RP Wynstone, LP v. NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RP WYNSTONE, LP, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION

NO. 24-959

NEW HANOVER TOWNSHIP, ET AL.,

Defendant.

OPINION

Slomsky, J. December 23, 2024

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 3

II. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................... 3

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 5

A. Allegations Made by All Plaintiffs in This Case ............................................................. 5

B. Allegations in State Court Are Asserted as Background Information in This Case ........ 6

1. RP Wynstone’s Initial New Development Plans Are Preliminarily

Approved and the Parties Agree on Ordinances That Would Apply ............................ 6

2. RP Wynstone’s Alleged Compliance With Township Ordinances .............................. 6

3. RP Wynstone Eventually Contends That the Township

Was Deliberately Trying to Thwart Its Plans ............................................................... 8

4. The Pending State Cases Seek to Void Ordinances

and to Order the Township to Reconsider Development Plans .................................... 8

5. Plaintiffs Provident and RPE Allege They Received

Similar Treatment From Township Officials .............................................................. 11

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................... 12

V. THE MOTION TO STAY THIS CASE ........................................................................... 13

VI. RELEVANT LAW .............................................................................................................. 14

A. Factors Pertinent to Whether a Stay Is Appropriate ....................................................... 14

B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine ................................................................................. 15

VII. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................................... 17

A. Factors Pertinent to Whether a Stay Is Appropriate

Weigh Against Abstention in This Case ......................................................................... 17

1. While Many Facts in the Prior State Cases Overlap With This Case,

They Merely Provide Background Information,

Not Total Identity of Parties and Issues ..................................................................... 17

2. The Court Need Not Stay the Case in the Interest of Comity .................................... 19

3. The Court Need Not Stay the Case in the Interest of Judicial Efficiency

Because the State Cases Are Not Parallel to This Case .............................................. 20

4. The Court Need Not Stay the Case to Avoid

Alleged Prejudice to the Party Opposing the Stay ...................................................... 21

B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply Here ............................................. 22

1. This Case Will Not Interfere With the State Cases,

Which Is a Threshold Issue for the Court to Consider

in Determining Whether Younger Abstention Applies Here ...................................... 22

2. Although the Ongoing State Cases Implicate State Interests,

a Stay Is Not Warranted Because the State Cases Do Not

Address the Alleged Constitutional Violations ........................................................... 23

3. This Case Involves Allegations of Constitutional and Civil Rights

Violations Not Claimed in Any of the State Cases ........................................................... 24

VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 24

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the facts of this case seem complicated, the story, for purposes of the Motion to

Stay Proceedings that is before the Court, is simple.1 Plaintiffs had plans to develop approximately

203 acres of land in New Hanover Township in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. One Plaintiff

received Preliminary Approval of its development plan from the Township. Other Plaintiffs

believed their plans would also be approved. They all proceeded to implement them. Then, things

got complicated by certain actions of Defendants, some with approval authority, leading some

Plaintiffs to file ten (10) cases in state court. In those cases, Plaintiffs question either the validity

of the applicable state ordinances or the application of those ordinances to their development plans.

Not satisfied with just filing those lawsuits, Plaintiffs in the state cases teamed with others in filing

this case in federal court. They allege that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate

their rights under provisions of the United States Constitution because, among other things,

Defendants wish to keep out minority residents from New Hanover Township. Now, Defendants

want this Court to stay this case until the pending state cases are completed. For the following

reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay (Doc. No. 33) will be denied.

II. PARTIES

Plaintiffs are landowners of various parcels of property in New Hanover Township. They

consist of entities and individuals, totaling nine (9) plaintiffs. They are grouped together as

follows:

• RP Wynstone, LP (“RP Wynstone”) and the following related entities:

o AT Realty, LP (“AT Realty”)

o AKM Properties, LP (“AKM Properties”)

1 The Motion was filed by the “Township Defendants,” named below.

o Trollyline Enterprises, LP (“Trollyline”)

o General Hancock Partnership Enterprises, LP (“General Hancock”)

• Real Pro Enterprises, LP (“RPE”)

• Provident Trust Group, LLC for the benefit of the following related individuals:

o Benjamin Goldthorp Roth IRA

o Clayton Heckler IRA

There are seventeen (17) Defendants in this case, which can be divided into three (3)

groups. The first group, (collectively “Township Defendants”), are as follows:

• The Board of Supervisors of New Hanover Township (the “Board”)

• the following Township officials (the “Individual Defendants”):

o William Ross Snook (“Supervisor Snook”)

o Kurt Zebrowski (“Supervisor Zebrowski”)

o Marie Livelsberger (“Supervisor Livelsberger”)

o Boone Flint (“Supervisor Flint”)

o Charles Garner (“Supervisor Garner”)

o Jamie Gwynn (“Manager Gwynn”)

• as well as the following other Township officials:

o Thomas Miskiewicz (“Authority Chair Miskiewicz”)

o William Moyer (“Planning Member Moyer”)

o Susan Smith (“Planning Vice Chair Smith”)

o Russel Oister (“Planning Chair Oister”)

• New Hanover Township (the “Township”)

• New Hanover Township Authority (“Sewer Authority”)

The second group of Defendants (“Cedarville Defendants”) are as follows:

• Cedarville Engineering Group, LLC (“Cedarville”) and its related individual:

o Robert Flinchbaugh (“Flinchbaugh”)

The third group of Defendants (“Knight Defendants”) are as follows:

• Knight Engineering Inc. (“Knight”) and its related individual

o Daniel Gray (“Gray”)

(See Compl. at ¶¶ 12–36.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Allegations Made by All Plaintiffs in This Case

Plaintiffs assert Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ federal civil

rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As alleged in the Complaint, Defendants thwarted their

development plans by reviewing their applications in bad faith as well as enacting ordinances and

manipulating the applicability of those ordinances to place obstacles in Plaintiffs’ path, in violation

of Plaintiffs’ property rights. (See Doc. No. 50 [“Amended Complaint” or “Compl.”] at ¶¶ 3, 4,

352–56). Plaintiffs further claim the alleged misconduct was extreme and outrageous and guided

by racial animus—insofar as Defendants wanted to prevent any increase in the population of racial

minorities in a town that is 95% white—in violation of the Equal Protection and Substantive Due

Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See id. at ¶¶ 5,

319–350.) For these violations, Defendants seek monetary and injunctive relief. (See id.)

B. Allegations in State Court Are Asserted as Background

Information in This Case

1. RP Wynstone’s Initial New Development Plans Are

Preliminarily Approved and the Parties Agree

on Ordinances That Would Apply

On July 13, 2005, Plaintiff RP Wynstone submitted plans to Defendant New Hanover

Township to develop a mixed-use “Town Center” on approximately 203 acres, including

residential dwelling units of various types. (Compl. at ¶ 95; Doc. No. 48-1 at 3, 4, Case No. 2020-

283, Notice of Appeal at ¶¶ 3–5.) On October 22, 2007, preliminary approval of the plans was

granted (the “Preliminary Approval”). (Compl. at ¶ 96; Doc. No. 48-2 at 6, Case No. 2020-5348

Compl. at ¶¶ 9, 11.) During the twelve (12) years that followed, RP Wynstone submitted to the

Township eight (8) revisions to the development plans. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 117, 150; Doc. No. 48-

2 at 3, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 12.) The parties had agreed the revised plans would be

subject to municipal ordinances in effect when the first plans were submitted (the “2005

Ordinances”) as well as Ordinances 06-02, 06-05, and 07-08 (the “Additional Ordinances”). (See

Compl. at ¶ 149; Doc. No. 48-2 at 2–3, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 9, citing Section 2 of

Resolution no. 58-07).2

2. RP Wynstone’s Alleged Compliance With Township Ordinances

On October 9, 2019, a manager for Defendant Township issued a letter asserting that RP

Wynstone’s clearing of land in preparation for development was in violation of the current Soil

Erosion, Sedimentation, and Grading Control Ordinance (the “E&S Ordinance”) and the Storm

Water Management Ordinance (the “SWM Ordinance”). (Compl. at ¶ 198; Doc. No. 48-1 at 3,

Case No. 2020-283, Notice of Appeal at ¶ 15.). The letter directed RP Wynstone to come into

2 Resolution no. 58-07 was later corrected from 06-05 to 05-06 so the “Additional Ordinances”

are 05-06, 06-02, and 07-08. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 6; Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 10.)

compliance or face enforcement action by the Township. (Compl. at ¶ 199; Doc. No. 48-1, Case

No. 2020-283, Notice of Appeal at ¶ 15.) Moreover, on the eighth revised plan, the Township

claimed “for the first time that the Additional Ordinances [did] not apply [requiring] significant

alteration of the revised plans, which comprise 187 plan sheets of detailed engineering design and

specifications.” (Compl. at ¶ 151; Doc. No. 48-2 at 6; Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 20.)

To avoid losing the protections afforded by the Preliminary Approval, RP Wynstone asked

for a one-year extension of the Preliminary Approval’s April 20, 2020 expiration date. (Compl. at

¶ 152; see Doc. No. 48-2 at 5, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 29.) Although the Township’s

Board of Supervisors voted on November 7, 2019 to grant the extension, the Township then

declared the extension void. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 6, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 32.) RP

Wynstone alleges this change could only have happened because (1) the granting of the extension

was designed to allow the Preliminary Approval to expire or (2) the Township acted without

authority. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 6–7, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at ¶ 33.) The inconsistent positions

taken by the Township created two potential expiration dates: April 22, 2020 and an open-ended

extension for review of the revised plans. (Doc. No. 48-2 at 7, Case No. 2020-5348 Compl. at

¶ 35.)

Another main point of contention among the parties involved changes to the Sump Pump

Ordinance. Plaintiffs claim the ordinance essentially prohibits basements in new developments.

(Compl. at ¶ 140; Doc. No. 48-9 at 8–9, Compl. at ¶¶ 32–37.) The ordinance dictated how much

water per day per sump pump (a device that removes water from the basement of a building to

prevent flooding and water damage) a developer would need to accommodate for when designing

stormwater management facilities to prepare for development. (Doc. No. 48-9 at 8, Compl. at

¶ 32.) The required amount of water was changed, purportedly as a correction of a typographical

error, from 4,000 gallons of water to 4,000 cubic square feet of water, which equals 29,922 gallons

of water. (Compl. at ¶ 130; Doc. No. 48-9; Case No. 2022-01135, Compl. at ¶¶ 32–37). After

acknowledging the mistake, the Township adopted Ordinance No. 22-01 (the Amended Sump

Pump Ordinance), but then decided to increase the amount of water that must be accommodated

per sump pump even more. (Doc. No. 48-9; Case No. 2022-01135, Compl. at ¶¶ 38–41). Absent

the Sump Pump Ordinance, Plaintiffs would have proposed building residential units with

basements that utilize certain sump pumps. (Case No. 2022-01135, Compl. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs

allege that “the sump pump flow calculation is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, unnecessary,

unduly restrictive, confiscatory, not a valid exercise of the Township’s police power, and bears no

relation to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.” (Id. at ¶ 47.)

3. RP Wynstone Eventually Contends That the Township

Was Deliberately Trying to Thwart Its Plans

RP Wynstone avers that through the Township’s conduct, it “has obstructed, delayed, and

refused to diligently and fairly process the plan revisions” based on the terms of the Preliminary

Approval. (Id. at ¶ 56.) RP Wynstone claims the Township breached their duty of good faith by

“refusing to provide guidance regarding the ordinances which govern the latest revised plan

submission . . . [and] providing inconsistent, conflicting, and erroneous interpretations regarding

the status and legal implications of the Preliminary Approval.” (Id. at ¶ 59.)

4. The Pending State Cases Seek to Void Ordinances and to Order

the Township to Reconsider Development Plans

Based upon Defendants’ alleged conduct in thwarting Plaintiffs’ development plans, some

Plaintiffs filed ten (10) suits in Pennsylvania state court. These cases were filed before this case

was filed in this court. Plaintiffs seek the following relief from state courts:

(1) to order Defendant Township to allow Plaintiff RP Wynstone to install required

stormwater management facilities in accordance with an appropriate permit without interference

or obstruction by the Township (see Doc. No. 48-1 at 10; Case No. 2020-283, Notice of Appeal at

¶ 28);

(2) to order the Defendant Township to review Plaintiff RP Wynstone’s revised plans

pursuant to the terms originally agreed to by the parties, declare that the Preliminary Approval

remains in full force, and appoint a neutral master to consider, oversee, and decide on the pending

plans (see Doc. No. 48-2 at 16; Case No. 2020-5348, Compl. at ¶ 63);

(3) to reverse the Board’s rejection of Plaintiff RP Wynstone’s revised plan sheets and

order Defendant Township to accept and process the plan sheets (see Doc. No. 48-3 at 7; Case No.

2021-3311, Notice of Appeal);

(4) to declare that Ordinance No. 21-03 is void3 (see Doc. No. 48-4 at 11; In re Appeal of

RP Wynstone, LP From the Enactment of New Hanover Township Ordinance No. 21-03, Case

No. 2021-5996);

(5) to order Defendant Township “to accept and review the 4 revised plan sheets submitted

… as a further revision of the subdivision and land development application submitted . . . award

money damages and counsel fees for the bad faith, dilatory, vexatious, and obdurate actions of the

Township . . . [and to] appoint a neutral master to consider, oversee, and decide on the pending

subdivision and land development application and [Plaintiff RP Wynstone’s] plans.” (Doc. No.

48-5 at 9–10; Case No. 2021-7294, Compl. at ¶ 34.)

(6) Plaintiff Real Pro Enterprises LP (“RPE”) asks the court to declare the following:4

3 Ordinance No. 21-03 omits particular residential uses (“B2 Atrium House” and “B2

Townhouse”) permitted in a district where RP Wynstone’s property is located and also omits

particular residential uses (“B2 Twins” and “B2 Atrium House”) as uses permitted in another

district where RP Wynstone owns property. (See Doc. No. 49-1 at 155, Ex. 7.)

4 Real Pro Enterprises LP has also gone by the name Forest Manor Apartments, Inc. (See

generally, Doc. No. 48-6 at 9; Case No. 2021-9306, Compl.)

Defendants [New Hanover Township and the Sewer Authority] are not permitted

to charge sewer rental charges for any Reserved Equivalent Dwelling Units

(“EDUs”) that are not connected to the Facility”; “Defendants may not charge more

than $25 per year for each of the Reserved EDUs that are not connected to the

Facility until said EDUs are physically connected”; “Defendants’ charges for the

Reserved EDUs to FMI, Windlestrae and ARED were improper and illegal;

Defendants owe RPE a refund for the improperly collected sewer rental charges

since 2017 in the amount of $189,500.

(Doc. No. 48-6 at 9; Case No. 2021-9306, Compl. at ¶ 43.)

RPE also seeks the following monetary relief pursuant to 72 P.S. §5566b:5 “the return of

$189,500 plus statutory interest which represents the amounts improperly collected by Defendants

for sewer rental charges for the Reserved EDUs that were not connected to the Facility. (Doc. No.

48-6 at 10–11; Case No. 2021-9306, Compl. at ¶¶ 46, 47.) Finally, RPE seeks $189,500 plus

statutory interest for their breach of contract claim. (Id. at ¶ 53.)

(7) Appellant RPE and Select Properties, Inc., seek an order from the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania sustaining their appeal of Appellee Township’s Board of Supervisors’ denial of its

development plan, reversing the Board’s denial, and remanding the application to the Board to be

stayed pending resolution of a procedural challenge. (Doc. No. 48-7 at 11–12; Case No. 2021-

16890, Notice of Appeal at ¶ 50.)

(8) Appellant RP Wynstone seeks a reversal of Appellee Board’s denial of its land

development plans, an appointment of a referee to receive additional evidence relating to the

5 72 P.S. §5566b provides in relevant part:

(a) Whenever any person or corporation of this Commonwealth has paid . . . into

the treasury of any political subdivision, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or under

protest, any taxes of any sort, license fees, penalties, fines or any other moneys to

which the political subdivision is not legally entitled, then . . . the proper authorities

of the political subdivision, upon the filing with them of a written and verified claim

for the refund of the payment, are hereby directed to . . . refund of such taxes, license

fees, penalties, fines or other moneys . . .

conduct of the Township and for further review, and consideration of the revised plans under the

2005 Ordinances as amended by the Additional Ordinances. (Doc. 48-8 at 41; Case No. 2021-

24529, Notice of Appeal at ¶ 187.)

(9) Plaintiffs RP Wynstone and RPE seek a declaration that the Stormwater Management

Ordinance 23-410.23.A.2.a enacted by Defendant Township is invalid, arbitrary, and

unenforceable. (Doc. No. 48-9 at 17; Case No. 2022-01135, Compl. at ¶ 52.)

(10) Plaintiff RP Wynstone asks the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas to

declare that Plaintiff has sole ownership in the sewer capacity Equivalent Dwelling Units for the

Sewer Properties and to grant such other and further relief as may be proper including an award of

counsel fees for the bad faith actions of Defendant Township. (Doc. No. 48-10 at 17; Case No.

2023-6048, Compl. ¶ at 63.)

5. Plaintiffs Provident and RPE Allege They Received

Similar Treatment From Township Officials

According to the Complaint, while all of the back and forth was happening with RP

Wynstone, Plaintiff Provident’s development plans were also thwarted by Defendants’ “bait-and-

switch” tactics concerning which ordinances would apply to their development plans. This mainly

concerned the applicability of the Sump Pump Ordinance:

On or about June 5, 2020, Provident entered into an agreement with a residential

homebuilder to subdivide and develop the parcel of the property at issue that is

owned by Provident with single-family residential dwelling units that included

basements. Because of the excessive requirements of the Sump Pump Ordinance,

the residential homebuilder determined that it was not economically feasible to

develop the property at the price per lot and terminated the agreement on January

19, 2021. If not for the excessive and unreasonable Sump Pump Ordinance,

Provident would be able to develop the Provident Property with basements.

(Compl. at ¶¶ 300–02.)

Similarly, Plaintiff RPE complains the Township “hindered and obstructed” their

development efforts by failing to give their application thorough proper review, among other

“inequitable treatment,” which is alleged in the Complaint as follows:

• first, improperly refusing to extend a routine extension on the final approval of a

development plan granted in 2015 based on the plan’s noncompliance with an ordinance

that was not enacted at the time and would not apply even if it had been enacted;

• then, enacting the excessive Sump Pump Ordinance, without notice or review, effectively

prohibiting basements, which the proposed townhouses on the RPE Property included;

• then, after RPE filed a complaint asserting a statutory challenge to the Sump Pump

Ordinance, with the newly placed roadblock to development at risk of invalidation, the

Township adopted yet another roadblock, namely Ordinance 21-01, deleting a permitted

use in the R-15 residential zoning district, where the RPE Property sat at the time;

• then, after RPE filed a notice of appeal challenging the validity of Ordinance 21-01 and

submitted a new application assuming Ordinance 21-01 would be invalidated, the

Township attempted to cure the procedural defect of Ordinance 21-01 by enacting

Ordinance 21-04, which purports to accomplish the same thing as Ordinance 21-01;

• then, in order to make the development subject to the newly enacted, again procedurally

defective, Ordinance 21-04, despite pending actions challenging the Sump Pump

Ordinance and Ordinance 21-01, the Township ignored RPE’s written time extension

waiver and denied RPE’s new application based on RPE’s noncompliance with Ordinance

21-01.

(Compl. at ¶ 254.)

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging (1) a violation of the

Substantive Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and (3) Civil Conspiracy.6 (Doc. No. 1.) On May 1, 2024, Township Defendants filed a Motion

6 The same statements appear in the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 50) under the same

paragraph numbers, and this is true throughout this Opinion. Leave to file the Amended

Complaint was given only as a means for Plaintiffs to define Parties for the Court more clearly.

to Dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. No. 30.) On May 7, 2024, both Cedarville Defendants and Knight

Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 34, 35.) Plaintiffs responded with

an Omnibus Response in Opposition to all three Motions. (Doc. No. 42.) At a hearing held on

October 25, 2024, Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to clarify

the identities of the numerous parties involved in this case. On November 1, 2024 Plaintiffs filed

the Amended Complaint, which is now the operative Complaint in this case (Doc. No. 50).

V. THE MOTION TO STAY THIS CASE

On May 7, 2024, Township Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in this case

pending disposition of the ten (10) state cases. The stay was requested based on the following

factors: (1) comity with other courts, (2) judicial economy, (3) potential prejudice to the parties,

(4) public policy, and (5) the Younger abstention doctrine. 7 (See Doc. No. 33-1 at 5–10.)

Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition asserting that: (1) the Younger abstention doctrine

does not apply and (2) because the federal case and the state cases are not parallel, no stay is

warranted under any other theory. (See Doc. No. 39 at 13–20.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the

cases are not parallel because: (1) there are 25 parties in the federal action, only five of whom

overlap with the state court proceedings;8 (2) the state claims mostly seek declaratory relief as to

the validity and application of land use ordinances while the federal claims are mostly for monetary

relief arising from alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Equal Protection and

Substantive Due Process Clauses to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

7 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and the abstention doctrine for which it stands, will be

discussed at length below. Abstention has been extended to include not just outright dismissals,

but also stays. “[C]ourts may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles.”

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).

8 The five parties that overlap are the following: RP Wynstone, RPE, Provident Trust Group,

LLC, the Township, and the Sewer Authority.

(See Doc. No. 39 at 17–19.) On October 25, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Stay

Proceedings (Doc. No. 33), which is now ripe for disposition.

VI. RELEVANT LAW

A. Factors Pertinent to Whether a Stay Is Appropriate

Defendants rely on two theories in support of their request that this case be stayed. First,

they argue that a court has the inherent discretion to stay a case. A federal court’s power to stay a

case pending the outcome of related proceedings is discretionary, and it is “incidental to the power

inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time

and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise

of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis v. N.

Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936).

One concern is that a federal case should not interfere with a state case. For there to be

federal interference, plaintiffs must “seek relief in federal courts which will impair the ability of

the state courts to adjudicate anything that is currently before them or where federal relief would

render the state court’s orders or judgments nugatory.” Rappaport v. Norlar, Inc., No. 93–4756,

1994 WL 167959, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1994) (internal citations omitted). Courts in this district

have “reviewed factors which should be considered before invoking a federal district court’s

inherent power to stay proceedings in a case which is also the subject of litigation in a state court.”

Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1392, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The factors are

the following:

1. identity of the parties and of the issues in both actions,

2. considerations of comity,

3. promotion of judicial efficiency,

4. adequacy and extent of relief available in the alternative forum,

5. likelihood of prompt disposition in the alternative forum,

6. convenience of the parties, counsel, and witnesses, and

7. possible prejudice to a party as a result of the stay.

Id. (citing Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (E.D.Pa.1974)).

B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine

Second, federal courts must generally exercise their jurisdiction. See Quackenbush v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). But there are limited exceptions, which include the

abstention doctrine outlined in Younger v. Harris, in which the United States Supreme Court

stressed the importance of “permit[ting] state courts to try state cases free from interference by

federal courts.”9 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).

In applying the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should dismiss complaints that

involve (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) which implicates important state interests,

and (3) offers an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise the same constitutional

challenges presented in the federal action. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54) [hereinafter the “Middlesex

test”]. Younger principles also apply to declaratory relief. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72

(1971). And while most circuits have held that Younger can apply to monetary relief, the Third

Circuit has held that abstention is appropriate only when a ruling on damages would necessarily

9 John Harris, Jr., the defendant in Younger, was indicted for violating a California statute

because he distributed leaflets condemning the killing of Leonard Deadwiler, a black man shot

by police while driving his pregnant wife to the hospital. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15,

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). While his prosecution was ongoing, Harris sued Evelle

J. Younger, California’s district attorney, to enjoin the enforcement of the statute on grounds

that it violated his right to free speech under the United States Constitution. A California

federal court ruled in his favor. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 508, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968),

rev’d, 401 U.S. 37, 91 (1971). This ruling was eventually reversed by the United States

Supreme Court. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 55. The Supreme Court held that because a decision

of the federal court in the civil case would interfere with the criminal prosecution of Harris,

abstention was appropriate there. See id. at 54.

call into question the validity of a state conviction.10 Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144 (3d

Cir. 1988).

Although Younger concerned the need for a federal court to abstain where hearing a case

would interfere with a criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court “has extended the doctrine to

particular state civil proceedings . . . that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and

judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 69–70 (internal citations

omitted). “[F]ederal courts must refrain from interfering with three types of state proceedings: (1)

‘state criminal prosecutions,’ (2) ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ and (3) ‘civil proceedings

involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their

judicial functions.” Altice USA, Inc. v. New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 26 F.4th 571, 576 (3d

Cir. 2022) (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78). In other words, Younger abstention applies where a

federal court is asked to consider relief that would interfere with state court proceedings.

Whether the federal case would interfere with state court proceedings is discussed by many

circuit courts as the threshold question when Younger abstention is sought. See e.g.,

Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2012). The doctrine also

applies when requested relief would indirectly interfere with state proceedings. See e.g., Bice v.

Louisiana Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2012). While the Third Circuit has not

expressly referred to interference as a threshold question, it has held that a district court erred when

applying the Middlesex test “without actually considering whether the federal action would

10 See e.g., Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2007) (Section 1983 damage award based

on successful due process argument would have same practical effect on state proceeding as

declaratory judgment based on same constitutional claim); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d

1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief

when judgment for plaintiff would have preclusive effects on pending state-court proceeding).

interfere with the ongoing state proceedings.” Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp.,

970 F.2d 1195, 1203 (3d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r New

Jersey Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, whether the federal

case would interfere with the state case(s) is a threshold question in this case, where a stay is being

sought under Younger abstention principles.

VII. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the stay was requested pursuant to the interests of: (1) comity with other

courts, (2) judicial economy, (3) potential prejudice to the parties, (4) public policy, and (5) the

Younger abstention doctrine, which prioritizes the need for state courts to try state cases free from

interference by federal courts.

A. Factors Pertinent to Whether a Stay Is Appropriate

Weigh Against Abstention in This Case

A review of the factors most relevant to whether a stay pending the outcome of related state

proceedings is appropriate reveals that such a stay is not warranted here. Of the factors outlined

in Chintala, Defendants point to considerations of comity, judicial efficiency, and potential

prejudice to parties as support for their Motion to Stay. (See Doc. No. 33-1 at 5–10.) The other,

and perhaps most important, consideration is whether the cases are parallel, which speaks to the

identity of parties and issues. Despite factual overlap, this case is not parallel to prior state cases,

and therefore this Court need not abstain in the interest of comity, judicial efficiency, or prejudice.

1. While Many Facts in the Prior State Cases Overlap

With This Case, They Merely Provide Background Information,

Not Total Identity of Parties and Issues

While it is true that the facts in the state cases provide necessary background with which

to understand and appreciate the claims in the instant case, there are differences between this case

and the state cases. The similar background facts are set forth in the Amended Complaint. (Doc.

No. 50.) The overlapping facts, however, do not lead the Court to conclude that the cases are

parallel because the Amended Complaint in this case alleges that (1) Defendants’ conduct was

“extreme and outrageous” and guided by racial animus and (2) Defendants conspired, acting under

color of state law, to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to use their land, causing

significant damages for which they seek monetary and injunctive relief. (See id. at ¶¶ 5, 319–350.)

The Third Circuit has held that factual overlap between the state and federal cases does not

necessarily warrant abstention because the plaintiff in the federal proceeding did not seek to

“enjoin any state proceedings, nor . . . challenge the legality of any township or municipal

ordinance.” See e.g., Gwynedd, 970 F.2d at 1201.

And as the Third Circuit noted in Yang v. Tsui, “parallel cases involve the same parties

and ‘substantially identical’ claims, raising ‘nearly identical allegations and issues.’” 416 F.3d

199, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Timoney v. Upper Merion Twp., 66 F. App’x 403, 405 (3d Cir.

2003)). Here, the differences among the parties and the issues in this case, and the parties and the

issues in the state cases are many. To start, the parties in the cases filed in both jurisdictions are

not entirely the same.

• Plaintiffs in this case are RP Wynstone, RPE and Provident. Plaintiffs in the state

cases are as follows:

o RP Wynstone is a plaintiff in eight (8) state cases;

o RPE is a plaintiff in three (3) state cases; and

o Provident is a plaintiff in one (1) state case.

o But none of the “related entities” for each Plaintiff named in this case, listed

above, are not named in any state cases.

• Defendants in this case do not totally overlap with Defendants in the state cases.

For example:

o The Township is a defendant in eight (8) state cases;

o The Board is a defendant in two (2) state cases;

o The Sewer Authority is a defendant in two (2) state cases;

o But none of the individual Board members, Cedarville Defendants or

Knight Defendants are named in any state cases.

Thus, in this case, there are only five (5) parties that overlap: RP Wynstone, RPE,

Provident, LLC, the Township, and the Sewer Authority, leaving 21 parties that do not overlap.

Further, the state cases are progressing at various stages, some having survived motions to dismiss

and motions for peremptory judgment, and some are still in discovery. (See Doc. No. 48.)

In a motion to dismiss based on abstention principles, including the Younger abstention

doctrine, a court in the Middle District denied the motion because there was no identity of parties.

“Because the state and federal lawsuits include different parties, as well as identical parties in

different procedural postures, the Court finds that the cases are not parallel.” Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n v. Corbett, 25 F. Supp. 3d 557, 572 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Here, there is no identity of

parties. Moreover, as noted above, the relief sought and the underlying issues in pursuit of that

relief differ from the cases filed in the two jurisdictions. Therefore, a stay based on abstention

principles concerning identity of parties and issues is not warranted.

2. The Court Need Not Stay the Case in the Interest of Comity

Defendants assert that “principles of comity support a stay of these proceedings” because

“allowing both cases to proceed on parallel tracks could result in conflicting decisions.” (Doc. No.

33-1 at 6–7.) By way of example, Defendants offer that “[a] decision by this Court regarding

Plaintiffs’ civil rights could easily be at odds with a decision from the state court finding that the

Township’s decisions were founded on good cause and valid state law.” Id.

But as Plaintiffs’ note in their reply, because “this proceeding does not involve

substantially similar parties or issues,” the Court need not abstain on the basis of comity. In this

regard, Plaintiffs have a strong argument:

This action asserts violations of federal constitutional substantive rights based on

the conduct of not only the Township and the Township Authority—which are

defendants in the state court actions—but also against the Board of Supervisors of

the Township, the Individual Township Defendants, the Knight Defendants and the

Cedarville Defendants—none of which are parties in the state court actions. The

pending state court actions do not involve claims related to Defendants’ concerted

effort to discriminate against and prevent land development plans that include

medium to high density housing.

Thus, the principles of comity do not support a stay here.

3. The Court Need Not Stay the Case in the Interest of Judicial Efficiency

Because the State Cases Are Not Parallel to This Case

Because certain parties and the issues in this case are not the same as the parties and issues

in the state cases, the Court need not stay this case in the interest of judicial efficiency. Defendants

allege that because there has already been discovery in the state cases, the time, effort and money

spent on new discovery in this case places an undue burden on the parties and the Court. (See

Doc. No. 33-1 at 5.) However, for that to be true, essentially the same parties would need to be

litigating essentially the same issues, which speaks to “the identity of the parties and of the issues

in both actions,” another pertinent factor identified in Chintala. Courts have used the term

“parallel” to describe this requirement. District courts “act within [their] bounds in staying []

action[s] for declaratory relief where parallel proceedings, presenting opportunity for ventilation

of the same state law issues, [are] underway in state court.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.

277, 290 (1995). The Third Circuit has held that “[p]arallel cases involve the same parties and

substantially identical claims, raising nearly identical allegations and issues.” 11 Yang, 416 F.3d

199 at 205, n. 5.

Defendants assume, without any support, that the state cases are parallel to the present

federal case. (See Doc. No. 33-1 at 5, 6.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the cases are not

parallel because: (1) not all the parties are the same, with 21 parties in the federal case not being

parties in the state cases; (2) the claims are not the same, as most of the state cases seek declaratory

relief as to the validity and application of land use ordinances while the federal claims are mostly

for monetary relief arising from alleged constitutional and civil rights violations. Thus, again,

because the parties and the issues in this case are not entirely the same as the parties and issues in

the state cases, with parallelism absent, the Court need not stay this case in the interest of judicial

efficiency.

4. The Court Need Not Stay the Case to Avoid Alleged

Prejudice to the Party Opposing the Stay

Defendants aver that because “Plaintiffs filed the state court land use appeals and related

lawsuits prior to the commencement of this action, Plaintiffs cannot claim prejudice from a stay

pending the disposition of those appeals.” (Doc. No. 33 at 2.) In other words, Defendants allege

that a stay would not prejudice Plaintiffs in the sense that putting the claims in this case on hold

would not time-bar them from the relief in state court because the state court proceedings are

already underway. (See Doc. No. 33-1 at 7.) Defendants further allege that if the case is stayed,

“Plaintiffs will avoid the costs associated with discovery that may likely prove to be unnecessary.”

11 Although Wilton and Yang involved another abstention doctrine, based on Colorado River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the requirement that the state

and federal cases be parallel has carried into cases weighing whether Younger abstention is

appropriate. Considering Younger abstention in another case, the Supreme Court noted, “[i]n

Younger [the Supreme Court] recognized an exception to [the obligation for federal courts to

exercise their jurisdiction] for cases in which there is a parallel [state proceeding].” Sprint,

571 U.S. at 69–70.

(Id.) However, while it is true that a stay would not prejudice Plaintiffs in terms of time-barring

their state claims, when the parties and the issues are different, additional discovery is often

necessary to get to the heart of the new claims that affect the new parties in the new case.

Therefore, the Court need not stay this case to avoid potential prejudice.

B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply Here

As noted earlier, the Younger abstention doctrine may apply where the federal case would

interfere with the state case(s) and where the Middlesex test is met. The elements of the Middlesex

test are that the federal complaint involves (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) which

implicates important state interests, and (3) offers an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings

to raise the same constitutional challenges presented in the federal action. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at

432 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54 (1971)).

1. This Case Will Not Interfere With the State Cases,

Which Is a Threshold Issue for the Court to Consider

in Determining Whether Younger Abstention Applies Here

As noted above, “federal courts must refrain from interfering with three types of state

proceedings: (1) ‘state criminal prosecutions,’ (2) ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ and (3) ‘civil

proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to

perform their judicial functions.” Altice 26 F.4th at 576 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78). And

interference with ongoing state proceedings is a threshold issue for district courts in deciding

whether to stay a case based on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Gwynedd, 970 F.2d at 1203.

Here, first, there are no state criminal prosecutions. Second, while some of the state cases seek

to enforce certain state ordinances and procedures, the only injunctive relief requested is for the

Court to enjoin Defendants from continuing the alleged discriminatory practices. But the issue of

whether Plaintiffs are entitled to this injunctive relief is premature. Plaintiffs are not seeking any

preliminary injunctive relief in this case. After trial, if liability on the part of Defendants were

found, equitable principles may warrant relief. However, at this point, there is no proven

discriminatory practice to enjoin. Therefore, at this time, there is no likelihood of federal

interference with the state cases.

Since Plaintiffs here are mostly seeking money damages, they are not currently seeking

relief in this Court that “will impair the ability of the state courts to adjudicate anything that is

currently before them or where federal relief would render the state court’s orders or judgments

nugatory.” Rappaport, 1994 WL 167959, at *9 (internal citations omitted). The federal case—

rather than seeking to impede the pending civil enforcement proceedings concerning the validity

and enforcement of land use ordinances and the application review process for developers—

involves alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ civil and constitutional rights, for which remedies at law

are available. Because there is no likelihood of interference at this point, the threshold issue of

federal interference is not met, and the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply here.

2. Although the Ongoing State Cases Implicate State Interests,

a Stay Is Not Warranted Because the State Cases

Do Not Address the Alleged Constitutional Violations

Next, the Court will also address the Middlesex factors, one of which covers whether the

state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to raise the same constitutional challenges

presented in the federal action. There is no dispute that there are several ongoing state proceedings,

which satisfies the first element of the Middlesex test. And issues involving zoning and land use

in the state cases are important state interests, which satisfies the second element. See Addiction

Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 409 (3rd Cir. 2005), abrogated on other

grounds by Sprint, 571 U.S. 69 (“[Z]oning and land use issues are of traditional significance to

states.”) The state proceedings do not, however, involve the same constitutional challenges

presented in the federal action. Therefore, the third prong of the Middlesex test, that the “state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional” challenges presented in the

federal action, is not met. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 424.

3. This Case Involves Allegations of Constitutional and Civil Rights

Violations Not Claimed in Any of the State Cases

The dispute in this case involves allegations of federal civil rights and constitutional

violations against alleged co-conspirators Township, Sewer Authority, Board, Individual

Township Defendants, Knight Defendants and Cedarville Defendants, based on a course of

conduct over a period of years. (Doc. No. 39 at 17.) In the state cases, Plaintiffs ask the courts for

declaratory and injunctive relief as to the validity or applicability of state ordinances. In this case,

the allegations involve violations of federal constitutional rights. None of the state claims allege

that any Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate any of Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional

rights.

In one state case, there is a claim that comes close to paralleling a federal claim. In that

state case, there is an allegation that the facts “set forth a course of conduct by New Hanover

Township, first collaborative, but then, following changes in elected officials and professional

consultants, demonstrating bad faith and a denial of due process under the law in an effort to

impede and prevent the proposed development.” (Doc. 48-8 at 3; Case No. 2021-24529, Notice

of Appeal.) However, because there is no allegation in the state cases that the conduct was

extreme, outrageous, or motivated by racial animus, the case is not parallel to the federal case.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, because the Court finds neither parallelism nor interference—

threshold issues that must be met in order for a district court to stay a case based on the Younger

abstention doctrine—the Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 33) will be denied. An appropriate

Order follows.