaints with
different administrative bodies. The complaints relevant to the present lawsuit are—
• A complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor filed on February
7, 2020 alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF
No. 9-1, PageID #1385.) The Department of Labor transferred the case to the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id.) The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission did not find that a violation of Title VII
occurred and dismissed the complaint. (ECF No. 9-2, PageID #1386.)
• Three charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, each
dismissed because the Commission was unable to find that discrimination
occurred. (ECF No. 9-4, PageID #1417–31; ECF No. 9-5, PageID #1432–33;
ECF No. 9-8, PageID #1445–49.)
On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit without the assistance of a
lawyer. (ECF No. 1.) She maintains that Ford retaliated against her and engaged in
discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Ford violated Title VII,
breached the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and intentionally inflicted
emotional distress. (See generally id.) The Court reads Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
as stating claims for: (1) violation of Title VII, (2) breach of the collective bargaining
agreement, (3) judicial review of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s three decisions,
and (4) a State-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ford moves
to dismiss the complaint claiming that the lawsuit is time barred and that she failed
to exhausted her administrative remedies before proceeding with litigation. (ECF
No. 9, PageID #1370.)
ANALYSIS
Pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are “liberally construed,” and
a “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, “the
lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991)). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and
courts are not required to make allegations on their behalf or create claims for them
that they have not spelled out in their pleading. Bassett v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73
F. App'x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic
pleading essentials”).
In any civil action, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible,
when measured against the elements” of the claim. Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d
440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. American Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 345–46
(6th Cir. 2016)). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the “realm
of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.
When analyzing a complaint under this standard, the Court construes factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and
draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ohio v. United States, 849
F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2017). But a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and
conclusions,” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court
required to accept “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual allegations[.]” Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634
(6th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Court must distinguish between well-pled factual
allegations, which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not
be. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court’s inquiry is limited to the content
of the complaint, although it may also consider matters of public record, orders, items
appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to or made part of the
complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).
I. The Title VII Claim
Before bringing a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff generally must file
a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Amini, 259
F.3d at 498 (citing Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d
394, 407 (6th Cir. 1999)). In Ohio, a plaintiff must file her charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission “within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory
act.” Alexander, 177 F.3d at 407; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Once the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission receives a charge, it has jurisdiction over it
for 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177
F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999). During the 180-day period, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission will investigate the charge to determine whether there is
“reasonable cause” to believe discrimination occurred. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, 177
F.3d at 456. If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission finds reasonable
cause, it can either sue on behalf of the employee or issue a right-to-sue letter. Id. If
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does not find reasonable cause, an
employee can request a right-to-sue letter. Id. The employee cannot file suit until
she receives a right-to-sue letter. Id. (citing Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143
F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Here, Ms. Sobolewski’s claims stem from the events leading up to her
termination on March 2, 2020. On February 7, 2020, she filed a timely charge with
the U.S. Department of Labor, which transferred the charge to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. (ECF No. 9-1, PageID #1385.) On October 6,
2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dismissed the charge and
issued a right-to-sue letter. (ECF No. 9–2, PageID #1386.) According to the right-to-
sue letter, Ms. Sobolewski had ninety days to file a lawsuit. (Id.) She filed the present
lawsuit on August 15, 2024, over three years after her ninety days had elapsed. (ECF
No.1.) Therefore, Ms. Soboleski’s claim is untimely.
II. Breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Ms. Sobolewski appears to claim that Ford violated the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 164–165, PageID #36.) Disputes over a
collective bargaining agreement have a six-month statute of limitations period.
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–71 (1983). The time
to file suit starts to run when the employee discovers or should have discovered the
employer’s final action. Robinson v. Central Brass Mfg. Co., 987 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th
Cir. 1993). Here, Ford’s final action discharging Ms. Sobolewski occurred on March
2, 2020. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 45–51, PageID #11–12.) Therefore, Ms. Sobolewski’s
challenge in 2024 to Ford’s actions under the collective bargaining agreement comes
too late.
III. The State-Law Claims
“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of
considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims.” Musson
Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (6th Cir. 1996).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim [if it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” The Court should retain jurisdiction “only in cases where the interests
of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh [the]
concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Columbus, 423 F. App’x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping
Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)). In exercising this discretion, the Court
may consider the convenience to the parties and judicial economy in resolving the
case. Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2000).
III.A. Review of the Decisions by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
Because Ms. Sobolewski’s request for judicial review of the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission is clearly untimely, the Court exercises its discretion to resolve this claim
in the interest of judicial economy. Under Section 4112.06 of the Ohio Revised Code,
a party may seek judicial review of a decision from the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
On February 11, 2021, April 1, 2021, and March 2, 2024, respectively, the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission dismissed the three charges that Ms. Sobolewski brought. (ECF
No. 9-4, PageID #1430–31; ECF No. 9-5, PageID #1432–33; ECF No. 9-8, PageID
#1448–49.) Each decision provided her with a notice of her right to petition for
judicial review and expressly stated that she had thirty days to seek judicial review
of the decision. Ms. Sobolewski’s filing of her complaint on August 15, 2024, over
three years after the first two thirty-day periods elapsed, is untimely, as is her suit
over the third.
II.C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
That leaves Ms. Sobolewski’s State-law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 138–44, PageID #30–31.) Again, in the interest of
judicial economy and bringing the dispute between the parties to an end, the Court
exercises its discretion to adjudicate this claim. To plead and prove a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Ohio law requires a plaintiff to show “(1)
that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff serious emotional distress, (2) that
the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, and (3) that the defendant’s
conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s serious emotional distress.” Phung v.
Waste Mgt. Inc., 71 Ohio St. 3d 408, 410, 1994-Ohio-389, 644 N.E.2d 286, 289 (citation
omitted). A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must meet a
reasonable-person standard. That is, the emotional distress that the plaintiff suffers
must be of such a nature that “no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.”
Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App. 3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 98, 103 (8th Dist. 1983) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965)). The Sixth Circuit notes the
“emotional anguish” requirement is a demanding standard requiring emotional
injury to be both severe and debilitating. 180 Indus., LLC v. Brunner Firm Co. LPA,
No. 20-419, 2021 WL 4955268, at *2 (6th Cir. July 13, 2021) (quoting Paugh v. Hanks,
451 NE.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983)).
However distressing the conduct of which Ms. Sobolewski complains was to
her, and however distressing she found it, her complaint makes clear that the events
at issue fall far short of the standard that Ohio law requires. Therefore, the Court
determines as a matter of law that she fails to state a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 9.)
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 26, 2024
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio