Siddiqui v. Keating

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RAZA SIDDIQUI,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24 CV 564

PATRICK KEATING, CHARLIE BRAICO, Judge Manish S. Shah

NABET-CWA, and COMMUNICATIONS

WORKERS OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Raza Siddiqui was elected president of his local union in 2022. Shortly

after, defendant NABET-CWA placed the local under trusteeship on the petition of

defendant Patrick Keating, another union member and Siddiqui’s political opponent.

Siddiqui successfully challenged the trusteeship, and he was reinstated as the local

president in August 2023. Less than two months later, Keating petitioned defendant

Communications Workers of America to place the local under a second trusteeship.

The CWA executive board, including defendant Charlie Braico, unanimously voted in

favor of a trusteeship. Siddiqui challenges the propriety of the second trusteeship and

seeks damages stemming from both trusteeships under Title I and Title III of the

Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. He also brings claims of tortious

interference and civil conspiracy against Braico and Keating. Defendants move to

dismiss Siddiqui’s claims.

I. Legal Standard

When reviewing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

a court accepts all well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences

in favor of the plaintiff. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 881 (7th Cir.

2022). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead ‘only enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

II. Facts

Plaintiff Raza Siddiqui was elected president of his local union, NABET-CWA

Local 54041, in March 2022. [1] ¶¶ 1, 14.1 Siddiqui was part of a slate that opposed

the existing leadership, including defendant Patrick Keating and defendant Charlie

Braico, called Team Solidarity. [1] ¶¶ 15–17. Braico, along with other past local

presidents, endorsed Keating, who ran for treasurer, and campaigned against

Siddiqui. [1] ¶¶ 16–17. Siddiqui and his slate defeated the Team Solidarity slate. [1]

¶ 17.

The defendants and their allies refused to accept the outcome of the election

and waged a campaign to oust Siddiqui. [1] ¶¶ 3, 18. Keating and others in the old

guard obstructed Siddiqui’s transition to power. [1] ¶ 43. Keating tried to extort

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. When a document has

numbered paragraphs, I cite to the paragraph, for example [1] ¶ 1. The facts are taken from

Siddiqui’s complaint, [1]. The parties attach evidence outside of the pleadings to their briefs.

I do not consider this evidence here. See Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 2018)

(“Generally, a district court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings to decide a motion

to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment.”)

conditions from Siddiqui as part of the transition for his own personal benefit. [1]

¶ 44. For example, Keating tried to keep a paid position within the local, to pick who

could hold certain roles, and to fix the line of pre-ordained succession on the

bargaining committee and as grievance chair. [1] ¶ 46. Keating tried to extract

promises that Siddiqui would not run or support another candidate in upcoming

NABET-CWA elections, in which Keating was planning to run. [1] ¶ 47.

When defendant Communications Workers of America sought to audit the local

under Siddiqui, the local’s lawyer documented the extent of the obstructionism faced

by Siddiqui’s administration. [1] ¶ 49. Keating refused to give access to the local’s

accounts, and the local’s prior attorney and defendant NABET-CWA refused to assist.

[1] ¶ 50. The local’s former president, who had been Keating’s running mate, kept a

laptop belonging to the local and when he returned it, the hard drive had been wiped,

making the data likely unretrievable. [1] ¶¶ 51–53. It took two months for Siddiqui

to gain access to important accounts because of this interference. [1] ¶ 50.

Upon a petition signed by Keating and others, NABET-CWA, led by Braico,

placed the local into a trusteeship in September 2022. [1] ¶ 54. Keating and a former

administrator were brought back to run the local. [1] ¶ 55. During the trusteeship,

changes were made to the local’s membership database, some of which were contrary

to past practice under the local’s constitution and bylaws. [1] ¶¶ 56–57. These

changes affected the eligibility of members to vote—Siddiqui believes that these

changes were made to gerrymander future elections by removing members supportive

of Siddiqui from the voter rolls and adding members favorable to the Team Solidarity

slate. [1] ¶¶ 56, 58.

Siddiqui and other union members brought a lawsuit against NABET-CWA

and Braico, in his official capacity, to challenge the trusteeship under Title III of the

LMRDA. 22-cv-5732, [9]. In December 2022, a federal court entered a temporary

restraining order dissolving the trusteeship, on the basis that it was imposed in bad

faith. 22-cv-5732, [40]. The court dissolved the trusteeship by a permanent injunction

on August 30, 2023. 22-cv-5732, [80].

The pattern of intentional actions to undermine Siddiqui’s ability to govern the

local continued after the termination of the first trusteeship. [1] ¶¶ 61–62. Upon

Siddiqui’s reinstatement, the administrator returned the local’s laptop with deleted

and corrupted files and data. [1] ¶ 60. Keating, Braico, and their allies waged a non-

stop campaign of charges and appeals against Siddiqui and sought to disqualify him

from office by any means. [1] ¶ 63. They also used NABET-CWA’s procedural

mechanisms to stop Siddiqui from implementing his leadership and to override the

actions of the local’s executive board when they were against Keating and Braico’s

interests. [1] ¶ 64.

Less than two months after the dissolution of the first trusteeship, Keating

petitioned the CWA to place the local under trusteeship. [1] ¶ 25. Keating said that a

second trusteeship was necessary because the local posted a net lost of $162,753.45

for the period March 2023–September 2023. [1] ¶ 27. The expenditures causing that

loss were due to a historic number of contract negotiations and were taken while the

first trusteeship was preliminarily enjoined. [1] ¶ 28. Running a deficit in a year that

has multiple contract negotiations is not uncommon for a labor union. [1] ¶ 29. Other

CWA locals have run similar deficits without being trusteed. Id. The deficit was also

caused by costs related to defendants’ own conduct bringing and maintaining an

unlawful trusteeship. [1] ¶ 31.

Keating’s petition also said that the local had inappropriately approved to pay

Siddiqui’s legal fees from the first lawsuit. [1] ¶ 32. Siddiqui alleges this act was

legitimate—the board’s decision was by majority vote, without Siddiqui’s

participation, and in furtherance of the local’s welfare as the lawsuit provided a

common benefit to all the local’s members by restoring its democratic leadership. [1]

¶¶ 32–33. At the time of this decision, a petition remained pending in the lawsuit

over the first trusteeship for the full amount of fees, with the expectation that those

fees would be reimbursed to the local. [1] ¶ 34.

Keating also said that the local failed to complete audit reviews when its

treasurers resigned in April 2022 and December 2022. [1] ¶ 35. Keating complained

that the local’s treasurer ran a QuickBooks report instead of including the required

itemized list of expenditures. [1] ¶ 36.

The CWA executive board approved Keating’s trusteeship petition one week

after receipt. [1] ¶ 39. The CWA imposed the trusteeship by unanimous vote without

any written reasoning or a prior hearing, so it is unclear what weight or importance

the CWA gave to any of Keating’s complaints. [1] ¶ 38. Siddiqui objected to the

trusteeship and a hearing was held beginning January 23, 2024. [1] ¶¶ 40–41.

Defendants also attempted to paper over the trusteeship by holding new elections

and disqualifying Siddiqui from running in those elections. [1] ¶ 67.

III. Analysis

A. Title III Claim

Siddiqui challenges the second trusteeship as unlawful under Title III of the

LMRDA. “Congress passed the LMRDA out of concern with widespread abuses of

power by union leadership.” Vought v. Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, 558

F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982)). The

Act’s primary objective is to “ensur[e] that unions [are] democratically governed and

responsive to the will of their memberships.” Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 436.

Title III provides that a labor organization can establish and administer a

trusteeship “over a subordinate body” only in certain, enumerated circumstances,

such as to “correct[ ] corruption or financial malpractice.” 29 U.S.C. § 462. A properly

imposed trusteeship “shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from

the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during such period

except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established or

maintained in good faith.” 29 U.S.C. § 464(c).

A trusteeship is invalid when it was not established or administered in

accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the union; or when it was not

established or administered for one of the enumerated statutory purposes. Boardman

v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 89 F.4th 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.

2564 (2024). A claim that a trusteeship was retaliatory fails if there was at least one

valid statutory purpose for imposing the trusteeship, even if the union which imposed

the trusteeship also had an impermissible motive. Id. (citing Serafinn v. Local 722,

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A mixed-motive theory of

liability is never proper in a suit brought under the [Act].”)).

Siddiqui alleges that the CWA imposed and maintained the trusteeship in bad

faith and for an improper purpose—to oust Siddiqui and end his political career

within the CWA and to preserve the power of Keating and Braico’s political machine.

[1] ¶ 76. He alleges that this was part of a retaliatory campaign against him for

political speech he made during his campaign for the local’s presidency. [1] ¶¶ 1, 18–

19, 72.

The CWA argues that Siddiqui has pled himself out of court because he alleges

that the CWA executive board had at least one permissible ground for establishing

the trusteeship—financial mismanagement. [20] at 13–14; see 29 U.S.C. § 462

(“financial malpractice” is a permissible purpose for imposing a trusteeship). Keating

supported his petition for trusteeship by citing to the local’s net loss for the period

March 2023–September 2023, the local’s approval of paying Siddiqui’s legal fees

associated with the first trusteeship, and the failure to properly audit the local’s

finances. [1] ¶¶ 26–27, 32, 35–36. Siddiqui alleges that it was “unclear what weight or

importance the CWA gave any of Keating’s complaints, because it imposed and

maintained a trusteeship by unanimous vote without any written reasoning or a prior

hearing.” [1] ¶ 38. The trusteeship notice to the Local, attached to the complaint,

stated that: “The CWA Executive Board took this action upon receipt of a petition

signed by 56 Local 54041 members . . . [which] set forth examples of gross financial

mismanagement and other violations of the Local By-Laws, Sector By-Laws, and the

CWA Constitution.” [1-6] at 1.

But also, according to the complaint, Keating’s reasons to seek the

trusteeship—financial mismanagement—were pretextual. For example, the net loss

was due to unprecedented numbers of contract negotiations, and it is common for

local unions to run deficits during periods with multiple negotiations. [1] ¶¶ 28–30.

Some of the deficit can be attributed to costs associated with the first trusteeship. [1]

¶ 31. As for the reimbursement of Siddiqui’s legal fees, Siddiqui alleges that this was

a legitimate decision of the local’s board. [1] ¶ 33. Siddiqui was not involved in the

local’s decision, and his challenge of the first trusteeship provided a common benefit

to all local members by restoring its democratic leadership. [1] ¶¶ 32–33. Siddiqui

alleges that Keating’s objection to the audits is illusory and that proper reports were

supplied. [1] ¶¶ 35–36.

Siddiqui also alleges that Braico and Keating both held retaliatory animus

against him. [1] ¶¶ 61–64, 72, 95–98. Braico and Keating allegedly waged a non-stop

campaign of charges and appeals against Siddiqui, seeking to disqualify him from

office by any means. [1] ¶¶ 63–67. But while Siddiqui alleges that Keating petitioned

and Braico voted for the trusteeship with retaliatory motives, he has not alleged facts

that support an inference that the CWA’s other executive board members also voted

for the trusteeship in bad faith. He does not allege that the other board members

knew that Keating’s allegations of financial mismanagement were pretextual, were

aware that Keating and Braico sought the trusteeship for retaliatory purposes, nor

harbored retaliatory intent themselves. Siddiqui argues that Braico, the current head

of NABET-CWA, inherently exercised power over the CWA board and that it is

reasonable to infer that he convinced other board members to retaliate against

Siddiqui. [28] at 3–4. But Siddiqui’s allegations do not support that Braico swayed

other members, affected their decision-making, or conspired with them to retaliate

against Siddiqui through imposing the trusteeship.

Out of eighteen board members, Siddiqui only alleges one had retaliatory

intent when voting on the second trusteeship. This is not enough to reasonably infer

that the trusteeship was imposed in bad faith. Siddiqui alleges that the CWA board

voted to impose the trusteeship based on Keating’s petition which laid out financial

mismanagement. Without any facts to support that the other seventeen board

members held retaliatory intent, it is reasonable to infer that these members took

Keating’s petition at face value and imposed a trusteeship to correct financial

mismanagement. Siddiqui does not argue that a trusteeship imposed to correct

financial mismanagement violates the local’s constitution or bylaws. See [28] at 10–

12. Even where improper motives may be present, “one proper purpose suffices to

uphold the trusteeship.” Boardman, 89 F.4th at 602. Siddiqui’s Title III claim is

dismissed without prejudice.2

B. Title I Claims

Title I of the LMRDA “provides union members with an exhaustive ‘Bill of

Rights’ enforceable in federal court.” Loc. No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving,

2 See Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015).

Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526,

536 (1984). “Title I is designed to guarantee every union member . . . freedom from

unreasonable restrictions on speech and assembly, and protection from improper

discipline.” Id. at 536–37; see also Vought, 558 F.3d at 621.

Siddiqui alleges that defendants twice placed the local in trusteeship and

terminated his elected position as the president in retaliation for opposing Braico and

Keating’s slate. [1] ¶¶ 3, 18–21, 25, 39. He seeks damages for removal from office

under Title I related to both trusteeships. [1] ¶¶ 69–73. Section 101(a)(2) of LMRDA

provides:

Every member of any labor right organization shall have the right

to . . . express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at

meetings of the labor organization his views . . . upon candidates in an

election of the labor organization . . . subject to the organization’s

established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). To succeed under Title I, Siddiqui “must establish: (1) he

engaged in protected expression; (2) he was subjected to an adverse action reasonably

likely to deter future expression; and (3) that action was caused by the protected

expression.” Marshall v. Loc. 701 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 387 F.App’x 623, 627–

28 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l. Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354

(1989)).

When a violation of rights protected by Title I is alleged to have resulted from

the establishment of a trusteeship, a plaintiff must first adequately plead that the

trusteeship was unlawfully established. See Boardman, 89 F.4th at 602 (“And

because Boardman’s Title I claims rest on the assertion that the trusteeship was

invalid, her remaining claims fail as well.”). As discussed above, Siddiqui has failed

to allege that the trusteeship was improperly imposed or imposed in retaliation for

Siddiqui’s protected activities. Because Siddiqui’s Title I claims derive from the

assertion that the second trusteeship was improper, and he has not stated a claim

under Title III, his Title I claim fails. Siddiqui’s Title I claims based on the second

trusteeship are dismissed without prejudice.

Siddiqui also brings Title I claims based on the first trusteeship against

NABET-CWA and Braico.3 Defendants argue that claim preclusion bars Siddiqui’s

claims against them. [14] at 10. In federal court, claim preclusion has “three

elements: (1) an identity of parties; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) an

identity of the cause of action (as determined by comparing the suits’ operative facts).”

Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). When it applies, the

doctrine prevents relitigating claims already litigated and claims that could have

been litigated but were not. Id. Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense and best

addressed on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Walczak v. Chicago

Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014). But when the complaint and

judicially noticed record establish the facts to prove preclusion, dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id.; Berry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 865 F.3d 880, 882–83

(7th Cir. 2017) (upholding Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on preclusion because “the

district court [had] everything it needed in order to be able to rule on the defense.”).

3 Siddiqui’s complaint is unclear whether he brings his Title I claim against the CWA based

on the first trusteeship. According to his allegations, the first trusteeship was imposed by

NABET-CWA, and he does not allege any facts the create a plausible inference that CWA

was involved in the first trusteeship. See [1] ¶¶ 5, 19. Nor did Siddiqui name the CWA as a

party in the first litigation. See 22-cv-5732, [9], [9-1]. To the extent that Siddiqui’s Title I

claim against the CWA is based on the first trusteeship, it is dismissed without prejudice.

Siddiqui does not contest that there was a final judgment on the merits in the

previous case nor that the suits’ operative facts overlap, instead he argues that the

identity of parties is not present. See [29] at 6–8. NABET-CWA and Braico, in his

capacity as Sector President of NABET-CWA, were both named in the prior lawsuit.

22-cv-5732, [9]. Siddiqui asserts that he brought his prior Title III claim “in a

derivative capacity on behalf of the Local.” [29] at 6–7. There is no cause of action for

individual damages under Title III, and “[a]ny right of action pursuant to [Title III]

belongs to the subordinate union, and while a union member may sue to enforce the

act’s provisions, such suits should be limited to relief on behalf of the union.” Gesink

v. Grand Lodge, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214, 216

(10th Cir. 1987). According to Siddiqui, this means that Title III claims are not

brought in an individual capacity, but in a representative capacity on behalf of the

local. [29] at 6–7. Here, Siddiqui brings his Title I claim as an individual, and

therefore, so the argument goes, he is present in a different legal capacity and is a

different party than he was in the earlier case. [29] at 7–8.

Siddiqui offers no case law to support that a union member bringing a Title III

claim does not do so in their individual capacity. Even if he is correct, Siddiqui did

appear in his individual capacity in the first lawsuit. Siddiqui sought to recover

personal damages for himself in the first lawsuit, which are not available under Title

III. 22-cv-5732, [9] at 23 (seeking reinstatement with full back pay, seniority, and

benefits lost due to his removal from office); Ross v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l

Union, 266 F.3d 236, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding individual relief cannot be sought

under Title III); Scott-Anderman v. Martinez, 60 F.4th 680, 683 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2023)

(“The reinstatement of a union officer is not available relief under Title III.”). Even if

Siddiqui brought his Title III claim in a representative capacity, he sought individual

damages against NABET-CWA and Braico in his individual capacity. Here, he is the

same plaintiff seeking individual relief from the same defendants again.

Siddiqui’s claim for individual damages in the first lawsuit and his Title I claim

here arise out of the same set of facts. Siddiqui could have brought a Title I claim for

damages resulting from the first trusteeship against NABET-CWA and Braico in the

first lawsuit. But he did not. Claim preclusion “bars not only those issues which were

actually decided in a prior suit, but also all issues which could have been raised in

that action.” Kratville v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 195, 197–98 (7th Cir. 1996). Siddiqui’s Title

I claims based on the first trusteeship are dismissed with prejudice.4

C. State Law Claims

Siddiqui brings state law claims against Keating and Braico in their individual

capacities for tortious interference with prospective economic gain and civil

conspiracy. [1] ¶¶ 77–99. The basis for jurisdiction over these claims is supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). [1] ¶ 13. Section 1367(c) provides that “courts

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)

if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When all federal claims are dismissed before

4 Because Siddiqui’s Title I claims based on the first trusteeship are precluded, amendment

would be futile.

trial, especially at early stages, federal courts generally relinquish jurisdiction over

any remaining supplemental state law claims. Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622,

631 (7th Cir. 2016); see Phillips v. Baxter, 768 F.App’x 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2019) (“As

to the state-law claims, after dismissing [plaintiffs] federal claims at such an early

stage of litigation, the district court should have followed the presumption of

relinquishing jurisdiction over them.”).

Siddiqui’s tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims are dismissed

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, [13], [15], [19], are granted. Plaintiffs Title III

claim, Title I claims based on the second trusteeship, and state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs Title I claims based on the first trusteeship

are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint by

January 21, 2025. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the dismissal of the

federal claims without prejudice will convert to a dismissal with prejudice and the

clerk will enter a final judgment terminating the case. If plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the parties shall file a joint status report by January 28, 2025, proposing

a schedule for responsive pleadings and discovery.

ENTER:

fs. © Ade

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: December 23, 2024

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